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ABSTRACT	
	
The	practice	 of	medicine	has	 long	been	 supported	by	 information	 technology.		
Computer	systems	allow	doctors	to	record,	process	and	review	vast	quantities	of	
data	and	help	to	raise	standards	in	the	delivery	of	health	care	services.	
Portable	 medical	 monitoring	 systems	 are	 already	 available	 in	 hospitals,	 for	
diagnostic/sports	medicine	applications,	or	for	monitoring	workers	in	hazardous	
environments.	 	 There	 is	 ongoing	 academic	 and	 commercial	 research	 into	
wearable	 bio‐monitoring	 systems.	 	 The	 capabilities	 of	 wearable	 networks	 of	
sensors	 that	 monitor	 patients	 and	 deliver	 appropriate	 and	 timely	 medical	
information	are	continually	being	enhanced.	
Recent	 research	 has	 focussed	 on	 the	 use	 of	 mobile	 technologies	 for	 bio‐
monitoring.	 	 Devices	 such	 as	 smartphones	 have	 been	 proposed	 to	 manage	
sensors	 and	 transmit	 data	 to	 the	 doctor.	 	 Such	 systems	 are	 typically	 body‐
portable	–powered	from	local	batteries	and	using	smartphones,	they	do	not	have	
any	physical	connection	to	communications.			
Using	such	a	portable	bio‐monitoring	system,	patients	might	be	monitored	in	the	
home	or	at	any	other	remote	location.		However,	current	research	seems	to	rely	
on	 the	 availability	 of	 mobile	 Internet	 to	 communicate	 between	 the	 wearable	
monitor	 and	a	base	 station.	 	While	mobile	 Internet	may	be	pervasive	 in	 some	
developed	countries	it	raises	several	concerns	in	many	areas	of	the	world.	
In	Australia,	 for	 example,	where	 blanket	 geographic	mobile	 Internet	 coverage	
does	not	exist,	or	in	places	where	infrastructure	is	less	developed,	mobile	Internet	
may	not	be	a	pervasive	carrier.		While	the	dependence	on	mobile	Internet	may	be	
implied,	 current	 research	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 identify	 lack	 of	 mobile	 Internet	
coverage	as	a	concern,	nor	does	 it	 identify	any	 fall‐back	position	when	mobile	
Internet	is	not	available.	 	We	contend	that	for	medical	monitoring,	redundancy	
and	fall	back	options	are	essential.						
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Research	 in	 the	 field	 typically	 assumes	 Internet	 communications	 are	 always	
available.		No	system	reviewed	appeared	to	be	agnostic	as	to	the	communication	
method	between	patient	and	doctor.		None	of	the	systems	we	reviewed	propose	
a	 multi‐carrier	 approach	 to	 allow	 transmission	 of	 monitoring	 data	 when	 the	
primary	carrier	is	unavailable.		Considering	that	even	in	a	country	like	Australia,	
mobile	coverage	can	be	patchy,	and	reception	can	switch	from	4G	to	3G	to	GSM	
to	limited	or	no	reception	in	the	space	of	a	few	kilometres	outside	of	capital	cities,	
we	assert	 that	 a	 system	 that	 assumes	a	 single	 “always	on”	 connection	using	a	
single	 type	 of	 carrier	 (Mobile	 Internet)	 may	 not	 be	 the	 most	 feasible	 in	 all	
circumstances.	
There	 is	 much	 focus	 on	 sensors	 and	 body	 area	 networks,	 as	 well	 as	
communications	between	those	sensors	and	a	control	module	worn	on	the	body.				
While	 such	 research	 is	 immensely	 valuable,	 it	 ignores	 part	 the	 end	 to	 end	
application	 topology	 and	 assumes	 that	 data	 communications	 and	 support	
infrastructure	exist.	 	Back‐to‐base	communications,	data	transmission	security,	
transmission	 robustness	 and	 data	 encryption	 or	 obfuscation	 all	 appear	 to	 be	
assumed.	 	 We	 contend	 that	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 requires	 a	 robust	
communications	infrastructure	to	link	the	monitor	to	the	physician,	especially	in	
a	healthcare	application.		While	single	carrier	solutions	may	assume	these	items	
are	provided	by	the	carrier,	if	we	want	redundancy,	we	cannot	depend	on	a	single	
communication	mechanism	and	so	our	solution	must	not	assume	the	presence	of	
specific	attributes	or	capabilities	provided	only	by	a	specific	carrier.			
In	addition,	 little	 consideration	 is	given	 to	 the	need	 to	 reconfigure	 the	 remote	
monitoring	system	in	the	field.		It	is	assumed	that	the	function	of	the	network	of	
sensors	 is	 never	modified.	 	 However,	 consider	 a	 system	 that	 polls	 its	 sensors	
every	minute	 –	 in	 the	 case	 of	 an	 adverse	 event,	 should	 the	 doctor	 be	 able	 to	
increase	this	sample	rate	for	diagnostic	purposes?	
In	this	thesis,	our	key	achievements	include	the	development	of	a	robust	carrier‐
agnostic	communications	protocol	as	the	foundation	for	bio‐monitoring	system	
communications.		We	demonstrate	how	bio‐monitoring	data	can	be	transmitted	
from	patient	to	doctor	reliably	with	no	dependence	on	the	features	of	a	specific	
communications	 method.	 	 We	 show	 how	 a	 monitoring	 system	 can	 be	
	
	 iv	 	
	
controlled/configured	remotely	using	an	extensible	configuration	format	while	
incorporating	sufficient	identification	features	to	allow	carrier	agnosticism.		We	
provide	facilities	to	transmit	patient	data	and	allow	the	doctor	to	modify	remote	
biomonitoring	 parameters	 to	 deal	 with	 an	 alarm	 condition	 or	 a	 change	 in	
monitoring	circumstances.	
We	also	highlight	features	required	to	implement	a	carrier‐agnostic	approach	to	
communications	between	 the	monitor	and	 the	doctor	and	discuss	 the	 impacts	
such	an	approach	has	on	transmission,	encoding	and	packaging	of	data.		We	also	
propose	a	methodology	to	allow	the	system	to	support	fail‐over	with	the	ability	
to	transmit	the	same	data	via	different	carriers	based	on	the	optimal	signal	path	
available	at	the	time	of	transmission.			
Our	 communications	 protocol	 possesses	 the	 attributes	 required	 to	 form	 the	
backbone	of	a	bio‐monitoring	system,	allowing	communication	to	occur	without	
reliance	 on	 any	 one	 underlying	 carrier.	 	 In	 reviewing	 the	 proposed	 solution	
against	existing	methods,	we	find	that	existing	methods	predominantly	rely	on	
(or	 assume)	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 single	 pervasive	 carrier,	 usually	 an	 Internet	
connection,	with	no	discussion	of	the	impact	when	that	carrier	is	not	available	to	
the	system.		Our	solution	improves	upon	currently	available	systems	by	providing	
a	comprehensive	set	of	data	transmission	and	control	capabilities	and	supporting	
robust	 communication	 by	 providing	 a	 fail‐over	 capability	 between	 multiple	
carriers	 to	 remove	 the	 reliance	 on	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 pervasive	 Internet	
connection.	
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1 . 	 INTRODUCTION	
This	chapter	is	an	introduction	to	the	thesis	and	is	organised	into	a	number	of	
sections.		In	Background,	the	underlying	factors	that	prompted	me	to	undertake	
this	work	are	discussed.	 	 In	Bio‐Monitoring	Systems,	we	examine	systems	and	
solutions	 that	 are	 used	 to	 capture	 and	 record	 data	 from	 a	 human	 body	 and	
evaluate	some	of	their	potential	uses.		In	Problem	Statement,	we	define	a	number	
of	potential	problem(s)	that	are	associated	with	current	research	in	the	field	and	
discuss	the	issues	that	we	will	consider	as	part	of	this	work.	 	In	Significance	of	
this	Work,	we	discuss	the	reasons	why	this	thesis	contributes	to	the	overall	body	
of	 knowledge	 relating	 to	 bio‐monitoring	 systems	 and	 solutions.	 	 Finally,	 in	
Structure	of	this	Thesis,	we	discuss	the	organisation	of	the	thesis	and	how	it	has	
been	constructed,	covering	an	overview	of	each	chapter	in	this	work.		
1.1	Background	
In	June	of	2006	my	wife	was	pregnant	with	our	first	child.		Early	in	the	duration	
of	 the	pregnancy,	we	discovered,	 in‐utero,	 that	 there	was	 a	 problem	with	 our	
baby.		A	congenital	heart	condition	had	been	diagnosed	and	this	diagnosis	meant	
that	 we	 experienced	 an	 extended	 period	 of	 concern,	 stress	 and	worry,	 as	we	
undertook	a	wealth	of	tests	to	attempt	to	discover	the	specific	problem	that	was	
wrong	with	our	unborn	baby.	
Over	the	course	of	around	six	weeks	of	testing,	my	wife	and	baby	were	subjected	
to	a	large	volume	of	tests.		We	saw	many	people	whose	titles	included	the	word	
‘specialist’.		At	the	end	of	the	tests,	our	baby	was	shown	to	be	a	female	on	the	basis	
of	genetic	testing,	and	our	yet	unborn	little	Rosie,	as	she	was	to	be	named,	was	
going	to	enter	the	world	with	a	condition	known	as	pulmonary	atresia.			
This	condition	occurs	in	less	than	one	in	10,000	newborns.		In	pulmonary	atresia,	
the	pulmonary	artery	which	supplies	blood	to	the	lungs	is	blocked	at	the	heart,	
and	as	a	result	 the	blood	that	needs	to	be	oxygenated	in	the	body	cannot	flow	
from	the	heart	into	the	lungs.		Prior	to	the	child’s	birth	the	condition	is	managed	
by	the	blood	flow	from	the	mother	through	the	placenta	and	umbilical	cord	(the	
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lungs	are	not	used	 in‐utero).	 	At	 the	point	of	birth,	 two	ducts	 still	 exist	 in	 the	
circulatory	system,	one	in	the	heart	called	the	foramen	ovale	and	another	between	
pulmonary	artery	 and	 aorta	which	 is	 called	 the	ductus	ateriosus.	 	These	ducts	
allow	 the	 blood	 from	 the	mother	 to	 flow	 around	 the	 body	with	 the	 ability	 to	
bypass	the	lungs.			
When	 the	 child	 is	born,	 the	ducts	 remain	open	 for	a	 few	days	and	slowly	 seal	
themselves	naturally	as	the	child	begins	to	breathe	and	use	the	proper	circulatory	
system.		While	it	may	appear	to	be	unintuitive,	while	the	ducts	are	open,	those	
same	ducts	that	allow	blood	to	bypass	the	lungs	in‐utero	also	allow	blood	flow	
into	the	 lungs	 for	a	 few	days	after	birth	 in	cases	where	a	child	has	pulmonary	
atresia.			
As	a	result	of	these	openings,	a	child	born	with	pulmonary	atresia	is	viable	for	the	
first	few	days.		However,	at	the	outside,	within	a	few	weeks	of	their	birth	if	the	
blockage	to	the	pulmonary	artery	is	not	opened	up	the	child	will	die	as	a	result	of	
the	inability	of	the	body	to	oxygenate	its	blood.			
Because	of	her	condition,	my	daughter	received	an	open‐heart	surgery	operation	
at	one	day	old.		Since	that	time,	she	has	required	two	other	open	heart	surgeries	
to	 treat	 the	 condition.	 	 She	 is	 now	 eight	 years	 old,	 and	 is	 happy,	 health	 and	
progressing	 through	 normal	 developmental	 goals	 well.	 	 Eventually	 she	 will	
require	additional	surgeries	to	replace	an	artificial	valve	which	was	inserted	into	
her	heart	at	13	months,	but	this	is	hopefully	not	until	she	is	into	her	teenage	years.	
While	my	daughter’s	condition	was	being	diagnosed	in‐utero,	it	became	apparent	
to	us	how	marvellous	and	advanced	the	field	of	diagnostic	medicine	actually	was.		
To	understand	this,	consider	that	for	the	doctors	to	determine	the	diagnosis	of	
our	child,	they	needed	to	scan	and	analyse	ultrasound	images	for	a	foetus’	heart	
that	was	no	bigger	than	a	pea	at	the	time	when	the	diagnosis	was	made	(figure	
1).		As	the	heart	grew	further	to	the	size	of	a	walnut	by	the	time	of	her	birth,	the	
specialist	diagnosticians	were	able	to	make	a	diagnosis,	determine	a	preferred	
course	of	action,	define	a	prognosis	for	my	daughter’s	condition	and	plan	for	the	
likely	course	of	treatment.			
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What	is	even	more	amazing	in	this	context	is	that	in	our	case,	the	specialists	were	
correct	in	every	element	of	their	diagnosis,	down	to	a	“to	the	day”	prediction	of	
the	time	when	the	birth	would	need	to	be	induced	to	endure	that	our	daughter	
had	 the	 best	 surgical	 chance	 of	 survival	 through	 the	 required	 surgical	
intervention.	
	
FIGURE	1:	A	SAMPLE	OF	DIAGNOSTIC	IMAGES	USED	TO	DIAGNOSE	MY	DAUGHTER	
	
With	all	the	apparent	magic	of	the	diagnostic	technologies,	once	my	daughter	had	
received	her	various	surgeries,	it	was	required	that	she	remain	an	inpatient	at	the	
hospital	in	order	that	she	could	be	monitored	to	ensure	her	systems	were	coping	
in	 the	 aftermath	 of	 surgery	 and	 that	 organs	 and	 circulatory	 system	 were	
functioning	as	required.		The	monitoring	of	my	daughter	post‐surgery	occurred	
in	intensive	care	and	then	on	the	cardiac	ward	at	the	Royal	Children’s	Hospital.		
For	a	time,	she	needed	reliable	cardiac	monitoring.		However,	there	came	a	point	
after	several	months	where,	when	her	progress	is	considered,	my	daughter	could	
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have	been	discharged	from	the	ward	and	received	monitoring	and	diagnostics	
checks	at	home.		Were	this	the	case,	it	could	have	made	a	bed	available	for	other	
patients	and	helped	to	reduce	the	cost	of	care.	
Doctors	and	specialists	made	much	use	of	 IT	based	systems	 to	assist	with	 the	
diagnosing	of	our	daughter’s	condition.		Analytical	and	diagnostic	devices	which	
possessed	the	ability	to	process	large	amounts	of	data	all	assisted	when	guiding	
our	specialists	to	the	correct	diagnosis	for	our	child.	 	This	then	helped	them	to	
make	a	determination	of	the	viability	of	a	foetus	which	was	less	than	10cm	long	
at	 the	 time	of	 the	diagnosis.	 	The	use	of	 IT	 in	 these	processes	highlighted	 the	
capabilities	of	IT	systems	in	the	process	of	saving	lives.		This	is	an	ongoing	area	
of	research	and	subject	to	significant	work	and	funding.	
However,	 in	 the	specific	area	of	bio‐monitoring	 for	patients	and	other	subject,	
there	is	a	pervasive	reliance	on	the	availability	of	an	Internet	connection	to	send	
data	back	to	base.		In	the	absence	of	this	Internet	connection,	the	system	fails	(i.e.	
there	is	no	fall‐back	strategy	for	communications	in	such	systems).	 	This	work	
examines	 the	communications	options	 that	could	be	applied	 to	diagnostic	bio‐
monitoring	 systems	 in	 the	 failure	 of	 the	 assumption	 of	 a	 pervasive	 internet	
connection	 and	 how	 a	 communications	 layer	 can	 be	 provided	 reliably	 (and	
possibly	with	fail‐over)	in	the	context	of	the	environment	in	which	the	system	is	
implemented.	
1.2	Bio‐monitoring	systems	
A	bio‐monitoring	system	is	a	system	that	can	convert	biological	information	such	
as	measurements	 for	respiration,	heart	 rate,	 temperature,	brain	activity,	heart	
activity,	or	blood	glucose	levels	for	diabetics	into	data	that	is	able	to	be	processed	
and	recorded.		For	a	compact	definition,	we	might	say	that:	
A	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 measures	 biological	 data	 from	 a	 living	 entity,	
converts	the	data	into	a	digitally	compatible	format	and	either	processes	or	
stores	that	data	in	some	way.	
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FIGURE	2:	AN	EXAMPLE	OF	A	FIXED	BIO‐MONITORING	SYSTEM	[1]	
Many	people	will	be	familiar	with	the	sort	of	fixed	bio‐monitors	(figure	2)	which	
are	seen	around	hospital	wards	all	over	the	world.		However,	in	addition	to	fixed	
monitoring	systems	such	as	the	above,	which	are	large,	bulky	and	not	portable,	
the	past	ten	years	has	seen	a	significant	amount	of	research	into	man‐portable	
ways	in	which	a	patient	or	subject	can	be	monitored.		This	research	has	made	use	
of	 modern	 developments	 in	 information	 technology	 to	 devise	 wearable	 bio‐
monitoring	systems	that	can	be	applied	in	a	number	of	application	such	as:	
 Athletes	 attempting	 to	 reach	 peak	 physical	 performance	 where	
monitoring	is	used	to	determine	biological	and	physiological	status	and	
define	where	to	focus	training	to	improve	performance	outcomes.	
 Hospital	 patients	 who	 are	mobile	 yet	 require	 ongoing	monitoring	 can	
wear	a	monitoring	system	and	not	be	restricted	to	the	hospital	ward.	
 Outpatients	may	require	the	collection	of	diagnostic	data	over	a	possibly	
extended	period	of	time.	
 The	 elderly	 or	 infirm	who	 are	 not	 in	 continuous	 care	may	 need	 to	 be	
monitored	in	their	homes,	to	preserve	quality	of	life	but	ensure	ongoing	
health	and	safety.			
Current	research	(refer	chapter	2)	shows	that	there	are	many	systems	that	have	
been	suggested	or	developed	that	can	remotely	monitor	subjects	such	as	those	in	
the	cohorts	above.		There	has	been	significant	recent	research	on	the	wearable	
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bio‐monitoring	system	–	the	hardware,	sensors,	 infrastructure	and	networking	
which	are	used	to	make	up	a	cohesive	and	wearable	system.			
Indeed,	recent	work	appears	to	concentrate	on	methods	by	which	a	body	area	
network	(BAN)	of	sensors	can	be	implemented,	for	example	using	Bluetooth	and	
ZigBee	 to	 allow	 sensor	 data	 to	 be	 transmitted	 around	 the	 BAN	 and	 then	
aggregated	using	a	central	controller	device	worn	by	the	subject.		In	many	cases,	
research	shows	the	central	controller	as	a	smartphone	style	computer,	that	by	
default	 can	 provide	 capabilities	 to	 run	 applications,	 perform	 data	
capture/logging	and	provide	data	processing	capabilities.		These	attributes	allow	
a	smartphone	 to	potentially	act	as	 the	central	 controller	of	 the	wearable	BAN.		
Figure	3	is	indicative	of	the	sorts	of	system	that	have	been	proposed.	
	
	
FIGURE	3:	AN	EXAMPLE	OF	A	WEARABLE	BIO‐MONITORING	SYSTEM	
	
These	systems	have	a	number	of	possible	applications	and	may	provide	massive	
benefits	 for	 diagnostic	 medicine.	 	 The	 subject	 groups	 above	 (and	 doubtless	
numerous	 others)	may	 be	 helped	 by	 using	 wearable	 bio‐monitoring	 systems.		
However,	 one	 of	 the	 concerns	 with	 the	 research	 is	 that,	 often,	 real‐world	
requirements	of	such	a	system	are	not	considered	as	part	of	the	research.			
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We	discuss	our	concerns	further	in	the	next	section	of	this	work.	
1.3	Problem	Statement	
The	benefits	offered	by	wearable	bio‐monitoring	systems	make	it	apparent	that	
research	into	bio‐monitoring	and	wearable	diagnostic	systems	is	fully	justified.		
However,	 recent	 research	 primarily	 concentrates	 on	 the	wearable	 network	 of	
sensors	and	a	central	control	device	or	the	creation	of	the	sensors	themselves.		
One	of	our	major	concerns	is	that	many	systems	overlook	real‐world	constraints	
and	requirements	that	should	always	be	considered	in	systems	that	will	be	used	
in	medical	monitoring.			
Current	 research	 proposes	 excellent	 examples	 of	 how	 networks	 of	 small,	
wearable	sensors	can	be	linked	together	into	a	body	area	network	and	that	with	
the	right	combination	of	sensors	such	a	BAN	can	be	used	to	collect	biological	and	
physiological	information	on	a	subject	or	patient.		However,	such	research	often	
assumes	 that	 best	 case	 operational	 scenarios	 exist	 with	 regards	 to	 support	
infrastructure	and	data	transmission	mechanisms.			
The	research	often	assumes	specific	characteristics	for	the	environment	where	
such	a	system	is	to	be	used.		For	example,	it	assumes	the	presence	of	a	ubiquitous	
and	 always‐on	 Internet	 connection,	 and	 that	 security	 and	 communications	
robustness	features	are	provided	by	this	ubiquitous	Internet	connectivity.			
We	contend	that	a	mobile	medical	monitoring	system	must	explicitly	 facilitate	
robustness	 and	 reliability	 to	 be	 used	 in	 a	 health	 care	 context.	 	 Rather	 than	
expecting	a	best‐case	scenario	for	communication	back	to	base	(i.e.	that	mobile	
Internet	is	always	available),	systems	must	cater	for	many	use‐cases	and	many	
environments.		Any	medical	system	must	provide	the	best	possible	redundancy	
and	 fault	 tolerance	 and	must	 consider	worst‐case	 scenarios	 in	 an	 operational	
context	 to	 ensure	 the	 system	 can	 continue	 to	 provide	 useful	 functionality	 in	
adverse	environments.	
It	should	be	noted	that	we	are	not	proposing	that	all	systems	need	to	be	designed	
to	work	 in	 the	context	of	a	high	 interference,	extremely	adverse	environment.		
Rather,	systems	intended	to	be	used	in	healthcare	cannot	simply	assume	there	is	
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a	reliable	internet	connection,	that	this	connection	will	always	be	on	and	available	
and	that	any	transmission	from	the	system	to	the	doctor	will	always	be	successful,	
first	time,	every	time.			
There	is	an	assumption	that	mobile	Internet	is	available	at	all	times.		There	are	
many	examples	where	this	is	not	the	case	or	where	coverage	is	patchy	(refer	to	
Appendix	 G	 for	 some	 examples	 of	 this).	 	 A	 fully	 realised	mobile	medical	 bio‐
monitoring	solution	must	consider	drop	out	and	lack	of	connectivity	and	should	
provide	 consideration	 to	 alternative	 communications	 such	 as	 radio,	 SMS	 and	
mobile	data	where	Internet	is	not	available.	
We	assert	that	a	system	which	relies	on	a	single	specific	type	of	data	connection	
may	 not	 be	 the	 most	 reliable	 or	 feasible	 for	 the	 environment,	 especially	 if	 it	
provides	 no	 secondary	 option	 for	 communications	 where	 the	 primary	 data	
communications	connection	fails.	
We	propose	 that	an	 ideal	 system	would	have	 the	ability	 to	 communicate	over	
more	than	one	carrier	using	a	best‐signal‐path	algorithm	to	determine	the	carrier	
to	use	in	a	specific	situation.		Furthermore,	if	multiple	carriers	are	available,	the	
system	should	prioritise	carriers	to	ensure	the	best	chance	of	success	for	delivery.		
Such	 prioritisation	 should	 be	 application	 specific	 and	 allow	 a	 weighting	 of	
carriers	based	on	the	implementation	environment.	
The	research	also	does	not	consider	the	ability	to	control,	diagnose	or	manage	the	
monitoring	system	remotely	once	it	is	deployed	into	the	field	on	a	subject.	
A	remote	bio‐monitoring	system	may	be	used	 to	gather	diagnostic	data	 for	an	
extended	 period	 of	 time	 [2].	 	 During	 monitoring,	 we	 contend	 that	 it	 is	 a	
reasonable	assumption	that	the	system	may	need	to	be	reconfigured	to	account	
for	 changes	 in	 the	 monitoring	 situation	 (i.e.	 a	 set	 of	 readings	 that	 raises	 an	
elevated	level	of	concern),	or	to	allow	for	environmental	changes	over	the	period	
of	monitoring	 (such	 as	 changing	 the	 primary	 communications	 link	 because	 of	
network	issues	or	failure,	etc.).			
For	example,	consider	a	system	where	the	remote	bio‐monitor	sends	values	back	
to	base	on	a	pre‐defined	interval,	say	once	an	hour,	to	a	medical	base	station.		As	
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a	result	of	changes	to	the	patient	telemetry	received	back	at	base,	a	doctor	may	
wish	 to	decrease	 the	monitoring	 interval	 from	60	minutes	 to	near‐continuous	
monitoring	every	30	seconds.		We	would	assert	that	the	ideal	system	should	be	
able	 to	 remotely	 reconfigure	operating	parameters	 so	 that	 it	 does	not	 require	
physical	access	to	make	changes	to	monitoring	parameters.	
However,	 if	we	 implement	 remote	 configuration	 capabilities	 and	 facilitate	 the	
system	to	operate	in	the	field	for	extended	periods,	we	would	further	assert	that	
the	 system	 should	 also	 be	 able	 to	 provide	 remote	 diagnostics.	 of	 its	 status,	
performance	and	operating	parameters	(i.e.	report	on	current	configuration	and	
local	system	issues,	and	confirm	configuration)	over	the	air.	
Our	work	discusses	a	model	for	communications	in	a	bio‐monitoring	system.		We	
believe	that	two	fundamental	requirements	must	be	addressed	for	a	solution	that	
is	used	in	medical	technology:	
	
1. The	 safety	 of	 the	 patient/subject	 is	 paramount	 and	 the	 system	 must	
facilitate	all	possible	methods	to	ensure	that	a	subject	can	be	reliably	and	
robustly	 monitored	 no	 matter	 the	 environment	 and	 operational	
conditions	in	which	the	system	is	used.		This	means	fail‐over	to	alternate	
transmission	mechanisms	 should	be	possible	 in	 case	of	 issues	with	 the	
primary	carrier.	 	However,	this	also	means	that	we	can	neither	assume,	
nor	rely	on,	specific	features	of	a	“preferred”	carrier	to	implement	system	
capabilities.	
	
2. The	reliability	of	 the	data	sent	 from	a	patient	 to	 the	doctor	 is	essential.		
Biometric	 data	 sent	 from	 the	 remote	monitor	must	 be	 trusted	 because	
robust	and	fault‐tolerant	methods	of	communication	enable	this	trust.		It	
should	 be	noted	 that	 robustness	 and	 security	 are	not	 the	 same	 thing	 –	
security	 can	 contribute	 to	 robustness,	 but	 robustness	 in	 our	 context	
should	be	taken	to	mean	that	data	can	be	trusted,	assured,	and	protected	
during	transmission.	
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It	is	not	the	intent	of	this	work	to	create	a	monitoring	system.		Sufficient	work	is	
already	in	progress	in	this	area,	and	another	thesis	along	the	same	lines	might	not	
significantly	add	to	the	pool	of	knowledge.		Rather,	this	work	proposes	specific	
methods	 by	 which	 we	 can	 implement	 robust,	 reliable	 communications	 and	
control	capabilities	over	more	than	one	data	carrier,	 in	a	manner	that	any	bio‐
monitoring	system	might	make	use	of	this	work	to	implement	robust,	real‐world	
communications	for	their	system.			
We	 will	 investigate	 and	 propose	 how	 data	 from	 a	 monitoring	 system	 can	 be	
transmitted	 from	 the	 patient	 to	 the	 doctor	 over	 multiple	 communications	
methods	 and	 define	 the	 mechanisms	 by	 which	 the	 system	 can	 be	 controlled	
remotely	by	the	doctor	using	‘over	the	air’	methods.			
We	will	maintain	an	application‐agnostic	approach	–	that	is,	our	communications	
and	 control	 platform	 will	 be	 developed	 such	 that	 any	 bio‐monitoring	 system	
could	leverage	it.		A	proposed	extension	to	the	work	is	that	such	a	solution	could	
be	 extended	 and	 applied	 to	 any	 telemetry	 or	 data	 gathering	 application	 that	
required	a	level	of	fault	tolerance,	redundancy	or	carrier	agnosticism.	
To	enable	redundancy	in	the	absence	of	specific	carrier	capabilities,	we	will	not	
expect	the	carrier	to	provide	our	system	with	any	carrier‐specific	features.		We	
will	evaluate	the	implications	of	a	carrier‐agnostic	approach	to	the	transmission	
of	data	 in	a	bio‐monitoring	system.	 	We	will	 further	evaluate	how	data	can	be	
encoded,	 secured	 and	managed	 in	 a	 carrier	 agnostic	 environment,	 where	 we	
cannot	assume	security	or	encryption	is	provided	by	the	carrier.			
We	will	consider	a	system	which	provides	the	ability	to	facilitate	fail‐over	to	allow	
transmission	of	the	same	data	via	different	carriers,	based	on	the	best	signal	path	
available	at	the	time	of	transmission.			
Finally,	we	will	propose	a	robust	and	resilient	communications	protocol	that	can	
support	the	above	requirements	and	can	be	implemented	on	any	platform	to	form	
the	 backbone	 of	 the	 monitoring	 system’s	 communications	 capabilities	 while	
retaining	 platform	 independence	 to	 allow	 application	 and	 carrier	 agnosticism	
wherever	possible.	
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This	gives	rise	to	the	key	requirements	of	our	system	which,	at	a	high	level	can	be	
stated	thus:	
 Can	use	any	suitable	carrier	for	message	transmission,	not	just	internet,	
with	the	same	message	format	is	used	between	carriers	
 Supports	fail	over	between	carriers		
 Provides	sufficient	robustness	and	security	features	to	meet	the	needs	of	
medical	monitoring	
 Support	remote	configuration	and	diagnostic	capabilities	
1.4	Significance	of	this	work	and	contributions	to	the	field	
This	 thesis	will	 propose	 a	 communications	 system	 that	 addresses	 gaps	 in	 the	
current	 research	 –	 specifically	 those	 of	 carrier	 independence,	 fail‐over	 and	
redundancy,	 remote	 control	 and	 configuration	 management.	 	 We	 define	 a	
solution	 that	 is,	as	much	as	possible,	platform	and	application	 independent,	 to	
enable	the	maximum	application	of	this	work.			
We	 will	 remediate	 the	 issues	 outlined	 above	 and	 facilitate	 robust	 real‐world	
communications	 in	 a	 number	 of	 scenarios.	 	 The	 resulting	 communications	
platform	will	result	in	a	work	that	possesses	a	significance	and	contributes	to	the	
body	of	knowledge	in	this	area	on	several	levels:	
1. By	 addressing	 the	 communications	 link	 dependency	 (as	 opposed	 to	
agnosticism),	lack	of	redundancy;	automated	fail	over;	optimal	signal	path	
determination;	 remote	 diagnosis	 and	 remote	 control	 of	 the	 system,	we	
will	 provide	 novel	 new	 capabilities	within	 bio‐monitoring	 platforms	 to	
enable	more	robust	and	reliable	communications	better	suited	to	use	in	
medical	or	workplace	monitoring	as	well	as	and	other	applications.		These	
features	are	not	prominent	in	current	research.	
	
2. We	 add	 new	 capabilities	 to	 the	 bio‐monitoring	 solution	 to	 facilitate	
extended	 use	 in	 the	 field	 by	 allowing	 it	 to	 be	 remotely	 controlled,	
reconfigured	and	diagnosed.		This	will	make	a	monitor	more	suitable	for	
extended	 deployment	 in	 the	 field	 as	 its	 operations	 can	 be	 monitored,	
primary	 functions	 controlled,	 and	 the	 system	 can	 to	 react	 to	 changing	
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monitoring	scenarios	(i.e.	by	increasing	the	frequency	of	monitoring).		The	
research	 focus	 in	 the	 field	 has	 not	 been	 on	 such	 features	 as	 a	 major	
characteristic.	
	
3. We	will	provide	the	communications	layer	to	facilitate	creation	of	systems	
to	allow	doctors	to	have	on‐demand	access	to	bio‐monitoring	data	from	a	
remote	 subject,	 and	 provide	 a	 level	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 system	 by	 way	 of	
ensuring	the	data	security	and	reliability.		By	addressing	critical	reliability	
and	failover	issues,	our	platform	supports	a	range	of	applications	such	as	
sports	 and	 performance	 medicine,	 or	 workplace	 health	 and	 safety	
monitoring.	 	 	 As	 much	 current	 research	 assumes	 a	 pervasive	 Internet	
connection,	 these	 capabilities	 are	 usually	 just	 assumed	 in	 current	
research.	
	
4. By	implementing	a	system	that	supports	best	signal	path,	optimum	carrier	
detection,	 data	 reliability	 mechanisms	 and	 intelligent	 failover,	 we	 will	
provide	 a	 trusted	 communications	 platform	 to	 be	 used	 by	 a	 medical	
monitoring	system,	something	that	is	appropriate	for	a	medical	device	and	
does	not	appear	to	have	been	a	concern	in	the	existing	research.		With	a	
trusted	system	as	a	backbone	for	prospective	bio‐monitoring	system,	our	
solution	 contributes	 to	 the	 development	 of	 practical	 real‐world	
monitoring	solutions	to	increase	the	ability	of	the	medical	profession	to	
reliably	 remotely	 monitor	 subjects.	 	 Improving	 the	 reliability	 of	 such	
systems	may	facilitate	reduction	in	the	use	of	beds	and	resources	within	
the	healthcare	system,	allow	for	improved	quality	of	 life	by	letting	non‐
critical	care	patients	to	be	monitored	remotely	from	home.			
	
5. We	 can	 apply	 the	 system	 to	 operations	 outside	 the	 healthcare	 area.	 	 A	
monitoring	 system	using	 the	 robust	 communications	platform	could	be	
used	to	monitor	workers	entering	confined	or	restricted	workspaces,	to	
ensure	they	do	not	experience	any	adverse	events.		For	example,	lack	of	
oxygen	in	a	confined	space	work	area	can	cause	blackout	and	subsequent	
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death.		This	situation	could	be	monitored	for	workers	in	a	confined	work	
environment,	 and	action	 taken	should	an	 issue	arise.	 	This	may	help	 to	
save	 lives	 of	 workers	 in	 hazardous	 environments	 and	 thus	 extend	 the	
breadth	of	applicability	of	this	work.	
	
6. We	can	apply	the	system	to	operations	in	sports	medicine,	for	example	to	
monitor	 an	 athlete	 attempting	 to	 reach	 peak	 performance	 or	 during	 a	
sporting	endeavour.		Real‐world	monitoring	for	athletes	outside	of	sports‐
medicine	 research	 centres	 (for	 example,	 a	 mountain	 climber	 during	 a	
climb)	may	therefore	become	easier	to	implement.	
	
7. By	 remaining	 application‐agnostic,	 our	 communications	 can	 apply	
telemetry	 applications	 outside	 of	 bio‐monitoring,	 where	 remote	 data	
needs	to	be	gathered	and/or	monitored	with	a	high	degree	of	resilience	
and	redundancy.		For	example,	in	remote	control	of	equipment	in	hostile	
or	high	interference	environments.		The	focus	of	the	research	in	the	field	
tends	to	be	specific	to	bio‐monitoring	for	medicine	so	our	work	extends	
this	use‐case	to	other	applications.	
1.5	The	structure	of	this	thesis	
We	 consider	 the	 communications	 implemented	 between	 a	 remote	 wearable	
monitoring	 system	 and	 a	 base	 station,	 and	 what	 infrastructure	 requirements	
these	mechanisms	impose	on	the	overall	system.		We	evaluate	the	capabilities	of	
a	 number	 of	 types	 of	 communications,	 and	 determine	which	 communications	
layers	 may	 be	 suitable	 for	 our	 application.	 	 We	 discuss	 the	 information	
requirements	of	medical	bio‐monitoring	data	and	we	develop	a	minimum	set	of	
requirements	that	must	be	supported	by	a	communication	carrier	in	order	for	it	
to	be	used	as	part	of	a	bio‐monitoring	solution.	
We	design	and	propose	a	packetized	protocol	 that	supports	delivery	of	robust	
communications	and	facilitates	transmission	of	data	in	a	carrier	agnostic	manner.		
We	evaluate	methods	required	 to	 implement	secure	transmission	of	data	with	
appropriate	 levels	 of	 data	 integrity	 in	 the	 communications	 layer,	 without	
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assuming	 specific	 carrier	 features.	 	We	 consider	 how	 the	 issues	 raised	 in	 our	
introduction	above	can	be	mitigated	to	provide	the	required	level	of	real‐world	
reliability,	 redundancy,	 security	 and	 performance	 to	 implement	 a	 monitoring	
system	for	use	in	human	medical	care.			
Finally,	 we	 demonstrate	 a	 fully	 developed	 protocol	 and	 communications	
mechanisms	to	show	how	the	conceptual	elements	of	the	model	can	be	built	into	
a	 real‐world	 application	 and	 could	 be	 placed	 into	 operation	 in	 a	 production	
system.			
In	support	of	these	goals,	the	structure	of	this	thesis	is	as	follows:	
Chapter	 1	 –	 Introduction:	 an	 introduction	 to	 this	 work	 discussing	 the	
background,	fundamental	concepts,	issues	that	this	thesis	will	address,	defining	
the	major	tasks	to	be	achieved	by	the	end	of	this	work	and	the	significance	of	the	
work	in	the	area.	
Chapter	2	–	Literature	Review:	analysis	of	research	in	the	field,	with	specific	
review	focusing	on	elements	that	concern	this	thesis,	conducting	an	evaluation	of	
these	works	in	relation	to	their	achievements	and	discussing	our	perception	of	
the	limitations	of	the	current	research	with	specific	relationship	to	the	key	issues	
that	have	been	identified	in	chapter	1.	
Chapter	 3	 –	 Alternative	 communications	 mechanisms	 to	 transmit	 bio‐
monitoring	data:	We	identify	a	number	of	different	types	of	bio‐monitoring	data	
and	 evaluate	 alternative	 communications	 carriers	 that	 can	 supplement	 or	
substitute	 for	 the	presence	of	a	pervasive	and	ubiquitous	 Internet	 connection.		
We	examine	the	usefulness	of	such	alternate	data	connection	methods	in	terms	
of	the	transmission	of	bio‐monitoring	data.		We	discuss	the	attributes	we	believe	
are	required	in	order	to	successfully	implement	a	multi‐carrier,	best‐signal‐path	
based	system	to	provide	a	robust	communications	platform	for	transmitting	data	
between	 a	mobile	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 and	 a	 base	 station	 (and	 vice	 versa).		
Finally,	we	propose	a	high‐level	model	of	the	proposed	solution.	
Chapter	 4	 ‐	 Using	 multiple	 communications	 methods	 in	 the	 same	
application:	 We	 consider	 the	 communications	 requirements	 and	 methods	
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identified	 in	 the	previous	 chapter	 and	propose	 a	 system	architecture	 that	 can	
incorporate	multiple	carriers	into	a	single	solution	and	which	is	then	able	to	send	
the	same	data	packet	over	a	specific	carrier	from	this	set	after	evaluating	the	most	
appropriate	communications	method	to	send	with.	
Chapter	5	 –	 Sending	and	Receiving	Messages	with	Multiple	Carriers:	We	
discuss	the	required	set	of	message	send	and	receive	functions	that	each	carrier	
transceiver	module	will	need	to	implement.			
Chapter	6	 ‐	Remotely	controlling	 the	monitoring	 system:	We	 evaluate	 the	
issue	of	remote	control	of	the	monitoring	system,	allowing	the	doctor	to	query,	
configure	and/or	reconfigure	the	bio‐monitoring	system	on‐the‐fly	without	the	
need	 for	 the	monitor	 to	 return	 to	 base	 or	 be	 physically	 interacted	with.	 	We	
evaluate	how	we	may	ensure	configuration	 is	 set	correctly	once	 it	 is	 remotely	
adjusted,	discuss	how	we	can	communicate	required	configuration	changes	to	the	
remote	monitoring	system	and	how	we	can	query	configuration	to	determine	the	
current	state	of	a	monitor.	
Chapter	7	–	Facilitating	security,	robustness,	assurance	and	identification:		
We	propose	considerations	and	methods	to	address	data	security,	encoding	and	
robustness	in	a	bio‐monitoring	solution.		We	evaluate	a	carrier	agnostic	model	to	
facilitate	 these	 attributes.	 	 We	 examine	 impacts	 of	 this	 model	 and	 identify	
solutions	 to	 maintain	 carrier	 independence	 while	 providing	 the	 data	
transmission	 capabilities	 that	we	 require.	 	 	 	We	 evaluate	 how	 the	 system	 can	
detect	when	 transmission	become	 lost	or	 corrupted	and	propose	mechanisms	
whereby	 data	 that	 is	 lost	 can	 be	 detected	 at	 the	 destination	 as	 a	 result	 of	 its	
absence.			
Chapter	 8	 –	 Reporting	 issues	with	 the	 alarm	message:	 	 We	 consider	 the	
process	when	issues	occur	at	the	remote	monitor	and	propose	methods	by	which	
we	can	report	to	the	base	station	that	there	is	an	issue.		We	propose	the	types	of	
alarm	 message	 that	 are	 required	 to	 facilitate	 issue	 reporting,	 and	 propose	
encoding	 schemes	 to	 allow	 messages	 to	 be	 sent	 back	 to	 base	 using	 carrier	
agnostic	communications.	
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Chapter	9	–	Evaluation	of	feasibility:	We	review	the	proposed	protocol	in	the	
context	of	 its	 feasibility	 for	 real‐world	 implementation.	 	We	 consider	whether	
carrier	 agnosticism	 is	 possible	 in	 medical	 monitoring	 systems,	 review	 the	
practical	 considerations	 for	 real‐world	 carrier	 agnosticism,	 evaluate	 whether	
such	communication	can	be	seamless	for	the	user	of	the	system	and	look	at	the	
potential	 for	 real	 work	 implementation	 given	 the	 hardware	 we	 have	 today.		
Finally,	 in	 the	context	of	 the	above,	we	 identify	 considerations	and	 limitations	
during	implementation.	
Chapter	10	–	Conclusions	and	future	work:	We	examine	the	outcome	of	the	
previous	 chapters,	 raise	 our	 conclusions	 and	 present	 a	 final	 summary	 of	 the	
solution.	 	We	propose	additional	developments	and	potential	enhancements	to	
the	 solution	 to	 expand	 the	 capabilities	 and	 application	 of	 the	 robust	
communications	platform	into	other	areas.	
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2. 	L ITERATURE	REVIEW	
We	discuss	current	research	in	wearable	bio‐monitoring	systems,	and	evaluate	
that	work	in	relation	to	our	problem	statement	and	the	issues	that	we	identified	
in	Chapter	1.			
2.1	Medical	Monitoring	Research	
Portable,	wearable	bio‐monitoring	(or	medical	monitoring	as	it	is	often	referred	
to),	 where	 wearable	 sensors	 assembled	 in	 a	 remotely	 monitored	 healthcare	
system	are	used	to	improve	quality	of	life	and	treatment	outcomes	for	patients,	
have	been	the	subject	of	significant	research	over	many	years.		As	early	as	2000,	
Jovanov	[3]	speaks	to	the	potential	of	single	chip	wireless	sensor	networks	for	
telemedicine	 and	 biometric	 monitoring,	 where	 sensors	 with	 communications	
capabilities	 interact	 to	 form	 personal	 body	 area	 networks	 for	 use	 in	 medical	
monitoring.			
Since	Jovanov’s	paper	was	published,	research	into	these	systems	shows	no	signs	
of	 abatement.	 	 There	 is	 ongoing	 research	 into	 the	 development	 of	 wearable	
portable	medical	monitoring	 systems.	 	 Ramsetter	 [4]	 and	Hussain	 [5]	 discuss	
continuing	 interest	 in	 body	 area	 networks,	 sensor	 arrays	 and	 wearable	
monitoring	systems	for	the	purposes	of	health	monitoring.		Applications	ranging	
from	critical	medical	care	through	advanced	monitoring	based	diagnosis	and	on	
to	performance	management	for	athletes	and	other	exercise	based	professionals,	
are	proposed,	and	it	appears	obvious	that	wearable	bio‐monitoring	has	a	place	in	
the	future	of	medical	care.			
In	 addition	 to	 research	 occurring	 in	 bio‐monitoring	 systems,	 research	 into	
information	 technology	 applications	 in	 biomedicine	 and	 bio‐monitoring	 also	
appears	 to	 be	 prevalent,	 especially	 around	 use	 of	 novel	 materials	 and	 new	
technologies	 that	 improve	 accuracy,	 sensitivity	 and	 other	 characteristics	 of	
monitoring	sensors.		Dei	[6],	Marani	[7]	and	Lee	[8]		all	speak	to	ongoing	efforts	
in	new	sensor	types	and	novel	ways	of	sensor	construction	to	increase	efficiency	
or	accuracy.			
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Jubete	[9],	Hafaid	[10]	and	Gong		[11]	contribute	to	the	body	of	work	concerned	
with	 identification	 of	 novel	 new	materials,	 production	 techniques	 and	new	or	
improved	 mechanisms	 for	 the	 use	 of	 existing	 technologies	 and	 materials	 to	
improve	the	sensitivity	and	performance	of	sensors	used	to	measure	vital	signs	
and	medical	symptoms.	
There	 is	 much	 laudable	 research	 in	 the	 field	 of	 bio‐monitoring,	 and	 research	
covers	the	gamut	of	this	field.	 	However,	the	research	often	focusses	on	purely	
academic	 outcomes	 solving	 one	 or	 more	 bio‐monitoring	 conundrums,	 from	
development	 of	 specific	 new	 sensors	 that	 address	 a	 current	 shortcoming	 in	
available	products	through	to	creation	of	entire	wearable	body	area	networks	of	
sensors	 and	 controllers	 to	monitor	 vital	 signs.	 	 However,	 where	 the	 research	
appears	to	fall	down	is	in	relation	to	the	practical	outcome	of	making	a	proposed	
system	usable	in	the	real	world.		We	assert	that	in	the	field	of	medical	research,	
the	ability	to	practically	apply	a	proposed	solution	in	a	manner	that	provides	the	
best	outcome	for	a	patient	is	paramount.	
2.2	The	structure	of	a	real	world	biometric	monitoring	system	
It	 is	 apparent	 that	 there	 is	 a	 ‘standard’	 model	 that	 has	 been	 assumed	 for	 a	
wearable	medical	 monitoring	 system	 (e.g.	 Otto	 [12]).	 	 This	model	 consists	 of	
fundamental	 components	 typically	 arranged	 in	 common	 fashion.	 	 The	
fundamental	components	can	be	described	thus:	
 A	network	of	sensors,	linked	using	short	range	networking	such	as	Bluetooth	
or	ZigBee.		Sensors	are	configured	in	a	Body	Area	Network	(BAN)	and	linked	
to	a	central	controller	device.	
 A	central	controller	receives	data	from	the	sensors	and	collates,	stores	and	
processes	it.		It	may	store	the	data	locally,	or	send	the	data	immediately	via	
‘the	network’	to	another	location.		In	some	systems,	the	aggregator	performs	
some	processing	or	analysis	on	data	(e.g.	alarm	conditions	analysis).	
 A	network	to	broadcast	over.		In	many	cases,	the	systems	link	to	a	wireless	
network	 assumed	 to	 be	 present	 (e.g.	 Wi‐Fi	 inside	 a	 hospital).	 	 However,	
systems	commonly	assume	the	presence	of	an	Internet	connection	which	is	
used	to	transmit	data.		Furthermore,	the	systems	reviewed	appear	to	assume	
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that	 this	 Internet	 connection	 is	 reliable	 and	 pervasive	 as	 to	 both	 its	
availability	and	the	success	of	communications	made	across	the	connection.	
 A	medical	monitoring	station.		This	element	takes	many	forms	–	it	may	be	a	
tablet	device,	a	smart	phone	or	PDA,	laptop,	PC	or	database	server.		Typically,	
this	device	stores	the	results	of	the	monitoring,	analyses	them,	in	some	cases	
processes	the	data,	and	then	makes	it	available	for	the	medical	professional	
to	use.	
Figure	4	illustrates	the	fundamental	components	which	appear	to	be	common	to	
almost	all	of	the	systems	evaluated	herein.	
	
	
FIGURE	4:	THE	COMMON	COMPONENTS	OF	A	MEDICAL	MONITORING	SYSTEM	
	
Given	 the	 similarities	 between	 the	 system	 architectures	 reviewed	 in	 the	
published	 works,	 we	 believe	 that	 this	 common	 basic	 structure	 for	 the	
implementation	of	a	bio‐monitoring	system	has	been	proven	to	be	sound	from	an	
implementation	and	technology	perspective,	and	thus	we	no	reason	to	assume	
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that	there	is	any	fundamental	flaw	with	the	basic	tenets	of	the	wearable	medical	
monitoring	system.			
The	physical	construction	of	the	body	area	network	of	sensors	and	the	associated	
controller/aggregator	solution	seems	to	address	the	fundamental	requirements	
for	monitoring	 a	 subject	 (portability,	wearability,	 independence	 for	 the	 user),	
whilst	leaving	plenty	of	scope	for	further	research	and	development	(for	example,	
the	nature	and	size	of	 the	sensors,	 the	communications	between	 the	elements	
within	 the	 BAN,	 the	 capabilities	 of	 the	 central	 aggregator/processor,	 etc.).			
Moving	forward,	this	work	assumes	that	the	model	outlined	above	is	a	suitable	
and	usable	model	for	real	world	implementation	of	a	wearable,	person‐portable	
bio‐monitoring	system.	
	
2.3	 The	 requirements	 of	 a	 real‐world	 biometric	 monitoring	
system	
A	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 intended	 for	 use	 in	 medical	 care	must	 consider	 the	
safety	of	the	patient	and	the	robustness	of	the	system	as	paramount	elements	in	
the	proposed	solution.		We	highlighted	these	two	key	requirements	in	chapter	1.	
The	 fundamental	 issue	 that	 concerns	 this	 research	 is	 that	 current	 work	 into	
remote	 medical	 monitoring	 systems	 does	 not	 consider	 many	 real‐world	
implementation	requirements	and	leads	to	proposed	solutions	that	are	difficult	
or	 impossible	 to	 apply	 in	 reality.	 	 Research	 that	 does	 not	 consider	 real‐world	
requirements	 for	 patient	 care	 has	 a	 lower	 probability	 of	 successful	
implementation	 and	 may	 be	 less	 useful	 than	 research	 that	 considers	 such	
requirements	to	make	the	solution	suitable	for	use	in	healthcare.	
In	chapter	1,	we	highlighted	the	issues	that	exist	around	wearable	bio‐monitoring	
research.		These	issues	include	the	assumptions	that:	
 There	is	always	an	Internet	connection.	
 Mobile	communications	are	always	reliable	and	resilient	and	detection	of	
issues	is	outside	the	scope	of	the	bio‐monitoring	system.	
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 The	remote	system	does	not	require	changes	to	configuration	whilst	in	the	
field.	
 Security	 of	 data	 is	 provided	 outside	 the	 specific	 bio‐monitoring	
implementation	(i.e.	by	the	communications	carrier)	
When	we	consider	these	issues	in	the	context	of	the	existing	body	of	research,	it	
appears	that	the	research	into	medical	monitoring	may	have	somewhat	stagnated	
and	 become	 fixated	 on	 working	 within	 the	 confines	 of	 a	 pre‐existing	
infrastructure	 which	 supplies	 both	 constant	 connectivity	 and	 a	 reliable	
communications	infrastructure,	something	which	may	in	reality	not	be	present	in	
all	use	cases.			
Our	 review	 of	 the	 existing	 quantum	 of	 research	 has	 identified	 that	 there	 are	
several	features	of	the	overall	medical	or	bio‐monitoring	system	that	appear	to	
be	 the	 subject	 of	 a	 lesser	 focus,	 or	 which	may	 be	 absent	 altogether	 from	 the	
solution	proposed	in	some	systems.		While	none	of	our	issues	alone	is	critical	or	
would	cause	a	monitoring	system	to	fail,	when	combined	they	have	the	potential	
to	 cause	 a	 significant	 detriment	 to	 a	 viable	 and	 practical	 portable	 wearable	
medical	bio‐monitoring	system.				
In	their	paper	[13]	Varshney	identifies	several	potential	issues	with	existing	and	
proposed	 wireless	 health	 monitoring	 systems,	 including	 the	 following	
requirements	which,	it	is	asserted,	would	need	to	be	met	by	any	viable	solution	
for	application	to	the	real‐world:	
 A	high	level	of	security	
 A	high	level	of	privacy	for	patient	data	
 The	usability,	reliability	and	functions	of	the	patient’s	device	
 Highly	reliable	and	usable	wireless	infrastructure	
These	requirements	align	somewhat	loosely	to	the	issues	that	we	wish	to	further	
investigate.		Varshney’s	paper	is	interesting	as	it	is	one	of	the	only	papers	we	have	
found	where	some	of	the	apparent	major	shortcomings	of	the	currently	proposed	
remote	 medical	 monitoring	 systems	 are	 discussed	 in	 detail.	 	 While	 Varshney	
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identifies	some	of	the	key	issues,	the	focus	of	his	paper	relates	to	the	identification	
of	the	issues	and	does	not	propose	a	resolution.				
Some	 of	 the	 issues	 in	 Varshney’s	 work	 relate	 to	 the	 real	 world	 commercial	
implications	of	these	systems	in	a	business	or	operational	sense.		For	example,	
Varshney	discusses	the	requirements	for	a	new	business	model	supporting	such	
monitoring	 systems	 within	 hospitals	 and	 in	 other	 care	 providers.	 	 He	 also	
discusses	the	requirement	for	a	solution	around	who	pays	for	the	systems,	what	
there	is	implication	in	medical	insurance	claims,	and	so	on.			
While	Varshney’s	requirements	are	interesting	as	a	starting	point	from	which	to	
design	 a	 system,	 we	 believe	 that	 the	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 operational	
implementation	 and	 deployment	 of	 a	 monitoring	 system	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	
hospital	 or	 medical	 centre	 are	more	 relevant	 to	 the	 system	 once	 it	 has	 been	
developed	 commercially	 and	 deployed.	 	 However,	 many	 of	 Varshney’s	 other	
issues	 are	 relevant	 to	 our	 research	 into	 the	 communications	 for	 a	 wearable	
portable	monitoring	system.	
Kwak	 et	 al	 [14]	 assert	 that	 there	 are	 three	 main	 areas	 of	 concern	 around	
healthcare	monitoring	systems.	 	They	state	 that	 the	areas	of	 legal	 compliance,	
privacy	and	security	are	paramount.			
With	 regards	 to	 security,	 we	 would	 assert	 that	 it	 is	 essential	 that	 proposed	
solution	 take	 into	 account	 both	 potential	 attacks	 against	 the	 system,	 and	 the	
security	of	data	within	the	system.		While	Kwak	et	al	state	that	most	papers	they	
reviewed	take	security	against	attack	into	account,	they	do	not	identify	security	
of	 data	 as	 having	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 coverage.	 	 The	 authors	 further	 identify	
privacy	 of	 information,	 the	 obfuscation	 of	 patients	 and	 their	 results,	 and	 the	
encryption	 of	 all	 transmissions	 as	 requirements	 for	 any	 system.	 	 Finally,	 they	
provide	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 legal	 issues	 around	 the	 data	 generated	 by	 such	 a	
system,	relating	to	who	is	responsible	for	the	data	and	its	protection.	
These	issues	are	consistent	with	some	of	the	issues	that	we	have	identified	in	the	
context	of	portable	bio‐monitoring	systems,	especially	in	the	areas	of	privacy	and	
security	for	the	data	collected	and/or	transmitted	by	the	system.		In	relation	to	
the	 specific	 legal	 implications	 of	 the	 system,	 our	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 information	
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technology	aspects	of	the	solution	and	we	will	therefore	consider	the	legal	issues	
for	 healthcare	 systems	 only	 as	 far	 as	 the	 system	 can	 facilitate	 the	 protection,	
proper	storage	and	restriction	of	access	to	data.		The	questions	of	who	owns	the	
data,	and	who	has	the	right	to	access	it	in	a	legal	sense	will	be	other	fields	of	work.	
Hanson	[15]	et	al	identify	a	number	of	the	traits	which	a	medical	bio‐monitoring	
system	must	possess	or	incorporate	into	its	design.		In	this	work,	Hanson	includes	
requirements	such	as:	
 Value	in	relation	to	improved	quality	of	life	
 Safety	in	use	on	the	body	
 Fault	tolerance	
 Security	of	access	and	configuration	
 Privacy	of	information	
 Encryption	of	data	
 Compatibility	of	components	
 Ease	of	use	
 Configurability	
Hanson	 discusses	 the	 componentry	 of	 BAN	 based	 systems	 and	 identifies	 the	
overriding	infrastructure	used	by	such	a	system,	including	Internet	and	Intranet	
connections	 as	 integral	 parts	 of	 the	 architecture.	 	 While	 many	 of	 Hanson’s	
requirements	are	aligned	issues	that	we	have	identified,	Hanson	also	falls	into	the	
common	trap	of	such	research,	where	he	makes	a	fundamental	assumption	of	the	
presence	 of	 the	 supporting	 infrastructure	 including	 a	 ubiquitous	 Internet	
connection.		We	would	contend	that	such	assumptions	should	not	be	made	where	
the	intent	is	for	the	technology	to	be	used	in	any	environment	globally.	
In	our	review	of	the	research,	none	of	the	earlier	papers	mentioned	consider	a	
need	 for	 reconfiguration	 the	 system	while	 it	 is	 deployed	 in	 the	 field.	 	Hanson	
mentions	 configurability	 as	 a	 requirement,	 but	 the	 implication	 is	 that	 such	
configuration	is	set	at	base,	then	left	intact	for	the	duration	of	the	bio‐monitoring	
system’s	deployment.			
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We	would	argue	that	as	readings	change	as	a	result	of	changing	circumstances,	
environments	or	a	change	to	a	patient’s	health,	it	may	be	necessary	to	change	the	
frequency,	 duration	 or	 type	 of	 readings	 taken	 by	 the	 remote	 bio‐monitoring	
system	to	facilitate	the	best	possible	patient	outcomes.		The	ability	to	change	such	
parameters	while	the	system	is	deployed	will	facilitate	higher	levels	of	care	and	
protection	for	the	patient	in	the	case	of	an	adverse	event.	
	
2.4	 Defining	 our	 requirements	 for	 monitoring	 system	
communications	
In	 section	 1.3	 we	 highlighted	 some	 of	 the	 under‐represented	 elements	 of	
communications	in	bio‐monitoring	research.		After	further	review	of	the	work	in	
the	field,	we	can	develop	these	requirements	further	to	mitigate	the	 issues	we	
identified	in	the	existing	body	of	work:	
	 Requirement	 Performance	indicator	
1	 Communications	that	can	to	
link	geographically	diverse	
patients	and	doctors,	
catering	for	changes	in	
communication	link	
availability	as	the	
monitored	subject	moves	
about	their	daily	business	
	
 Remove	the	reliance	on	a	pervasive	
Internet	connection	
 Facilitate	communications	over	more	
than	one	communications	channel	in	
the	same	system	
 Consider	availability	of	
communication	links	in	different	
environments	and	adapt	to	changing	
connectivity	situations	
2	 A	secure	solution	that	can	
protect	the	data	transmitted	
within	the	monitoring	
solution.	
	
 Support	obfuscation	of	data	
 Support	encryption	of	data	
 Do	not	rely	on	assumed	capabilities	of	
the	communications	layer	to	deliver	
security	
3	 Robust	communications	
with	the	ability	to	assure	
transmission	accuracy	and	
identify	missing	messages	
for	a	patient.	
 Support	data	checksums	or	validation	
fields	in	the	message	package	
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	 Requirement	 Performance	indicator	
	  Support	message	identification/	
numbering/	sequencing	inside	the	
message	
4	 Reliable	communications	
infrastructure	with	
communications	link	
redundancy,	carrier	
agnosticism	and	fail‐over	to	
alternative	communication	
when	required.	
	
 Support	fail	over	between	
communications	channels	using	the	
same	message	and	data	
 Select	the	“best”	communications	
channel	based	on	an	application	
specific	algorithm	and	the	carriers	
available	
5	 The	ability	to	be	
reconfigured	remotely	in	
order	to	adapt	to	changing	
circumstances	in	patient	
care.	
	
 Support	for	the	ability	to	send	
extensible	configuration	messages	of	
various	types	
 Allow	the	base	station	to	query	the	
configuration	of	the	remote	system	
Table 1. Requirements	for	bio‐monitoring	communications	
	
When	we	evaluate	some	of	the	systems	proposed	in	recent	research,	they	appear	
to	 fall	down	 in	one	or	more	of	 the	areas	 that	we	would	consider	 to	be	critical	
requirements.		This	is	discussed	in	section	2.5	below.	
	
2.5	Considering	existing	proposed	 systems,	 their	 features	and	
perceived	shortcomings	
Oliver	 [16]	 proposes	 a	 system	 based	 around	 mobile	 smartphones	 using	
additional	sensors	 linked	via	Bluetooth.	 	This	system	is	aimed	at	physiological	
monitoring	 of	 movement	 and	 heart	 rate	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 subject’s	 exercise	
patterns	and	performance.			
This	 is	 a	 simplified	 example	 of	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 where	 the	 data	 is	
aggregated	by	the	smartphone	using	Bluetooth	connections	to	the	sensors,	then	
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stored	locally	in	the	phone.		There	is	no	discussion	of	onwards	transmission	of	
the	data,	nor	is	there	discussion	of	a	mechanism	for	protecting	the	data	on	the	
telephone	 or	 during	 any	 onward	 transmission.	 	 The	 system	 is	 presented	 as	
statically	configured,	and	there	is	no	concept	of	reconfiguration	by	anything	other	
than	direct	interaction.			
There	is	no	information	provide	on	the	reliability	or	security	of	this	body	area	
network,	or	of	how	 the	data	 is	protected	 from	external	attack	or	 interception.		
Additionally,	there	is	no	discussion	of	encryption,	encoding	or	obfuscation	of	the	
data	stored	on	the	smartphone	so	that	 it	 is	protected	should	the	system	(or	at	
least	 the	 smartphone	component)	 fall	 into	 the	wrong	hands.	 	 In	 these	days	of	
privacy	 legislation	 and	 litigation	 for	 misuse	 or	 abuse	 of	 personal	 data,	 the	
omission	of	secure	storage	for	medically‐related	information	could	be	considered	
a	serious	omission	in	the	proposed	solution.	
Vitek	et	al	 [17]	discuss	 the	use	of	ZigBee	 for	 the	 transmission	of	physiological	
information	between	a	patient	and	medical	personnel.		In	their	implementation,	
hardware	and	sensors	for	the	measurement	of	body	temperature	and	pulse	rate	
are	 proposed.	 	 Up	 to	 99	 modules	 can	 be	 used	 and	 interconnected,	 based	 on	
network	constraints.		Data	is	interpreted	on	a	PC	and	stored	there,	so	the	system	
includes	no	capability	for	storage	within	the	wearable	component	of	the	system	
itself.		Vitek	et	al	identify	their	principal	requirements	as	follows:	
"low	power	consumption	of	measuring	modules,	using	of	standardized	wireless	
protocol,	 modular	 conception	 with	 advantage	 of	 simple	 expansion,	 setup	
simplicity,	maintenance	and	low	price.”[17]	
The	 requirements	 do	 not	 mention	 fail‐over	 or	 fault	 tolerance,	 security	 or	
robustness	as	considerations	of	the	solution.		In	addition,	there	is	no	concept	of	
remote	configuration	of	the	system	–	rather,	configuration	seems	to	be	a	function	
of	the	sensors	included	at	the	point	of	commissioning.			
Further	reading	into	the	detail	of	the	paper	identifies	that	AES128	encryption	can	
optionally	be	used	to	ensure	connection	security	between	the	sensors,	but	this	is	
not	 identified	as	a	 core	component	of	 the	solution.	 	 In	addition,	while	 there	 is	
detailed	discussion	about	module	communications	and	the	construction	of	 the	
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various	hardware	devices,	 there	appears	 to	be	no	 concept	of	 fail‐over	or	 fault	
tolerance,	 and	 it	 is	 unclear	 what	 happens	 if	 a	 module	 fails	 or	 is	 subject	 to	
interference	whilst	it	is	an	active	part	of	the	network.			
Modules	added	 to	 the	network	automatically	search	 for	a	compatible	network	
when	 powered	 up,	 but	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 no	 authorisation	 process	 which	
protects	the	modules	from	connecting	to	the	‘wrong’	network.		This	could	lead	to	
the	potential	for	abuse	through	the	hijacking	of	a	module’s	transmissions	into	a	
‘rogue’	network.	 	There	also	appears	to	be	no	ability	to	reconfigure	the	sensor	
sample	intervals	remotely,	if	at	all.		Transmission	error	is	mentioned,	where	the	
authors	state	that	“Absence	or	error	in	received	data	is	displayed	too”	[17]	but	
there	is	no	specific	detail	of	how	errors	can	be	determined	other	than	if	they	occur	
in	the	ZigBee	transmission	and	are	detected	by	ZigBee’s	internal	error	detection	
algorithms.	
Fernandez‐Lopez	[18]	expands	the	use	of	ZigBee	significantly	by	proposing	a	full	
vital	 signs	monitoring	 system	 for	 use	within	 hospitals.	 	 HM4All	 is	 a	 complete	
monitoring	system,	where	sensors	utilising	ZigBee	connect	to	a	coordinator	unit,	
which	aggregates	data	and	sends	it	via	Wi‐Fi	or	Internet	to	the	monitoring	station	
(PC)	or	PDA	of	a	healthcare	provider.	
This	solution	considers	quality	of	service	concerns	and	the	different	sample	rates	
required	of	different	sensors.		The	spatially	distributed	network	used	to	link	the	
sensors	and	sensor	architecture	itself	is	well	developed	and	appears	to	be	well	
conceived,	 using	 ZigBee	 channel	 architecture	 to	 define	 different	 networks	 in	
different	 hospital	 zones.	 	 However,	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 no	 discussion	 of	 data	
encryption	around	the	network.		There	is	also	no	information	on	fault	tolerance	
or	 failure	 handling	 within	 the	 network,	 nor	 how	 the	 specific	 sensors	 are	
authorised	securely	in	that	network.	
The	data	from	the	system	is	aggregated	and	transmitted	over	standard	TCP/IP	
networking	protocols,	either	over	the	Internet	or	via	internal	Wi‐Fi	networks	to	
a	monitoring	station	or	PDA.		There	is	no	discussion	of	transmission	fail‐over	or	
the	 ability	 to	 determine	 if	 a	 sensor	 or	 patient	 has	 fallen	 off	 the	 network.	 	 A	
particular	 concern	 is	 that	 the	 paper	 specifically	 discusses	 the	 use	 of	 HTTP	
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connections	for	data	transfer,	and	despite	the	nature	of	the	data	does	not	require	
encrypted	 connections	 during	 transmission.	 	 This	 leaves	 the	 transmitted	 data	
from	each	patient	in	insecure	packets,	potentially	transmitted	across	the	public	
Internet	in	a	format	that	could	be	intercepted	and	read.	
There	is	no	discussion	of	the	storage	of	data	in	the	context	of	this	solution,	but	it	
is	assumed	that	data	would	be	stored	or	displayed	on	the	monitoring	systems	
(the	PDA	or	PC).		Encryption	is	not	mentioned,	nor	is	data	security	or	privacy,	so	
it	 is	unclear	how	patient	data	 is	safeguarded	from	unauthorised	access	or	use.		
The	serving	of	data	to	“authenticated	clients”	is	mentioned,	but	there	is	no	detail	
of	 how	 this	 authentication	 entails,	 or	 what	 it	 is	 intended	 to	 achieve.	 	 Finally,	
remote	 (re)configuration	 is	 absent	 from	 the	 features	 and	 capabilities	 of	 the	
proposed	system.	
Once	 again,	 this	 is	 an	 extremely	 well‐conceived	 concept	 where	 the	 focus	 is	
predominantly	on	the	bio‐monitoring	system.		The	work	focuses	on	key	aspects	
of	the	system,	but	does	not	address	all	real‐world	concerns	and	assumes	that	the	
infrastructure	is	always	present	and	inherently	reliable.	
Wu	et	al	[19]	present	a	system	which	is	“a	general	architecture	for	a	wearable	
sensor	 system	 that	 can	 be	 customized	 to	 an	 individual	 patient’s	 needs.	 This	
architecture	 is	 based	 on	 embedded	 artificial	 intelligence	 that	 permits	
autonomous	operation,	sensor	management	and	inference,	and	may	be	applied	
to	a	general	purpose	wearable	medical	diagnostics”	[19].	
Their	Medic	system	is	presented	as	a	fully	developed	architecture	of	sensors,	data	
aggregators,	 body	 area	 networks,	 localised	 transmission	 networks	 and	 the	
Internet.		However,	as	they	state,	“The	system	relies	on	the	established	Internet	
network	infrastructure	in	the	first	tier,	and	then	standard,	ubiquitous	wireless	or	
GPRS	or	cellular	data	technologies	(Wi‐Fi	or	general	packet	radio	service	(GPRS))	
in	the	second	tier”	[19].		The	system	assumes	the	presence	of	a	pervasive	Internet	
connection	as	a	fundamental	component	of	the	overall	solution.		In	addition,	the	
system	appears	to	assume	the	inherent	reliability	of	the	Internet	connection	as	a	
fundamental	reliable	and	fault	tolerant	transfer	method.		
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Either	Bluetooth	or	ZigBee	are	potential	communications	links	for	the	nodes	of	
the	BAN.		While	the	BAN	itself	is	not	encrypted,	the	authors	provide	for	security	
of	 the	 transmissions	 between	 monitoring	 system	 and	 doctor’s	 base	 station,	
through	 the	 use	 of	 SSH	 communications.	 	 The	 authors	 also	 discuss	 further	
development	of	 the	system	to	use	alternative	methods	of	secure	data	transfer,	
although	the	incorporation	of	such	methods	is	deferred	to	further	research.	
The	 Medic	 data	 is	 aggregated	 into	 a	 central	 medical	 monitor	 accessed	 by	
healthcare	professionals.	 	There	 is	no	discussion	of	security	of	storage	 for	 this	
data.		Finally,	they	mention	that	the	ability	to	remotely	configure	sensors	would	
be	desirable,	but	that	the	system	is	currently	static	in	configuration.		This	is	listed	
as	an	area	for	possible	future	research.	
Medic	 provides	 the	 best	 conceived	 overall	 approach	 to	 a	 real‐world	 system,	
including	 security	 in	 transmissions,	 a	 fully	 realised	 sensor	 and	 transmission	
architecture	and	acceptance	of	the	need	for	remote	and	flexible	configuration	of	
the	sensors	and	remote	system.		However,	the	system	is	aimed	at	the	novel	area	
of	predictive	symptoms	analysis,	using	the	readings	from	the	sensor	network	to	
predict	the	current	and	future	state	of	the	patient	and	thus	act	on	this	data.		As	
such,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 not	 on	 the	 underlying	 transport	 and	
communications	infrastructure,	the	security	or	the	real‐world	use	of	the	system	
to	remotely	monitor	patients	–	these	are	component	blocks	that	are	assumed	to	
exist	so	the	researchers	can	achieve	their	aims.			
We	 would	 contend	 that	 a	 discussion	 on	 transmission	 fail‐over,	 the	 ability	 to	
reconfigure	 the	 remote	 sensors	 and	 remote	monitoring	 controller,	 security	 of	
data	 and	 alternatives	 to	 Internet	 to	 allow	 the	 system	 to	 be	 used	 in	 a	 remote	
location	use	would	enhance	this	system	significantly.	
Tay	 [20]	 discusses	 “a	 remote	 vital	 signs	monitoring	 system,	 which	 integrates	
wireless	body	area	network	(WBAN)	and	personal	digital	assistant	(PDA)	phone	
technology.	Four	different	physiological	signs,	e.g.,	ECG,	SpO2,	temperature	and	
blood	 pressure,	 can	 be	 continuously	 acquired	 or	 derived	 from	 two	 wireless	
sensor	 nodes—ECG	 sensor	 and	 integrated	 SpO2/temperature	 sensor.	 Once	
sentinel	 events	 happened	 or	 the	 request	 to	 real‐time	 display	 vital	 signs	 is	
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confirmed,	 all	 physiological	 signs	 and	 critical	 indices	 will	 be	 immediately	
transmitted	 to	 patient’s	 PDA	 phone	 through	 Bluetooth	 and	 further	 relayed	 to	
doctor’s	 PDA	 phone	 through	 global	 system	 for	 mobile	 communication	 (GSM)	
technology”	[20].			
MEMSWear	is	an	excellent	example	of	a	class	of	research	that	proposes	systems	
to	suit	a	very	specific	need	and	is	therefore	only	viable	in	a	particular	situation	or	
location.		For	example,	MEMSWear	is	proposed	for	use	in	Singapore,	and	assumes	
that	country’s	100%	coverage	of	GSM	mobile	telecommunications	as	an	integral	
part	of	its	implementation.	
The	system	consists	of	a	BAN	with	ECG	and	SpO2	sensors	integrated	with	a	central	
processing	unit	(CPU)	which	stores	all	of	the	patient	sensor	data.		This	CPU	can	
accept	 remote	 requests	 for	 data	 from	 a	 Personal	 Digital	 Assistant	 (PDA)	 or	
smartphone,	and	will	respond	to	such	requests	through	the	transmission	of	the	
sensor	data	to	the	PDA	and	the	subsequent	processing	of	that	data	in	some	way.	
Processing	of	data	may	occur	in	order	to	raise	an	alarm,	store	the	data	or	transmit	
it	on	to	a	medical	professional’s	PDA	or	phone.		At	the	medical	professional’s	end,	
the	data	can	be	stored,	alarmed	or	displayed	for	use.	
This	system	is	novel	in	the	way	that	it	presents	the	sensors	(by	way	of	a	wearable	
shirt	 featuring	 the	 sensors	 embedded	 into	 the	 garment).	 	 MEMSWear	 also	
exhibits	what	we	contend	are	some	of	the	common	shortcomings	in	such	systems.		
For	example,	the	BAN	is	not	secured	or	encrypted.		On	the	patient	side,	neither	
the	CPU	nor	the	PDA	stores	the	data	in	encrypted	form	or	protects	the	data	for	
unauthorised	access.		On	the	doctor’s	side,	the	same	“security	of	data”	issues	are	
apparent.	 	 Furthermore,	 transmission	 of	 the	 data	 via	 GSM	 does	 not	 discuss	
encryption,	obfuscation	or	data	security.		It	is	assumed	that	the	inherent	‘security’	
of	GSM	is	sufficient.		However,	GSM	communications	including	SMS	are	encrypted	
using	the	A5	family	of	algorithms,	A5/1,	A5/2	and	A5/3	[21].		GSM	encryption	is	
provided	between	the	phone	and	the	mobile	network	and	can	be	used	to	prevent	
casual	 eavesdropping	 during	 calls	 or	 transmissions.	 	 In	 recent	 years,	 A5	
algorithms	 have	 been	 broken/cracked,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 published	 solutions	
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allow	 decryption	 of	 GSM	 based	mobile	 transmissions	 encrypted	 using	 the	 A5	
algorithm	family	(potentially	in	real	time)	[21,	22].			
Finally,	 the	 ability	 to	 configure	 the	 system	 remotely	 is	 absent	 –	 in	 fact,	 the	
implication	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 that	 configuration	 is	 fixed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 novel	
presentation	of	the	sensors	in	garment	form.	
Hu	et	al’s	paper	[23]	presents	a	sensor	network	to	monitor	patient	health.		The	
primary	focus	of	this	work	is	on	the	sensor	communications	inside	the	BAN,	with	
a	model	featuring	sensors	for	oxygen	saturation,	heart	rate	and	blood	pressure.			
Hu	proposes	a	method	 through	which	 the	communications	of	 the	sensors	 to	a	
data	aggregator	such	as	a	PDA	can	be	made	more	resilient	and	more	tolerant	of	
network	conditions	inside	the	BAN.		The	quality	of	service	and	resiliency	of	the	
network	 communications	 is	 paramount	 in	 this	 work.	 	 A	 proposed	 system	
illustrates	 how	 the	 sensors	 operate.	 	 It	 describes	 how	 various	 sensors	 can	
transmit	data	to	an	aggregator,	and	the	aggregator	can	send	data	on	to	some	other	
point	via	a	wireless	data	relay	model	where	data	is	hopped	from	one	aggregator	
to	another	in	the	‘right’	direction.		There	is	no	discussion	of	transmission	security,	
how	aggregators	 are	 identified	and/or	 authorised,	 and	how	 transmissions	 are	
encoded,	encrypted	or	obfuscated	to	prevent	misuse.		Configuration	is	a	function	
of	sensors	present	in	the	network,	but	appears	fixed	once	deployed.		The	system	
does	 not	 assume	 an	 ever‐present	 Internet	 connection,	 as	 its	 own	 network	 of	
sensors	 and	 aggregators	 facilitates	 the	 onward	 transmissions	 to	 a	monitoring	
station.	
Otto	 [12]	proposes	a	 solution	 that	provides	a	highly	 configurable	 system	with	
user‐definable	options	at	virtually	every	level.		This	solution	consists	of	sensors	
linked	 to	 an	 aggregator/processor	 in	 a	 BAN,	 with	 the	 aggregator	 linked	 to	 a	
central	monitoring	station	using	Internet.		The	aggregator	can	store	data	locally.		
In	this	solution,	the	BAN	can	utilise	Bluetooth	or	ZigBee,	the	personal	network	
controller	can	be	a	PC,	mobile	phone	or	PDA,	and	the	end	point	can	be	any	one	of	
a	number	of	systems	and	users.			
Given	 the	 degree	 of	 configurability	 of	 the	 system	 components,	 the	 system	 is	
exceptionally	flexible	and	its	features	are	comprehensive.		The	paper	is	the	first	
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to	discuss	encryption	of	the	BAN	and	other	transmissions,	and	makes	a	note	of	
error	correction	in	BAN	network	signals.		However,	the	system	does	not	visibly	
incorporate	 fault	 tolerance	 on	 communications	 transmissions,	 and	 does	 not	
discuss	how	data	transmissions	from	the	remote	system	to	the	central	monitor	
can	be	validated	and	assured	for	accuracy.			
Once	again,	Internet	is	assumed.		While	the	authors	state	that	“Patient	privacy,	an	
outstanding	issue	and	a	requirement	by	law,	must	be	addressed	at	all	tiers	in	the	
healthcare	system”	[12]	this	is	contextualised	in	relation	to	data	transmissions	
and	the	removal	of	personal	data	before	medical	information	is	stored	in	research	
databases.		It	is	not	related	to	either	the	local	storage	on	the	wearable	system,	or	
on	the	central	monitoring	station.	
In	 a	 recent	 patent	 application	 [24],	 Ali	 et	 al	 discuss	 a	 wearable	 medical	
monitoring	 system	 that	 incorporates	 a	 cognitive	 transmitter	 that	 “checks	
detected	frequency	spectra	for	unused	bandwidth	and	recommends	one	or	more	
bands	 on	 which	 to	 transmit	 clinically	 relevant	 information	 received”.	 	 This	
transmitter	 allows	 a	 short	 range	 local	 system	 to	 frequency	 hop	 around	 an	
allocation	for	communications	purposes,	essentially	finding	the	best	signal	path	
back	to	the	base	station.		This	provides	the	wearable	monitor	with	a	better	set	of	
transmission	path	options.		However,	from	our	perspective,	we	would	assert	that	
while	 this	 is	 fine	 in	 a	 controlled	 usage	 scenario	 (i.e.	 for	 hospital	 based	
monitoring),	 the	 proposed	 solution	 is	 dependent	 on	 a	 single	 communication	
carrier	back	to	base.		If	the	underlying	carrier	is	not	available,	this	system	will	fail.		
No	alternate	transmission	mechanisms	are	present	if	no	frequency	is	currently	
available	 for	use	within	 the	bandwidth	 range	allocation	granted	 to	 the	device.		
This	may	mean	the	proposed	solution	will	suffer	from	congestion	as	more	devices	
in	the	network	consume	more	of	the	frequency.	
Lubecke	 et	 al	 [25]	 propose	 that	 the	 ever	 increasing	 Internet	 of	 Things	 could	
facilitate	 e‐Health	 monitoring	 in	 the	 home.	 	 They	 note	 that	 as	 monitoring	
capabilities	 become	 more	 pervasive,	 so	 too	 will	 privacy	 and	 security	 issues	
around	patient	data	become	more	concerning.		Their	paper	identifies	many	ways	
in	which	the	Internet	of	Things	can	assist	in	pervasive	monitoring	of	patients,	but	
	
	 33	 	
	
they	do	not	propose	 solutions	 for	 the	 security	 and	privacy	 concerns	 that	 they	
raise.	
Zhan	et	al	[26]	discuss	the	ability	of	wearable	systems	to	sample	and	interact	with	
the	environment	immediately	around	the	subject,	in	their	case	specifically	to	do	
with	atmospheric	characteristics	such	as	Carbon	Dioxide	and	Oxygen	content	in	
an	 astronaut’s	 environment.	 	 The	 solution	 interacts	 directly	 with	 the	 subject	
being	monitored,	 using	 “sound	 and	 vibration	 if	 any	 dangerous	 thresholds	 are	
surpassed”.		In	this	system,	the	communication	with	the	base	station	via	wireless	
technologies	is	discussed,	and	a	single	transmission	carrier	enabled	(which	one	
may	 argue	 could	 be	 suitable	 for	 an	 application	 such	 as	 astronaut	monitoring,	
where	this	is	little	opportunity	to	leave	the	immediate	confines	of	the	spacecraft.	
Yexing	and	Lin	[27]	identify	capabilities	for	“transmission	of	command	data	to	base	
station	and	sensor,	including	positioning	instructions,	request	data	instructions	and	
configuration	 instructions.	 The	 system	 receives	 data	 from	 base	 station,	 including	
patient	 calls,	 vital	 sign	 data,	 configuration	 data,	 location	 data	 and	 command	
implementation	 return	 value”.	 	 Their	 solution	 relies	 on	 ZigBee	 to	 provide	 links	
between	the	base	and	monitors,	and	while	low	power,	this	restricts	the	range	over	
which	the	solution	can	operate.		They	elaborate	that	the	design	leaves	much	still	to	
study,	“such	as	information	security,	…,	fault	tolerance	mechanism	etc.	“.		We	would	
concur	with	their	assessment	that,	while	their	solution	offers	a	very	well	realised	bio‐
monitoring	 solution	using	 low	power	 components,	 there	 is	 additional	work	 to	be	
done	in	order	to	make	a	real‐world	solution.		
Huang	et	al	[28]	discuss	a	“universal	interface”	that	can	be	used	to	integrate	modules	
of	wearable	medical	monitoring	 equipment.	 	 They	 propose	 a	 solution	where	 “all	
kinds	of	function	modules	and	host	of	a	remote	medical	monitoring	equipment”	can	
be	 interconnected	 into	 a	 single	 system.	 	 Their	 implementation	 “improved	 the	
flexibility	of	monitoring	equipment	but	also	reduced	 the	complexity	of	 the	design	
processes”	by	allowing	a	modular	design	in	the	wearable	system	allowing	modules	
to	 be	 swapped	 appropriately.	 	 The	 system	 proposed	 in	 this	 paper	 addresses	
requirements	that	we	consider	essential	in	real‐world	multi‐purpose	bio‐monitors	
and	 would	 sit	 comfortably	 beside	 our	 own	 work	 in	 the	 communications	 layer	
between	the	wearable	system	and	the	base	station.	
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Brandao	[29]	proposes	a	middleware	application	to	aggregate	the	information	from	
BAN	sensors	while	providing	a	common	platform	for	a	monitoring	system	to	query	
those	 sensors.	 	 Again,	 such	 a	 solution	would	 provide	 an	 ideal	 hardware	 agnostic	
middleware	to	an	application	using	our	proposed	communications	platform.	
	
2.6	Additional	issues	to	be	considered	
Our	review	of	the	many	proposed	systems	and	works	in	the	field	has	identified	
numerous	other	issues	which	could	be	considered	in	relation	to	this	work.	
Postema	 [30]	 identifies	 that	 a	 key	 factor	 preventing	 implementation	 of	 home	
healthcare	systems	is	stability	of	internal	and	external	environments	in	which	the	
healthcare	 system	 operates.	 	 This	 could	 easily	 apply	 to	 the	 stability	 and	
availability	 of	 the	 network	 communications	 systems	 to	 support	 a	 monitoring	
system.	
Boyle	 [31]	 identifies	 issues	 with	 wireless	 technologies	 which	 should	 be	
considered	 for	 wearable	 monitoring	 systems.	 	 Specifically,	 Boyle	 refers	 to	
electromagnetic	 interference	 issues	 around	 various	 wireless	 technologies,	
implications	for	transmission	reliability	and	interference	between	devices	where	
numerous	different	devices	may	be	used	in	a	small	area.		Boyle	also	discusses	the	
potential	 health	 issues	 related	 to	 electromagnetic	 waves,	 and	 that	 we	 must	
maintain	awareness	of	downsides	 to	 the	 technology,	evaluating	 their	potential	
impacts	in	light	of	the	overarching	benefits	of	the	systems	being	used.	
Boyle’s	work	is	intended	as	a	guide	to	the	issues,	not	a	proposed	solution,	and	it	
is	successful	in	expanding	on	potential	problems	when	large	numbers	of	wireless	
electromagnetic	radiation	emitters	are	placed	in	a	small	area.	 	However,	while	
Boyle’s	issues	are	significant,	they	are	also	relatively	well	known	and	documented	
outside	 the	 research	 area.	 	 Boyle	 himself	 cites	 37	 associated	 works	 and	
references,	most	of	which	relate	to	investigations	and	remediation	of	interference	
issues	in	the	EM	spectrum.		We	consider	these	issues	to	be	well	documented	and	
the	subject	of	sufficient	research	effort	to	exclude	further	consideration	here.	
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Yang	et	al	 [32]	 speaks	 to	 research	 in	 this	 transmissions,	and	outlines	how	 the	
switch	 from	 GHz	 to	 THz	 communications	 has	 facilitated	 new	 concepts	 in	
communications	 to	 be	 evaluated	 for	 short	 range	 use	 within	 the	 body,	 thus	
facilitating	 addition	 types	of	 sensors	 and	 “network	on	a	 chip”	 applications	 for	
health	 monitoring.	 	 While	 these	 are	 novel	 new	 uses	 of	 the	 increasing	
communications	technologies	that	are	being	developed,	they	do	not	address	the	
underlying	concerns	that	we	have.	
Additional	 work	 into	 transmission	 is	 ongoing.	 	 Traille	 et	 al	 discuss	 novel	
approaches	to	antenna	technology	using	liquid	antennae	to	bypass	some	of	the	
issues	of	using	metallic	antennae	close	to	the	body.	[33]	while	[34]	discuss	the	
use	of	3D	printing	technology	for	the	creation	of	BAN	network	antenna	in	more	
recent	research.	
Additional	recent	works	 in	 the	book	published	by	Springer,	edited	by	Mehmet	
Yuce	[35]	cover	a	number	of	the	issues	around	communications	between	nodes	
in	 the	monitor	network	or	over	 short	 ranges	 to	 local	base	stations.	 	UWB	and	
60Ghz	communications	links	are	attractive	as	they	can	facilitate	massive	amounts	
of	bandwidth	over	short	distances,	in	some	cases	up	to	multi‐gigabit	links.		The	
focus	here	is	on	the	communications	between	the	Wireless	Body	Area	Network	
nodes,	and	the	 implementation	of	the	UWB	communications.	 	Again,	 this	work	
supplements	the	work	we	are	undertaking	but	does	not	offer	a	solution	to	the	
issues	of	link	redundancy,	fail	over	and	best	signal	path	selection	over	distance.	
Ameen	 [36]	 identifies	 a	 number	 of	 quality	 of	 service	 issues	 with	 body	 area	
networks,	 specifically	 focusing	 on	 issues	 around	 overall	 quality	 of	 service	 on	
wireless	body	area	networks	(WBAN),	routing	support	for	QoS	in	WBANs,	and	
using	energy	efficiency	as	an	input	to	QoS	calculations	inside	the	network.		Again,	
all	of	these	issues	are	highly	relevant	to	the	overall	field	of	wearable,	portable	bio‐
monitoring	systems.		However,	as	these	issues	relate	more	generically	to	WBAN	
data	not	 specifically	 to	 their	 use	 in	medical	monitoring,	we	 choose	 to	 exclude	
these	 items	 from	 our	 issue	 list	 and	 leave	 their	 pursuit	 to	 more	 specialised	
researchers	in	this	particular	field.	
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Gatton	[37]	discusses	the	standards	by	which	healthcare	data	can	be	encoded	and	
stored.	 	 It	 references	 the	 IEEE1457	and	HL7	medical	document	standards	and	
discusses	how	HL7	 is	a	more	suitable	 standard	 for	medical	data	 transmission.		
The	 paper	 further	 speaks	 to	 the	 requirements	 of	 those	 standards,	 including	
encryption	of	data,	privacy	and	encoding	of	the	medical	data,	each	of	which	aligns	
with	one	or	more	of	the	issues	we	have	previously	identified.	
We	believe	that	the	issues	identified	within	Gatton’s	paper	are	compatible	with	
our	 own	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 security	 of	 the	 data	 in	 storage	 and	 during	
transmission.		The	advantage	of	Gatton’s	work	is	that	it	introduces	a	use	for	an	
existing	 data	 storage	 standard	 which	 facilitates	 the	 concise	 and	 regimented	
transmission	 of	 medical	 data.	 	 When	 overlaid	 with	 our	 own	 communications	
protocol	 to	 facilitate	 system	 functionality	 such	 as	 remote	 configuration	 and	
missing	message	identification,	we	believe	that	the	work	outlined	by	Gatton	et	al	
could	prove	to	be	immensely	beneficial.			
Ramsetter	 [4]	 identifies	 a	 number	 of	 issues	with	 pervasive,	 portable	wireless	
network	 systems	 such	 as	 the	 medical	 monitoring	 systems	 in	 which	 we	 are	
interested.	 	While	not	 specifically	 relating	 to	medical	monitoring,	Ramstetter’s	
work	identifies	a	number	of	issues	which	should	be	considered	around	wireless	
user‐centric	systems.			
Ramstetter’s	concern	lies	predominantly	in	the	possibility	of	an	attack	on	such	a	
system,	using	either	side	channel	leaks	(where	an	attacker	surreptitiously	joins	
and	eavesdrops	on	the	network	through	close	proximity	to	the	transmission)	or	
a	lack	of	network	trust	(for	example,	when	a	transmission	device	connects	to	a	
public	access	point	where	neither	the	provider	nor	the	security	of	the	network	
can	be	 established).	 	 	We	believe	 that	Ramstetter’s	work	 aligns	with	 our	 own	
issues,	 as	 the	 paper	 discusses	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 wireless	 body	 area	
network	 is	 secure	 because	 of	 its	 short	 range,	 not	 because	 the	 operator	 of	 the	
solution	has	planned	and	implemented	methods	to	make	it	inherently	secure.			
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2.7	Onward	from	here	
We	identified	several	potential	shortcomings	in	the	current	research	that	can	be	
addressed.		Each	proposed	system	reviewed	lacks	at	least	some	of	the	features	
we	identified	as	requirements	in	table	1.		Whilst,	on	a	per‐application	basis,	the	
systems	evaluated	may	meet	a	specific	defined	need,	we	contend	that	all	of	the	
issues	we	identified	should	be	addressed	in	a	truly	robust	and	reliable	medical	
monitoring	system.		Thus,	we	believe	that	such	systems	would	be	enhanced	by	
the	 provision	 of	 the	 carrier	 agnostic	 communications	 we	 are	 proposing,	 its	
capability	 to	 control	 and	 configure	 the	monitoring	 system,	 and	 the	 improved	
reliability	implications	that	the	implementation	of	this	platform	provides.	
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3. 	ALTERNATIVE	
COMMUNICATIONS	MECHANISMS	
TO	TRANSMIT	BIO‐MONITORING	
DATA	
We	review	the	types	of	medical	data	that	may	be	transmitted	as	part	of	a	bio‐
monitoring	solution.		In	the	context	of	these	data	types,	we	evaluate	alternative	
communications	 methods	 to	 Internet	 and	 evaluate	 their	 applicability	 for	 the	
transmission	of	bio‐monitoring	data.			
We	examine	how	we	might	 implement	a	multi‐carrier	system	able	 to	evaluate	
available	carriers,	select	the	optimal	signal	path	on	an	application‐specific	basis	
and	thus	provide	a	more	capable	communications	platform	for	transmitting	data	
from	a	mobile	system	to	a	base	station.	
	
3.1	Medical	data	types	
A	 fundamental	 assertion	 of	 this	 work	 is	 that	 the	 application	 using	 our	
communications	solution	is	a	bio‐monitoring	system.		On	this	basis,	we	must	look	
for	 alternative	 communication	methods	 that	 allow	 us	 to	 transmit	 and	 receive	
medical	data	values.			
There	are	a	number	of	data	items	that	we	might	conceivably	send	from	such	a	
system	to	a	home	base	or	monitoring	station.		Budinger	[38]	discusses	some	of	
the	data	types	we	might	want	to	encode	as	the	output	of	a	bio‐monitoring	system.		
The	table	below	summarises	the	types,	sizes	and	ranges	of	medical	data	that	we	
might	 consider	 as	 the	 subject	 of	 transmissions	 through	 our	 communications	
system.	
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Type	 Min	 Max Unit	of	measure Data	type	 #	Octets	
required	to	
encode	the	
data	
Temperature	 0	 ~50	 Degrees	C	 Binary	
integer	
1	
Heart	Rate	 0	 ~200	 Beats	per	minute	 Binary	
integer	
1	
Blood	Pressure	 0	 ~200	 mmHg	(x	2	
measurements)	
Binary	
integer	
2	
Respiration	rate	 0	 ~50	 Breaths	per	minute	 Binary	
integer	
1	
Blood	oxygen	
concentration	
0	 100	 Percentage	Oxygen	
Saturation	(SpO2)	
Binary	
integer	
1	
Blood	glucose	
concentration	
0.0	 ~50.0	 Mmol/L	–	a	decimal	
value	(to	1	decimal	
place)	
Binary	coded	
decimal	
2	
Table 2. Medical	data	types	
Notes:	
One	may	argue	 that	body	 temperature	 could	 be	 sub‐zero	 if	 the	 body	 is	dead	and	 tissue	 frozen.		
However,	a	bio‐monitoring	system	is	for	live	patients,	and,	given	hypothermia	sets	in	when	the	body	
core	is	below	35	degrees	Celsius[39]	and	death	will	follow	if	this	is	not	treated,	a	temperature	of	0	
degrees	Celsius	means	the	subject	is	dead,	and	any	lower	value	will	not	make	the	subject	more	or	less	
deceased.	
The	above	table	is	not	an	exhaustive	list	of	medical	data	types,	but	illustrates	the	
sorts	 of	 data	 we	 might	 conceivably	 send	 from	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 system.	 We	
acknowledge	 that	 there	are	other	medical	and	biometric	data	types	 that	could	
conceivably	be	transmitted,	and	we	discuss	some	limitations	to	the	data	we	might	
transmit	in	a	later	section	of	this	chapter.	
To	 encode	 such	data,	we	must	 cater	 for	 the	 predominant	 features	 of	 the	 data	
types:	
 Values	are	predominantly	positive	integers.		Negative	encoding	may	not	be	
required	depending	on	 the	nature	of	 the	data	 to	be	 transmitted.	 	This	can	
reduce	the	encoding	overhead	for	data	(i.e.	no	need	for	two’s	complement	
encoding).	
	
 Most	values	have	small	range.		Many	can	be	encapsulated	in	a	single	octet	(i.e.	
0	 –	 255)	 but	 some	 measurements	 may	 require	 multiple	 values	 to	 have	
	
	 40	 	
	
relevance.		For	example,	blood	pressure	comprises	two	single	octet	values	–	
i.e.	120/80.			
 Some	measurement	 data	 types	may	 require	 higher	 precision	 values	 –	 for	
example,	blood	glucose	is	a	decimal	value	when	measured	in	Mmol/L.	
In	summary,	values	have	different	ranges	for	the	maximum,	but	none	of	the	data	
set	above	exceeds	the	capacity	of	a	single	octet	number	(255).		However,	some	
decimal	values	are	required.	
If	data	to	be	encoded,	for	a	single	measurement,	will	typically	fit	within	the	range	
of	a	single	octet	(with	maximum	of	2	octets	required	for	larger	values	outlined	
above),	it	is	possible	to	store	many	discrete	elements	of	such	biometric	data	even	
in	a	small	data	packet.		This	means	it	may	be	feasible	for	us	to	consider	using	an	
SMS	(text)	message,	capable	of	transmitting	140	octets	in	a	single	message,	for	
communications.	 	This	could	facilitate	transmission	of	over	100	measurements	
assuming	there	was	a	small	overhead	required	in	the	underlying	communications	
mechanism.	
	
3.2	Limitations	to	the	data	we	can	transmit	
We	are	 able	 to	 transmit	 a	 variety	of	medical	data	values	 in	 a	 small	 volume	of	
transmission	data	capacity.		However,	if	we	consider	data	transmission	methods	
that	are	not	limitless	in	terms	of	available	transmission	length	(for	example,	an	
SMS	of	140	octets)	we	must	consider	what	limitations	this	imposes.	
In	a	limited	data	space,	we	may	not	be	able	to	feasibly	encode	data	that	requires	
a	 continuous	 analogue	 data	 stream,	 such	 as	 an	 electroencephalograph	 (brain	
wave)	measurement,	 a	pulse	wave	 form	or	electrocardiogram	(heart	beat	and	
activity	measurements).		While	such	data	is	able	to	be	encoded	in	a	digital	form	
that	has	a	meaningful	resolution	for	doctors,	recording	and	transmission	of	this	
data	 can	 require	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 data	 capacity.	 	 The	 American	 Heart	
Association	stated	that	a	single	electrocardiogram	could	require	a	total	of	1.36	
gigabytes	to	record	it	at	meaningful	resolution	[40].			
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The	 implication	 of	 this	 is	 that	 for	 some	medical	 data,	 we	may	 not	 be	 able	 to	
transport	 large	 analogue	 data	 types	 if	 we	 incorporate	 length	 limited	
communications.	 	This	 is	an	advantage	of	mechanisms	such	as	Internet,	where	
data	size	is	virtually	unlimited.		We	consider	the	ability	to	send	large	volumes	of	
data	and	their	impact	on	our	choices	of	carrier,	later	in	this	work.	
	
3.3	Mobile	Internet	–	is	it	the	only	choice?	
While	we	would	not	argue	that	Internet	is	an	ideal	transmission	medium	for	data,	
as	 discussed	 in	 Appendix	 G	 there	 are	 limitations	 to	 the	 availability	 of	mobile	
Internet	by	virtue	of	limitations	of	related	mobile	communications	infrastructure.		
Access	 to	 suitable	 mobile	 telephone	 services	 or	 gaps	 in	 geographic	 coverage	
mean	that	mobile	Internet	is	not	available	everywhere.			
If	we	assume	mobile	Internet	is	our	communication	method	of	choice,	we	must	
assume	the	presence	of	 suitable	mobile	services	 to	provide	access	 to	 Internet.		
Coverage	 information	 from	 carrier	web	 sites	 (appendix	 G)	 shows	 that	mobile	
services	in	many	areas	provide	a	minimum	service	level	of	GSM900	and	GSM1800	
services.	 	While	 this	may	provide	mobile	 telephony	and	a	mobile	modem	data	
connection,	it	is	not	necessarily	a	service	level	that	will	enable	3G	or	other	high	
speed	 data	 services.	 	 GSM900	 and	 GSM1800	 network	 services	 provide	 phone	
services	including	SMS	[41]	but	they	do	not	necessarily	implement	higher	speed	
data	services	for	Mobile	Internet.	 	While	data	services	are	part	of	the	standard	
GSM	(2nd	generation)	specifications	[41‐43],	mobile	data	transmission	 is	much	
slower	 than	 3G	 and	 4G	 Internet	 equivalents.	 	 Mobile	 data	 also	 requires	 a	
persistent,	 reliable	 mobile	 connection	 and	 some	 implementations	 of	 GSM	 2G	
services	do	not	support	“always	on”	data	connections,	mainly	implementing	GPRS	
data	which	is	a	timeslot	shared	service	with	potential	bandwidth	restrictions	and	
service	delivery	delays	[44].	
If	 carriers	 show	a	minimum	service	 level	of	GSM900	and	GSM1800	where	 the	
presence	 of	 mobile	 Internet	 is	 not	 clear,	 we	 believe	 that	 one	 cannot	 make	 a	
reliable	assumption	that	robust	mobile	Internet	connectivity	is	available	globally,	
or	even	globally	across	the	so‐called	developed	nations	of	the	world.	
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If	we	cannot	assume	Internet	wireless	connectivity,	is	it	fair	to	state	that	mobile	
Internet	is	the	only	choice	for	wearable	biometric	monitoring	systems?		If	we	can	
guarantee	full	control	of	the	use	case	for	a	wearable	bio‐monitoring	system	–	that	
is,	we	define	where	the	system	is	used	and	with	what	supporting	infrastructure,	
we	can	also	assert	that	a	mobile	wearable	bio‐monitoring	system	can	use	mobile	
Internet?		However,	for	the	system	to	be	truly	mobile	and	usable	anywhere,	we	
cannot	assume	mobile	Internet	exists.	
If	other	transmission	mechanisms	are	available	to	the	user,	and:	they	provide	the	
application	with	a	data	transmission	capacity	into	which	the	sorts	of	biometric	
data	we	have	discussed	can	be	encoded;	and	assuming	they	facilitate	a	level	of	
robustness	 for	 data	 transmission	 that	 is	 commensurate	 with	 the	 medical	
monitoring	purpose	to	which	we	will	put	the	carrier,	then	should	we	not	use	these	
alternate	 mechanisms	 as	 potential	 candidates	 to	 mobile	 Internet	 for	 the	
transmission	of	biometric	data?			
	
3.4	Communications	requirements	
To	consider	alternate	data	communications	method	to	mobile	Internet,	we	must	
understand	the	data	transmission	requirements	we	must	meet	‐	specifically,	what	
factors	 constitute	 a	 useful	 data	 communications	 mechanism	 for	 medical	
monitoring.	
Data	Capacity	
To	transmit	medical	data,	we	must	have	at	least	some	capacity	to	transmit	data.		
For	the	purposes	of	evaluation,	we	must	define	how	small	a	user	data	segment	
can	be	useful	to	us	before	the	overhead	of	the	management	and	assurance	of	the	
data	outweighs	the	usefulness	of	the	carrier	itself.			
In	our	paper	on	the	use	of	SMS	for	encoding	and	transmission	of	data	[45],	we	
showed	 that	 the	data	capacity	of	an	SMS	message	 (140	octets)	 can	be	used	 to	
carry	a	variety	of	data	for	medical	monitoring.		Table	2	shows	many	types	of	data	
that	can	be	encoded	and	transmitted	in	one	or	two	octets.		If	we	consider	the	SMS	
and	its	140‐octet	capacity	as	the	lowest	limit	we	will	accept	for	a	practical	and	
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useful	data	transmission,	we	can	establish	a	baseline	for	the	capacity	of	the	data	
transmissions.	 	 (As	 an	 aside,	 consider	 that	 6	 –	 8	 SMS	 can	 be	 concatenated	
relatively	 reliably	 with	 little	 probability	 of	 packet	 loss	 in	 the	 concatenated	
message	[46],	this	means	our	140	octet	packet	can	be	multiplied	up	to	8	fold	for	
a	total	of	for	a	total	of	1120	octets	of	message	capacity.	)	
Transmission	distance	
We	 should	 consider	 the	 distance	 over	which	we	might	wish	 to	 transmit	 data.		
Bluetooth	or	ZigBee	could	be	used	for	data	transmission.		However,	if	we	add	the	
requirement	for	transmission	over	significant	distance	(for	example,	assuming	a	
use	 case	 of	 a	 doctor	 in	 the	 hospital	 monitoring	 a	 patient	 at	 home)	 we	 can	
therefore	 potentially	 define	 a	 set	 of	 communications	 methods	 that	 excludes	
certain	common	short‐range	communications	such	as	ZigBee,	Bluetooth	and	ad‐
hoc	 Wi‐Fi	 and	 focus	 only	 on	 those	 methods	 that	 facilitate	 longer	 range	
communication.			
For	medical	monitoring,	we	believe	a	1km	minimum	establishes	a	useful	baseline	
for	data	transfer	between	base	station	and	patient.		This	baseline	was	established	
by	reviewing	the	campus	sizes	of	a	number	of	prominent	hospitals	such	as	the	
Royal	 Children’s	 Hospital,	 Austin	 Hospital	 and	 Monash	 Medical	 Centre,	 all	 in	
Melbourne.	
User	defined	data	segment	
To	use	a	communications	method	for	bio‐monitoring,	we	must	be	able	to	send	
our	medical	data	via	that	mechanism.		Any	communications	method	we	use	must	
support	user	definable	data.			
Use	of	unproven	communications	methods	
There	may	be	novel	communication	methods	that	are	fit	for	purpose	in	terms	of	
our	baseline	requirements	but	that	are	not	proven	in	real‐world	application.		As	
our	communications	are	intended	for	bio‐monitoring	and	healthcare,	we	believe	
that	 proven	 technologies	 with	 well	 documented	 use	 cases	 and	 operational	
parameters	 are	 important.	 	 To	 this	 end,	 we	will	 utilise	 only	 readily	 available	
communications	carriers	that	have	a	history	of	production	use	and	that	have	been	
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proven	in	real‐world	applications.		As	a	result,	we	have	elected	not	to	consider	or	
propose	 any	 novel	 new	 communications	 carriers	 in	 our	 evaluation	 of	
alternatives.			
Portability	
Our	 final	 consideration	when	 selecting	 alternative	 communication	methods	 is	
their	 applicability	 to	 wearable	 medical	 monitoring.	 	 To	 properly	 facilitate	 a	
wearable	 bio‐monitoring	 solution,	 the	 communications	 mechanism	 should	 be	
able	 to	be	mobile	–	 that	 is,	 the	hardware	must	be	man‐portable	and	wherever	
possible	not	require	fixed	connection	to	infrastructure	to	enable	the	connection	
between	bio‐monitor	and	the	communications	network.		This	requirement	would	
exclude,	for	example,	the	use	of	fixed	line	data	and	telephone	services,	and	any	
service	 such	 as	 satellite	 data	 that	 has	 significant	 antenna	 or	 hardware	
requirements.	
An	overview	of	the	requirements	for	our	communications	methods	
Table	 3	 summarises	 the	 requirements	 for	 our	 communications	 methods	
identified	in	section	3.4.	
Requirement	
Provide	a	user	defined	data	segment	
Provide	a	capacity	of	at	least	140	8	bit	binary	octets	
Able	to	be	transmitted	over	a	significant	distance	(at	least	1km	minimum)
Readily	 available	 and	 operationally	 proven	 (i.e.	 we	 will	 only	 consider	
communications	carriers	that	are	operationally	available	in	current	real‐
world	applications	
Transmission	equipment	must	be	portable		
Table 3. The	baseline	requirements	for	suitable	bio‐monitoring	
communications	methods	
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3.5	 Reviewing	 mobile	 Internet	 against	 the	 baseline	
requirements	
Mobile	Internet,	using	TCP/IP	packets	and	a	variety	of	Internet	protocols	(such	
as	FTP,	HTTP,	etc.)	that	provide	virtually	unlimited	data	capacity,	can	obviously	
meet	 the	 baseline	 set	 of	 requirements	 for	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 communications	
solution.			
TCP/IP	packets	allow	a	default	of	576	octets	per	packet	in	IPv4	[47]	and	must	be	
able	to	be	concatenated	into	longer	variable	length	transmissions.		The	capacity	
of	mobile	Internet	based	transmissions	is	theoretically	unlimited.			
Mobile	internet	meets	all	of	the	requirements	identified	in	table	3,	as	it	provides	
user	data,	has	unlimited	capacity,	can	be	transmitted	globally,	is	proven,	and	can	
be	used	with	portable	mobile	equipment	such	as	a	smartphone.	
3.6	Alternative	data	communications	methods	
There	are	many	other	communication	options	that	may	be	evaluated	against	our	
requirements.	 	 The	 following	 list	 shows	 a	 number	 of	 readily	 available	
communications	 methods	 that	 we	 will	 evaluate	 against	 our	 baseline	
requirements:	
 Radio	based	data	transmission	(packet	radio	data)	
 Short	Message	Services	(SMS)		
 Multimedia	Message	Services	(MMS)	
 Mobile	 data	 (i.e.	 modem	 data	 transmission	 over	 mobile	 telephony	
services)	
 Wi‐Fi	
 Bluetooth	
 ZigBee	
Note	 that	 fixed	 line	 communications	have	been	excluded	due	 to	 their	 obvious	
inability	to	be	portable.	
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Radio	
In	the	1960’s,	radio‐based	data	was	used	in	the	ARPANET	project	[48]	and	was	
adopted	for	amateur	use	in	1978	[48].		Hardware	to	support	the	packet	radio	on	
amateur	frequencies	was	developed	in	1980	[48]	and	standards	eventuated	out	
of	the	Tucson	Amateur	Packet	Radio	Corporation	(then	the	Tucson	chapter	of	the	
IEEE	Computer	Society)	meeting	in	1981	[48].	
A	number	of	different	packet	radio	formats	can	be	used	for	the	transmission	of	
data.		One	common	form	of	packet	radio	is	the	AX.25	protocol.		AX.25	is	designed	
to	“accept and reliably deliver data over a variety of communications links between 
two signalling terminals”	 [49].	 	 The	 protocol	 implements	 a	 number	 of	
communications	 types	 (Layer	 3	 protocols),	 including	 TCP/IP,	 AppleTalk	 and	
native	AX.25	communications.		The	information	frame	type	in	AX.25	appears	as	
follows	[50]:	
Flag	 Address	 Control	 PID	 Info	 FCS	 Flag	
8	bits	 112/224	
bits	
8/16	bits	 6	bits	 256	
octets	
default	
16	bits	 8	bits	
Table 4. AX.25	Frame	
The	flag	field	is	a	frame	delimiter.		Two	frames	may	share	a	single	flag	(i.e.	the	
flag	delimits	the	end	of	one	frame	and	start	of	another)	in	a	concatenated	frame	
transmission.		The	flag	in	AX.25	is	set	to	the	value	of	01111110.	
The	address	 field	 identifies	the	source	of	the	frame	and	the	destination	of	the	
frame	 and	 may	 be	 supplemented	 with	 additional	 information	 in	 some	 frame	
types.	
The	control	field	identifies	what	type	of	frame	this	is	and	controls	a	number	of	
the	characteristics	of	the	frame.	
The	PID	field	is	the	protocol	identifier,	and	identifies	what	Layer	3	protocol	(for	
example,	AX.25,	TCP/IP,	AppleTalk)	is	implemented	by	these	frames.	
	
	 47	 	
	
The	FCS	field	is	the	frame	check	sequence,	a	16‐bit	number	that	is	calculated	and	
agreed	on	by	the	sender	and	the	receiver,	to	ensure	that,	in	a	single	transmission,	
frames	are	not	lost	during	the	transmission	of	a	concatenated	frame	message.	
The	information	field	is	defaulted	to	256	octets,	but	is	subject	to	a	bit	stuffing	
algorithm	which	inserts	a	0	after	any	5	continuous	“1”	bits,	to	prevent	any	chance	
of	the	flag	field	occurring	in	the	data	segment.		Data	encoding	must	consider	this,	
but	is	typically	handled	by	the	modem	itself.			
In	essence,	the	information	field	is	provided	for	the	use	of	user	defined	data.		The	
other	fields	are	used	by	the	underlying	radio	system	to	control	and	manage	the	
transmissions,	track	issues	and	detect	lost	frames.	
Using	the	information	field,	the	AX.25	protocol	allows	data	to	be	transmitted	up	
to	 a	 default	 length	 of	 256	 octets	 per	 frame.	 	 Multiple	 frames	 can	 be	 used	 to	
facilitate	a	longer	data	transmission,	so	the	256	octets	of	data	per	frame	can	be	
significantly	expanded	by	using	additional	frames	in	a	message.		For	example,	for	
a	message	of	650	octets	of	data,	we	would	use	three	frames,	as	per	figure	5:	
	
Flag	 Data	 Flag	 Data	 Flag	 Data	 Flag	
	
	
	
	
The	 total	 data	 capacity	 of	 this	message	 (not	 counting	 the	 requirement	 for	 bit	
stuffing)	is	256	x	3	octets.			
The	AX.25	protocol	also	manages	the	sequencing	and	verification	of	frames,	so	it	
is	apparent	when	a	frame	has	been	lost	as	part	of	a	larger	message	sequence	such	
as	in	the	above	example.			
Given	that	data	capacity	is	expandable,	AX.25	can	encode	user	defined	data	into	
its	message	structure	in	excess	of	our	140‐octet	minimum,	and	considering	that	
Frame	1	
Frame	2	 Frame	3	
FIGURE	5:	AX.25	MULTI	FRAME	MESSAGE
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radio	can	be	transmitted	over	 long	distances,	 is	proven	since	1978	and	can	be	
transmitted	by	person‐portable	equipment.		Small,	man‐portable	radio	modems	
such	as	the	RF	Design	RFD	900u	modem	are	available	with	range	capabilities	in	
excess	of	10km	[51]	depending	on	antennae	setup,	so	this	meets	our	range	and	
portability	 requirements.	 	 Packet	 radio	 using	 AX.25	 meets	 or	 exceeds	 our	
baseline.		It	should	therefore	be	considered	a	candidate	for	our	carrier	agnostic	
system.			
SMS	and	MMS	
SMS	(Short	Message	Service)	and	MMS	(Multimedia	Message	Service)	are	GSM	
mobile	telephony	message	services	that	facilitate	data	transfer.		SMS	is	commonly	
used	in	transmitting	text	messages,	while	MMS	is	used	for	sending	binary	data	
such	as	images	or	sounds	between	mobile	devices.	
Our	earlier	paper	and	associated	Honours	research	[45]	conducted	a	significant	
evaluation	into	the	suitability	of	SMS	as	a	data	carrier.		To	summarise,	SMS	is	a	
packetized	 data	 transmission	 mechanism	 with	 support	 for	 limited	 packet	
concatenation.		The	user	data	segment	of	an	SMS	is	140	octets,	and	6‐8	SMS	can	
be	concatenated	safely	to	form	a	longer	data	segment	body	[46].	
The	structure	of	an	SMS	data	packet	is	as	follows	[41,	42]:	
FIELD	
NUMBER	
OCTETS PURPOSE	
1	 1	 Length	of	the	SMSC	information	(the	phone	number	and	type	of	
the	SMSC	that	handled	the	message	shown	as	fields	2	and	3)	in	
octets	
2	 1	 Address	type	of	the	SMSC	Phone	Number	(see	below)	
3	 1	...	12	 SMSC	Phone	Number
4	 1	 SMS‐DELIVER	Delimiter
5	 1	 Length	of	Sender	 Information	(the	phone	number	and	 type	of	
the	sender	originating	the	message)	in	octets	
6	 1	 Address	type	of	the	Sender	Phone	Number	
7	 1	...	12	 TP‐OA	Originating	Address
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FIELD	
NUMBER	
OCTETS PURPOSE	
8	 1	 TP‐PID	Protocol	Identifier
9	 1	 TP‐DCS	Data	Coding	Scheme
10	 7	 TP‐SCTS	Service	Centre	Time	Stamp
11	 1	 TP‐UDL	User	Data	Length	(in	octets	for	8‐bit	data	messages)
12	 1	...	140	 TP‐UD	User	Data	(in	octets)
Table 5. Format	of	the	SMS	Protocol	Data	Unit	for	a	device	receiving	
an	SMS	
Field	12	is	the	user	data	segment.		In	its	default	form,	this	carries	up	to	140	octets	
of	data.		However,	SMS	can	be	concatenated	into	a	multi‐part	message	extending	
the	data	segment.		
SMS	 is	 sent	 by	 the	 mobile	 network	 in	 a	 short	 burst	 transmission,	 with	 each	
message	treated	as	a	unique	packet	by	the	network	(whether	or	not	the	single	
SMS	is	part	of	a	larger	concatenated	message).		Because	transmission	duration	is	
short,	it	is	possible	that	SMS	may	work	when	mobile	telephone	connection	quality	
is	inconsistent	and	does	not	facilitate	mobile	Internet	transmission.		SMS	is	often	
the	last	data	transmission	mechanism	from	your	phone	to	stop	working	[52]	and	
so	it	provides	a	useful	fall	back	communications	mechanism,	when	all	else	fails	
and	signal	quality	is	poor	and	inconsistent.	
Concatenated	SMS		
Concatenated	 SMS	 (CSMS)	 was	 introduced	 to	 the	 GSM	 Standard	 in	 revision	
23.040	published	in	2009	[43].	 	Concatenated	SMS	provides	a	standard	way	to	
join	multiple	SMS	messages	into	a	single	virtual	message,	combining	the	capacity	
of	their	user	data	segments.			
A	concatenated	SMS	is	created	by	the	mobile	device	providing	an	interface	that	
accepts	user	data	beyond	the	normal	140	octet	boundary	of	the	SMS	TP‐UD	data	
segment.		It	sends	the	combined	user	data	payload	over	multiple	individual	SMS	
messages	by	encoding	the	data	across	sufficient	individual	packets	to	provide	a	
total	payload	capacity	that	meets	the	user	data	requirements.		The	concatenated	
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SMS	can	extend	up	to	a	theoretical	 limit	of	255	SMS	in	total	[43].	 	Each	SMS	is	
sequenced	via	an	internal	sequence	number.		The	mobile	device	sends	each	SMS	
as	an	independent	message	which	contains	all	of	the	standard	SMS	fields	(table	
5).		The	encoding	of	the	concatenated	message	is	the	responsibility	of	the	sending	
device.			
The	destination	device	receives	the	concatenated	SMS	as	a	sequence	of	individual	
messages	 and	 has	 the	 responsibility	 to	 re‐assemble	 the	 overall	 message.	 	 A	
concatenated	SMS	will	typically	not	be	 ‘received’	and	available	to	the	end‐user	
until	all	component	SMS	have	arrived	and	been	reassembled	in	the	right	order.		
Figure	6	illustrates	this	process	[45].	
	
	
FIGURE	6:	THE	BASIC	PROCESS	OF	TRANSMITTING	A	CONCATENATED	SMS	MESSAGE	
	
As	a	concatenated	SMS	is	built	on	top	of	the	standard	SMS	message	packet	format,	
the	first	6	octets	of	the	user	data	segment	in	each	standard	SMS	are	repurposed	
to	manage	the	concatenated	message	structure	and	the	sequence	of	the	message	
in	the	set.	 	6	octets	are	therefore	removed	from	the	capacity	of	each	SMS’	data	
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segment	 leaving	 an	 available	 user	 data	 segment	 per	 SMS	 of	 134	 octets	 once	
concatenation	occurs.		The	6	octets	are	used	as	follows:	
OCTET	 PURPOSE	
1	 Concatenated	 short	 message	 reference	 number.	 	 This	 is	 the	
identity	of	 the	concatenated	SMS,	and	 is	 the	same	 for	all	of	 the	
component	messages	 in	 the	message	 set.	 	The	 receiving	device	
uses	 this	 to	 determine	 the	messages	 that	 are	 components	 of	 a	
concatenated	SMS.	
2	 How	many	messages	comprise	this	concatenated	SMS.	
3	 Sequence	number	of	this	SMS	in	the	concatenated	message.	
Table 6. Information	Element	Data	group	octets	
	
Fernandes	[46]	documents	real	world	trials	of	the	CSMS	system,	and	notes	that	
while	the	standard	supports	a	theoretical	255	message	CSMS,	the	practical	limits	
are	between	6	and	8	SMS	messages	to	form	a	single	concatenated	message	body.		
The	 limitation	 arises	 because	 SMS	 does	 not	 implement	 delivery	 guarantees,	
schedules	or	delivery	of	messages	in	the	order	they	were	sent.			
Considered	 this,	 it	 is	 apparent	 that	 once	 we	 utilise	 more	 than	 8	 SMS	 in	
concatenation,	the	chance	of	losing	one	message	in	the	set	becomes	too	high	for	
us	to	consider	this	a	feasible	part	of	a	robust	messaging	system.		Accepting	this	
reasoning	and	 limiting	our	practical	CSMS	message	 to	 the	upper	bound	of	 the	
Fernandes	recommendation,	namely	8	SMS	in	a	single	concatenated	message,	we	
find	a	possible	data	payload	 range	of	 (134	x	8	octets)	=	1072	octets.	 	This	 is	 a	
significant	enhancement	to	the	capacity	of	a	single	SMS	and	provides	a	user	data	
segment	that	allows	a	variety	of	data	to	be	transmitted.	
However,	 we	 must	 also	 consider	 the	 downsides	 of	 Concatenated	 SMS	 that	
Fernandes	mentions	 in	his	work.	 If	one	SMS	from	the	Concatenated	set	 is	 lost,	
there	is	no	error	correction	possible	to	recreate	the	missing	piece.		Therefore,	the	
whole	CSMS	may	be	rendered	useless	and,	for	purposes	of	data	carriage,	we	must	
therefore	consider	that	an	incomplete	Concatenated	SMS	may	provide	misleading	
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or	 inaccurate	data	and	so	must	be	discarded.	 	This	 implies	a	need	 to	use	data	
validation	mechanisms	if	using	Concatenated	SMS	in	order	to	protect	our	system	
from	 incomplete	 messages.	 	 The	 requirement	 for	 validation	 will	 be	 further	
discussed	later	in	this	work.	
SMS	is	sent	using	commonly	available,	proven	mobile	telephone	hardware	as	well	
as	 many	 other	 mobile	 devices,	 it	 is	 transmittable	 using	 person‐portable	
hardware,	and	range	is	not	an	issue	assuming	mobile	infrastructure	is	available.		
As	such,	SMS	and	concatenated	SMS	are	both	options	for	our	data	transmissions.	
Multimedia	Message	Service	(MMS)	
MMS	 is	a	messaging	system	common	on	3G	and	4G	mobile	services	and	while	
similar	 to	 SMS,	 is	 implemented	 quite	 differently.	 Ghaderi	 discusses	 the	
Multimedia	Message	Service	as	such	[53].			
MMS	implements	a	content	independent	messaging	format	where	the	receiver	is	
responsible	for	defining	whether	it	supports	a	message’s	content	type.		As	such	
there	may	be	a	fundamental	incompatibility	between	what	one	device	can	encode	
and	what	 another	 device	 can	 receive	 and	 decode.	 	 The	 two	 ends	 of	 a	 sender‐
receiver	chain	must	agree	on	what	 formats	can	be	 transmitted	using	 the	MMS	
messaging	protocol	between	them.	
MMS	 requires	 components	 including	 a	 sender	 and	 receiver,	 which	 in	 turn	
communicate	with	 a	 system	 of	mobile	 network	 based	MMS	 proxy	 relays	 that	
store	and	forward	the	multimedia	message	content	to	the	device	on	demand.	
The	Open	Mobile	Alliance	specifies	the	following	use	case	illustrating	how	MMS	
is	used	by	compatible	devices	[54].	
1. User	activates	MMS	Client	(assumed	to	be	available	on	a	terminal	of	some	
description	–	the	specifics	of	implementation	are	left	to	the	client).	
2. User	selects	or	enters	MMS	target	address(es).	
3. User	composes/edits	MMS	to	be	sent.	
4. User	requests	that	MMS	be	sent.	
5. MMS	Client	submits	 the	message	to	 its	associated	MMS	Proxy‐Relay	via	
the	MMSM	interface.	
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6. MMS	Proxy‐Relay	resolves	the	MMS	target	address(es).	
7. MMS	 Proxy‐Relay	 routes	 forward	 the	MMS	 to	 each	 target	MMS	 Proxy‐
Relay	via	the	MMSR	interface.	
8. The	MMS	 is	 stored	by	 the	MMS	Server	 associated	with	 the	 target	MMS	
Proxy‐Relay.	
9. Target	 MMS	 Proxy‐Relay	 sends	 a	 notification	 message	 to	 target	 MMS	
Client	via	the	MMS	interface.	
10. Target	MMS	Client	retrieves	the	MMS	from	the	MMS	Server.	
11. Target	MMS	Client	notifies	target	user	of	new	MMS	available.	
12. Target	user	requests	rendering	of	received	MMS.	
13. Target	MMS	Client	renders	MMS	on	target	user’s	terminal.	
The	message	 is	 stored	 in	 the	 server	 infrastructure	 until	 one	 of	 the	 following	
events	occurs:	
1. The	message	expiry	time	is	reached	
2. The	message	is	delivered	to	the	receiver	
3. The	receiver	rejects	the	message	because	it	cannot	deal	with	the	content	
type	
4. The	 message	 is	 rejected	 for	 other	 reasons	 (network	 capacity,	 storage	
availability,	policy,	etc.)	
If	the	receiver	supports	the	message	content,	it	uses	the	detail	in	the	notification	
message	to	retrieve	the	content	as	a	data	stream	from	the	MMS	Proxy	Relay,	with	
the	nature	of	the	stream	defined	by	the	MMS	content	type.		Once	retrieved,	the	
receiver	has	to	perform	any	decoding	and	content	presentation	to	the	user.	
The	 fact	 that	data	can	be	streamed	from	the	sender	to	the	receiver	via	a	relay	
network	of	store	and	forward	servers	means	that	data	payload	capacity	of	MMS	
is	theoretically	unlimited	and	restricted	only	by	network	(and	internetwork	–	i.e.	
transmitting	from	one	mobile	carrier	network	to	another)	policies.		As	such,	MMS	
binary	data	stream	support	would	appear	to	make	MMS	an	eminently	suitable	
mechanism	for	data	transmission.		As	per	SMS,	it	is	person‐portable,	proven	and	
range	is	not	an	issue.	
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However,	MMS	introduces	issues	that	we	must	consider.		SMS	is	purely	delivered	
over	 the	 GSM	 capable	 network,	 and	 requires	 no	 additional	 infrastructure	 to	
support	it.		MMS	requires	IP	network	support,	as	according	to	the	Open	Mobile	
Alliance,	 much	 of	 the	 multimedia	 messaging	 content	 is	 moved	 around	 via	 IP	
networking	 features	 and	 may	 actually	 occur	 outside	 of	 the	 traditional	 GSM	
services.	 	 The	 requirements	 to	 send	 or	 receive	 an	 MMS	 may,	 in	 some	 cases,	
approach	the	requirements	for	a	mobile	Internet	connection	and	thus	it	must	be	
considered	 that	 MMS	 may	 have	 greater	 infrastructure	 and	 connectivity	
requirements	than	an	SMS	message.	
Irrespective,	if	we	compare	the	facilities	of	MMS	to	our	baseline	requirements	of	
a	user	definable	data	segment,	a	capacity	of	a	minimum	of	140	octets,	person‐
portable	 hardware,	 proven	 and	 long‐distance	 capable,	MMS	 is	 a	 suitable	 data	
transfer	mechanism	for	our	system.	
Mobile	Data	
Mobile	data	calls,	essentially	a	modem	connection	over	GSM	mobile	telephony,	
are	simply	an	adaptation	of	basic	fixed	line	modems	into	the	realm	of	GSM.			Using	
a	mobile	 telephone	 to	make	a	modem‐data	call	has	 long	been	established	as	a	
capability	of	GSM	mobiles	(from	GSM	level	2,	[43])	and	is	a	proven	technology	
with	widespread	availability.	
A	mobile	data	call	requires	a	modem	at	both	ends	of	the	communication	channel,	
and	these	devices	need	sufficient	signal	quality	to	be	able	to	handshake	(agree	
communications	 characteristics)	 and	 then	 reliably	 transmit	 data.	 	At	 low	data	
rates,	handshaking	and	transmission	is	more	robust	as	there	is	more	tolerance	
for	transmission	quality	issues.		It	is	essential	that	the	two	modems	are	able	to	
agree	on	a	communications	speed	and	maintain	a	connection	for	the	duration	of	
the	transmission.				Such	a	connection	would	appear	as	per	Figure	7:	
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FIGURE	7:	OVERVIEW	OF	ELEMENTS	IN	A	DATA/MODEM	CALL	
	
A	connection	is	established	between	two	parties,	the	two	modems	agreed	on	the	
transmission	characteristics,	and	can	 then	send	and	receive	data	 in	a	virtually	
unlimited	fashion	via	serialised	data	stream.	 	Typically,	 transmissions	occur	 in	
blocks,	with	one	end	“talking”	followed	by	an	acknowledgement	from	the	other	
“end”	of	the	call.			
Mobile	 data	 allows	 for	 serialised	 transmission	 of	 data,	 so	 the	 baseline	 of	 140	
octets	is	met.		The	ability	for	the	user	to	define	the	data	payload	is	an	inherent	
part	of	the	modem	communication.		The	downside	of	the	modem	data	call	is	the	
overhead	required	to	establish	the	connection,	handshake	between	the	modems	
even	 before	 any	 data	 is	 transmitted.	 	 Our	 tests	 using	 a	mobile	 telephone	 to	 a	
landline	 fixed	modem	showed	 that	 this	 handshaking	 could	 take	 an	 average	 of	
around	10	–	15	seconds	with	a	good	quality	mobile	connection	before	the	call	was	
successfully	established.	 	Handshaking	speed	and	success	depended	on	factors	
such	as	signal	strength	and	line	quality	and	could	extend	significantly	with	lower	
quality	mobile	connections.			
Given	handshaking	overhead,	a	communications	model	over	modem	is	likely	to	
be	quite	slow	as	the	overhead	before	actual	transmission	is	significant	(several	
seconds).	 	However,	the	transmission	of	140	octets	of	data	would	be	complete	
within	a	second,	even	at	a	slow	rate	of	9600	baud.			
The	 slow	 transmission	 speed	 should	 be	 considered	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 practical	
application	of	mobile	data	communications.		However,	as	a	contingency	method	
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to	transfer	data,	we	believe	that	the	overhead	is	acceptable	in	exchange	for	the	
enhanced	reliability	of	an	additional	communications	method	in	our	arsenal.	
Once	again,	if	we	compare	solely	against	the	baseline	requirements,	mobile	data	
calls	are	an	acceptable	mechanism	by	which	to	transmit	our	data.	
Fixed	line	data	communications	
Fixed	 line	 data	 communications	 comprise	 a	 group	 of	 communications	
mechanisms	that	require	access	to	hard‐wired,	fixed	point	infrastructure	in	order	
to	make	a	connection.	 	These	include	fixed	public	switched	telephone	network	
(PSTN)	phone	line	modem	connections,	fixed	line	Internet	and	Cable	Internet.	
For	the	purposes	of	this	work,	 fixed	 line	data	communications	such	as	modem	
communication	 or	 fixed	 line	 Internet	 have	 been	 excluded,	 as	 the	 overall	
requirement	is	to	facilitate	mobile	monitoring	for	the	end	user.		Plugging	in	the	
end	user	does	not	achieve	this	aim	and	therefore	does	not	meet	all	of	our	stated	
requirements.	
However,	mobility	aside,	it	should	be	noted	that	fixed	line	communications	using	
modems,	 Internet	 etc.	 would	 be	 perfectly	 acceptable	mechanisms	 to	 transmit	
medical	data.		While	it	may	not	be	suitable	for	the	wearable	bio‐monitoring	aspect	
of	the	solution,	fixed	line	communications	could	be	an	acceptable	part	of	system	
topology	at	the	base‐station	(receiver)	end	of	the	network,	assuming	the	remote	
monitored	patient	could	connect	without	the	need	for	them	to	be	part	of	the	fixed	
line	infrastructure.	
Bluetooth	
According	to	the	official	website	of	the	Bluetooth	SIG,	“Bluetooth®	technology	is	
a	wireless	communications	 technology	 that	 is	 simple,	 secure,	and	everywhere.	
You	can	find	it	in	billions	of	devices	ranging	from	mobile	phones	and	computers	
to	medical	devices	and	home	entertainment	products.	 It	 is	 intended	to	replace	
the	cables	connecting	devices,	while	maintaining	high	levels	of	security.”	[55]	
Bluetooth	has	made	significant	inroads	into	modern	technology	and	is	present	in	
the	home,	car,	and	office,	 it	has	 limitations	which	make	 it	 infeasible	 for	use	 in	
communications	between	the	wearable	monitoring	system	and	the	base	station.			
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Bluetooth	has	three	current	classes	of	radio	transceiver	–	Class	1,	2	and	3.		They	
are	rated	in	reverse	order	in	terms	of	power	and	range,	so	Class	3	has	a	range	of	
up	to	1	metre,	class	2	has	a	range	of	up	to	10	metres,	and	class	1	has	a	range	of	up	
to	 100	metres.	 	 In	 all	 cases,	 these	 ranges	 fail	 to	meet	 the	minimum	 distance	
requirements	that	we	have	established	for	our	system.	
This	 does	not	 preclude	Bluetooth	 from	being	 a	 part	 of	 the	 overall	monitoring	
system	in	the	BAN.		Between	the	sensors	on	the	body	and	a	central	aggregator,	
Bluetooth	is	an	appropriate	connectivity	platform	[20]	[15].		Thus,	our	exclusion	
does	not	say	it	is	not	suitable	for	bio‐monitoring,	just	that	it	is	not	suitable	for	the	
overall	communications	between	remote	system	and	base	station.	
ZigBee	
ZigBee	 is	 a	 wireless	 communications	 standard	 that	 is	 both	 low	 power	 and	
application	agnostic.	 	The	 latest	version,	ZigBee	3.0,	provides	 communications	
between	a	wide	range	of	devices[56].	
ZigBee,	 like	Bluetooth,	can	certainly	be	a	part	of	a	wireless	sensor	network	for	
bio‐monitoring	[18,	57].		However,	with	an	effective	range	of	between	20	and	70	
metres	 [58],	 ZigBee	 fails	 to	 meet	 the	 distance	 constraint	 of	 our	 system	
requirements,	 and	 so	 cannot	 provide	 the	 communications	 backbone	 between	
monitor	and	base	station.	
Wi‐Fi	
Wi‐Fi	 in	 its	various	forms	is	typically	a	carrier	 for	a	wireless	Internet	protocol	
connection.		As	we	are	already	considering	wireless	Internet,	we	will	not	consider	
wireless	in	isolation	here.		In	addition,	the	range	limitations	of	ad‐hoc	Wi‐Fi	mean	
it	is	not	suitable	to	our	purposes.	
3.7	Implementing	a	carrier	agnostic	system	
To	implement	a	carrier	agnostic	system,	we	must	ask	the	question	“can	we	use	a	
number	of	carriers	to	transmit	the	same	message?”		We	identified	a	number	of	
methods	 above	 as	 suitable	 for	 our	 data	 transmissions.	 	 Each	has	 a	 number	 of	
similarities	but	also	some	significant	differences.			
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The	 primary	 comparison	 is	 that	 each	 communications	 method	 discussed	 can	
carry	a	user	data	segment.		Some	carriers	are	theoretically	“unlimited”	in	terms	
of	data	capacity	while	others	have	operational	limitations	(for	example,	SMS).			
Given	that	each	communications	method	is	disparate	in	terms	of	features,	can	use	
them	all	in	the	same	system	to	provide	a	robust	communications	backbone?	
Table	7	covers	some	of	the	features	we	might	use	in	a	bio‐monitoring	system,	and	
evaluates	which	 of	 the	 communications	methods	we	 reviewed	 provides	 them	
natively:	
Feature	 Radio	 SMS	 MMS	 Mobile	
Data	
Wireless	
Internet	
User	
definable	
data	segment	
Yes	 Yes Yes Yes	 Yes
Data	
capacity	
Unlimited	1 140	octets	2 Unlimited	1 Unlimited	1	 Unlimited	1
Native	
encryption	
No	 Yes Yes No	 No	
Network	
defined	
sender	ID	
No	 –	 set	 on	
each	 station	
by	the	user	
Yes Yes No	 No	5
Network	
defined	
receiver	ID	
No	 –	 set	 on	
each	 station	
by	the	user	
Yes Yes No	 No	
Error	
correction	
Yes	3	 No	4 No	4 No	4	 Yes	3
Real	time Yes	 No No Yes	 No	
Delivery	
time	
guarantee	
No	 No No No	 No	
Delivery	
sequence	
guarantee	
Yes	 No N/A N/A	 Yes
Data	
encoding	
mechanism	
Native	 frame	
with	packing	
algorithm	
7	 bit	 ASCII	 or	
8‐bit	binary	
Binary ASCII	 or	
Binary	
Binary
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Feature	 Radio	 SMS	 MMS	 Mobile	
Data	
Wireless	
Internet	
Application	
Specific	
Message	ID	
Yes	 Yes Yes No	 Yes
Message	
sequence	
number	
Yes	 Yes, in	
concatenated	
SMS	
No No	 Yes	 (at	 the	
packet	level)	
Message	 age	
stamping	
No	 Yes Yes No	6	 Yes
Message	
validity	
period	
No	 Yes Yes No	 Yes
Table 7. Features	of	the	different	communications	methods	
1 The	 unlimited	 capacity	 of	 these	 communications	methods	 needs	 to	 be	 considered	 alongside	 practical	
measures	–	i.e.	possibility	of	corruption	for	longer	transmissions	through	loss	of	packets	(radio,	Internet),	
transmission	issues	(mobile	data)	or	failures	in	storage	(MMS)	
2 SMS	data	capacity	can	be	expanded	by	concatenating	messages	into	a	concatenated	SMS	where	6	–	8	SMS	
are	the	practical	limit.	
3 Packet	Radio	AX.25	has	rudimentary	error	correction	in	the	packets,	as	does	Internet	TCP/IP	
4 SMS,	MMS	and	Mobile	Data	have	little	or	no	ability	to	error	correct	the	user	data	segment	
5 TCP/IP	sender	and	destination	addresses	have	been	shown	to	be	‘spoofed’	or	replaced	with	user	defined	
data	rather	than	the	actual	address	of	the	sender/receiver	
6 In	mobile	data	transmissions,	no	message	age	is	possible	as	the	transmission	is	real	time	
Table	 7	 identifies	 few	 common	 features	 across	 all	 potential	 communications	
methods.	 	 For	 example,	 some	 methods	 above	 facilitate	 error	 correction	 (i.e.	
AX.25),	while	others	have	a	limited	(or	no)	ability	to	correct	the	data	transmitted.		
Some	methods	support	real	time	or	near	real	time	(i.e.	modem	data,	packet	radio)	
transmission,	others	(such	as	SMS,	MMS)	feature	transmissions	that	are	deferred	
based	on	network	 characteristics	 such	 as	 load	 and	device	 connectivity.	 	 Some	
methods	 identify	 the	 sender	 via	 network	 functionality	 (i.e.	 SMS,	 MMS)	 while	
others	do	not	inherently	do	this	(i.e.	data	modem	connections).				
The	differences	in	features	between	the	communications	methods	means	that	in	
order	 to	consider	 them	as	parts	of	 the	same	carrier	agnostic	 system,	we	must	
distil	their	capabilities	down	to	the	lowest	common	denominator	of	functionality.			
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If	we	discard	 all	 differences,	 these	 communications	methods	 share	 a	 common	
baseline	of	a	user	definable	data	segment	with	a	capacity	of	at	least	140	octets	of	
user	data.		This	common	data	segment	can	transmit	the	types	of	information	we	
have	 identified	 for	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 solution.	 	 They	 can	 transmit	 data	 over	 a	
distance	 greater	 than	 a	 kilometre,	 and	 are	 all	 readily	 available	 using	 person‐
portable	 equipment.	 As	 such,	 they	 meet	 the	 fundamental	 requirements	 we	
established	in	table	3.	
By	reviewing	what	each	 type	of	communication	provides,	 it	 is	evident	 that	we	
cannot	assume	any	common	feature	across	all	methods	other	than	the	presence	
of	a	data	transmission	mechanism	for	our	medical	data.		For	example,	while	one	
communication	method	might	incorporate	network	defined	sender	ID,	another	
may	not.		Therefore,	our	solution	should	implement	a	sender	ID	if	we	require	it	
for	 our	 solution,	 ignoring	 or	 supplementing	 a	 network	 sender	 ID	 if	 such	 is	
defined.			
Following	 the	 lowest	 common	 denominator	 principal,	 we	 must	 discard	 any	
features	that	are	not	globally	available	across	all	of	our	communication	methods.		
Any	 feature	 that	 we	 require	must	 be	 implemented	 as	 part	 of	 our	 solution	 to	
ensure	it	is	available	independently	of	the	selected	communication	method.		Our	
solution	must	therefore	consider	that	the	carrier	only	supplies	a	user	definable	
data	segment,	which	has	a	capacity	of	X	bytes.		We	can	make	use	of	that	user	data	
segment	to	send	any	information	that	we	require	for	both	system	management	
and	user	data	transmission.			
3.8	Attributes	of	a	carrier	agnostic	message	
To	remain	carrier	agnostic,	we	must	not	assume	any	capabilities	are	supplied	by	
the	carrier	unless	these	are	truly	common	and	cross	compatible.		In	section	3.7	
we	identified	that	the	only	truly	common	feature	across	all	of	our	communication	
methods	 is	 the	 user	 defined	 data	 segment.	 	 If	we	 therefore	 discard	 any	 other	
carrier	specific	attributes,	based	on	our	earlier	work	(both	academically	[45]	and	
commercially	[59])	figure	8	shows	capabilities	that	should	be	implemented	in	our	
carrier‐agnostic	message.	
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FIGURE	8:	FIELDS	IN	A	BASIC	CARRIER	AGNOSTIC	MESSAGE	
Sender	identification	
We	 must	 be	 able	 to	 authoritatively	 identify	 the	 sender	 of	 a	 message	
independently	of	the	communications	method	used	to	establish	who	originated	
the	message.		This	is	essential	to	link	messages	to	the	patient	being	monitored.	
Receiver	identification	 	
We	must	authoritatively	identify	the	intended	receiver	of	a	message	within	the	
system/application.		In	some	cases,	we	do	not	want	the	wrong	station	to	“hear”	
the	message	 and	 apply	 it,	 especially	when	broadcast	 communication	methods	
such	 as	 radio	 are	 used.	 	 This	 is	 essential	 so	 that	 a	 receiver	 can	 determine	 a	
message	is	intended	for	its	own	use,	for	example,	where	a	configuration	message	
is	sent	from	one	station	to	a	remote	monitor.			
Communication	message	type	
There	 may	 be	 many	 different	 types	 of	 message,	 such	 as	 control	 message,	
configuration	message,	data	message	etc.		this	attribute	will	identify	the	type	of	
message	and	inform	the	system	how	to	evaluate	the	message	content.		
Message	ID	
A	message	identifier	to	allow	individual	messages	to	be	tracked	and/or	receipted	
specifically	 between	 stations	 in	 the	 system.	 	 Ideally,	 each	message	 should	 be	
uniquely	identifiable.	
Message	sequence	number	in	a	set	
Because	some	of	our	carriers	provide	a	limited	data	capacity,	we	may	need	to	use	
more	than	one	message	to	send	all	of	the	data	we	need	to	transmit.		The	system	
should	contain	the	ability	group	messages	into	a	larger	set	and	thus	to	identify	
the	sequence	number	of	a	message	in	a	multi‐part	message	set	(i.e.	similar	to	SMS	
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concatenation).		This	will	allow	us	to	send	messages	in	multiple	small	packages	
to	maximise	 reliability,	 and	 reassemble	 them	 into	 a	 single	 data	 package	 after	
reception.	
Message	age		
A	 timestamp	 for	 when	 the	 message	 was	 generated.	 	 This	 will	 provide	 an	
indication	of	the	age	and	relevance	of	the	data	and	allow	us	to	discard	aged	data	
in	any	system	where	deferred	delivery	is	possible	(MMS,	SMS	for	example).	
Message	validity	period	
The	maximum	 time	 for	 which	 a	 message	 should	 be	 considered	 usable	 in	 the	
system	should	be	an	attribute	of	any	medical	data	transmission.		This	time	limit	
can	be	defined	by	the	application,	but	encoding	it	with	the	message	provides	a	
safe	 guard	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 system	 does	 not	 use	 out	 of	 date	 or	 obsolete	
information.	
Security	Mode	
If	 out	 communication	 protocol	 is	 carrier‐	 and	 application‐agnostic,	 then	 we	
should	provide	the	facility	to	identify	and	apply	security	to	message	content.		This	
attribute	will	 define	 the	mode	 by	which	 a	message	 has	 been	 secured	 against	
unintended	use.		For	example,	the	value	here	could	identify	the	use	of	encryption,	
encoding	 etc.	 to	 ensure	 the	 data	 is	 private	 and	 only	 accessible	 (easily)	 to	 the	
intended	user(s)	or	system(s).		This	will	ensure	that	biometric	data	monitored	by	
the	system	is	not	available	to	be	read	by	unauthorised	recipients	without	some	
significant	effort.	
Encoding	Mode	
This	attribute	will	define	how	the	message	is	encoded	to	ensure	the	application	
can	 use	 the	message	 appropriately.	 This	 attribute	 relates	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 the	
system	to	make	use	of	the	available	data	space	in	a	manner	that	is	both	efficient	
and	carrier	agnostic.	
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Error	detection	checksums	
The	ability	of	the	message	to	include	information	to	identify	that	a	transmission	
error	has	occurred.		In	bio‐monitoring,	only	error	detection	should	be	used,	as	the	
communication	mechanisms	should	not	modify	the	data	being	sent,	only	identify	
where	that	data	has	been	corrupted	en‐route.	
Application	data	segment	
The	 space	 in	which	 our	 application’s	 data	 can	 be	 stored	 during	 transmission.		
Despite	 any	of	 the	other	 features	 or	 attributes	mentioned	 above,	 the	message	
packet	 must	 retain	 the	 capacity	 to	 transmit	 a	 defined	 amount	 of	 application	
specific	(or	user)	data,	independent	of	the	communication	method	in	use.			
Additional	Message	fields		
In	addition	to	the	attributes	defined	in	3.8,	we	assert	some	additional	fields	are	
necessary,	for	the	reasons	outlined	below:	
 Start	of	message	delimiter	
When	transmitting	data	in	a	data	stream	over	some	types	of	
communications	(for	example,	serial	data	or	packet	radio),	this	field	
allows	us	to	provide	a	“message	frame	start”	to	ensure	that	we	can	
identify	the	start	of	the	message	correctly	with	a	high	degree	of	certainty.	
 Application	identifier	
With	an	application	and	carrier‐agnostic	protocol	for	use	with	bio‐
monitoring,	we	may	use	some	carriers	where	messages	are	transmitted	
by	broadcast	(for	example,	radio).		The	application	ID	provides	the	ability	
to	identify	the	application	for	which	a	message	is	intended.	
 Message	Protocol	Format	
Again,	in	agnostic	systems,	multiple	versions	of	the	message	protocol	
exist	on	a	network.	This	could	be	an	issue	with	broadcast	carriers.	By	
including	a	message	format,	we	can	ensure	that	we	are	decoding	a	
message	correctly.	
 Application	user	data	segment	length	
The	user	data	segment	can	be	of	variable	length	and	the	length	may	vary	
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by	carrier.		In	our	protocol,	the	header	is	fixed,	but	the	length	of	
application	data	will	vary	from	message	to	message.		A	message	packet	
must	be	able	to	specify	how	much	application	data	is	being	sent	after	the	
pre‐defined	message	header.			
This	provides	a	final	message	frame	as	in	figure	9.	
	
FIGURE	9:	THE	FINAL	MESSAGE	FRAME	
These	attributes	address	a	set	of	characteristics	that	can	be	used	to	construct	the	
basic	message	that	we	will	send	back	and	forth	within	a	bio‐monitoring	system.		
Each	of	 the	attributes	must	be	able	 to	be	encoded	within	any	of	our	proposed	
communication	methods.			
In	chapter	4,	we	will	develop	a	packet	of	information	that	can	be	encoded	into	any	
of	 these	disparate	 carriers	 to	provide	all	 of	 the	above	attributes.	 	With	 this	 in	
place,	 we	 can	 implement	 a	 carrier	 agnostic	 communications	 mechanism	 that	
retains	 its	 usefulness	 to	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 solution	 independent	 of	 any	
assumptions	about	the	nature,	availability	and	features	of	the	underlying	carrier.			
With	these	capabilities,	this	facilitates	a	mechanism	to	allow	a	fail‐over	between	
carriers,	where	 the	 same	 transmission	 packet	 can	 be	 sent	 on	 via	 any	method	
supported	 by	 our	 application.	 	 This	 allows	 us	 to	 implement	 redundancy	 and	
increase	the	robustness	of	a	system,	removing	the	dependency	on	a	single	carrier.			
	
3.9	Validating	the	data	transmission	capabilities	of	the	proposed	
carriers	
In	section	3.7,	we	showed	that	the	only	common	capability	across	our	proposed	
communication	methods	was	a	user	definable	data	segment.	 	 	Furthermore,	 in	
section	3.4,	we	identified	that	the	fundamental	payload	capacity	requirement	of	
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our	communication	methods	was	 to	 support	a	minimum	of	140	octets	of	user	
data.	
To	 validate	 the	 data	 transmission	 capabilities	 of	 each	 communication	method	
proposed	 against	 these	 requirements,	 a	 simple	 test	 rig	was	 established	 using	
appropriate	hardware	for	each	type	of	communication.			
The	test	protocol	was	as	follows:	
1. A	 140‐character	 message,	 encoded	 using	 8	 bit	 characters	 from	 the	
standard	English	character	set	was	generated	as	per	the	below:	
The	test	message	was	as	follows:	
	
Hello	 there.	 I	 am	 Station	 number	 1.	 I	 am	 sending	 this	message	 to	
Station	Number	2	on	13/04/2013.		My	data	is	123aBcDeFg!@#.	Have	a	
nice	day!	
	
The	test	message	was	a	mixture	of	character	data	structured	so	as	to	be	
human	readable.		However,	by	incorporating	a	mix	of	symbols,	different	
cases	of	characters	etc.	in	the	message,	the	message	replicated	a	variety	of	
binary	character	encodings	within	 the	140‐octet	data	 segment.	 	 	 It	 also	
represented	a	pattern	that,	while	human	readable,	could	be	validated	to	
see	if	all	aspects	of	the	message	transmitted	and	were	received	as	sent.	
	
2. For	each	of	the	carriers	proposed,	a	test	setup	was	established	and	the	test	
message	transmitted	between	a	sender	and	receiver	device.			
3. Upon	reception,	the	message	was	validated	manually	by	presenting	it	to	
the	 operator	 for	 review	 and	 comparison	 with	 the	 original	 transmitted	
data.			
4. The	test	was	repeated	over	a	reasonable	number	of	attempts	to	determine	
whether	there	were	any	substantive	reception	 issues	between	a	sender	
and	receiver	in	a	fixed	location.	
The	specific	test	environments	for	each	proposed	communication	method	were	
as	follows:	
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Internet	transmission	
A	basic	web	form	was	set	up	on	a	test	server,	consisting	of	a	text	field	and	submit	
button	embedded	in	the	form.		The	form	was	accessed	on	a	mobile	device	(Nokia	
Lumia	930),	the	text	field	was	filled	with	the	message	and	then	submitted	to	the	
server.			
At	the	server	side,	the	server	received	the	form	submission	of	HTTP	using	TCP/IP	
networking	over	mobile	and	reflected	what	it	received	from	the	text	field	back	to	
the	form	response,	which	was	then	displayed	back	on	the	web	page	for	validation	
(figure	10).	
	
FIGURE	10:	WEB	FORMS	TESTING	
	
Packet	radio	data	
An	application	called	EasyTerm	(figure	11)	linked	to	an	AX.25	packet	radio	PC	
based	soundcard	modem	application	named	Soundmodem	(figure	12)	was	used	
to	test	the	transmission	of	data	between	two	PC’s	using	AX.25	via	the	soundcard	
audio	out/in.		In	this	way,	radio	audio	channel	transmission	was	simulated.	
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The	test	message	was	entered	into	Easy	Term	and	transmitted	to	the	receiving	
channel.	 	The	 receive	 then	decoded	 the	message	onto	 the	Easy	Term	 terminal	
upon	receipt.	
	
FIGURE	11:	EASYTERM	
	
	
FIGURE	12:	SOUNDMODEM	
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Short	Message	Services	(SMS)		
Two	mobile	telephones	(Nokia	Lumia	930	and	Samsung	Galaxy	S4)	were	used	to	
transmit	and	receive	data	in	an	SMS	message	form.			
The	 message	 was	 entered	 into	 an	 SMS	 on	 the	 Nokia	 phone	 (figure	 13)	 and	
transmitted	 to	 the	 receiver	 (Samsung)	 phone	 addressed	 by	way	 of	 the	 phone	
number	field	(hidden	blue	above).			
	
FIGURE	13:SMS	TESTING	
	
Multimedia	Message	Services	(MMS)	
The	same	hardware	setup	as	per	the	SMS	test	was	used	for	MMS	‐	two	mobile	
telephones	(Nokia	Lumia	930	and	Samsung	Galaxy	S4)	were	used	to	transmit	and	
receive	data	in	an	SMS	message	form.			
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The	difference	in	this	test	was	that,	in	order	to	force	the	message	interface	to	MMS	
format	 on	 the	 Nokia	 phone	 (there	 is	 no	 explicit	 method	 in	 the	 phone	 user	
interface	 to	 say	 “send	 an	 SMS	 vs	 send	 an	 MMS),	 an	 image	 (locally	 stored	
photograph	taken	using	the	phone)	was	 incorporated	into	the	message	(figure	
14).		By	adding	an	extended	binary	data	package	to	the	underlying	message,	this	
forced	the	phone	to	MMS	mode.	
	
FIGURE	14:	MMS	TESTING	
	
Mobile	data	modem	transmission	
A	Siemens	M20‐T	GSM	mobile	 terminal	using	a	Telstra	network	SIM	card	and	
supporting	the	standard	AT	command	set	was	used	to	make	a	dial	up	data	call	to	
a	fixed	line	modem	(figure	15).			
Hyper‐terminal	 was	 then	 used	 as	 the	 terminal	 application	 through	 which	 to	
manage	a	connection	and	communicate	a	message.	
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FIGURE	15:	MOBILE	DATA	MODEM	TEST	RIG	
Outcomes	
The	 tests	 were	 conducted	 by	 sending	 the	 same	 message	 100	 times	 over	 the	
various	 carriers.	 	 In	 each	 case,	 the	message	was	 received	 as	 sent,	with	 a	 few	
exceptions.	 	 In	the	case	of	the	MMS,	the	message	was	received	with	the	binary	
data	(photo)	intact.	
Carrier Send	
attempts	
Messages	
Received	
Correctly	
Message	
faults	
Average	
transmission	
time	to	receive	
Longest	
transmission	
time	
Mobile	
Internet	
100	 100 0 <	1	second	 <	1	second
AX.25	
Packet	
Radio	
100	 99 1	2 5	seconds	 17	seconds
SMS	 100	 100 0 3	seconds	 35	seconds
MMS	 100	 100 0 4	seconds	1	 50	seconds
Mobile	
Data	
100	 98 2	2 20	seconds	 45	seconds
Table 8. Message	test	results	
1		It	should	be	noted	that	while	the	MMS	notification	was	received	at	the	receiving	station	after	an	
average	of	4	seconds,	in	some	cases	“opening”	the	message	took	several	seconds	longer	to	display	the	
content.	
2		Three	message	faults	occurred	across	packet	radio	and	mobile	data	connections.		However,	in	each	
case,	these	were	handshaking	errors,	and	were	immediately	notifiable	to	the	sender	and	thus	could	
be	rectified	by	re‐establishing	the	connection.		However,	for	accuracy	the	issues	are	included	here.	
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In	terms	of	the	speed	of	transmission,	Mobile	Internet	was	almost	instantaneous	
in	the	transmit/response	cycle	and	was	the	most	consistent	over	the	tests.		SMS	
was	second	 fastest	 in	 these	 tests	with	rapid	reception	(on	 the	same	network).		
MMS	was	next	fastest,	with	AX.25	at	1200	baud	followed	by	mobile	data	coming	
in	 last	 in	 terms	of	 comparative	 transmission	 speed	 (as	a	 result	 of	 the	need	 to	
handshake	to	establish	communications	parameters).	 	 	 It	should	be	noted	that	
mobile	 data	 would	 potentially	 be	 faster	 than	 AX.25	 if	 the	 mobile	 data	
transmission	averaged	9600	baud	and	its	underlying	connection	was	maintained	
between	transmission,	reducing	the	overhead	from	handshaking.	
As	 noted	 in	 the	 results,	 both	 “modem”	 style	 transmissions,	 AX.25	 and	Mobile	
Data,	experienced	handshaking	issues	on	one	or	two	occasions	during	the	test.		
While	this	caused	a	failure	to	connect,	the	issue	was	immediately	recognised	at	
the	sender	and	the	connection	retried	and	successfully	established.		We	therefore	
conclude	that	this	is	no	impediment	to	the	use	of	these	communication	methods	
in	our	system,	as	the	only	impact	is	to	the	speed	of	the	data	transfer	over	all.	
In	conclusion	from	this	test,	it	can	be	clearly	demonstrated	that	140	octets	of	user	
defined	data	can	be	sent	across	any	of	the	proposed	communication	methods,	and	
that	the	same	packet	of	user	data	could	be	sent	on	any	of	the	proposed	carriers.		
This	supports	our	requirements	for	reliable	communications	shown	in	table	1	–	
specifically	 those	 for	 requirement	 4	 ‐	 that	 we	 can	 support	 fail‐over	 amongst	
different	communication	channels	for	the	same	message,	and	we	can	therefore	
look	to	establish	the	“best”	communication	method	for	a	message	at	a	particular	
time,	 and	 for	 requirement	 1	 –	 that	 it	 allows	 us	 to	 remove	 the	 reliance	 on	 a	
pervasive	 Internet	 connection,	 facilitate	 communication	 over	 more	 than	 one	
method	 in	 the	 same	 system,	 and	 operate	 in	 environments	 where	 not	 all	
communication	methods	are	available.	
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4. 	USING	MULTIPLE	
COMMUNICATIONS	METHODS	 IN 	
THE	SAME	APPLICATION	
In	consideration	of	the	communications	requirements	identified	in	the	previous	
chapters	and	the	proposed	communication	methods	that	could	be	used	to	carry	
bio‐monitoring	data,	we	propose	a	communications	architecture	to	incorporate	
multiple	communication	methods	and	able	to	send	the	same	data	packet	using	a	
best	available	communication	method	selection	approach.	
	
4.1	Supporting	the	requirements	of	a	bio‐monitoring	system	
A	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 where	 the	 user	 can	 be	 monitored	 by	 a	 health	
professional	 implies	 that	 there	 is	 a	 two‐party	 relationship	 between	 the	
monitoring	system	worn	by	the	patient	and	the	monitoring	station	used	by	the	
health	professional	to	view	the	data	from	the	remote	monitoring	system.		Figure	
3shows	an	example	of	such	a	system.	
Table	1	identifies	the	types	of	issue	that	we	are	attempting	to	remediate	with	this	
work	and	table	3	identifies	some	basic	requirements	for	communications	within	
such	a	system.		Further	to	these	requirements,	we	should	establish	the	foundation	
use	 case	 for	 our	 system.	 	 Specifically,	while	 supporting	 the	 data	 transmission	
between	a	doctor’s	base	station	and	patient’s	wearable	bio‐monitor,	we	should	
consider	 that	 in	 a	 healthcare	 context,	 the	 doctor	may	monitor	more	 than	 one	
patient.	 	 As	 such,	 our	 use	 case	 requires	 the	 solution	 to	 support	 seamless	
communication	over	multiple	communication	methods	between	more	than	one	
pair	of	endpoints,	allowing	for	more	than	one	subject	to	be	monitored:	
	“We	must	be	able	to	communicate	seamlessly	between	the	two	ends	(sender	
and	 receiver)	 of	 our	 bio‐monitoring	 application,	 independently	 of	 the	
communication	method,	while	 supporting	multiple	 senders	 and	 receivers	
within	the	same	system,	using	the	best	available	carrier.”	
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4.2	Required	features	to	support	our	fundamental	requirements	
With	our	fundamental	use	case	defined	and	added	to	our	requirements,	we	can	
take	the	message	attributes	discussed	in	Figure	8	and	use	them	as	the	foundation	
for	 a	message	 frame	 that	 provides	 communications	 independence	 in	 the	 bio‐
monitoring	 system	 while	 addressing	 our	 performance	 indicators	 and	
requirements.		In	section	3.8,	we	identified	required	attributes	of:	
 Sender	identification	
 Receiver	identification	
 Message	type	definition	
 Message	unique	identification	
 Message	sequence	in	a	set	
 Message	age		
 Message	validity	period	
 Data	security	
 Data	encoding	
 Error	detection		
 Application	data		
Further	 considering	 the	 requirements	 in	 table	 1,	 table	 3,	 and	 section	 4.1,	 we	
therefore	propose	a	number	of	components	that	can	provide	a	communication	
message	framework	that	will	address	the	requirements.	
4.3	The	communication	framework	
To	 address	 all	 of	 the	 requirements	 identified,	 we	 propose	 a	 communications	
framework	 that	 incorporates	 an	 application	 layer,	 communication	 layer	 and	
specific	 hardware	 drivers	 for	 the	 communication	 methods	 supported	 by	 our	
system.		Figure	16	provides	an	overview	of	the	system.	
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FIGURE	16:	BLOCK	DIAGRAM	OF	THE	COMMUNICATIONS	SYSTEM	
While	we	are	concerned	with	the	message	protocol	and	the	management	of	that	
protocol	to	enable	its	use	with	a	variety	of	communication	methods,	we	discuss	
the	overall	components	of	the	system	below.	
The	application	layer	
Our	 communications	 format	 is	 application‐	 as	 well	 as	 carrier‐agnostic.	 	 The	
application	layer	represents	any	specific	application,	for	example	a	wearable	bio‐
monitoring	system,	that	may	utilise	the	message	capabilities	that	we	propose.			
The	application	layer	will	typically	populate	or	read	from	the	message	fields,	and	
utilise	the	application	data	capability	to	send	application	data	between	stations	
in	the	network.			
The	message	management	module	
If	 the	 application	 is	 the	 consumer	 of	 our	 communications	 solution,	 then	 our	
proposed	solution	proper	 commences	with	 the	message	management	module.		
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This	 module	 provides	 the	 interface	 between	 the	 application	 and	 the	
communications	packet.	
	The	 message	 management	 layer	 facilitates	 communications	 operations	 in	 a	
standard	 manner,	 independent	 of	 the	 carrier	 being	 used,	 and	 provides	 the	
following	capabilities:	
 Message	packet	format	definition	
o Define	all	of	the	fields	and	the	data	types	for	the	message	packet	
 Message	encode	
o Take	 a	 set	 of	 parameters	 and	 create	 a	 message	 packet	 in	 the	
defined	format	
 Message	decode	
o Take	 a	message	 packet	 and	 extract	 each	 of	 the	 attributes	 of	 the	
message	into	parameters	
 Message	send	
o Implement	 the	selection	algorithm	for	 the	“best”	signal	path	and	
then	 pass	 this	 to	 the	 hardware	 integration	 layer	 to	 send	 the	
message	
 Message	receive	
o Scan	each	communication	method	to	determine	if	a	message	has	
been	received	and	if	so,	store	it	for	decoding	
The	 message	 management	 module	 must	 expose	 received	 messages	 to	 the	
application,	send	messages	from	the	application,	and	expose	any	errors	or	issues	
to	the	application.	
As	a	proof	of	concept,	an	implementation	of	a	message	management	module	was	
created	using	a	C#	object	class	using	Visual	Studio	2015.		This	object	provides	the	
message	 attributes	 identified	 in	 figure	 8	 and	 implements	 the	methods	 shown	
above.		Figure	17	shows	a	high‐level	class	diagram	of	this.	
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FIGURE	17:	MESSAGE	MANAGEMENT	MODULE	CLASS	DIAGRAM	
Message	protocol		
Our	2010	article	[45]	demonstrated	a	message	format	that	could	be	encoded	into	
the	body	of	a	single	SMS	message	to	provide	a	standard	control	header	and	a	user‐
definable	data	segment.		The	message	implemented	fields	that	addressed	several	
control	 and	 data	 requirements	 within	 a	 consistent	 structure	 utilising	 defined	
field	sizes	and	field	functions.			
We	demonstrated	that	a	delineated	message	packet	can	be	encoded	in	such	a	way	
as	to	provide	similar	functionality	to	that	which	is	required	in	a	carrier	agnostic	
system,	 by	 implementing	 fields	 to	 identify	 sender	 and	 receiver,	 application,	
message	purpose	and	so	on.			
To	support	a	variety	of	carriers,	a	message	packet	that	implements	a	header	block	
that	can	deliver	appropriate	attributes	independently	of	the	carrier	of	the	data	is	
required.		We	must	include	enough	administrative	and	management	information	
so	that	we	can	remove	any	reliance	on	the	carrier	to	provide	metadata	about	the	
message.			
Our	message	packet	contains	the	capability	to	include	an	expandable	user	data	
payload	 to	 carry	 application	 specific	 data.	 	 The	 message	 packet	 will	 provide	
sufficient	 attributes	 to	 allow	 it	 to	 remain	 carrier	 agnostic	 and	 support	
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transmission	between	a	remote	bio‐monitor	and	a	base	station.		More	than	one	
sender/receiver	will	be	supported	in	the	system.		 	The	specific	elements	of	the	
message	protocol	that	are	necessary	to	achieve	this	will	be	discussed	throughout	
the	following	sections.	
The	message	protocol	defines	 the	 structure	of	messages	used	by	our	 solution.		
The	 message	 protocol	 packet	 is	 encoded	 into	 the	 user	 data	 segment	 of	 the	
communication	 method	 being	 used	 –	 for	 example	 as	 an	 Internet	 POST	
submission,	SMS	message,	etc.		The	basic	relationship	of	elements	in	a	send	(top)	
and	receive	(bottom)	scenario	is	shown	in	Figure	18.			
	
FIGURE	18:	RELATIONSHIPS	BETWEEN	ELEMENTS	OF	THE	SOLUTION	
We	 identified	 communication	methods	 suitable	 for	 our	 solution	 in	 chapter	 3.		
Each	one	provides	user	data	capabilities	of	varying	capacity	but	little	in	the	way	
of	 common	 features	 to	 support	 our	 messaging.	 	 To	 remain	 carrier	 agnostic	
therefore,	our	message	protocol	packet	must	support	the	attributes	identified	in	
section	3.8.			Table	9	shows	the	proposes	message	protocol	structure:	
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Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Format Description	 Example
1	 Start	of	
Message	
Frame	
SOMF 2 Binary	
coded	
ASCII	
A	demarcation	field	to	
ensure	the	message	is	
fundamentally	in	the	
correct	format.		Used	to	
ensure	that	this	is	the	
start	of	message	and	
indicate	a	protocol	
header.		While	this	is	
not	so	important	for	
single	packet	self‐
encapsulated	
transmissions	such	as	
SMS,	it	is	relevant	for	
radio	and	modem‐
based	data	
transmissions	where	
the	start	of	a	frame	
may	need	to	be	clearly	
demarked	and	where	
multiple	messages	may	
be	sent	rapidly	in	
sequence.	
	
**
2	 Message	
Protocol	
Format	
MFMT 1 Binary The	message	format	
identifier,	used	to	
distinctly	identify	the	
implementation	of	the	
message	format	that	
has	been	used	to	
encode	the	message.	
	
00000001
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Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Format Description	 Example
3	 Message	
Type	
MTYP 1 Binary Message	type	
identifier,	used	to	
identify	the	type	of	the	
message	package	(for	
example,	a	polling	
request	message,	a	
polling	response	
message,	a	remote	
device	originated	
message,	or	an	alarm	
(critical	incident)	
message	or	a	control	
message.		This	field	
allows	the	message	to	
be	processed	correctly	
by	the	system.	
	
Where	it	is	a	control	
message,	the	field	
defines	the	type	of	
control	message	being	
sent	to	the	remote	
system	and	uses	the	
data	segment	of	the	
message	to	define	the	
actual	control	data	to	
be	applied.	
	
00000001
4	 Application	
ID	
APID 1 Binary An	application	
identification	code	
which	can	be	used	to	
identify	the	generator	
of	the	message	in	a	
system	where	multiple	
applications	may	make	
use	of	the	same	
communications	
formats	and	carriers.	
	
00000001
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Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Format Description	 Example
5	 Sender	
Device	ID	
SDID 3 Binary	 A	device	ID	to	identify	
the	sender	of	the	
message	within	the	
current	system.		When	
combined	with	the	
Application	ID	field,	
this	field	allows	us	to	
determine	that	a	
message	is	for	the	
current	application	and	
uniquely	identifies	the	
sender	of	the	message	
within	that	application.	
	
00000000
00000000	
00000001	
6	 Recipient	
Device	ID	
RDID 3 Binary	 A	device	ID	to	identify	
the	intended	recipient	
of	the	message.		The	
recipient	should	check	
the	application	ID	is	
correct	for	its	own	use,	
and	that	the	recipient	
device	ID	matches	its	
own	internal	ID	
(defined	by	the	
system)	before	making	
use	of	the	message.	
	
00000000
00000000	
00000010	
7	 Message	ID	 MSID 3 Binary A	24‐bit	number	that	
identifies	this	message	
for	the	current	sender.		
This	field	is	used	to	
provide	a	reference	to	
identify	the	message	in	
receipts,	
acknowledgement	
messages	etc.).	The	
sender	will	be	
responsible	for	
managing	this	field,	
incrementing	it	for	
each	message	sent.	
	
00101000
11010110	
10110111	
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Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Format Description	 Example
8	 Message	
Structure	
MSTR 1 Binary Message	structure	
identifier	to	define	
whether	this	message	
is	being	sent	in	a	single	
part,	is	concatenated	
between	multiple	
carrier	messages	or	is	
in	some	other	format	
defined	by	the	
application.	
	
00000001
9	 Generation	
Timestamp	
GENT 7 Binary	
integer	
value	
The	time	when	the	
message	was	
generated,	in	the	form:	
yyyymmddhhmmssxxx.		
Note	that	the	time	
should	be	set	based	on	
a	common	reference	
point	–	for	example,	all	
the	devices	using	the	
same	application	ID	in	
the	same	system	
should	be	
synchronised	to	the	
same	base	time	value,	
whether	this	be	
GMT/Zulu	or	a	
common	local	time.	
20150113
212359003	
	
would	
convert	to	
	
01000111	
10010110	
01101011	
11010100	
00110100	
11100001	
01011011	
10	 Validity	
Period	
VAPD 3 Binary A	24‐bit	number	
defining	the	validity	
period	of	the	message	
in	seconds	from	the	
time	identified	in	the	
generation	timestamp.		
This	provides	us	with	a	
range	of	0	through	to	
16777200	seconds	
(approximately	190	
days)	of	message	
validity	period.	
	
00000000
00110110	
11111110	
11	 Application	
User	Data	
Segment	
Length	
UDSL 2 Binary Defines	the	length	of	
the	user	data	segment	
in	octets.	
01010000
00111100	
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Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Format Description	 Example
12	 User	Data	
Segment	
Encryption	
ID	
UDSE 1 Binary Defines	the	type	of	
encryption	that	has	
been	used	to	encrypt	
the	user	data	segment	
information.		This	is	
application	specific	and	
requires	to	be	paired	
with	a	valid	application	
ID	for	this	value	to	be	
meaningful	(for	
example,	the	value	
00000101	in	one	
application	may	have	a	
different	encryption	
meaning	to	the	same	
value	in	another	
application).	
	
00100101
13	 Header	
Checksum	
HCHK 4 Binary A	4‐octet checksum	for	
the	header	block	of	the	
message	(that	is,	all	
octets	prior	to	this	field	
in	the	message	
header).	
	
11001100
10101010	
11101011	
10010100	
14	 User	Data	
Segment	
Checksum	
UCHK 4 Binary Checksum	for	the	user	
data	segment	block	of	
the	message.	
11001100
10101010	
11101011	
10010100	
	
15	 Combined	
Message	
Checksum	
MCHK 4 Binary Checksum	for	the	
message	as	a	whole	
including	the	header	
(minus	this	field)	and	
the	user	data	segment	
(when	both	are	
concatenated	into	a	
single	contiguous	octet	
stream).	
	
11001100
10101010	
11101011	
10010100	
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Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Format Description	 Example
16	 Application	
User	Data	
Segment	
UDSG X Binary The	user	data	segment,	
appended	to	the	
message	after	the	
header.		The	UDSG	is	
binary	data,	but	is	used	
in	an	application	
specific	fashion	which	
implies	it	may	also	be	
coded	to	carry	ASCII	or	
other	types	of	data.		
The	UDSG	will	have	a	
minimum	capacity	of	
140	–	40	=	100	octets.	
Application	
specific	
Table 9. The	message	format	
The	data	 structure	 outlined	 in	 table	 9	 uses	 the	minimum	number	 of	 octets	 to	
facilitate	the	requirements	identified	in	section	3.8.		We	use	the	minimum	data	
octets	possible	because,	if	we	support	multiple	communication	methods,	we	must	
consider	any	restricted	data	capacities	across	all	of	our	communication	methods	
and	provide	the	maximum	application	data	space	to	send	actual	bio‐monitoring	
data.		A	minimal	number	of	octets	for	the	“header”	shown	in	fields	1	–	15	of	table	
9	 therefore	provides	 the	maximum	application	data	capability	 (field	16)	while	
still	providing	all	of	the	capabilities	we	require.			
The	message	protocol	 fields	are	 length	delimited	 in	a	standard	structure.	 	The	
protocol	defines	the	allowable	content	of	each	field.	However,	certain	fields	(for	
example,	 message	 type)	 may	 have	 application	 specific	 usage,	 meaning	 and	
interpretation	(see	later	in	this	chapter	for	more	on	this).			
The	 message	 protocol	 can	 be	 encoded	 independently	 of	 the	 communication	
method	being	used.		However,	for	implementation	purposes,	a	solution	using	this	
protocol	will	need	to	determine	the	communication	method	being	used	prior	to	
creating	a	message.		This	is	to	ensure	that	application	data	is	encoded	within	the	
capacity	of	the	underlying	communication	method	(i.e.	restrict	overall	message	
length	to	SMS’	140	octets).				
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4.4	Using	each	message	protocol	field	
To	make	our	message	packet	consistent	over	any	carrier,	message	fields	will	be	
used	in	consistent	fashion	independently	of	the	carrier	that	has	been	chosen	to	
transmit	the	message.		We	will	encode	fields	in	a	way	that	can	be	interpreted	by	
the	 sender	 and	 the	 receiver	 and	 that	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 carrier	 attributes.	 	We	
establish	the	rules	and	constraints	around	how	each	field	is	below.		Table	9	shows	
the	message	format.		The	usage	for	each	field	follows:	
SOMF	‐	Start	of	Message	Frame	
Identifies	the	start	of	the	message	and	commencement	of	the	header	block.		We	
include	this	field	for	use	with	serial	data	transmissions	such	as	packet	radio	or	
serial	 modem	 communications	 where	 messages	 may	 require	 a	 delimiter	 to	
denote	the	commencement	of	the	message	frame.			
The	start	of	message	value	is	two	asterisk	characters	encoded	as	binary	coded	
ASCII.		The	binary	representation	of	these	characters	provides	a	consistent	and	
recognisable	pattern,	namely	00101010	00101010.		For	our	protocol,	allowable	
values	for	this	field	are:	
Value	 Description
**	 Double	 character	 sync	 field	 delimits	 commencement	 of	
message	and	start	of	header	block	
Other	values	are	reserved	for	future	development.
Table 10. Start	of	message	frame	field	values	
MFMT	‐	Message	Protocol	Format	
Identifies	 the	specific	message	protocol	 format	 that	 this	message	conforms	 to.		
Over	 time,	 different	 versions	 of	 the	 protocol	 may	 be	 developed	 to	 support	
additional	features,	requirements	or	applications.	 	The	format	identifier	assists	
applications	to	ensure	the	message	is	processed	in	the	correct	way.			
This	protocol	will	be	 identified	as	binary	00000010,	Carrier	Agnostic	Message	
Format	version	1.		The	value	00000001	was	used	by	our	earlier	work	[45]	for	an	
SMS	specific	communications	protocol.	
Value	 Description
00000001 CSMS	Communications	Protocol	version	1	
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Value	 Description
00000010 Carrier	Agnostic	Message	Format	version	1	
11111111 Reserved	for	system	use
Other	values	are	reserved	for	future	development.
Table 11. Message	Protocol	Format	field	values	
MTYP	‐	Message	Type	
Defines	the	type	of	message	being	sent.		We	support	a	number	of	different	types	
of	 message,	 for	 example	 control	 messages,	 alarm	 messages	 or	 general	 data	
messages.	 	 The	 message	 type	 field	 allows	 the	 receiver	 to	 process	 a	 message	
appropriately.	
The	 basic	 functional	 requirements	 for	 the	 monitoring	 system	 imply	 that	 the	
remote	monitor	needs	to	send	a	message	to	the	base	station.		If	we	extend	this,	
we	 should	 also	 support	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 base	 station	 (that	 is,	 the	monitoring	
physician)	 to	“get	an	update”	at	 the	monitoring	subject	and	“poll”	 the	monitor	
directly	to	receive	the	latest	readings	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.			
The	 ability	 to	 update	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	monitor	while	 it	 is	 in	 the	 field	
further	 implies	 some	 additional	message	 types	 are	 required	 in	 our	 system	 to	
update	and	confirm	the	configuration.			Finally,	the	need	to	inform	the	monitoring	
physician	of	high	priority	alarm	data	implies	a	third	class	of	message,	the	alarm	
message.	
To	 address	 these,	 we	 define	 message	 types	 within	 the	 system	 message	 type	
(MTYP)	field	to	tell	the	application	what	sort	of	message	is	being	transmitted.		We	
must	define	messages	to	allow	us	to	receive	data	from	the	bio‐monitoring	system	
back	at	base,	request	the	latest	set	of	readings	from	the	remote	monitor	on	an	ad	
hoc	basis	and	change	the	configuration	of	the	remote	monitor	while	it	is	in	the	
field.		As	shown	in	table	45	above,	this	gives	rise	to	the	following	message	types:	
1. Remote	originated	message	–	monitor	sends	data	on	subject	back	to	base	
at	pre‐defined	intervals	based	on	its	current	configuration	
2. Configuration	 control	 message	 from	 base	 to	 monitor	 to	 request	 the	
monitor	update	its	configuration	
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3. Configuration	control	acknowledgement	message	from	monitor	to	base	to	
acknowledge	 the	 change	 in	 configuration	 and	 confirm	 the	 status	of	 the	
change	
4. Ad‐hoc	polling	message	from	base	to	monitor	
5. Ad‐hoc	polling	response	message	from	monitor	to	base	
In	addition	to	the	messages	above,	an	additional	message	type,	namely	a	specific	
class	of	alarm	message,	is	defined,	and	this	message	type	is	used	to	alert	the	base	
station	of	a	priority	issue	on	the	remote	monitoring	system.		The	alarm	message	
need	not	necessarily	be	related	 to	a	monitoring	 issue,	but	may	be	a	system	or	
diagnostic	issue	that	needs	to	be	addressed.		In	essence,	the	alarm	message	can	
be	considered	to	be	a	priority	message	that	should	be	investigated,	and	possibly	
actioned,	urgently.	
Messages	may	be	transmitted	from	monitor	to	base	station,	or	from	base	station	
to	monitor.		Figure	19	illustrates	the	typical	directionality	of	the	various	message	
types.	
	
FIGURE	19:	MESSAGE	TYPES	AND	DIRECTION	
	
The	following	values	are	supported	for	the	message	type	field.	
Message	
Type	ID	
Message	
Type	Octet	
Message	Type	Description
1	 00000001	 Remote	originated	message	– sent	by	the	monitor	to	the	base	at	
a	pre‐defined	interval,	containing	the	measurements	from		
2	 00000010	 Ad‐hoc	poll	message	from	base	to	monitor	
3	 00000011	 Ad‐hoc	poll	response	from	monitor	to	base	
4	 00000100	 Remote	control	message	from	base	to	monitor	
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Message	
Type	ID	
Message	
Type	Octet	
Message	Type	Description
5	 00000101	 Remote	 control	 acknowledgement	 and	 confirmation	 from	
monitor	to	base	
6	 00000110	 Configuration	confirmation	request
7	 00000111	 Configuration	confirmation	response	
8	 00001000	 Alarm	acknowledgement	and	reset
193	 11000001	 Remote	originated	message	– sent	by	the	monitor	to	the	base	at	
a	pre‐defined	interval,	with	receipt	requested	
194	 11000010	 Ad‐hoc	 poll	 message	 from	 base	 to	 monitor,	 with	 receipt	
requested	
195	
	
11000011	 Ad‐hoc	 poll	 response	 from	 monitor	 to	 base,	 with	 receipt	
requested	
196	 11000100	 Remote	 control	 message	 from	 base	 to	 monitor,	 with	 receipt	
requested	
197	 11000101	 Remote	 control	 acknowledgement	 and	 confirmation	 from	
monitor	to	base,	with	receipt	requested	
198	 11000110	 Configuration	confirmation	request,	with	receipt	requested
199	 11000111	 Configuration	confirmation	response,	with	receipt	requested
200	 11001000	 Alarm	acknowledgement	and	reset	with	receipt	requested
253	 11111101	 Receipt	message
254	 11111110	 Alarm	 message	 – sent	 by	 the	 monitor	 to	 the	 base	 station	 if	
something	is	wrong	or	where	a	message	needs	to	be	dealt	with	
as	a	priority.	
255	 11111111	 Reserved	for	system	use
Other	values	are	reserved	for	future	development.
Table 12. Message	type	field	values	
The	message	 type	octet	provides	 two	subsets	of	messages,	 standard	messages	
and	messages	requiring	receipt.		The	field	is	split	into	a	3‐bit	and	a	5‐bit	sub‐field	
structure,	as	shown	in	figure	20:	
Most significant bit Least significant bit
Receipt Required Definition
Message Type Definition 	
FIGURE	20:	SUB‐FIELD	STRUCTURE	WITHIN	THE	MESSAGE	TYPE	OCTET	
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Most	message	types	have	two	definitions	–	the	first	set	commencing	000	in	the	
three	most	significant	bits,	does	not	expect	a	receipt.		The	equivalent	definition	
commencing	with	110	in	the	most	significant	bits	is	the	same	message	type	but	
requesting	a	receipt.		The	exceptions	to	this	are	the	receipt	message	and	the	alarm	
message.	 	These	are	discussed	in	more	detail	 in	chapters	7	and	8	respectively.		
The	comparison	of	message	type	octets	with	and	without	receipt	can	be	seen	in	
the	following	table:	
Message	Type	 Octet	 value	 –	
receipt	 not	
required	
Octet	 value	 –
receipt	required	
Remote	 originated	 message	 – sent	 by	 the	
monitor	 to	 the	 base	 at	 a	 pre‐defined	 interval,	
containing	the	measurements	from		
00000001 11000001	
Ad‐hoc	poll	message	from	base	to	monitor 00000010 11000010	
Ad‐hoc	poll	response	from	monitor	to	base 00000011 11000011	
Remote	control	message	from	base	to	monitor 00000100 11000100	
Remote	 control	 acknowledgement	 and	
confirmation	from	monitor	to	base	
00000101 11000101	
Configuration	confirmation	request 00000110 11000110	
Configuration	confirmation	response 00000111 11000111	
Table 13. Comparison	of	message	type	octets	requiring	receipts	vs	not	
requiring	receipts	
The	use	of	the	receipt	message	types	is	discussed	in	chapter	7.	
APID	‐	Application	ID	
An	 application	 and	 carrier	 agnostic	 communication	 protocol	 may	 be	 used	 to	
transmit	 and	 manage	 data	 for	 more	 than	 a	 single	 application	 within	 the	
communications	 infrastructure.	 	 This	 is	 especially	 relevant	 to	 broadcast	
infrastructure	 such	 as	 radio,	 but	 also	 may	 impact	 scenarios	 where	 the	 same	
hardware	devices	(such	as	mobile	phones,	radios	or	internet	connected	devices)	
or	base	stations	are	used	to	manage	multiple	different	monitoring	applications.	
To	cater	for	these	scenarios,	the	application	ID	field	provides	a	unique	application	
identifier	to	identify	specific	applications	using	the	message	protocol	within	the	
current	communications	infrastructure.		This	field	allows	a	specific	application	to	
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identify	 messages	 that	 relate	 to	 it	 and	 therefore	 ensure	 only	 the	 intended	
application	 actually	 processes	 a	message.	 	 Any	 application	 reading	 a	message	
checks	the	application	ID	matches	its	own	application	ID	before	it	processes	the	
message	any	further.		As	the	header	is	consistent	for	all	use	of	the	protocol,	this	
operation	is	entirely	feasible.		This	of	course	means	that	the	use	of	application	ID	
in	 a	 single	 communications	 infrastructure	 must	 be	 controlled	 to	 ensure	 that	
application	ID’s	are	uniquely	allocated	to	an	application	in	an	infrastructure.					
In	addition	to	identification	of	discrete	applications,	the	application	ID	may	also	
be	 used	 to	 allow	 partitioning	 of	 messages	 within	 a	 single	 communications	
infrastructure	 across	 multiple	 base	 stations	 –	 for	 example,	 Base	 1	 may	 have	
application	ID	1,	while	Base	2,	at	a	different	hospital	or	in	a	different	department,	
may	have	application	ID	2,	all	using	a	shared	communications	backbone	and	the	
same	fundamental	application	infrastructure.		This	would	facilitate,	for	example,	
doctors	monitoring	cancer	patients	in	the	cancer	ward	to	separate	their	messages	
from	doctors	in	the	cardiac	ward	monitoring	cardiac	patients.	
If	 only	 a	 single	 application	 exists,	 the	 application	 ID	 should	 be	 00000001,	 or	
“default	 application”.	 	 Where	 a	 more	 open	 application	 landscape	 or	
communications	 backbone	 is	 used,	 up	 to	 254	 different	 applications	 can	 be	
defined	for	the	same	infrastructure.		The	allocation	of	application	ID’s	other	than	
the	default	application	is	implementation	specific.	
Value	 Description
00000001 Default	application
…	 Future	development	(application	specific)	
11111111 Reserved	for	system	use
Other	values	are	reserved	for	application	specific	identification	and	future	development.
Table 14. APID	values	
SDID	/	RDID	‐	Sender	Device	ID	&	Recipient	Device	ID	
The	 sender	 and	 recipient	 device	 ID’s	 are	 24‐bit	 (3	 octet)	 device	 identification	
fields	 and	 should	 be	 allocated	 uniquely	 within	 a	 particular	 application.	 	 This	
allows	unique	identification	of	16,777,215	devices	which	should	be	adequate	to	
uniquely	 identify	 a	 device	 within	 an	 application	 and/or	 communications	
infrastructure	 in	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 context.	 	 However,	 variants	 of	 the	 protocol	
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may	 choose	 to	 extend	 the	 device	 ID	 length	 should	 additional	 identification	
resolution	be	required.			
While	our	message	format	has	a	sender	and	recipient	device	ID,	a	discrete	device	
in	the	application	using	our	protocol	has	a	single	ID	–	its	device	ID.		The	sender	
and	recipient	 ID	are	used	to	define	the	source	and	destination	of	the	message.		
When	sending	a	message,	the	sender	puts	its	device	ID	in	the	sender	device	ID	
field,	and	addresses	the	message	to	the	device	with	which	it	 is	communicating	
(i.e.	base	station)	by	putting	that	device’s	ID	into	the	recipient	ID	field.			
This	implies	a	couple	of	rules	for	the	application	using	the	protocol.		
1. Each	device	in	a	monitoring	application	must	be	aware	of	its	own	device	
ID.	 	The	recipient	may	use	the	sender	ID	to	validate	the	message	comes	
from	 an	 “allowed”	 device	 before	 it	 actions	 the	 message	 (i.e.	 allow	 the	
application	 to	 check	 that	 configuration	 messages	 come	 from	 the	 base	
station	ID).		For	example,	figure	21	shows	the	monitor	device	configured	
with	both	its	own	ID	and	its	base	station	ID	for	validation	purposes.			
Monitoring device
Configured with its 
own device ID
Configured with at 
least its base station ID
MessageSender Device ID Field
Recipient Device ID 
Field
	
FIGURE	21:	A	REMOTE	MONITOR	USING	THE	SDID	AND	RDID	FIELDS	
2. Each	device	in	the	monitoring	application	should	be	aware	of	at	least	one	
device	ID	to	use	as	the	recipient	device	ID	for	its	messages.		For	example,	
a	 remote	 monitor	 must	 be	 aware	 of	 its	 base	 station’s	 ID	 to	 correctly	
address	messages.		A	base	station,	however,	must	maintain	a	directory	of	
the	 remote	 monitors	 with	 which	 it	 communicates	 in	 order	 to	 address	
messages	and	identify	remote	senders	(figure	22).			
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Note:	The	structure	of	the	message	format	makes	it	possible	to	use	this	
protocol	for	inter‐device	communication,	for	example	between	two	base	
stations.	However,	as	evidenced	in	the	research	(for	example,	 [20]),	 the	
primary	communication	model	in	a	bio‐monitoring	application	a	system	
between	the	remote	monitor	and	a	base	station	and	thus	we	are	not	really	
concerned	with	inter‐remote‐monitor	communications.		This	reduces	the	
number	of	ID’s	a	remote	monitor	(at	least)	needs	to	be	aware	of.	
Base station
Configured with its 
own device ID
Directory of ID’s for 
remote monitors
MessageSender Device ID Field
Recipient Device ID 
Field
	
FIGURE	22:	A	BASE	STATION	USING	THE	SDID	AND	RDID	FIELDS	AND	THE	CONCEPT	OF	THE	
DEVICE	DIRECTORY	
With	capacity‐limited	carriers,	one	may	argue	that	when	data	capacity	is	an	issue,	
it	 is	 possible	 to	 shorten	 device	 ID’s	 to	 2	 or	 even	 a	 single	 octet,	 depending	 on	
application	 specific	 requirements	 for	 the	 number	 of	 unique	 devices	 to	 be	
supported.		As	with	extending	the	length	of	these	fields,	shortening	them	is	also	
possible	in	application	specific	variants	of	the	protocol.	
The	sender	device	ID	and	the	recipient	device	ID	come	from	the	same	pool	of	ID	
numbers	 –	 that	 is,	 each	 application	 has	 a	 pool	 of	 24	 bit	 values	with	which	 to	
identify	devices	in	the	system.	 	Thus,	the	ID	should	uniquely	identify	a	specific	
device	and	when	combined	with	the	application	ID,	will	define	the	specific	device	
in	a	specific	application	within	the	communications	network.	
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It	is	the	responsibility	of	the	application	to	ensure	that	device	IDs	are	allocated	
uniquely.	
	
A	special	feature	of	the	device	ID	–	broadcast	message	ID	
We	propose	the	recipient	ID	should	allow	for	a	special	case	where	the	underlying	
application	 architecture	 supports	 this	 –	 namely	 a	 broadcast	 message.	 	 The	
broadcast	 ID	 is	 defined	 as	 a	 recipient	 ID	 field	with	 a	 value	 of	 0.	 	 A	 broadcast	
message	is	actioned	by	any	receiver	that	receives	a	copy	of	the	message,	whatever	
the	type	of	message.	
Given	carrier	agnosticism,	broadcast	messaging	will	require	application	specific	
implementation	 to	 enable	 broadcast	 functionality	 across	 all	 carriers	 –	 for	
example	broadcast	on	SMS	vs	Radio	would	require	 two	different	 transmission	
methods.	 	 In	 radio	 based	 communications,	where	 all	 stations	 in	 range	 hear	 a	
message	and	then	must	determine	it	is	for	them,	the	receiver	ID	simply	needs	to	
be	set	to	0	and	the	message	sent.		Any	station	in	range	will	“see”	the	message	over	
the	radio	and	upon	decoding	the	message,	see	that	the	recipient	ID	is	set	to	0,	and	
action	the	message	as	if	the	recipient	ID	was	set	to	its	own	device	ID.	
However,	for	addressed	communications	such	as	SMS,	MMS	and	serial,	it	would	
be	necessary	 to	send	a	message	 to	each	station	 in	 the	network	either	 through	
some	form	of	bulk	addressing	or	one	message	at	a	time.		This	imposes	logistical	
difficulties	 such	 as	 considerations	of	 the	 time	 to	propagate	 the	message	 to	 all	
recipients,	the	effective	lifespan	of	the	message,	whether	the	validity	period	and	
timestamp	are	modified	for	each	transmission	of	the	message,	and	so	on.	
As	a	result	of	our	carrier	agnosticism,	 the	broadcast	 ID	 is	proposed	only	as	an	
attribute	 of	 the	 message	 format,	 and	 it	 is	 left	 to	 those	 applications	 that	 may	
require	it	to	develop	appropriate	methods	for	implementation.	
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Value	 Description
000000000000000000000000 Broadcast	ID	(receiver	ID	only)	
000000000000000000000001 First	device	ID
111111111111111111111110 Last	device	ID
111111111111111111111111 Reserved	for	system	use	
All	values	can	be	used	to	identify	a	device.		ID’s	should	be	unique.
Table 15. SDID	and	RDID	values	incorporating	the	broadcast	ID	
MSID	‐	Message	ID	
In	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	messages	 are	 actioned	more	 than	 once,	 the	 ability	 to	
identify	specific	messages	is	important.		The	message	ID	field	is	a	24‐bit	number	
identifying	a	specific	message.		This	is	used	both	for	message	identification	and	
receipting	of	messages.			
The	 application	 populates	 the	 message	 ID	 with	 any	 non‐zero	 24‐bit	 binary	
integer.	 	 Ideally,	 for	a	 specific	 application	 lifetime	 (i.e.	 the	period	a	monitor	 is	
deployed	to	the	field)	the	message	ID	will	be	unique.		With	a	possible	16.7	million	
message	ID’s	available,	 the	message	ID,	when	combined	with	sender,	recipient	
and	application	ID’s,	provide	a	high	resolution	for	message	identification	between	
a	 sender	 and	 receiver	 in	 a	 specific	 application.	 	 The	 use	 of	 the	message	 ID	 is	
discussed	further	in	chapter	7.	
Value	 Description
000000000000000000000000 Not	used
000000000000000000000001
...	
111111111111111111111110
Range	of	actual	message	IDs
111111111111111111111111 Reserved	for	system	use
All	values	can	be	used	to	identify	a	message.	 ID’s	should	be	unique.
Table 16. MSID	values	
MSTR	‐	Message	Structure	
The	message	structure	octet	defines	whether	this	message	is	part	of	a	multi‐part	
concatenated	set,	or	whether	the	message	is	a	single	part	message	with	no	other	
dependencies.		The	field	is	a	single	binary	octet	containing	the	appropriate	value	
according	to	the	message	structure	encoding	scheme.		
The	encoding	scheme	for	the	message	structure	octet	is	as	follows:	
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If	the	message	is	a	single‐part	message	transmission,	this	value	of	the	octet	is	set	
to	0	(00000000).	
If	the	message	is	part	of	a	concatenated	set	of	messages,	the	two	most	significant	
bits	 are	 set	 to	 01	 and	 the	 6	 least	 significant	 bits	 are	 used	 to	 manage	 the	
concatenation.		The	field	is	thus	split	into	three	sub‐fields	as	per	Figure	23:	
0 1 xx x y y y
Concatenated message Number of Messages Sequence number of this message
	
FIGURE	23:	THE	MESSAGE	TYPE	FIELD	IN	CONCATENATED	MESSAGES	
The	 most	 significant	 two	 bits,	 01,	 define	 the	 message	 as	 concatenated.	 	 In	 a	
concatenated	message,	the	message	ID,	sender	ID,	receiver	ID	and	application	ID	
should	remain	the	same	for	all	messages	in	the	concatenated	set.	
The	second	sub‐field,	XXX	above,	defines	 the	 total	number	of	messages	 in	 this	
concatenated	set.		The	last	sub‐field,	YYY	above,	defines	the	sequence	number	of	
this	message	 in	the	concatenated	set.	 	Both	3‐bit	sub‐fields	support	7	message	
positions	in	the	concatenated	set.	
We	propose	a	maximum	of	7	messages	 for	concatenation	because	of	 the	work	
done	 by	 Fernandes	 [46]	 who	 notes	 that,	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 internal	 error	
correction	and	fault	tolerance	in	SMS,	practical	reliable	limits	for	concatenation	
in	SMS	are	between	6	and	8	individual	messages,	despite	the	fact	that	the	SMS	
message	protocol	supports	a	 theoretical	concatenation	 limit	much	higher	 than	
this.	 	To	be	 truly	carrier	agnostic,	we	must	work	within	 the	constraints	of	 the	
lowest	capability	of	each	potential	carrier.			
Each	 sub‐field	 defines	 the	message	 number	 or	messages	 set	 size	 in	 binary	 as	
follows:	
Value	 Field	Bits
1	 001
2	 010
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Value	 Field	Bits
3	 011
4	 100
5	 101
6	 110
7	 111
Table 17. Message	set	and	sequence	values	
The	formats	for	this	field	are	therefore	follows:	
Value	 Description
00000000 Single	message	transmission	– no	concatenation	
01xxxyyy	 Concatenated	message,	where	x	and	y	represent	the	sequence	
number	 and	 total	 number	of	messages	 in	 the	 concatenated	
sequence,	respectively	
10xxxxxx	 Values	commencing	10	are	reserved	for	future	development.
11111111 Reserved	for	system	use
Table 18. Message	structure	values	
To	encode	protocol	messages	to	concatenate	a	series	of	three	messages,	we	would	
set	 the	 following	 values	 in	 the	 message	 structure	 field	 for	 the	 concatenated	
messages.	
Message Message	structure	field
1	 01011001
2	 01011010
3	 01011011
Table 19. Concatenation	message	structure	field	example	
The	message	ID,	sender	ID,	receiver	ID	and	application	ID	remain	the	same	for	all	
three	 messages	 in	 the	 set	 to	 identify	 that	 the	 three	 concatenated	 parts	 are	
components	of	the	single	whole	message.	
The	protocol	concatenation	can	be	used	on	any	carrier.		This	may	even	be	the	case	
for	 serial	 type	 communications,	 where	 requirements	 of	 the	 application	 or	
constraints	imposed	by	the	environment	may	indicate	that	multiple	short	bursts	
of	 serial	 data	 may	 be	 more	 reliable	 than	 a	 longer	 single	 continuous	
communication.	
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Application‐specific	 uses	 of	 the	 field	 are	 supported	 by	 setting	 the	 two	 most	
significant	 bits	 to	 10	 and	 the	 least	 significant	 6	 bits	 for	 application	 specific	
purposes	(defined	by	the	application).			
Note:	the	protocol	concatenation	above	is	not	the	same	as	concatenated	SMS,	which	
is	a	facility	provided	by	the	underlying	GSM	protocol	and	is	not	related	to	the	use	of	
these	octets.		While	we	may	use	send	data	using	concatenated	SMS,	this	is	a	feature	
provided	at	the	carrier	level,	and	we	thus	ignore	it	on	the	basis	that	we	cannot	use	
any	feature	of	a	carrier	that	is	not	supported	by	all	carriers.	
GENT	‐	Generation	Timestamp	
The	message	 generation	 timestamp	 defines	 the	 time	 at	which	 a	message	was	
generated	by	its	originator.		This	timestamp	implies	that	each	message	originator	
within	an	application	shares	the	same	reference	time.	
The	 generation	 timestamp	 is	 written	 by	 the	 sender	 during	 generation	 of	 a	
message.		The	timestamp	is	a	7‐octet	binary	integer	field.		The	field	is	represented	
in	the	form:	
yyyyMMddhhmmssxxx	
Using	the	following	schema:	
Field	 Description Example
yyyy	 4‐digit	year 2010	
MM	 2‐digit	month	with	leading	0 04	
dd	 2‐digit	day	with leading	0 23	
hh	 2‐digit	hour	with	leading	0	in	24‐hour	format 14	
mm	 2‐digit	minute	with	leading	0 36	
ss	 2‐digit	second	with	leading	0 59	
xxx	 3‐digit	milliseconds	value	with	leading	0’s 003	
Table 20. Generation	timestamp	field	format	
The	schema	is	applied	as	follows:	
 Times	are	24‐hour	format,	from	00	to	23.			
 Year	is	always	four‐digit	format.			
 All	fields	are	left	padded	with	0	if	they	do	not	fill	the	field	length.	
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 The	 field	 should	 be	 convertible	 to	 a	 valid	 date	 and	 time	 (i.e.	
20130230010101003	 is	 not	 a	 valid	 value,	 as	 the	30	February	does	not	
exist).	
 All	devices	use	the	same	reference	time	value	(that	is,	when	it	is	2pm	on	
the	1st	January	2015,	all	devices	in	the	network	agree	that	it	is	2pm	on	1st	
January	2015).	
	
For	 example,	 of	 the	use	of	 the	 field,	 to	 convert	 the	 timestamp	21st	April	 1975	
5:43:56.003AM,	the	component	parts	are	converted	to	an	integer	and	then	binary	
encoded.	
The	base	integer	would	be:	
19750421054356003	
This	is	then	converted	to	a	7‐octet	binary	number:	
01000110	00101010	11100111	00111111	00011011	11111010	00100011	
VAPD	‐	Validity	Period	
Defines	 the	 time	 span	 during	 which	 this	 message	 is	 usable	 or	 active.	 	 It	
commences	from	the	generation	timestamp	and	represents	seconds	beyond	that	
point.			
Note:	because	some	carriers	do	not	deliver	messages	instantaneously	and	may	defer	
delivery	 until	 network	 conditions	 allow,	 the	 validity	 of	 a	message	 should	 never	
consider	when	a	message	is	received.	
The	validity	period	is	a	24	bit	(3	octet)	binary	number	which	gives	a	value	of	0	–	
16,777,215	seconds	which	is	equivalent	to	a	maximum	of	194	days’	validity.		In	
bio‐monitoring	solutions,	validity	will	typically	be	a	short	period	and	the	ability	
to	identify	when	a	measurement	was	taken	is	important	[60],	but	some	messages	
such	as	alarms	may	identify	longer	validity	periods	as	a	result	of	their	need	to	be	
received	and	processed	no	matter	when	they	are	received	at	the	destination.		As	
such,	this	validity	period	provides	sufficient	support	for	both	use	cases.	
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The	recipient	of	a	message	will	use	the	generation	timestamp	and	validity	period	
fields	to	determine	whether	a	received	message	is	valid.		The	end	of	the	useful	life	
of	 the	 message	 can	 be	 calculated	 as	 any	 time	 greater	 than	 the	 generation	
timestamp	plus	the	value	of	the	validity	period	(figure	24).	 	Messages	received	
beyond	that	 timeframe	have	expired,	and	the	message	should	be	discarded	no	
matter	its	content.	
Generation Timestamp
End of message life
Validity Period
Any message 
received beyond 
the point of “end 
of message life” 
must be 
discarded, no 
matter the 
content
	
FIGURE	24:	THE	MESSAGE	VALIDITY	PERIOD	
A	message	may	set	the	validity	period	field	to	0.		This	special	case	means	that	the	
message	has	no	expiry,	and	should	be	processed	no	matter	when	it	is	received.		
Any	positive	integer	value	sets	an	expectation	of	message	expiry	and	should	be	
added	to	the	generation	timestamp	to	determine	the	message	“end	of	life”.	
Value	 Description
000000000000000000000000 No	validity	period	expiration	– use	message	at	any	time
000000000000000000000001
...	
111111111111111111111110
Validity	period	in	seconds	– 1	– 16777214	seconds
111111111111111111111111 Reserved	for	system	use
Table 21. VAPD	values	
UDSL	‐	User	Data	Segment	Length	
The	user	data	segment	length	field	defines	the	length	of	the	application	user	data	
segment	in	octets.		This	length	relates	to	the	size	of	the	data	beyond	the	end	of	the	
header	(as	the	header	is	structured	and	maintains	consistent	size	for	any	message	
using	this	protocol).		The	user	data	segment	length	is	a	binary	number	of	16‐bit	
length,	 which	 supports	 a	 total	 capacity	 for	 65534	 octets	 of	 data	 in	 a	 single	
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message.		Application	specific	variants	of	this	protocol	could	extend	this	field	to	
support	longer	data	segments,	as	appropriate.	
For	some	carriers	(specifically	SMS)	this	maximum	payload	size	supported	in	this	
field	 is	 far	 in	 excess	 of	what	we	 can	 actually	 carry	 successfully.	 	 	Where	 data	
capacity	exceeding	capacity	of	the	carrier	is	required,	the	application	will	need	to	
address	this	issue	if	a	size	limited	carrier	is	selected.		This	may	be	managed	by	
rejecting	the	message	as	too	big	for	the	current	infrastructure,	or	by	going	back	
to	 select	 a	 more	 appropriate	 carrier.	 	 Options	 for	 handling	 this	 scenario	 are	
discussed	later.	
Value	 Description
0000000000000000	 Minimum	user	data	segment	length	
1111111111111110	 Maximum	user	data	segment	length		
1111111111111111	 Reserved	for	system	use
The	maximum	data	segment	length	will	be	determined	and	restricted	by	the	specific	carrier	
in	use	and	may	therefore	not	be	permitted	to	exceed	a	certain	value	(which	may	be	smaller	
than	65534	octets).	
Table 22. UDSL	values	
UDSE	‐	User	Data	Segment	Encryption	ID	
To	enhance	security	of	the	data,	the	user	data	segment	may	be	encrypted.		The	
communications	message	 format	 supports	 the	 use	 of	 encryption	 but	 does	 not	
mandate	the	type	of	encryption	to	be	used.		The	use	of	encryption	is	discussed	in	
chapter	7.	
The	user	data	segment	encryption	ID	is	a	single	octet,	used	by	an	application	to	
define	the	type	of	encryption	used	to	encrypt	the	user	data	segment	data.	 	We	
propose	 that	 the	 header	 is	 never	 encrypted	 as	 all	 data	 is	 obfuscated	 and	 the	
header	carries	no	personally	identifiable	data.		As	such,	encryption	applies	to	the	
user	data	segment.			
The	 use	 of	 this	 octet	 is	 application	 specific.	 	 Any	 non‐zero	 value	 defines	 that	
encryption	 is	 applied	 to	 the	 user	 data.	 	 The	 value	 identifies	 the	 application‐
specific	encryption	type	to	use	to	encode	and/or	decode	the	message.		We	review	
encryption	options	for	the	User	Data	Segment	in	chapter	7.	
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Value	 Description
00000000 No	encryption	used
00000001	
...	
11111110	
Range	of	encryption	IDs	(1	– 254)
11111111 Reserved	for	system	use
Table 23. UDSE	values	
Data	checksums	
A	checksum	is	a	method	of	checking	data	to	determine	whether	any	errors	have	
occurred	 during	 transmission.	 	 Our	 protocol	 incorporates	 three	 independent	
checksums	encoded	with	a	view	to	increasing	the	likelihood	of	the	system	being	
able	 to	 determine	 errors.	 	 As	 Stone	 et	 al	 demonstrate,	 checksums	 are	 a	 good	
method	of	catching	errors	in	the	data	so	that	“between	one	packet	in	10	billion	
and	one	packet	in	a	few	millions	will	have	an	error	that	goes	undetected”	[61].		
Multiple	checksums	have	been	shown	to	increase	the	potential	to	detect	errors	in	
specific	usage	scenarios	[62].	
HCHK	‐	Header	Checksum	
The	 header	 checksum	provides	 integrity	 checking	 for	 the	 header	 block	 of	 the	
message.		The	header	block	contains	data	that	is	encoded	at	bitwise	resolution,	
so	there	is	a	potential	that	if	a	single	bit	is	corrupted	the	meaning	of	the	header	
(for	example	the	ID	of	the	sender,	recipient	etc.)	can	be	meaningfully	changed	and	
this	disrupt	the	efficacy	and	relevance	of	the	message.		As	such	it	is	important	to	
ensure	the	header	is	correct	before	processing	begins.			
The	header	checksum	is	generated	by	reading	the	header	bytes	taken	from	the	
SOMF	field	up	to	and	including	the	UDSE	field	(that	is,	the	three	checksum	fields	
and	 the	 user	 data	 segment	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	 calculation	 of	 the	 header	
checksum).	
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FIGURE	25:	THE	FIELDS	OF	THE	MESSAGE	PROTOCOL	USED	IN	THE	CALCULATION	OF	HCHK	
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Figure	25	shows	the	fields	included	in	the	header	checksum	(dark	blue)	and	the	
location	of	the	header	checksum	field	in	the	context	of	the	message	header.	
The	checksum	is	a	four	octet	(32	bit)	CRC32	or	Adler32	checksum.		Both	CRC32	
and	Adler32	checksums	provide	good	coverage	of	the	data	and	a	high	probability	
of	error	detection	[63].	Creation	of	such	checksums	is	discussed	in	Appendix	A.	
UCHK	‐	User	Data	Segment	Checksum	
The	user	data	segment	checksum	provide	integrity	checking	over	the	user	data	
segment.		This	checksum	is	generated	across	the	entire	user	data	segment	of	the	
message	(figure	26).	
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FIGURE	26:	THE	FIELDS	OF	THE	MESSAGE	PROTOCOL	USED	IN	THE	CALCULATION	OF	UCHK	
The	checksum	is	a	four	octet	(32	bit)	CRC32	or	Adler32	checksum.		Creation	of	
these	checksums	is	discussed	in	Appendix	A	of	this	work.		
	
MCHK	‐	Message	Checksum	
The	 message	 checksum	 is	 calculated	 over	 the	 entire	 message	 including	 the	
previous	two	checksums.		As	this	checksum	is	stored	in	the	header,	the	checksum	
is	generated	by	first	setting	the	MCHK	field	to	an	alternating	pattern	of	1’s	and	
0’s.		As	such,	the	default	pattern	for	the	message	checksum	(in	order	to	generate	
the	real	checksum	over	the	body	of	the	message)	is:	
10101010	10101010	10101010	10101010	
Once	the	checksum	is	generated	over	the	entire	message,	the	calculated	value	of	
the	checksum	 is	 inserted	 into	 the	message	 in	 the	appropriate	message	header	
position	(figure	27).			
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FIGURE	27:	THE	FIELDS	OF	THE	MESSAGE	PROTOCOL	USED	IN	THE	CALCULATION	OF	MCHK	
Upon	 receiving	 the	 message,	 the	 receiver	 extracts	 the	 value	 of	 the	 message	
checksum’s	 4	 octets,	 resets	 the	 checksum	 field	 in	 the	message	 to	 the	 default	
pattern,	and	recalculates	the	checksum	across	the	message.			
The	checksum	is	a	four	octet	(32‐bit)	CRC32	or	Adler32	checksum.		Calculation	of	
these	checksums	is	discussed	in	Appendix	A	of	this	work.		
Applying	the	three	checksums	
The	application	of	the	three	message	checksums	can	be	seen	in	figure	28:	
Message header (X octets – 12 octets for 
the three checksums) User Data Segment (variable length)
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FIGURE	28:	CHECKSUM	APPLICATION	
The	process	to	apply	the	checksums	is	as	follows:	
 The	header	checksum	is	calculated	for	the	header	fields.	
 The	value	recorded	in	the	HCHK	field.			
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 The	second	checksum,	 for	 the	user	data	segment,	 is	calculated	over	 the	
user	data	segment.	
 The	value	is	encoded	into	the	UCHK	field.			
 A	default	value	is	coded	into	the	MCHK	field.	
 The	message	checksum	is	calculated	for	the	whole	message	from	octet	1	
to	octet	N	where	N	is	the	position	of	the	last	octet	in	the	user	data	segment.		
 The	 default	 checksum	 value	 in	 the	MCHK	 field	 is	 overwritten	with	 the	
generated	value.	
 The	message	is	then	ready	for	sending.	
UDSG	‐	User	Data	Segment	
The	user	data	segment	(UDSG)	is	a	free	form	binary	data	field	which	can	be	put	
to	any	appropriate	application‐define	use.		The	UDSG	may	have	a	number	of	uses	
based	 on	 the	 type	 of	 message	 being	 sent.	 	 For	 example,	 in	 a	 configuration	
message,	 information	 may	 be	 encoded	 into	 the	 UDSG	 to	 define	 the	 new	
configuration	of	the	remote	monitor.		In	an	information	message,	the	UDSG	may	
contain	 specific	 biometric	 readings	 of	 the	 subject	 being	 monitored.	 	 Some	
potential	uses	for	the	User	Data	Segment	are	discussed	later	in	this	work.	
4.5	Addressing	shortcomings	of	a	carrier	agnostic	approach	
By	supporting	multiple	communication	methods,	we	cannot	rely	on	specific	
attributes	of	a	single	defined	carrier.		This	raises	additional	challenges	and	
shortcomings	that	we	must	address.		We	discuss	possible	shortcomings	of	this	
approach,	and	the	proposed	solutions,	below.	
Checking	the	whole	message	has	been	delivered	
Each	communication	method	in	our	system	is	used	to	provide	a	data	transmission	
capability	that	we	use	to	send	a	header	and	application	data	payload.	
A	 data	 package	 received	 on	 any	 of	 our	 carriers	 should	 contain	 a	 complete	
message	 (including	 both	 header	 and	 application	 data).	 	 However,	 we	 cannot	
assume	this	to	be	the	case.		What	if	the	data	stream	is	incomplete,	or	if	part	of	the	
message	was	lost?	
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To	 check	message	 validity,	 the	 first	 thing	we	 should	 do	 is	 determine	 that	 the	
correct	volume	of	data	has	been	delivered.		Message	start	is	delimited	by	the	start	
of	message	delimiter	 field	(table	9	 field	1).	 	The	message	end	can	be	validated	
after	the	message	is	extracted	from	the	carrier	data.		To	validate	the	length,	we	
calculate	the	length	of	the	header	(per	table	9,	a	fixed	size)	and	add	the	length	of	
the	user	data	segment,	defined	by	a	field	11	of	the	header.			
This	 method	 allows	 us	 to	 validate	 the	 message	 is	 fundamentally	 intact	
independent	of	the	carrier	capabilities.		While	this	does	not	validate	the	message	
content	or	confirm	that	data	intact,	it	does	provide	an	initial	check	from	which	to	
proceed	to	decode	and	validate	the	message.		If	the	message	is	not	long	enough,	
or	does	not	start	with	the	correct	pattern,	we	can	instantly	discard	it.	
Identifying	the	sender	of	a	message	
With	no	common	carrier‐provided	method	of	identifying	the	sender	of	a	message,	
we	must	 identify	 the	sender	within	our	own	protocol.	 	Sender	 identification	is	
provided	using	a	combination	of	the	Application	Identifier	and	the	Sender	Device	
Identifier	fields.			
Sender	Device	ID’s	will	be	uniquely	allocated	to	a	particular	sender	for	a	specific	
application.		For	example,	with	a	single	octet	application	ID	we	have	255	discrete	
applications	in	our	communications	infrastructure.	 	A	4‐octet	sender	device	ID	
will	provide	4,294,967,295	possible	discrete	devices	inside	an	application.		Such	
an	ID	scheme	is	likely	to	provide	sufficient	unique	IDs	for	even	the	most	extensive	
of	monitoring	situations.	 	However,	the	advantage	of	our	proposed	structure	is	
that	 variants	 of	 the	 message	 protocol	 can	 extend	 either	 ID	 field	 to	 provide	
additional	identification	capacity	as	required	in	an	application	specific	context.	
Identifying	the	intended	receiver	of	a	message	
Where	 our	 carriers	may	 use	 broadcast	 capability	 (radio,	 for	 example),	 and	 to	
cater	 for	scenarios	such	as	misaddressing	of	a	message,	 receiver	 identification	
allows	us	to	define	who	a	message	is	intended	for.		This	ID	will	function	the	same	
as	 sender	 identification,	 using	 the	 Recipient	 Device	 ID	 and	 Application	 ID	 to	
uniquely	identify	the	intended	recipient	of	the	message.			
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In	order	to	properly	assure	the	use	of	a	message,	applications	should	ensure	that	
the	recipient	ID	matches	the	current	device	ID	before	processing	the	message.	
Determining	how	to	process	a	message	
There	 are	 many	 potential	 usage	 scenarios	 for	 messages	 in	 a	 bio‐monitoring	
solution.		Messages	could	be	request/response	polling	(send	me	your	data	now),	
device	 originated	 transmissions	 (here	 is	 my	 regular	 data	 transmission),	
emergency	medical	readings	(I	have	an	emergency	threshold	reading),	 remote	
configuration	messages	(please	turn	on	sensor	X),	and	so	on.	
In	 the	 context	 of	 the	 above	 message	 scenarios,	 defining	 the	 type	 of	 message	
allows	us	to	ensure	we	process	a	message	correctly.		The	message	type	field	(table	
9	field	3)	supports	65535	possible	message	types	within	an	application	to	ensure	
an	application	can	determine	categorically	how	a	message	should	be	processed.	
Uniquely	identifying	a	specific	message	
Messages	in	a	bio‐monitoring	system	have	an	implied	level	of	importance	due	to	
the	type	of	data	transmitted.		What	if	we	regularly	lose	messages	or	if	a	message	
is	somehow	duplicated?	
If	we	are	carrier‐agnostic,	messages	may	be	sent	over	broadcast	or	store‐and‐
forward	 carriers	 without	 delivery	 guarantees	 [46].	 	 A	 message	 may	 not	 be	
delivered	quickly,	may	be	delivered	out	of	sequence,	duplicated	or	lost	due	to	a	
network	weakness	or	exploitation	[64,	65].			
To	track	and	identify	specific	messages,	each	message	has	a	Message	ID,	which	
uniquely	identifies	a	message	from	a	particular	sender.		The	unique	message	ID	
will	use	of	a	combination	of	Sender	ID,	Recipient	ID,	Application	ID	and	Message	
ID	field.	 	When	combined,	these	fields	will	uniquely	identify	a	specific	message	
within	an	application.		
Defining	the	age	of	a	message	
Some	 of	 our	 carriers	 feature	 store‐and‐forward	 delivery	 which	 may	 take	
significant	time.		In	such	a	case,	data	received	may	no	longer	be	current.		For	bio‐
monitoring,	 we	 do	 not	 want	 to	 react	 to	 a	 message	 that	 is	 out	 of	 date	 and	
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superseded	by	more	recent	data.		As	such,	we	must	be	able	to	identify	the	age	of	
a	message.	
The	age	of	a	message	is	not	defined	by	when	it	is	delivered.		Carrier‐agnosticism	
means	 that	 we	 cannot	 assume	 transmission	 and	 delivery	 occur	 in	 real‐time.		
Message	age	is	therefore	determined	by	the	Message	Generation	timestamp	field.		
This	field	assumes	that	all	devices	within	a	single	application	are	synchronised	to	
the	same	time.	 	This	defines	a	fundamental	assumption	that	we	must	make	for	
our	system	to	work	correctly:	
Communication	components	of	the	system	will	be	time	aware	and	will	be	set	
to	the	same	base	time	within	a	single	application	
Upon	 receipt	 of	 a	 message,	 comparing	 the	 current	 application	 time	 to	 the	
generation	 timestamp	 of	 the	 message	 provides	 the	 age	 of	 the	 message	
independent	of	network,	carrier	or	delivery	timestamps.	
Application	time	–	generation	timestamp	=	age	of	message	
Checking	validity	of	a	message	
For	 medical	 data,	 validity	 of	 data	 is	 highly	 important	 [66].	 	 If	 a	 message	 is	
corrupted	during	transmission,	we	should	not	use	the	data	within	that	message	
to	make	any	decisions.		This	is	especially	the	case	where	the	message	relates	to	
the	state	of	health	of	a	monitored	subject.	 	To	determine	whether	a	message	is	
valid,	we	must	facilitate	mechanisms	to	determine	that	the	message	received	is	
the	same	as	the	message	that	was	sent.			
In	 addition	 to	 validating	message	 length,	 each	message	will	 contain	 a	 validity	
period	 to	 define	 a	 lifespan	 for	 the	 message	 calculated	 using	 the	 generation	
timestamp.		The	timeliness	of	the	message	can	therefore	be	determined.			
If		
((Generation	timestamp	+	validity	period)	<	Current	application	time)		
Then		
Message	Is	Valid	
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Else	
	 Message	Is	Expired	
Where	the	message	has	expired,	it	should	be	discarded.			
In	addition	to	the	validity	period	for	a	message,	the	content	of	the	message	should	
be	validated	and	verified.		We	use	three	efficient	checksums	across	different	parts	
of	the	data,	to	provide	a	combined	level	of	validation	to	the	message	data.	
The	first	checksum	is	a	header	checksum	to	validate	the	content	of	the	message	
header.		The	second	checksum	is	calculated	on	the	content	of	the	application	data	
segment.	 	 Finally,	 the	 third	 checksum	 is	 calculated	 on	 the	 overall	 message	
including	 header,	 application	 data	 and	 the	 other	 two	 checksums.	 	 Specific	
discussion	on	the	assurance	of	data	validity	can	be	found	in	chapter	7.	
Transmitting	application	specific	data	
Field	 15,	 the	 application	 user	 data	 segment,	 in	 our	 protocol	 facilitates	
transmission	 of	 application	 data	 for	 bio‐monitoring.	 	 The	 capacity	 of	 the	
application	data	segment	is	determined	by	the	carrier	in	use.	 	After	the	header	
block	is	written	(a	consistent	size	for	any	carrier),	any	remaining	data	capacity	in	
a	 message	 is	 available	 for	 the	 application	 data.	 	 The	 size	 of	 the	 maximum	
permissible	 user	 data	 segment	 for	 a	 message	 over	 a	 specific	 carrier	 can	 be	
calculated	by	taking	the	size	of	the	header	block	(X	octets)	from	the	capacity	of	
the	carrier.		For	example,	figure	29	shows	the	case	of	a	single	SMS:	
Header block
X octets
User data segment
140 – X octets
	
FIGURE	29:	HEADER	AND	DATA	BLOCK	IN	A	SIZE	LIMITED	DATA	CARRIER	
Extending	the	data	segment	through	message	concatenation	
Some	 potential	 carriers	 that	 we	 may	 use,	 such	 as	 SMS,	 have	 specific	 and	
potentially	restrictive	limits	on	the	size	of	messages.		To	transmit	more	data	than	
our	 carrier	 supports	 in	 a	 single	 message,	 we	 will	 allow	 messages	 to	 be	
concatenated	into	a	“single”	virtual	message.			
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Our	 carrier	 independent	 concatenation	 mechanism	 uses	 multiple	 individual	
messages	on	any	carrier	(or	potentially	over	different	carriers)	to	send	the	data	
volume	that	the	application	requires.		For	example,	using	the	most	limited	carrier,	
SMS,	 consider	a	message	with	application	data	of	220	octets,	 greater	 than	 the	
140‐octet	capacity	of	a	single	SMS	message.			
Assume	our	header	requires	a	nominal	50	octets,	we	have	140	–	50	=	90	octets	of	
application	data	capacity	in	a	single	SMS	message.			We	would	need	to	concatenate	
3	SMS	to	send	the	220	octets	of	user	data.	
140	x	3	=	420	octets	of	carrier	data	
50	x	3	=	150	octets	of	header	data	(one	header	per	SMS)	
420	–	150	=	270	octets	of	application	data	
Thus,	our	application	data	would	be	sent	over	three	SMS	as	per	Figure	30.	
Message 1 Header block
X octets
User data segment part 1
140 ‐ X octets
Message 2 Header block
X octets
User data segment part 2
140 ‐ X octets
Message 3 Header block
X octets
User data segment part 3
140 ‐ X octets
	
FIGURE	30:	MULTIPLE	MESSAGES	CONCATENATED	TO	PROVIDE	LONGER	DATA	SEGMENT	IN	
PACKETISED	SHORT	MESSAGE	TRANSMISSIONS	
We	provide	a	message	structure	field	to	concatenate	messages.	 	The	use	of	the	
field	is	discussed	in	detail	later	in	this	chapter.	
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Concatenation	not	required	‐	messages	transmission	in	size‐
unlimited	carriers	
Concatenation	 is	 only	 required	when	 our	 communication	method	 is	 data	 size	
restricted.		With	carriers,	such	as	Internet	or	serial	data,	where	data	capacity	is	
large	or	potentially	 infinite,	 concatenation	 is	not	 required.	 	As	 such,	while	 the	
above	 scenario	 required	 concatenation	 over	 SMS,	 it	would	 be	 sent	 as	 a	 single	
message	over	Internet	as	shown	in	figure	31:	
Header block
X octets
User data segment
220 octets
	
FIGURE	31:	HEADER	AND	DATA	BLOCK	IN	AN	'UNLIMITED'	DATA	CARRIER	
A	 single	 header	 block	 and	 a	 single	 user	 data	 segment	 of	 220	 octets	 are	 all	
transmitted	in	a	single	message	transmission.		The	message	structure	field	would	
indicate	that	this	is	a	non‐concatenated	message	and	the	length	of	the	user	data	
segment	would	be	defined	as	220	octets	by	the	user	data	segment	length	field.	
Data	security	and	obfuscation	for	message	content	
Medical	 information	 is	 often	 sensitive	 and	 requires	 specific	 privacy	
considerations	(for	example	under	Australian	Privacy	legislation	[67]).		Because	
of	the	sensitivity	of	the	information	we	may	send,	security	of	data	is	required.		We	
facilitate	security	of	information	in	two	ways.			
The	header	block	contains	no	user‐identifiable	data.		System	identifier	values	for	
sender,	receiver,	message	type,	application	and	so	on	do	not	contain	personally	
identifiable	data.		An	unauthorised	user	intercepting	the	header	requires	access	
to	the	underlying	application	configuration	(i.e.	at	the	base	station)	to	decode	the	
application	specific	configuration	value	translations	(for	example,	the	application	
knows	that	sender	ID	12345	is	Ben	Townsend,	but	this	is	not	transmitted	in	the	
message	 data).	 	 As	 such,	 the	 first	 level	 of	 protection	 for	 our	 data	 is	 through	
obfuscation	of	header	information	to	ensure	there	is	no	personally	identifiable	
data	presented	therein.		
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The	second	level	of	protection	is	to	allow	the	personal	data	(the	medical	readings	
in	the	application	user	data	segment)	to	be	encrypted.	 	The	user	data	segment	
supports	the	use	of	encryption,	should	the	application	require	it.		The	User	Data	
Segment	 Encryption	 ID	 field	 facilitates	 the	 use	 of	 multiple	 encryption	 types.		
However,	encryption	 imposes	additional	considerations,	so	will	not	be	applied	
globally	to	each	message.		The	use	of	encryption	is	discussed	in	chapter	7.	
4.6	Encoding	field	data	in	our	message	protocol	
The	message	header	block	will	use	different	encoding	formats	for	data.		Each	field	
uses	the	most	efficient	method	to	encode	type	of	data	that	the	field	represents.		
Specifically,	we	utilise	binary	values,	bitwise	 indicator	 fields	and	binary	coded	
ASCII	data.		The	detail	of	each	field	encoding	is	shown	below.	
Binary	fields	
If	a	field	is	binary	value,	encoding	is	by	the	binary	value	of	the	octet	(or	groups	of	
octets	 if	greater	 than	an	8‐bit	value	 is	required).	 	Each	octet	contains	8	bits	of	
binary	data	representing	a	single	unsigned	binary	number	between	0	and	255.		
More	 than	 one	 octet	 can	 be	 concatenated	 into	 a	 single	 field	 value	 to	 provide	
greater	 bitwise	 resolution	 (for	 example,	 2	 octets	 supports	 values	 from	 0	 to	
65535).	
A	binary	 field	with	a	numeric	value	of	1	will	be	encoded	as	binary	00000001.		
Where	a	number	greater	than	255	needs	to	be	encoded,	two	or	more	sequential	
octets	will	be	concatenated	into	a	single	field,	and	encoded	in	standard	form	with	
the	least	significant	bit	being	the	rightmost	bit	of	the	combined	octets.	
For	example,	for	a	field	that	is	required	to	support	a	value	range	of	255,	we	encode	
a	single	octet:	
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Binary	 	 Decimal	
00000000		 	 0	
00000001	 	 1	
…	
11111111	 	 255	
For	a	 field	 that	 requires	a	range	up	 to	65535	we	concatenate	 two	consecutive	
octets.		Thus,	for	a	value	of	256,	we	encode:	
Binary	 	 	 Decimal	
0000000100000000		 256	
And	for	65535:	
1111111111111111		 65535	
We	are	not	proposing	any	data	compression	in	our	header,	 thus	to	encode	the	
value	1	in	a	16‐bit	field,	both	octets	are	used	thus:	
0000000000000001		 1	
It	is	important	therefore	to	choose	field	lengths	that	suit	the	potential	ranges	of	
data	in	order	to	minimise	header	octet	use.			
It	should	be	noted	that	while	we	could	evaluate	use	of	bitwise	storage	within	the	
header,	and	define	data	fields	at	the	bit	rather	than	octet	level	(for	example,	using	
5	bits	if	we	only	need	to	represent	a	value	between	0	and	31),	for	simplicity	we	
have	 limited	 our	 field	 definitions	 to	 discrete	 octet	 boundaries.	 	 Should	 data	
capacity	become	an	overriding	issue	for	the	header,	bitwise	encoding	could	be	
evaluated	to	determine	the	savings	that	can	be	made	in	the	header.	
When	encoding	small	values	 into	 fields	of	greater	capacity,	 the	binary	value	 is	
padded	with	leading	0’s	to	fill	all	octets	comprising	the	field.		The	component	bits	
are	then	split	into	octets,	and	encoded	from	left	to	right	into	the	message.	 	For	
example,	if	we	want	to	encode	14255	into	a	24‐bit	field:	
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14255	=	Binary	11011110101111	
Pad	with	leading	0’s	to	make	up	the	24	bits:	000000000011011110101111	
Then	split	into	octets:	00000000			00110111			10101111	
Bitwise	indicator	fields	
A	bitwise	indicator	field	is	a	binary	field	where	meaning	is	not	represented	by	the	
binary	value	across	the	octet,	but	rather	by	the	use	of	each	binary	digit	position	
as	a	switch.		Thus,	a	single	octet	has	8	bitwise	switches,	two	octets	16	switches	
and	so	on.	
Each	bit	position	shows	the	on/off	status	of	the	bit.		An	application	is	responsible	
for	 defining	 the	 usage	 matrix	 for	 each	 “switch”	 in	 the	 octet(s)	 for	 whatever	
purpose	 is	 required	 by	 the	 application.	 	 Bitwise	 indicators	 can	 be	 used,	 for	
example,	to	turn	sensor	channels	on	and	off	when	the	monitor	is	in	the	field.			
Binary	Coded	ASCII	
Binary	coded	ASCII	is	used	where	it	would	be	inefficient	or	inappropriate	to	use	
binary	values,	for	example	to	send	a	message	string	in	human	readable	form.	In	
this	field	type,	data	is	encoded	in	8	bit	extended	ASCII	format	(see	Appendix	B	for	
the	ASCII	table)	or	alternatively	into	7‐bit	packed	ASCII	format	on	an	application	
specific	basis	(see	Appendix	C).			
An	example	use	case	assumes	we	wanted	to	encode	the	date	and	time	in	a	string	
format	of	YYYYMMDDHHNNSS	where	Y	is	year,	M	is	month,	D	is	date,	H	is	hour,	
N	is	minute	and	S	is	second.		A	sample	timestamp	would	be:	
20131115150632	
These	characters	have	the	following	ASCII	decimal	values:	
50	48	49	51	49	49	49	53	49	53	48	54	51	50	
When	converted	to	binary	this	is	then	represented	as	the	following	sequence	of	
octets:	
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00110010	00110000	00110001	00110011	00110001	00110001	00110001	
00110101	00110001	00110101	00110000	00110110	00110011	00110010	
This	binary	value	is	encoded	into	14	octets	representing	each	ASCII	character.	
Decoding	 these	 fields	 occurs	 in	 the	 reverse	 order.	 	 The	 value	 of	 each	 octet	 is	
calculated	and	the	ASCII	character	value	extracted.		This	process	is	repeated	from	
left	to	right,	until	all	of	the	octets	in	the	field	have	been	decoded	back	to	ASCII	
characters.	
4.7	Performance	indicators	addressed	by	the	proposed	message	
format	
In	 table	1,	we	 identify	 a	number	of	 requirements	 and	associated	performance	
indicators	that	are	required	for	a	carrier	agnostic	communications	solution.	
Through	 the	 protocol	 attributes	 defined	 in	 this	 chapter,	we	 have	 addressed	 a	
number	of	the	performance	indicators.		Specifically,	by	defining	a	set	of	attributes	
that	 facilitate	 appropriate	 communication	 features	 without	 relying	 on	 the	
attributes	 of	 any	 one	 carrier,	we	 remove	 the	 reliance	 on	 a	 pervasive	 Internet	
connection,	 facilitate	 communication	 over	 more	 than	 one	 communications	
channel	in	the	same	system.		By	ensuring	the	message	is	the	same	independent	of	
carrier,	we	support	fail	over	between	communication	methods,	and	facilitate	the	
ability	to	implement	an	algorithm	to	select	the	most	appropriate	communications	
channel.	
Through	 the	 structure	 of	 our	 header	 and	 the	 attributes	 defined	 therein,	 we	
obfuscate	 data	 by	 not	 sending	 personally	 identifiable	 data	 in	 the	 header.	 	We	
support	 the	 use	 of	 encryption	 in	 the	 user	 data	 segment,	 and	will	 expand	 this	
concept	in	Chapter	7.		We	support	robustness	through	the	inclusion	of	multiple	
data	checksums,	and	by	incorporating	high	resolution	sender/receiver	message	
identification	 capabilities.	 	 Furthermore,	 our	 header	 removes	 any	 reliance	 on	
carrier	capabilities	for	the	security	and	robustness	of	data.		
In	the	subsequent	chapters,	we	will	address	additional	performance	indicators	
for	our	communications	protocol.	 	
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5: 	SENDING	AND	RECEIVING	
MESSAGES	WITH	MULTIPLE	
CARRIERS 	
The	communication	protocol	proposed	in	Chapter	4	facilitates	the	ability	to	send	
and	receive	messages	over	a	carrier	agnostic	communications	infrastructure.		On	
an	application	basis,	the	process	of	sending	or	receiving	must	interact	with	the	
underlying	carrier	being	used.		We	discuss	the	processes	required	to	successfully	
send	 and	 receive	 messages	 independently	 of	 the	 carrier,	 using	 our	
communication	protocol.	
5.1	Message	send	
The	message	send	module	takes	a	protocol	message	from	the	application.		It	will	
determine	 the	 best	 current	 carrier	 for	 the	 data	 using	 an	 application	 specific	
carrier	selection	algorithm	and	send	the	message	by	passing	it	to	the	appropriate	
physical	transceiver	communications	module.			
	
FIGURE	32:	CLASS	DIAGRAM	FOR	THE	MESSAGE	SEND	MODULE	
As	per	the	class	diagram	in	Figure	32,	the	send	module	implements	two	methods,	
method	 Send	 takes	 a	 protocol	message	 and	 sends	 it	 via	 a	 nominated	 carrier,	
method	Select	will	evaluate	 the	carriers	currently	available	 to	 the	system,	and	
determine	which	one	 is	 the	best	 to	 send	a	message	at	 the	 current	 time.	 	Both	
methods	are	used	in	the	message	send	process.	Figure	33	illustrates	the	process	
for	sending	a	message.	
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FIGURE	33:	HIGH	LEVEL	PROCESS	FOR	MESSAGE	SEND	MODULE	
Selecting	the	best	carrier	
The	selection	of	the	best	carrier	is	an	application	specific	decision,	and	requires	
the	Select	method	to	implement	a	carrier	selection	algorithm	that	is	based	on	a	
number	of	factors.		These	factors	include:	
 The	carriers	available	within	the	application	
 The	priority	of	the	carriers,	based	on	carrier	capability	according	to	the	
application	requirements	
 The	carriers	that	are	currently	able	to	transmit	a	message	(i.e.	have	signal,	
connectivity	etc.)	
The	process	for	selecting	a	carrier	is	shown	in	figure	34:	
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FIGURE	34:	SELECTION	OF	BEST	AVAILABLE	CARRIER	
We	proposed	a	number	of	carriers	that	can	support	the	sending	of	bio‐monitoring	
data	in	section	3.6.		An	application	using	our	communication	protocol	may	elect	
to	use	any	or	all	supported	carriers,	or	other	carriers	we	have	not	considered.		
However,	as	we	discuss	in	Appendix	G,	we	should	not	assume	that	because	we	
wish	to	use	a	communication	method,	that	method	is	actually	available.		Various	
environmental	 factors	may	mean	that	a	particular	carrier,	 for	example,	mobile	
Internet,	 is	 not	 available,	 while	 another	 carrier	 such	 as	 SMS	 is.	 	 In	 order	 to	
successfully	send	a	message,	the	first	step	in	selecting	the	optimal	carrier	is	to	
identify	the	list	of	currently	available	carriers.	
The	carriers	available	 to	an	application	should	be	defined	 through	application	
configuration.		Such	configuration	informs	the	message	send	and	receive	modules	
which	physical	carriers	might	participate	in	the	communications	for	the	system.	
Each	carrier	should	then	be	prioritised.		The	prioritisation	of	carriers	should	be	
based	on	specific	requirements	of	the	application.	 	For	example,	an	application	
making	 use	 of	 short	 data	 transmissions,	 with	 no	 real‐time	 requirement	 for	
	
	 117	 	
	
transmission,	 might	 define	 that	 SMS	 was	 the	 most	 suitable	 mechanism	 over	
which	 to	 transmit	 (as	 it	 requires	 a	 lower	 quality	 of	 signal	 than	 Internet,	 for	
example).	 	However,	 Internet	may	be	 the	priority	choice	where	near‐real	 time	
transmission	 is	 required	 for	 larger	 packets	 of	 data.	 	 Radio	may	 be	 the	 choice	
where	infrastructure	for	GSM	mobile	communications	is	limited	or	inconsistent.		
Each	decision	would	be	made	based	on	 the	environment	 and	use‐case	 for	 the	
particular	application.		Our	protocol	supports	such	varied	use	cases	as	we	do	not	
depend	on	any	specific	carrier.	
From	 the	 list	 of	 available	 carriers,	 the	 systems	 should	determine	whether	 the	
“best”	carrier	can	currently	transmit.			This	process	must	be	carrier	specific.		For	
example,	using	AT	commands	on	an	SMS	modem	(like	the	Siemens	M20T	that	we	
used	for	test	purposes),	the	AT+CSQ	command	provides	signal	quality	of	the	GSM	
network	[68].		Using	a	mobile	Internet	connection,	a	ping	to	the	base	station	may	
assure	 transmission	 capability,	 while	 over	 radio	 or	 mobile	 data,	 a	 successful	
handshake	to	a	remote	host	could	inform	of	the	ability	to	make	a	connection.				
Ultimately,	validation	of	the	availability	of	carriers	would	be	dependent	on	the	
application,	as	it	must	account	for	the	specific	carrier	hardware	in	use	and	the	
facilities	 provided	 by	 that	 hardware.	 	 The	 validation	 of	 a	 carrier’s	 ability	 to	
transmit	will	not	be	an	agnostic	operation,	but	the	same	capability	will	be	enabled	
for	 each	 carrier,	 using	 the	 carrier’s	 specific	 methods	 to	 determine	 if	 a	
transmission	should	be	attempted	over	that	carrier.		
What	if	no	carrier	is	available?	
For	medical	monitoring,	 we	must	 account	 for	 the	 scenario	where	 there	 is	 no	
carrier	 available	 at	 the	 time	 we	 wish	 to	 send	 a	 message.	 	 	 In	 this	 case,	 the	
communication	solution	would	work	through	each	of	the	available	carriers	and	
then	enter	an	alert	status	when	no	more	carriers	are	available,	as	shown	in	figure	
33.		Alternatively,	the	process	may	loop	back	to	the	start	of	the	prioritised	list	of	
carriers,	continuing	to	try	and	find	a	carrier	to	send	the	message	until	such	time	
as	the	message	is	sent.	
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An	example	of	a	carrier	selection	algorithm	
The	 selection	 algorithm	 for	 the	 “best”	 carrier	 will	 be	 application	 dependent,	
specific	to	the	underlying	configuration	of	the	solution	using	the	carrier	agnostic	
communication	protocol.		However,	to	demonstrate	a	carrier	selection	algorithm	
in	a	practical	sense,	we	established	up	a	set	of	test	scenarios	using	a	two‐carrier	
solution,	with	SMS	and	Internet	as	 the	enabled	carriers.	 	SMS	was	 transmitted	
using	a	GSM	modem,	while	Internet	made	use	a	PC	internet	connection.	
In	terms	of	priority,	our	application	prioritised	Internet	as	the	highest	priority	
carrier,	followed	by	SMS.	
A	 test	 was	 conducted	 using	 a	 number	 of	 operational	 scenarios	 to	 outline	 the	
possible	availability	scenarios	for	each	carrier,	as	shown	in	table	24:	
Test	Number	 Internet	 SMS	
1	 Available	 Available	
2	 Available	 Not	Available	
3	 Not	Available	 Available	
4	 Not	Available	 Not	Available	
Table 24. Scenarios	for	testing	“best”	carrier	selection	
Running	through	these	scenarios,	pseudocode	to	demonstrate	the	steps	that	were	
taken	and	the	outcomes	achieved	can	be	shown	as	follows:	
Scenario	Test	Number	1	
Step	1	 	 Read	configuration	to	determine	configured	carriers	
Resp	1		 Internet	and	SMS	
Step	2	 	 Determine	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	2		 Internet	
Step	3	 	 Can	Internet	currently	transmit	
Resp	3		 Yes	
Step	4	 	 Select	Internet	and	transmit	message	
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Resp	4		 Transmission	successful	
Scenario	Test	Number	2	
Step	1	 	 Read	configuration	to	determine	configured	carriers	
Resp	1		 Internet	and	SMS	
Step	2	 	 Determine	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	2		 Internet	
Step	3	 	 Can	Internet	currently	transmit	
Resp	3		 Yes	
Step	4	 	 Select	Internet	and	transmit	message	
Resp	4		 Transmission	successful	
Scenario	Test	Number	3	
Step	1	 	 Read	configuration	to	determine	configured	carriers	
Resp	1		 Internet	and	SMS	
Step	2	 	 Determine	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	2		 Internet	
Step	3	 	 Can	Internet	currently	transmit	
Resp	3		 No	
Step	4	 	 Determine	next	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	4		 SMS	
Step	5	 	 Can	SMS	currently	transmit	
Resp	5		 Yes	
Step	6	 	 Select	SMS	and	transmit	message	
Resp	6		 Transmission	successful	
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Scenario	Test	Number	4	
Step	1	 	 Read	configuration	to	determine	configured	carriers	
Resp	1		 Internet	and	SMS	
Step	2	 	 Determine	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	2		 Internet	
Step	3	 	 Can	Internet	currently	transmit	
Resp	3		 No	
Step	4	 	 Determine	next	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	4		 SMS	
Step	5	 	 Can	SMS	currently	transmit	
Resp	5		 No	
Step	6	 	 Determine	next	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	6		 None	
Step	7	 	 Enter	transmission	error	state	
For	the	scenario	where	no	carrier	can	transmit,	the	system	will	need	to	define	a	
process	 to	 handle	 this	 occurrence	 (and	 it	 should	 implement	 specific	 defined	
behaviour	 in	 this	 case).	 	 For	 example,	 taking	 test	 scenario	 4,	 if	 we	 were	 to	
implement	a	retry	process:	
Scenario	Test	Number	4	with	wait	state	on	error	
Step	1	 	 Read	configuration	to	determine	configured	carriers	
Resp	1		 Internet	and	SMS	
Step	2	 	 Determine	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	2		 Internet	
Step	3	 	 Can	Internet	currently	transmit	
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Resp	3		 No	
Step	4	 	 Determine	next	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	4		 SMS	
Step	5	 	 Can	SMS	currently	transmit	
Resp	5		 No	
Step	6	 	 Determine	next	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	6		 None	
Step	7	 	 Enter	transmission	error	state	
Resp	7		 Wait	for	1	second	
Step	8	 	 Go	to	step	1	and	retry	
It	will	be	at	the	onus	of	the	application	using	the	protocol	to	determine	specifically	
how	to	handle	this	sort	of	error.	 	For	robustness,	we	recommendation	that	the	
solution	attempts	a	number	of	retries	on	each	carrier	before	failing	over	to	the	
next	 available	 carrier.	 	 In	 the	 case	 of	 a	 totally	 failed	 transmission	 (that	 is,	 no	
carrier	sent	the	message),	the	application	would	start	again	or	raise	an	end	user	
alarm,	depending	on	the	application	requirements.	
Errors	during	transmission	
A	potential	issue	scenario	arises	where	an	error	occurs	during	the	transmission.		
That	is,	the	following	conditions	are	met:	
1. Available	carriers	have	been	determined	
2. Best	priority	carrier	has	been	selected	
3. Carrier	can	transmit	a	message	
4. Message	transmit	attempt	commences	
5. Message	fails	during	transmission	
This	illustrates	that	we	must	not	assume	that,	because	a	carrier	can	transmit,	that	
a	message	has	been	transmitted	successfully.		Once	the	selected	carrier	is	decided	
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and	 transmission	 attempted,	 success	 of	 the	 transmission	 from	 the	 carrier	
hardware	define	whether	the	message	was	sent	successfully.		
Where	 the	 message	 is	 not	 sent	 successfully,	 the	 system	 should	 manage	 this.		
Retries	 could	 occur	 for	 that	 carrier	 before	 the	 system	 “fail	 over”	 to	 the	 next	
available	carrier	occurs.		For	example,	assuming	transmission	fails	on	the	primary	
selected	carrier	in	a	3‐retry	system,	a	sample	scenario	for	transmission	would	be	
as	follows:	
Scenario	Test	Number	1	with	failure	of	transmission	on	the	first	selected	
carrier	
Step	1	 	 Read	configuration	to	determine	configured	carriers	
Resp	1		 Internet	and	SMS	
Step	2	 	 Determine	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	2		 Internet	
Step	3	 	 Can	Internet	currently	transmit	
Resp	3		 Yes	
Step	4	 	 Select	Internet	and	transmit	message	
Resp	4		 Transmission	unsuccessful	
Step	5	 	 Enter	transmission	error	state	
Resp	5		 Retry	available	–	retry	1	
Step	6	 	 Select	Internet	and	transmit	message	
Resp	6		 Transmission	unsuccessful	
Step	7	 	 Enter	transmission	error	state	
Resp	7		 Retry	available	–	retry	2	
Step	8	 	 Select	Internet	and	transmit	message	
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Resp	8		 Transmission	unsuccessful	
Step	9	 	 Enter	transmission	error	state	
Resp	9		 Retry	available	–	retry	3	
Step	10	 Select	Internet	and	transmit	message	
Resp	10	 Transmission	unsuccessful	
Step	11	 Enter	transmission	error	state	
Resp	11	 Retry	not	available	–	fail	over	
Step	12	 Determine	next	highest	priority	carrier	
Resp	13	 SMS	
Step	14	 Can	SMS	currently	transmit	
Resp	14	 Yes	
Step	15	 Select	SMS	and	transmit	message	
Resp	15	 Transmission	successful	
By	 assigning	 each	 carrier	 a	 priority,	 using	 carrier	 specific	 checking	 we	 can	
determine	the	availability	of	the	best	priority	carrier,	send	the	message	using	that	
carrier	or	deal	with	the	consequences	of	the	carrier	not	being	available	or	failing.		
Implementation	of	this	functionality	would	be	application	specific.	
Combining	 all	 of	 these	 requirements,	 figure	 35	 shows	 how	 the	 send	 process	
integrates	into	the	overall	solution.	
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FIGURE	35:	MESSAGE	SEND	PROCESS	
5.2	Message	receive	
The	message	receive	module	 looks	 for	notification	of	new	messages	 that	have	
been	received	by	any	carriers	currently	operational	within	the	system,	checks	for	
carrier	 level	 errors	 and	 takes	 the	messages	 received	 and	 passes	 them	 to	 the	
message	management	 layer	 for	action.	 	A	class	diagram	for	message	receive	 is	
shown	in	figure	36:	
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FIGURE	36:	MESSAGE	RECEIVE	CLASS	DIAGRAM	
The	receive	module	implements	a	single	method	called	Receive	which	will	poll	
each	of	the	current	carrier	hardware	interface	modules	for	messages,	expose	any	
issues	with	the	message	reception	(identified	by	the	carrier)	and	then	pass	the	
message	or	the	error	status	to	the	message	management	layer.	
Where	there	is	a	carrier	error	found	upon	receipt	of	a	message,	the	message	will	
be	 discarded	 and	 the	 carrier	 error	 exposed	 to	 the	 application.	 	 This	will	 be	 a	
carrier	dependent	operation	that	is	made	transparent	by	the	receive	module.	
The	process	for	the	receive	method	is	as	per	figure	37:	
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FIGURE	37:	HIGH	LEVEL	PROCESS	FOR	MESSAGE	RECEIVE	MODULE	
The	message	receive	module	will	poll	each	carrier	for	any	messages	received	and	
convert	them	into	message	protocol	packages	if	there	are	no	carrier	level	errors	
(interpreted	 through	 carrier	 specific	 software).	 	 Figure	 38	 illustrates	 the	
fundamental	process	that	will	be	used	when	multiple	carriers	are	available.			
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FIGURE	38:	PROCESS	FOR	RECEIVING	A	MESSAGE	
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5.3	Interfacing	with	carrier	hardware	
A	hardware	interface	layer	is	required	to	interact	between	the	messaging	later	
and	 the	 devices	 that	 provide	 transmission	 capabilities	 for	 the	 system.	 	 The	
hardware	 specific	 control	will	 be	 different	 for	 each	 type	 of	 hardware	 used	 to	
access	a	particular	carrier.		The	modules	to	interface	with	carrier	hardware	are	
application	 specific	 and	 are	 discussed	 here	 for	 completeness.	 	 The	 hardware	
interface	layer	cannot	be	considered	agnostic	as	to	hardware	and	carrier.			
Some	hardware/interface	modules	will	work	for	all	devices	of	a	certain	type	(for	
example,	it	is	possible	that	all	mobile	data	devices	using	the	AT	command	set	can	
be	driven	using	a	 single	hardware	 interface	 layer	 to	 send	SMS	or	mobile	data	
messages).		However,	others	may	need	to	implement	a	specific	“driver”	module	
for	each	different	device	(i.e.	driving	different	mobile	device	hardware	directly	to	
send	an	MMS).			
While	 a	 device	 specific	 implementation	 is	 required	 to	 allow	 our	 solution	 to	
integrate	directly	with	 the	 fundamental	 carrier	hardware	and	 software,	 at	 the	
higher	levels	of	the	system	diagram,	the	system	need	not	consider	the	physical	
implementation	of	the	carrier	as	the	interface	layer	should	standardise	access	to	
the	carrier	by	 implementing	a	consistent	set	of	methods	that	can	be	called	the	
same	way	from	the	messaging	send	and	receive	modules.	
A	sample	hardware	interface	class	diagram	is	shown	in	figure	39.	
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FIGURE	39:	SAMPLE	HARDWARE	INTERFACE	CLASS	DIAGRAM	
While	 this	 layer	 is	 not	 part	 of	 our	 specific	 scope	 in	 this	 work,	 we	 would	
recommend	that	the	hardware	interface	software	implement	consistent	methods	
such	as	those	shown	above.		The	software	methods	implemented	in	this	“driver”	
operate	the	hardware	device	using	the	hardware’s	own	internal	command	set	but	
provide	our	solution	with	a	consistent	interface	between	the	application	and	the	
carrier.		The	hardware	then	interfaces	with	the	actual	carrier	medium	to	send	or	
receive	a	message.			
	
5.4	 Validation	 of	 communications	 via	 carrier	 agnostic	
transmission	
In	order	to	validate	whether	our	message	protocol	could	be	transmitted	over	a	
selection	of	the	carriers	we	proposed	in	chapter	3,	a	test	implementation	utilising	
a	carrier	selection	and	failover	algorithm,	a	message	protocol	class	was	created	
using	C#	(figure	40):	
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FIGURE	40:	MESSAGE	PROTOCOL	CLASS	DIAGRAM	
	
	 131	 	
	
This	class	was	used	to	encode	a	protocol	message	with	arbitrary	data	that	could	
be	sent	and	then	validated	at	the	receiver.		Hardware	driver	modules	for	the	SMS	
and	Internet	hardware	layers	were	created,	and	these	were	then	used	to	transmit	
a	message	according	to	use	case	scenarios	identified	in	table	24.	
Internet	was	prioritised	over	SMS	as	the	best	system	carrier.		For	each	scenario,	
100	messages	were	sent	as	fast	as	the	carrier	could	accept	each	message.	 	The	
retry	scenario	allowed	a	single	retry	on	error	before	failover	was	attempted.		
The	 received	message	 was	 decoded	 and	 compared	 to	 the	 transmitted	 source	
message.		The	results	are	tabulated	below.	
Test	
scenario	
Messages	
Sent	
Messages	
Received	
Errors Sent	 via	
primary	
carrier	
Sent	 via	
secondary	
carrier	
1	 100	 100	 0	 100	 0	
2	 100	 100	 11	 100	 0	
3	 98	 98	 22	 0	 98	
4	 100	3	 0	 100	 0	 0	
Table 25. Outcomes	of	100	message	test	by	test	scenario	
Notes:	
1. While	a	message	was	received	in	the	case	of	the	error	in	internet	transmission,	there	was	an	
issue	decoding	the	checksum	for	the	data	segment	which	was	later	found	to	be	an	interface	
code	 issue	 that	was	 later	 rectified.	 	The	error	 is	 included	 for	completeness	but	does	not	
reflect	on	the	underlying	communications	architecture.	
2. Two	errors	occurred	due	to	GSM	network	timeout	when	the	test	experienced	a	period	of	low	
GSM	signal	strength	and	connection	to	send	a	message	could	not	be	established.		However,	
it	should	be	noted	that	in	this	case,	the	fail	over	from	the	priority	carrier	to	the	secondary	
carrier	was	successfully	illustrated.	
3. In	test	4,	with	no	available	carriers,	while	100	message	send	attempts	were	conducted	each	
send	attempt	resulted	 in	 the	retry	 limit	being	reached	and	ultimately	 found	no	 fail	over	
carrier,	thus	resulting	in	a	transmission	error.	
Elements	of	the	code	used	for	these	tests	is	included	in	appendix	F.	
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5.5	Performance	 indicators	addressed	by	the	send	and	receive	
processes	
The	ability	 to	send	and	receive	messages	over	multiple	carriers	contributes	to	
addressing	two	of	our	requirements	and	five	performance	indicators	outlined	in	
Table	1.	
The	 support	 for	 sending	 and	 receiving	 across	multiple	 carriers	 facilitates	 the	
removal	of	reliance	on	a	single	pervasive	Internet	(or	any	other)	connection.		It	
also	facilitates	the	use	of	multiple	carriers	and,	through	the	processes	discussed	
for	carrier	selection,	supports	determination	of	the	best	communications	method	
available.			
Our	proposed	send	methodology	supports	 fail	over	when	carrier	 issues	occur,	
and	 proposes	 retry	 capabilities	 to	 ensure	 the	 communication	 capability	 is	 as	
robust	 as	possible.	 	 Finally,	 the	 ability	 to	 check	 that	 a	 carrier	 can	 send	before	
attempting	to	use	it	allows	us	to	consider	communication	availability	in	different	
environments	and	adapt	to	a	changing	monitoring	situation.	
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6. 	REMOTELY	CONTROLLING	THE	
MONITORING	SYSTEM	
Remote	 control	 of	 the	 monitoring	 system	 allows	 the	 base	 station	 to	 query,	
configure	and	reconfigure	the	system	on	demand	whilst	in	the	field.		This	allows	
the	doctor	to	react	to	changing	monitoring	scenarios	and	removes	the	need	to	
bring	 the	 remote	 patient	 to	 a	 location	 in	 which	 the	 physician	 can	 physically	
interact	with	the	monitoring	system	in	order	to	reconfigure	it.		
We	examine	how	we	can	configure	operating	parameters	on‐the‐fly	and	propose	
an	extensible	model	that	will	allow	the	remote	monitor	to	be	(re)	configured	and	
to	report/confirm	that	configuration,	all	while	maintaining	carrier	agnosticism	
and	without	relying	on	the	capabilities	of	any	particular	communications	method,	
thus	enhancing	the	capabilities	of	our	carrier	agnostic	communications	protocol.	
6.1	Why	facilitate	remote	control	and	configuration	
A	 wearable	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 is	 a	 hardware	 system	 that	 takes	
measurements	from	the	subject	being	monitored.		The	bio‐monitor	will	possess	
a	specific	set	of	sensors	at	the	time	of	deployment	on	the	subject.	Because	it	is	a	
worn	system,	the	statement	that	a	specific	monitor	relates	to	a	specific	patient	is	
a	valid	assumption.	
The	 purpose	 of	 a	 wearable	 monitoring	 system	 is	 to	 increase	 the	 freedom	 of	
movement	and	activity	by	the	patient	(i.e.	[20],	[19]).		Where	a	system	is	used	to	
monitor,	for	example,	a	patient	for	diagnostic	data	gathering	prior	to	surgery,	that	
patient	may	be	going	about	normal	activities	–	going	to	work,	at	home,	shopping	
during	 the	 normal	 data	 gathering	 process.	 	 The	 subject	 being	monitored	may	
therefore	change	their	 location	markedly	across	the	period	of	monitoring	data	
collection.	
For	the	purposes	of	diagnostic	medicine,	monitoring	may	occur	over	an	elongated	
time	period	of	days	or	even	weeks	[69].		The	monitoring	may	be	done	for	many	
possible	reasons	(and	this	is	by	no	means	an	exhaustive	list,	as	the	research	in	the	
field	shows	that	there	are	many	possible	applications	of	this	technology	[70]):	
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 Monitoring	a	cardiac	patient	for	analytical	data	prior	to	surgery	[69]	or	for	
management	of	stress	related	factors	[71]	
 Monitoring	a	surgical	patient	post‐discharge	to	track	recovery	
 Recording	 analytical	 biometric	 information	 to	 inform	 treatment	 of	 a	
patient	
 Monitoring	muscle	data	from	an	athlete	for	biometric	data	to	measure	and	
improve	performance	[72]	
 Monitoring	a	worker	in	a	remote	area	to	ensure	their	safety	
 Monitoring	workers	in	confined‐space	environments	where	there	may	be	
restrictions	on	air	flow	and	risk	of	asphyxiation	[73]	
The	duration	and	period	of	 the	monitoring	activity	will	be	application	specific	
based	on	 the	use	 case	 for	which	 the	monitoring	 system	 is	 being	used.	 	 	 If	 the	
duration	of	monitoring	is	short,	there	may	be	little	need	to	consider	changing	the	
configuration	of	the	remote	monitor	during	this	time	period.			
However,	we	must	consider	that	there	may	be	situations	where	a	subject	requires	
extended	monitoring.		For	example,	a	person	with	non‐critical	cardiac	issues	may	
have	 their	 heart	 rate,	 blood	 pressure	 or	 other	 biometric	 data	measured	 over	
weeks	or	months	for	diagnostic	profiling	as	a	precursor	to	further	intervention	
or	to	monitor	the	effects	of	medication;	a	diabetic	could	have	their	blood	glucose	
monitored	in	case	of	hypoglycaemic	event	[74].		In	such	situations,	there	is	the	
possibility	that	the	patient	may	not	be	in	face‐to‐face	contact	with	the	doctor	for	
an	extended	period.			
Another	 scenario	 to	 consider	 is	 that	whilst	 reviewing	 a	 remote	 subject,	 if	 the	
doctor	notices	data	implying	an	adverse	event	or	condition,	obviously,	this	should	
be	investigated	further.		Consider	scenarios	such	as	the	following:	
 An	athlete’s	pulse	 rate	may	go	up	above	a	 threshold	 “safe”	or	expected	
value	during	a	training	run	
 A	worker’s	blood	oxygen	concentration	may	dip	or	their	temperature	rise	
to	an	unsafe	level	unexpectedly	whilst	in	a	confined	space	environment	
 A	 cardiac	 patient	may	 suffer	 from	 an	 abnormal	 (too	 fast,	 too	 slow)	 or	
inconsistent	pulse	rate	
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 A	 diabetic	 may	 suffer	 hypoglycaemia,	 or	 too	 low	 blood	 sugar,	 risking	
diabetic	shock	and/or	coma.			
Depending	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 data,	 a	 change	 of	 monitoring	 sensors	 or	
modification	 to	 the	 frequency	 of	 monitoring	 readings	 may	 be	 required	
(obviously,	an	adverse	reading	may	also	necessitate	intervention	with	the	subject	
by	their	medical	professionals,	but	this	is	outside	the	scope	of	our	concerns	in	this	
work).			As	such,	if	we	see	a	situation	during	monitoring	that	requires	us	to	“take	
a	closer	look”	at	something	unexpected,	how	can	we	do	that	if	the	patient	is	in	the	
field.		We	may	have	no	physical	access	to	the	monitor	and	we	cannot	assume	the	
patient	is	able	to	assist	(especially	in	cases	of	an	adverse	event).			
If	physical	access	to	the	monitor	is	not	achievable	in	a	short	timeframe,	this	gives	
rise	to	a	requirement	to	implement	capabilities	by	which	it	is	possible	to	modify	
the	operating	parameters	of	 the	monitor	on‐the‐fly	and	gather	 immediate	and	
potentially	more	relevant	data	on	the	subject	as	soon	as	possible.			
We	therefore	contend	that	it	should	be	an	essential	functional	characteristic	of	a	
bio‐monitoring	 system	 that	 the	 operator	 can	 make	 changes	 to	 the	 monitor’s	
configuration	whilst	it	is	in	use	on	a	remote	subject.		However,	this	functionality	
obviously	comes	with	certain	risks.			
Considering	 the	 uses	 for	which	 bio‐monitoring	 systems	will	 be	 employed,	 the	
system	must	be	able	to	provide	absolute	assurance	that	the	remote	monitor	has	
applied	 any	 change	 in	 configuration	 correctly,	 and	 that	 it	 has	 applied	 it	
successfully.	 	The	support	for	remote	configuration	further	implies	the	need	to	
support	a	remote	request	to	the	monitor	to	send	its	configuration	without	any	
change	being	performed.	 	Finally,	 the	provision	of	this	 function	should	require	
some	 form	 of	 security	 –	 specifically	 we	 must	 consider	 how	 we	 facilitate	
authorisation	of	the	user	requesting	the	change.	
This	gives	rise	to	three	principal	requirements	for	remote	control	of	the	system.			
1. Configuration	of	the	monitor	should	be	remotely	settable.		
2. Configuration	 of	 the	 monitor	 must	 be	 able	 to	 be	 queried	 by	 the	 base	
station	to	ensure	that	correct	settings	have	been	applied.	
	
	 136	 	
	
3. Any	change	to	configuration	of	the	monitor	must	be	restricted	to	a	sender	
who	is	authorised	to	request	the	change.	
6.2	 Carrier	 and	 application	 agnostic	 control/configuration	
messages	
To	remotely	interact	with	the	configuration	of	the	bio‐monitor,	we	must	define	
how	we	will	use	protocol	messages	to	send	and	receive	control/	configuration	
requests	from	the	base	station	to	the	remote	monitor.			
Because	of	carrier	agnosticism	(and	our	preference	for	application	agnosticism	
also)	 our	 generic	 bio‐monitoring	 communications	 protocol	 must	 support	
different	hardware.		The	act	of	applying	remote	control/configuration	messages	
will	therefore	always	be	application	specific	and	related	to	the	specific	hardware	
in	use.		For	example,	in	a	bio‐monitoring	system	utilising	six	different	sensors,	a	
control	message	might	be	used	to	turn	specific	sensors	on	or	off,	or	to	modify	the	
threshold	values	for	sensor	measurements.		The	bio‐monitoring	application	will	
define	 the	 specific	 implementation	 and	 application	 of	 control	message	 values.		
For	example,	in	one	application,	sensor	ID	1	may	be	a	pulse	rate	monitor,	but	a	
temperature	sensor	in	another	application.			
To	remain	agnostic	to	the	specific	hardware	and	communications	in	a	particular	
application,	the	control	and	configuration	framework	caters	for	a	wide	variety	of	
control	and	configuration	use	cases	and	allows	for	differences	in	configurations	
and	hardware	to	facilitate	a	format	that	can	be	adapted	or	enhanced	to	support	
new	 sensors	 and	 different	 hardware	 or	monitoring	 configurations.	 	While	 the	
application	 will	 determine	 how	 to	 utilise	 the	 specific	 values	 transmitted	 in	 a	
control	message,	we	define	a	simple	command	and	control	structure	that:	
a) Does	not	 consume	excessive	amounts	of	 capacity	 in	our	minimum	data	
packet	size;		
b) Provides	flexibility	and	extensibility	to	support	a	variety	of	application	use	
cases	and	scenarios.	
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The	foundation	of	the	control	message	is	our	field‐delimited	header	as	discussed	
in	chapter	4.		The	header	consumes	the	minimum	data	size	possible	in	order	to	
provide	 the	 maximum	 available	 application	 user	 data	 capacity.	 	 We	 could	
consider	adding	fields	to	the	message	header	for	control	messaging	(in	fact,	we	
developed	 a	 mechanism	 to	 do	 this	 in	 our	 2010	 work	 on	 SMS	 based	
communications	[45]).		However,	in	a	carrier	agnostic	situation,	where	we	might	
have	 size	 limited	 carriers,	 we	 should	 preserve	 data	 capacity	 to	 support	 the	
maximum	number	of	possible	carriers	and	provide	the	greatest	application	data	
capability.	
	
FIGURE	41:	ENCODING	CONTROL	FIELDS	IN	HEADER	CONSUMES	THOSE	OCTETS	IN	EVERY	
MESSAGE	‐	EVEN	NON‐CONTROL	MESSAGES	
Figure	 41	 illustrates	 the	 impact	 of	 using	 header	 fields	 for	 control	 and	
configuration	 functionality.	 	 While	 we	 could	 establish	 control	 fields	 in	 our	
message	header	and	include	them	as	part	of	the	standard	message	structure,	not	
every	message	will	be	a	control	message.		In	cases	where	we	do	not	send	a	control	
message,	 those	 header	 control	 octets	 are	 unused	 in	 that	 message	 but	 the	
application	user	data	segment	is	always	reduced	by	their	allocation	in	the	header.		
As	such,	rather	than	defining	control	header	 fields	 in	every	message,	a	control	
message	 type	 that	 uses	 only	 the	 pre‐existing	 MTYP	 field	 in	 the	 header	 can	
facilitate	 options	 to	 utilise	 the	 user	 data	 segment	 to	 send	 the	
control/configuration	data	only	when	it	is	needed.			
6.3	The	control	message	format	
The	message	of	type	CONTROL	MESSAGE	(messages	4,	5,	196	and	197	in	table	
12)	 indicate	 to	 the	 application	 that	 the	user	data	 segment	 is	 used	 to	 transmit	
control/configuration	information	or	acknowledgement	values.		This	minimises	
	
	 138	 	
	
the	size	of	the	standard	header	and	reduces	the	need	for	inconsistently	consumed	
octets	in	the	header.		This	also	allows	us	to	make	use	of	the	UDSG	in	a	way	that	is	
appropriate	to	the	message	type	and	provides	a	high	degree	of	flexibility	as	to	
what	configuration	data	we	can	send	and	receive	as	we	can	use	the	entire	UDSG	
to	send	(or	acknowledge)	configuration	data	if	required.	
Considerations	for	a	bio‐monitoring	configuration	scheme	
As	 our	 system	 is	 agnostic	 as	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 monitoring	 hardware	 and	
communication	 carriers,	 our	 control	messages	must	be	 able	 to	 control	 a	wide	
variety	 of	 software	 configurations,	 hardware	 combinations	 and	 system	
operations.		In	terms	of	sensors,	in	3.1	we	discussed	the	potential	measurement	
of	bio‐signs	such	as:	
 Temperature	
 Heart	Rate	
 Blood	Pressure	
 Respiration	rate	
 Blood	oxygen	concentration	
 Blood	glucose	concentration	
However,	there	is	also	potential	to	measure,	sample	and	transmit	analogue	data	
waveforms	 such	 as	 electroencephalograph	 (EEG	 or	 brain	 wave	 data),	
electrocardiogram	data	(ECG	or	heart	data)	[75]	and	so	on	given	sufficient	data	
capacity.			
While	we	have	a	number	of	different	types	of	bio‐sensor	that	can	be	specifically	
identified	 for	 use,	 medical	 research	 into	 biometric	 monitoring	 is	 a	 hotbed	 of	
activity	(refer	chapter	2)	and	there	are	many	novel	new	approaches	to	sensors,	
sampling	and	measurement	 tools	 (for	example	 [76],[77]).	 	Any	bio‐monitoring	
system	must	allow	for	the	addition	of	new	sensors	into	the	monitoring	ecosystem	
over	 time.	 	 Therefore,	 any	 control	 message	 framework	 should	 support	
application	specific	hardware	and	sensors.	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 biometric	 sensors	 outlined	 above,	 however,	 a	 monitoring	
application	might	make	use	of	environmental	sensors	as	part	of	the	monitoring	
	
	 139	 	
	
system.	 	 For	 example,	 to	 provide	 a	 holistic	 view	 of	 the	 subject’s	 environment	
during	monitoring,	sensors	such	as	location	(GPS),	accelerometer	and	orientation	
sensors	may	 be	 used	 to	 show	where	 the	 subject	 is	 located	 and	 how	 they	 are	
moving	 (or	 not)	 at	 the	moment	 [78].	 External	 environmental	 sensors	 such	 as	
ambient	temperature,	humidity	and	air	pressure	may	provide	a	more	complete	
picture	 of	 the	 subject,	 their	 location,	 their	 condition	 and	 identify	 any	 adverse	
elements	 in	 their	 environment.	 	 We	 must	 therefore	 assume	 sensors	 may	 be	
included	in	the	remote	monitor	that	are	not	simply	for	biometric	measurement.	
Considering	 the	 combination	 of	 biometric	 and	 environmental	 sensors,	 it	 is	
feasible	for	our	bio‐monitoring	system	to	utilise	a	cluster	of	perhaps	10	or	more	
sensors	on	and	around	a	monitoring	subject	(figure	42).		It	is	feasible	that	not	all	
of	these	sensors	are	in	use	at	all	times,	and	various	sensors	may	be	enabled	or	
disabled	based	on	the	current	monitoring	situation.		To	this	end,	the	solution	for	
remote	control	and	configuration	must	be	dynamic	and	able	to	accept	and	control	
additional	sensors	which	we	may	not	have	considered.	
	
FIGURE	42:	A	PATIENT	WITH	AN	ENHANCED	CLUSTER	OF	SENSORS	
Furthermore,	while	we	allow	for	new	sensors	to	be	introduced	to	the	system	(and	
conversely,	for	existing	sensors	to	be	removed	or	deactivated	on	the	system),	we	
must	also	allow	flexibility	as	to	which	sensors	are	deployed	on	each	patient.		With	
bio‐monitoring	 applications,	 different	 patients	 will	 have	 different	 needs	 and	
potentially	 require	 different	 sensors.	 	 An	 application	 may	 utilise	 different	
hardware	monitoring	configurations	depending	on	the	patient.			
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For	 example,	 one	 patient	 may	 require	 the	 gamut	 of	 sensors	 for	 an	 overall	
combined	 monitoring	 picture,	 while	 another	 patient	 may	 be	 the	 subject	 of	 a	
focused	study	and	require	blood	pressure	and	heart	rate	readings	on	a	regular	
basis.	 	 The	 configuration	 of	 these	 two	 subject’s	 monitoring	 systems	 will	 be	
different,	and	thus	our	control	mechanism	must	cater	not	only	for	differences	in	
the	number	and	type	of	sensor,	but	also	for	differences	in	how	the	sensors	are	
used.		As	no	two	patients	are	alike,	we	must	assume	that	there	will	not	be	a	single	
set	of	 sensor	configurations	used	 for	all	patients.	 	The	solution	must	allow	 for	
varied	monitoring	hardware	configurations	between	monitoring	devices.	
Who	can	transmit	control	messages	
Consider	the	indicative	diagram	of	a	bio‐monitoring	system	in	figure	43.	
	
FIGURE	43:	INDICATIVE	BIO‐MONITORING	SYSTEM	
The	 system	 is	 comprised	 of	 a	 base	 station,	 and	 one	 or	 more	 remote	 bio‐
monitoring	 systems	 containing	 a	 variety	 of	 sensors.	 	 Messages	 flow	 bi‐
directionally	between	the	base	and	the	monitor	–	for	example,	the	base	might	ask	
for	 an	update	 from	 the	monitor,	or	 the	monitor	may	automatically	 generate	 a	
message	to	base	based	on	time,	alarm	condition	etc.		However,	while	we	can	have	
more	 than	 one	 remote	 monitor,	 we	 could	 also	 have	 potentially	 many	 base	
stations.		In	open	carrier	networks,	such	as	radio,	where	anyone	with	access	to	
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the	channel	may	be	able	to	broadcast	on	it,	we	may	have	the	situation	where	an	
unauthorised	station	broadcasts	on	the	channel	used	by	our	application.	
To	prevent	 unauthorised	use,	 a	 remote‐control	message	 can	be	 issued	 from	a	
base	station	which	is	registered	on	the	remote	monitor	as	authorised	to	send	such	
messages.	 	 It	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 requirement	 to	 limit	
configuration	changes	to	a	single	base‐station	device.	 	The	remote	monitor	can	
maintain	 a	 list	 of	 authorised	 base	 stations,	 and	 any	 one	 of	 them	 could	 apply	
configuration	changes.	
A	control	message	must	be	addressed	to	a	single	monitor	(i.e.	a	control	message	
is	never	allowed	to	be	a	broadcast	message)	and	only	the	specifically	nominated	
receiver	 ID	should	action	 the	control	message.	 	This	gives	 rise	 to	a	number	of	
constraints	 around	 the	 transmission	 of	 control	 messages	 and	 their	
acknowledgements	(figure	44):	
 An	application	using	control	messages	must	implement	configuration	to	
identify,	 on	 each	monitor,	 the	 authorised	 senders	who	may	 transmit	 a	
control	message.	
 A	 remote	monitor	will	 only	 action	 a	 control	message	 received	 from	 an	
authorised	sender	ID	that	is	specifically	identified	in	its	configuration.			
 In	the	case	of	a	control	message	received	from	an	unauthorised	sender,	
the	control	message	should	neither	be	actioned	or	acknowledged.	
 A	remote	monitor	must	always	acknowledge	a	control	message	from	an	
authorised	sender.	
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The base station sends a 
control message to the 
remote system
Base Station
The remote monitor sends a 
receipt to acknowledge the 
control message 	
FIGURE	44:	THE	SIGNAL	PATH	FOR	CONTROL	MESSAGES	
	
Control	message	header	use	
To	send	a	control	message,	 the	message	 type	 field	 is	 set	 to	 the	value	of	either	
00000100,	00000101,	11000100	or	11000101	as	per	the	message	types	defined	
in	Table	12.		There	are	no	additional	header	octets	for	a	control	message	and	thus	
no	wasted	octets	if	a	message	is	not	a	control	message.		We	consider	this	to	be	an	
improvement	over	our	earlier	work	[45],	where	12	control	octets	were	used	to	
define	 control	 options,	 and	 which	 were	 simply	 left	 unused	 by	 non‐control	
messages.	
Control	message	data	segment	use	
The	control	message	uses	the	user	data	segment	to	specify	the	control	message	
content.		The	use	of	the	UDSG	will	be	structured	into	control	blocks	as	per	figure	
45.	
Octets 1 and 2
Control Message Format
16 bit control message type ID
Octets 3 … x
Control Data
Control Message data or response 	
FIGURE	45:	THE	USE	OF	THE	UDSG	FOR	CONTROL	MESSAGES	
Control	messages	will	use	the	framework	defined	here	to	provide	an	extensible	
method	from	which	to	develop	a	variety	of	control	messages	to	suit	the	specific	
requirements	of	an	application.		The	first	2	octets	of	the	user	data	segment	will	
be	used	to	define	the	type	of	control	message,	and	these	types	will	be	defined	in	
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an	 application	 specific	 context.	 	 This	 will	 be	 known	 as	 the	 Control	Message	
Format	Block.	
Octets	3	–	x	(where	x	is	the	length	of	the	user	data	segment)	can	then	be	used	to	
encode	control	and	configuration	information,		
The	Control	Message	Format	Block	
The	Control	Message	Format	Block	is	a	16‐bit	binary	number	encoded	over	two	
octets	in	the	first	two	octets	of	the	user	data	segment	of	a	control	message.		This	
field	identifies	the	type	of	control	message	that	is	in	use	in	this	message.	This	field	
supports	a	possible	65535	control	messages	that	can	be	uniquely	identified.		The	
value	of	0	is	the	“No	Message”	value	that	should	never	be	used	in	a	production	
context.		The	value	65535	is	reserved	for	system	use.		All	other	values	can	be	used	
to	define	specific	control	messages.	
The	control	message	data	block	
Any	 data	 from	 octet	 3	 of	 the	 user	 data	 segment	 constitutes	 the	 configuration	
instructions	implied	by	the	message	type	selected	in	the	control	message	format	
block.		The	message	format	informs	the	application	how	to	interpret	and	apply	
the	data	in	the	user	data	segment.		As	part	of	our	framework,	the	following	basic	
message	types	for	control	messages	are	proposed	as	system	defaults.	
Message	Type	ID	 Description
0000000000000000	 No	message	– should	be	reserved	for	testing	use	only
0000000000000001	 Reset	system
0000000000000010	 Stop	remote	originated	messages
0000000000000011	 Start	remote	originated	messages
0000000000000100	 Set	remote	originated	message	interval	
0000000000000101	 Change	active	sensors
0000000000000110	 Change	sensor	reading	period(s)
0000000000000111	 Change	sensor	alarm	threshold(s)
0000000000001000	 Change	 sensor	 parameters	 (activation,	 reading	 period	 and	
alarm	thresholds)	
0000000000001001	 Change	base	station
0000000000001010	 Change	device	ID
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Message	Type	ID	 Description
0000000000001011	 Display	 message	 (requires	 and	 assumes	 message	 display	
capability)	
…	 Application	specific	use	and	future	expansion	
1111111111111111	 Reserved	for	system	use
Table 26. Configuration	message	types	for	the	control	message	field	
Many	 of	 the	 proposed	 message	 types	 require	 additional	 information	 to	 be	
included	in	the	user	data	segment	as	control	data	that	is	to	be	used	to	perform	
the	actual	configuration.	 	The	proposed	use	of	the	user	data	segment	is	shown	
below	for	each	of	the	above	message	types.	
Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
0000000000000
000	
No	message N/A	– this	is	reserved	for	testing	use	only	and	should	not	be	
issued	in	a	production	system	
0000000000000
001	
Reset	
system	
UDSG	reiterates	the	message	type	ID	to	confirm	the	system	
reset.	
0000000000000
010	
Stop	remote	
originated	
messages	
16	 bit	 (2	 consecutive octets)	 binary	 number	 sets	 the	
number	of	seconds	between	remote	originated	messages	to	
a	zero	value	to	stop	remote	originated	messages.			
	
A	non‐zero	value	used	with	this	message	type	will	result	in	
the	message	being	considered	invalid	and	discarded.	
	
0000000000000000	
0000000000000
011	
Start	 or	 set	
the	 remote	
originated	
messages	
interval	
16	 bit	 (2	 consecutive octets) binary	 number	 sets	 the	
number	of	seconds	between	remote	originated	messages	to	
a	 non‐zero	 value	 (note	 that	 a	 0‐value	 used	 with	 this	
message	type	will	result	 in	the	message	being	considered	
invalid	and	discarded).			
	
For	example,	300	seconds	would	be	
	
0000000100101100	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
0000000000000
100	
Change	
active	
sensors	
	
	
	
	
	
	
A	 binary	 switch,	 where	 each	 bit	 represents	 an	 active	 or	
inactive	 sensor	 state,	 with	 the	 Least	 Significant	 Bit	 as	
sensor	1.	
	
For	 our	 framework,	 we	 assume	 that	 a	 single	 remote	
monitoring	 system	 will	 implement	 no	 more	 than	 40	
physical	sensors	per	remote	monitor.		This	limitation	could	
be	modified	for	specific	implementations	but	we	believe	40	
possible	 sensors	 is	 a	 good	 initial	 value	 for	 flexibility	 and	
capacity	and	to	demonstrate	the	potential	for	this	control	
message.	
	
We	 use	 5	 consecutive	 octets	 (8‐bit	 x	 5	 =	 40	 bits)	 to	
represent	the	total	switch	pack	for	all	sensors.		Sensor	1	is	
represented	by	 the	Least	 Significant	Bit.	 	 The	 application	
will	 be	 responsible	 for	 mapping	 sensor	 ID	 numbers	 to	
actual	devices.			
	
For	 example,	 to	 activate	 sensors	 1,2,3,7,10	 and	 14,	 we	
would	send:	
	
00000000	00000000	00000000	00100010	01000111	
	
While	this	message	supports	up	to	40	sensors,	if	a	sensor	is	
not	configured	or	 implemented	at	the	related	bit	position	
(i.e.	if	a	sensor	activation	for	bit	position	20	is	sent	but	no	
sensor	is	physically	configured	on	the	monitor	at	position	
20,	the	request	for	that	bit	position	is	simply	ignored).		See	
later	in	this	chapter	on	shortcomings	of	this	approach	for	
more	around	the	suitability	of	control	messages.	
	
The	use	of	the	bits	is	shown	in	figure	46:	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
FIGURE	46:	BIT	TO	SENSOR	ALLOCATION	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
0000000000000
110	
Change	
sensor	
reading	
(sample)	
period(s)	
This	message	type	is	used	to	modify	the	sample	period	for	
a	sensor	(i.e.	how	often	does	the	monitor	read	and	store	the	
value	for	that	sensor).		
	
The	message	is	 implemented	to	read	triplets	of	octets	 for	
each	sensor	being	modified,	as	follows:	
	
The	first	octet	is	a	binary	number	identifying	the	sensor	(as	
per	the	above	limitation,	from	1	to	40).	
	
The	 next	 two	 octets	 identify	 the	 sample	 interval	 for	 the	
sensor	 as	 a	 binary	 number	 in	 seconds	 (from	 0	 to	 65534	
seconds).			
	
For	example,	to	set	sensor	7	to	300	second	read	interval	the	
octets	would	be	set	as	follows	(shown	below	from	octet	1	–	
3):	
00000111			‐	Sensor	ID	
00000001			‐	Interval	Octet	1	
00101100			‐	Interval	Octet	2	(least	significant)	
	
The	sequence	or	triplet	octets	can	be	repeated	within	the	
User	Data	Segment	for	multiple	sensors	as	required.	Each	
sensor	must	only	be	specified	once	per	control	message,	or	
the	message	will	be	deemed	invalid	and	discarded.	
	
Where	sensor	configuration	is	sent	for	a	sensor	that	does	
not	 physically	 exist	 on	 this	 monitor,	 that	 item	 of	
configuration	is	ignored.	
	
The	structure	of	the	octets	is	shown	in	the	figure	47:	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
Octet 1
Sensor ID – 1 ‐ 40
Octet 2 – 3
Interval – 16 bit number
	
FIGURE	47:	SENSOR	SAMPLE	PERIOD	
	
And	its	use	for	multiple	sensors	is	shown	in	figure	48:	
Sensor 1 Interval for Sensor 1 Sensor 28 Interval for Sensor 28
	
FIGURE	48:	SENSOR	SAMPLE	PERIOD	FOR	MULTIPLE	SENSORS	IN	A	SINGLE	MESSAGE	
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0000000000000
111	
Change	
sensor	
alarm	
threshold(s)
This	message	sets	the	alarm	thresholds	(high	or	low)	for	a	
sensor	reading.		It	uses	6	octets	to	define	either	the	low	or	
high	threshold	for	a	sensor.		The	threshold	defines	the	value	
where,	if	it	is	crossed	(for	a	high	threshold,	above	the	value,	
and	 for	 a	 low	 threshold,	 below	 the	 value)	 and	 thus	
constitutes	an	alarm	condition.	
	
The	first	octet	is	a	binary	number	identifying	the	sensor	ID	
(as	per	the	above	limitation,	from	1	to	40).		The	second	octet	
is	an	encoding	of	ASCII	H	(ASC72)	or	ASCII	L	(ASC76)	for	
High	or	Low	threshold.	
	
The	 next	 four	 octets	 encode	 a	 fixed	 point	 zoned	 binary	
coded	decimal	value	with	2	decimal	places.		In	such	a	value,	
each	nibble	(4	bits)	relates	to	a	digit	of	the	number,	with	the	
sign	of	the	number	in	the	least	significant	nibble	of	the	least	
significant	octet.			
	
Nibble
8 7 6 5 4	 3	 2	 1
10,000 1,000 100 10 1	 .1	 .01	 Sign
Table 27. Structure	of	the	Fixed	Point	Zoned	BCD	
value	
	
This	 gives	 us	 a	 range	 of	 ‐99,999.99	 to	 +99,999.99	 as	 our	
threshold	 values	 (and	 this	 could	 be	 further	modified	 for	
application	specific	requirements).	
	
Alarm	thresholds	data	block	
1 2 3 4 5	 6	
ID H/L Value
Table 28. Alarm	Threshold	Message	Data	
	
The	 sequence	 can	 be	 repeated	 for	 multiple	 sensors	 as	
required,	but	each	sensor	must	only	be	specified	once	per	
control	message,	or	the	message	will	be	deemed	invalid.	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
Where	sensor	configuration	is	sent	for	a	sensor	that	does	
not	 physically	 exist	 on	 this	 monitor,	 that	 item	 of	
configuration	is	ignored.	
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0000000000001
000	
Change	
sensor	
parameters	
(activation,	
reading	
period	 and	
alarm	
thresholds)	
A	combined	message	to	turn	on	and	off	sensors,	change	the	
reading	sample	time	and	alarm	thresholds.		This	would	be	
used	where	a	sensor	or	monitor	needs	to	be	reconfigured	
more	extensively	than	for	one	aspect	of	the	parameter	set.	
	
The	first	five	octets	of	the	user	data	would	contain	the	same	
format	 of	 octets	 as	 those	 defined	 for	 the	 message	 type	
0000000000000101	 “Change	 active	 sensors”.	 	 Each	 bit	
represents	a	sensor	and	is	used	to	turn	the	sensors	on	and	
off.	
	
The	 second	 set	 of	 octets	 will	 set	 the	 sensor	 reading	
(sample)	 period	 for	 any	 number	 of	 sensors.	 	 As	 this	
sequence	of	 triplets	can	be	repeated	up	to	the	number	of	
sensors	configured	on	the	remote	monitor,	when	all	of	the	
sample	 time	 configuration	 values	 has	 been	 listed,	 a	
delimiter	 of	 five	 consecutive	 binary	 0	 octets	 (00000000)	
will	 be	 used	 to	 signify	 the	 end	 of	 this	 block	 of	 sensor	
triplets.	
	
The	 third	 set	 of	 octets	will	 set	 the	 thresholds	 as	 per	 the	
Change	Sensor	Alarm	Threshold(s)	message.	
	
The	message	must	maintain	this	format:	
	
 5	octets	–	Activation	Switches		
 3x	octets	–	Sensor	reading	periods	
 5	octets	–	delimiter		
 6x	octets	–	Sensor	alarm	thresholds	
 5	octets	–	delimiter		
	
The	final	delimiter	ends	the	message.	
	
It	 is	 envisaged	 that	 this	 message	 type	would	 be	 used	 to	
perform	en‐masse	configuration	of	a	remote	monitor	 in	a	
single	message	transmission.			
	
If	we	were	to	set	every	sensor	of	our	40	allowable	sensors	
for	 each	 possible	 value	 option	 (on/off	 status,	 reading	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
period,	 high	 and	 low	 threshold)	 the	maximum	 user	 data	
segment	would	require:	
	
	
	
	
  
Octet Size 
Per 
Sensor 
Number 
of repeats 
Total 
octets 
Change Active 
Sensors  5  1  5 
Sensor Reading 
Periods  3  40  120 
Delimiter  5  1  5 
Alarm 
Thresholds  6  80  480 
Delimiter  5  1  5 
         615 
Table 29. Size	of	the	maximum	change	
sensor	parameters	message	
	
Thus,	the	message	data	segment	requires	up	to	615	octets,	
plus	2	for	the	message	type	for	a	total	of	617	octets.	
	
Where	sensor	configuration	is	sent	for	a	sensor	that	does	
not	 physically	 exist	 on	 this	 monitor,	 that	 item	 of	
configuration	is	ignored.	
	
Figure	49	illustrates	the	structure.	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
1 2 3 4 5
Sensor on/off
1 2 3
Sample period
Block 1
…
Repeat
Sample Period
Block
3x octets
3 4 1 2 3 4 5
Alarm Threshold Block 1
6 …Repeat
Alarm Threshold
Block 
6x octets
1 2
Delimiter
Up to one 
block per 
sensor Up to two blocks (high and low 
threshold) per 
sensor
21 3 421
Octet
5
Delimiter
5
Delim ter
FIGURE	49:	STRUCTURE	OF	THE	CHANGE	SENSOR	PARAMETERS	MESSAGE	
	
0000000000001
001	
Change	base	
station	
This	message	 is	used	 to	set	 the	control	base	station	 for	a	
remote	 monitor.	 	 This	 could	 be	 required,	 for	 example,	
where	 a	 base	 is	 going	 to	 be	 decommissioned	 or	 will	 be	
unavailable	due	to	maintenance	or	outage,	and	allows	the	
current	 base	 to	 transfer	 control	 of	 in‐field	 monitors	 to	
another	base	station.	 	The	user	data	 in	 this	case	segment	
contains	four	sets	of	3	octet	values.			
	
The	 first	 3	 octets	 are	 the	 ID	 of	 the	 current	 control	 base	
station.		As	this	is	a	control	message,	this	should	match	the	
sender	device	ID	in	the	message,	and	match	the	monitor’s	
current	accepted	control	base	station.	
	
The	second	group	of	3	octets	is	the	ID	of	the	base	station	to	
which	control	will	be	passed.		This	will	be	recorded	by	the	
monitor	as	the	new	base	station.		The	old	base	station	(the	
sender	of	this	message)	will	therefore	no	longer	be	able	to	
control	the	monitor.	
	
The	third	and	fourth	sets	of	3	octets	replicate	the	second	set	
of	 octets	 (the	 ID	of	 the	 new	base	 station).	 	 All	 three	 sets	
should	match	(as	the	new	base	station	ID)	before	the	ID	is	
applied	to	the	monitor.	
	
The	base	station	ID	is	encoded	as	per	the	structure	of	the	
sender	and	recipient	device	ID	in	the	message	header.	
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Message	 Type	
ID	
Octets	1	&	2	
Descriptio
n	
User	data	segment
Octets	3	…	x	
0000000000001
010	
Change	
device	ID	
This	message	type	is	used	to	“rename”	a	device	within	the	
system.	 	 This	 is	 a	 powerful	 function	 which	 essentially	
allows	a	monitor	to	be	given	a	new	ID.		This	may	be	used	in	
cases	of	a	mismatch	or	conflict	in	ID’s,	or	where	there	is	a	
need	to	rename	a	monitor.	
	
The	user	data	segment	contains	four	groups	of	3	octets.	
	
The	first	set	of	octets	is	the	ID	which	is	currently	allocated	
to	 the	 monitor	 (and	 which	 should	 match	 the	 recipient	
device	ID).	
	
The	second	set	of	octets	is	the	ID	to	which	this	monitor	is	
being	reallocated.	
	
The	third	and	fourth	sets	of	3	octets	replicate	the	second	set	
of	octets	with	the	new	ID	of	the	device.		All	three	sets	should	
match	(as	the	new	monitor	ID)	before	the	ID	is	applied	to	
the	monitor.	
0000000000001
011	
Display	
message	 (a	
hardware	
dependent	
message	
format	 that	
requires	
message	
display	
capability	in	
the	 remote	
monitor)	
The	display	message	 is	an	open	 format	message	which	 is	
used	by	a	system	where	remote	monitors	possess	display	
functionality.	 	 Our	 communications	 take	 no	 heed	 of	 the	
ability	 of	 the	 monitor	 to	 display	 the	 message,	 so	 it	 is	
obviously	a	requirement	of	 the	 implementation	to	ensure	
that	 this	message	 is	handled	by	a	 system	specific	display	
functionality.	
	
The	user	data	segment	in	this	case	is	a	packed	7‐bit	ASCII	
message	to	be	displayed	on	the	display.		The	message	can	
extend	 to	a	volume	as	big	as	 the	capacity	of	 the	message	
format,	 or	 the	 capacity	 set	 by	 the	 system	 based	 on	 the	
capabilities	of	the	remote	monitors.	
	
Refer	to	Appendix	C	for	information	on	7	bit	ASCII	packing.
Table 30. Data	segment	configuration	for	each	control	message	type	
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6.3	Transmitting	a	control	message	
In	 addition	 to	 the	 standard	 setup	 of	 the	 header	 fields	 (all	 header	 fields	 are	
required	to	have	a	value	–	whether	0	or	greater),	a	control	message	must	have	a	
defined	non‐zero	validity	period,	as	it	will	only	be	actioned	if	it	is	received	and	
actioned	during	the	validity	period	of	the	message.		Figure	50	shows	the	process	
for	the	base	station	to	send	such	a	message:	
	
FIGURE	50:	PROCESS	TO	SEND	A	CONTROL	MESSAGE	
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An	appropriate	validity	period	for	a	control	message	
A	 control	message	 requires	 a	 validity	 period.	 	We	must	 consider	 the	 scenario	
where	store	and	 forward	carriers	such	as	SMS	deliver	a	control	message	 later	
than	we	would	otherwise	desire.		We	do	not	want	an	old	control	message	to	be	
received	after	a	deferred	delivery	and	applied	to	configuration	when	we	do	not	
expect	it.		This	may	result	in	an	adverse	or	uncontrolled	monitoring	situation.			
Where	communications	are	virtually	instantaneous	(such	as	in	radio	or	Internet	
data)	 the	 validity	 period	 may	 not	 be	 an	 issue,	 as	 the	 message	 will	 either	 be	
delivered	 or	 fail	 almost	 immediately	 (although	 Internet	 protocol	 packets	may	
take	different	 routes	 and	 so	be	delayed	 in	delivery).	 	However,	 in	deferred	or	
store‐and‐forward	 style	 communications	 mechanisms,	 there	 is	 no	 delivery	
guarantee	of	successful	delivery	and	no	guarantee	of	delivery	timeframe	[41‐43].		
To	mitigate	 potential	 issues	 caused	 by	 delayed	 configuration	messages	 being	
applied,	the	message	validity	period	defines	the	lifespan	of	the	message	and	thus	
the	period	during	which	the	remote	monitor	will	attempt	to	apply	the	message	
control	actions.			
When	 the	 remote	monitor	 receives	 the	 request	 to	 change	 its	 configuration,	 it	
should	process	the	request	and	respond	with	a	receipt	message	that	has	the	same	
magnitude	of	validity	period.	 	 If	we	assume	that	 the	application	of	 the	control	
message	will	take	a	finite	time,	the	base	station	should	therefore	expect	to	receive	
a	receipt	for	its	control	request	message	according	to	the	following	time	period	
formula:	
Maximum	Response	Time	=	2	x	validity	period	+	Generation	and	
processing	buffer	
Or,	to	simplify:	
R	=	2VP	+	G	
The	formula	outlined	above	defines	the	time	for	a	control	message	to	be	actioned	
and	receipted	back	to	base.		From	the	time	the	base	generates	the	original	control	
message,	the	base	station	will	expect	to	receive	acknowledgement	and	receipt	of	
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the	 request	 within	 a	 period	 that	 is	 equivalent	 to	 the	 maximum	 of	 2	 validity	
periods	 plus	 a	 system	 defined	 processing	 buffer	 time	 allocated	 to	 allow	 the	
remote	monitor	to	receive,	decode,	apply	and	then	generate	the	receipt	for	this	
control	 message.	 	 If	 the	 base	 station	 does	 not	 receive	 the	 receipt	 within	 this	
timeframe,	it	may	then	elect	to	resend	the	message.	
This	sort	of	usage	scenario	can	be	seen	in	figure	51.	
	
FIGURE	51:	CONTROL	MESSAGE	SUCCESSFUL	
In	the	above	scenario,	the	control	message	is	sent,	the	remote	monitor	receives	
it,	actions	it,	and	then	returns	the	receipt	within	the	period	2VP+G.	
Validity	period	is	a	 function	of	the	carriers	being	used,	and	should	account	 for	
that	carrier’s	mean	time	to	establish	a	connection	to	the	destination,	then	send	
the	appropriate	data.		For	example,	the	validity	period	for	an	always	on	Internet	
connection	may	 be	 shorter	 than	 for	 SMS,	 and	 SMS	may	 be	 shorter	 than	 for	 a	
mobile	data	call	(to	allow	for	the	significant	handshaking	and	call	establishment	
times).		
The	default	validity	period	for	a	control	message	will	be	defined	on	an	application	
basis,	based	on	the	carriers	that	are	being	supported.		The	validity	period	should	
account	 for	 the	slowest	 carrier	 in	use	within	a	 system,	as	 this	 then	allows	 the	
control	message	to	take	a	different	path	during	sending	and	receipting	–	such	as	
in	figure	52:	
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FIGURE	52:	DIFFERENT	CARRIERS	COULD	BE	USED	TO	SEND	AND	RECEIPT	A	CONTROL	
MESSAGE	
Therefore,	validity	period	should	be	calculated	using	the	longest	duration	that	we	
can	expect	to	experience	when	transmitting	data	using	the	slowest	participating	
carrier.	
Assume,	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 discussion,	 that	 a	 packet	 radio	 handshake	 and	
acknowledgement	of	a	100‐octet	message	forms	the	basis	of	our	validity	period	
calculation	for	the	“slowest”	carrier,	and	is	measured	at	37	seconds.		Add	to	this	
a	short	buffer	to	generate	and	process	the	message,	say	10	seconds	to	allow	for	
slow	 or	 busy	 hardware	 processing	 the	message,	 and	 our	 validity	 period	 for	 a	
control	 message	 (in	 the	 context	 of	 our	 environment,	 carriers	 and	 service	
providers)	should	not	exceed:		
2VP	+	G	
(2	x	37)	+	10	=	84	seconds	
Obviously,	 the	 calculation	of	 the	maximum	validity	period	value	 is	 application	
specific	and	depends	on	the	carrier,	hardware,	environment,	network	congestion	
and	other	factors	that	may	affect	the	send	and	receive	time.			
6.4	Receiving	a	control	message	
A	 control	 message	 should	 only	 be	 applied	 by	 the	 monitor	 when	 it	 has	 been	
validated.	 	All	 of	 the	 checksums	must	be	 validated.	 	 The	message	 recipient	 ID	
should	 be	 matched	 to	 the	 current	 device,	 and	 the	 sender	 ID	 checked	 as	 an	
authorised	 sender	 for	 control	 messages.	 	 Only	 then	 should	 the	 message	 be	
applied.	
This	is	shown	in	figure	53:	
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FIGURE	53:	RECEIVING	A	CONTROL	MESSAGE	
	
6.5	Managing	control	message	delivery	issues	
When	sending	control	messages,	we	should	consider	other	delivery	scenarios	for	
the	message	and	the	actions	the	system	should	take	in	these	events.		We	do	not	
want	the	control	messages	“floating	around”	in	the	ether,	left	without	action	for	
any	extended	period	of	time	and	then	delivered	when	we	least	expect	them.	
The	scenario	where	the	control	message	is	received,	actioned	and	then	receipted	
back	 to	 the	 base	within	 this	 period	 is	 the	 ideal	 success	 scenario	 for	 a	 control	
message.		However,	we	should	consider	additional	scenarios	for	message	delivery	
to	ensure	we	cater	for	issues	with	this	powerful	message	type.		For	example:	
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 A	 control	 message	 is	 delivered	 and	 applied	 within	 the	 initial	 validity	
period	but	receipt	not	received	within	2VP	+	G	
 A	control	message	is	not‐received	at	remote	system	due	to	delivery	failure	
 A	control	message	is	receipted	not	received	at	base	due	to	delivery	failure	
Control	message	delivered	and	applied	but	receipted	late	
Send a Control 
Message
Receive a Control 
Message
Apply control 
request to system
Send control 
Response Message
Sender receives 
ResponseBA
SE
RE
MO
TE
Validity period of the original message Validity period of the receipt message
Generation
Buffer 
Time
	
FIGURE	54:	MESSAGE	RECEIPT	NOT	RECEIVED	BY	THE	END	OF	2VP	+	G	TIMEFRAME	
In	figure	54,	the	control	message	is	received	and	applied	by	the	remote	monitor,	
but	the	response	is	received	back	at	base	outside	the	time	defined	by	2VP	+	G.		In	
the	 case	 of	 medical	 monitoring,	 we	 would	 argue	 that	 all	 actions	 need	 to	 be	
explicit,	absolute	and	definite.		This	therefore	implies	one	of	two	options	where	
the	receipt	of	the	control	message	is	not	received	in	time:	
1. The	base	reissue	the	control	message;	or		
2. The	base	 confirms	 the	 configuration	of	 the	 remote	monitor	 in	 order	 to	
verify	the	remote	configuration.			
The	first	option	is	already	available	to	us	–	the	base	station	simply	regenerates	
the	control	request	message	with	a	new	generation	timestamp,	asking	the	remote	
monitor	to	apply	the	same	configuration	and	respond	within	2VP	+	G.			
However,	the	second	possibility	identifies	the	requirement	to	support	a	request	
by	 the	 base‐station	 to	 the	 remote	monitor	 to	 confirm	 its	 configuration.	 	 This	
requires	support	for	a	message	to	request	and	confirm	the	current	configuration	
of	 a	 specific	 monitor.	 	 This	 is	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 configuration	 confirmation	
request	and	response	messages	(types	6	and	7	or	198	and	199	in	table	12).	
This	confirmation	message	has	advantages	over	the	resend	of	the	configuration	
in	 that	 configuration	 need	 not	 be	 re‐applied	 needlessly	 (with	 any	 associated	
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monitoring	disruption	that	this	might	imply)	if	the	remote	monitor	confirms	the	
correct	configuration.	
Control	message	not	received	at	remote	monitor	due	to	delivery	
failure	
Send a Control 
Message
Message not delivered 
to recipient or delivered 
outside the validity 
period
X
Response not 
received as control 
message not 
received at remote 
base
BA
SE
RE
MO
TE
Validity period of the original message Validity period of the receipt message
Generation
Buffer 
Time
	
FIGURE	55:	CONTROL	MESSAGE	NOT	RECEIVED	AT	REMOTE	SITE	INSIDE	INITIAL	VALIDITY	
PERIOD	
Figure	 55	 shows	 a	 scenario	 where	 the	 request	 is	 not	 delivered.	 	 In	 carrier‐
agnostic	communication,	we	must	consider	that	our	carriers	may	not	all	support	
immediate	delivery	or	receipting	(for	example,	SMS	or	MMS).		The	initial	control	
message	may	not	be	received	by	the	monitor	and	the	base	may	not	be	aware	of	
this	because	of	limitations	in	the	carrier	to	inform	us	of	this	fact.		Thus,	no	receipt	
confirmation	is	ever	received	back	to	base.			
It	is	therefore	imperative	that	the	base	station	recognises	a	control	message	that	
received	no	acknowledgement.		In	this	case,	the	base	must	assume	configuration	
has	not	been	applied	in	line	with	our	assertion	that,	for	medical	monitoring,	all	
actions	must	be	explicit,	absolute	and	definite.			
In	 this	 scenario,	 the	 base	 should	 attempt	 retry	 of	 the	 original	 configuration	
message,	with	updated	generation	timestamp	and	ID’s	once	2VP+G	seconds	have	
elapsed.	 	Alternatively,	 the	base	station	might	 request	 the	monitor	confirm	 its	
configuration,	validate	this	and	act	accordingly	if	configuration	differs	from	that	
which	was	requested.	 	The	specific	option	taken	by	an	application	depends	on	
how	quickly	configuration	requests	must	be	applied	and	the	overhead	and	impact	
of	reapplying	configuration	requests.			
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Control	message	receipt	not	received	at	base	due	to	delivery	failure	
Send a Control 
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Send control 
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FIGURE	56:	RECEIPT	NEVER	RECEIVED	AT	BASE	
Figure	56	shows	the	scenario	where	the	request	is	delivered	and	applied	by	the	
remote	monitor,	but	the	response	acknowledgement	receipt	is	never	received	by	
the	 base	 station.	 	 This	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 previous	 scenario,	 where	 the	 control	
message	 is	 never	 received	 by	 the	 remote	 monitor,	 but	 in	 this	 case	 the	
configuration	has	been	applied	by	the	remote	monitor	but	the	base	is	unaware.	
As	 per	 our	 assertion	 that	 all	 actions	need	 to	 be	 explicit,	 absolute	 and	definite	
when	 issuing	 control	message,	 in	 the	 absence	of	 the	 receipt,	we	must	 assume	
configuration	has	not	been	applied	at	the	remote	monitor.		This	implies	a	need	to	
retry	or	confirm	the	configuration	control	message	as	per	the	previous	scenario.	
The	impact	of	reapplying	the	same	configuration	
It	should	be	noted	that	the	structure	of	the	control	message	means	that	applying	
the	 same	 configuration	 control	 message	 to	 a	 remote	 monitor	 where	 that	
configuration	 is	already	applied	should	have	no	adverse	effects	–	 in	effect,	 the	
same	 configuration	 would	 be	 reapplied	 and	 the	 only	 impact	 would	 be	 any	
interruptions	to	monitoring	service	while	the	configuration	is	applied.			
If	 this	 downside	 is	 significant	 in	 an	 application	 context,	 the	 configuration	
confirmation	message	could	be	used	by	the	base	to	confirm	the	configuration	of	
the	remote	monitor	before	attempting	to	reapply	the	configuration.	
6.6	Confirming	the	application	of	configuration		
A	control	message	can	have	a	material	impact	on	the	operation	of	the	monitoring	
system.		All	control	messages	must	be	acknowledged	to	ensure	that	the	expected	
configuration	was	applied	by	the	monitor.		The	control	message	response	is	the	
way	 in	 which	 the	 system	 will	 confirm	 the	 monitor	 has	 received	 the	 correct	
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configuration	and	applied	the	right	changes	–	it	provides	the	remote	monitor’s	
acknowledgement	 of	 receiving	 and	 applying	 a	 control	message	 and	what	was	
applied.			
When	sending	a	control	message	response,	the	message	type	field	should	be	set	
to	 the	 Configuration	 Confirmation	 Response	 value	 of	 00000111	 (or	 the	
associated	receipted	value)	as	per	table	12.		The	control	message	response	is	not	
the	same	as	a	 receipt	message	 that	 is	discussed	 in	 the	 following	chapter.	 	The	
control	 message	 process	 always	 requires	 an	 acknowledgement	 message	
independently	of	any	receipting	requested.	
The	control	response	is	sent	by	the	remote	monitor	to	the	requesting	base	station	
once	the	configuration	in	the	control	message	has	been	applied	successfully	by	
the	 remote	 device.	 	 This	 is	 done	 to	 ensure	 that	 there	 is	 no	 issue	 in	 actually	
applying	the	configuration	to	the	system	(i.e.	system	crash,	invalid	configuration	
etc.)	and	ensures	the	response	acknowledges	only	configuration	that	has	been	
applied.		It	should	be	clearly	noted	that	the	control	response	is	not	a	receipt	for	
the	 control	 message,	 but	 an	 acknowledgement	 that	 the	 control	 message	 was	
received	AND	applied.			
The	process	for	acknowledging	a	control	message	is	shown	below	in	figure	57:	
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FIGURE	57:	CONTROL	MESSAGE	RESPONSE	PROCESS	
The	structure	of	the	control	response	message	
The	control	response	message	uses	the	header	in	a	similar	fashion	to	the	control	
message	and	sets	the	User	Data	Segment	with	a	copy	of	the	configuration	that	was	
applied	 using	 the	 same	 format	 as	 the	 original	 configuration	 control	 request	
message.	 	 The	 response	 is	 generated	 once	 the	 configuration	 is	 applied,	 and	
provides	 the	 base	 station	 with	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 configuration	 that	 was	 actually	
applied	to	the	remote	monitor.			
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The	base	station	can	then	validate	this	copy	of	the	configuration	against	what	the	
base	originally	requested.		In	this	way,	the	base	station	can	be	assured	that	the	
configuration	changes	requested	were	applied	correctly.	
The	 table	 below	 shows	 the	 use	 of	 the	 header	 fields	 in	 the	 control	 response	
message	compared	to	the	control	message:	
Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Use	 in	 control	
message	
Use	 in	 control	
response	message	
3	 Message	Type	 MTYP 1 Set	 to	 control	
message	00000100	
Set	 to	 control	
receipt	 message	
00000101	
9	 Generation	
Timestamp	
GENT 7 Set	to	the	time	when	
the	 control	 message	
is	generated	
Set	 to	 the	 time	
when	 the	 control	
receipt	 message	 is	
generated	
10	 Validity	Period	 VAPD 3 Set	 to	 the	 validity	
period	 for	 a	 control	
message	(see	Setting	
an	 appropriate	
validity	 period	 for	 a	
control	 message	
above)	
Set	 to	 the	 validity	
period	for	a	control	
message	 (see	
Setting	 an	
appropriate	validity	
period	for	a	control	
message	above)	
16	 User	Data	
Segment	
UDSG ?? As	 defined	 by	 the	
requirements	 of	 the	
control	message	
Mirrors	 the	 UDSG
that	 was	 received	
and	applied	by	the	
monitor	to	show	the	
configuration	 that	
was	actioned	
Table 31. Use	of	key	fields	in	control	and	control	response	messages	
The	user	data	segment	is	structured	the	same	as	for	the	control	message	(refer	
table	30).	
6.9	End	to	end	process	for	sending	and	receiving	remote	control	
messages	
The	overall	process	for	sending	and	receiving	control	messages	is	per	the	cross	
functional	process	diagram	in	figure	58,	showing	the	roles	of	the	base	station	and	
the	remote	monitor.	
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FIGURE	58:	OVERALL	PROCESS	FOR	SENDING	AND	RESPONDING	TO	CONTROL	MESSAGES	
6.10	Verifying	 the	configuration	of	 the	remote	system	without	
changing	it	
Section	6.5	discusses	 scenarios	where	 the	base	 station	may	need	 to	verify	 the	
configuration	of	the	remote	monitoring	system	but	not	change	the	configuration.		
To	perform	this	verification,	the	configuration	confirmation	message	is	used.		The	
configuration	confirmation	message	is	not	a	control	message	and	does	not	change	
the	configuration.		The	key	fields	from	our	message	header	are	used	as	follows:	
Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Use	in	control	
confirmation	
request	message	
Use	in	control	
confirmation	
receipt	message	
3	 Message	Type	 MTYP 1 Set	to	control	
confirmation	
request	message	
00000110	
Set	to	control	
confirmation	
receipt	message	
00000111	
9	 Generation	
Timestamp	
GENT 7 Set	to	the	time	when	
the	message	is	
generated	
Set	to	the	time	
when	the	receipt	
message	is	
generated	
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Field	
Nbr.	
Field	Name	 Abbrev. Length	
(octets)
Use	in	control	
confirmation	
request	message	
Use	in	control	
confirmation	
receipt	message	
10	 Validity	Period	 VAPD 3 Set	to	the	validity	
period	for	a	message	
Set	to	the	validity	
period	for	a	receipt	
message	
17	 User	Data	
Segment	
UDSG ?? Not	used Shows	the	
configuration	of	the	
system	(see	below)	
Table 32. Use	of	key	fields	in	control	confirmation	messages	
Configuration	confirmation	messages	will	only	ever	come	from	a	base	station	and	
the	response	message	will	only	ever	come	from	the	remote	monitor	(i.e.	a	base	
station	should	not	respond	to	a	request	to	confirm	its	configuration	as	this	has	no	
relevance	in	our	proposed	medical	monitoring	application).			
The	remote	monitor	will	encode	all	of	its	current	configuration	information	into	
the	user	data	segment.		The	user	data	segment	will	use	a	pre‐defined	extensible	
field	format	delimited	as	appropriate.		The	configuration	of	the	system	is	encoded	
in	 the	user	data	 segment	 in	 the	same	manner	as	 that	proposed	 for	 the	earlier	
“change	remote	monitor	parameters”	message	in	table	30.		
The	first	five	octets	of	the	user	data	would	contain	the	same	format	of	octets	as	
those	defined	for	the	message	type	0000000000000101	“Change	active	sensors”	
in	table	30.		Each	bit	represents	a	sensor	and	is	used	to	turn	the	sensors	on	and	
off.		The	second	set	of	octets	will	set	the	sensor	reading	(sample)	period	for	any	
number	of	sensors.		As	this	sequence	of	triplets	can	be	repeated	up	to	the	number	
of	 sensors	 configured	 on	 the	 remote	 monitor,	 when	 all	 of	 the	 sample	 time	
configuration	 values	have	been	 listed,	 a	 delimiter	 of	 five	 consecutive	binary‐0	
octets	(00000000)	will	be	used	to	signify	the	end	of	this	block	of	sensor	triplets.	
The	 third	set	of	octets	will	 set	 the	 thresholds	as	per	 the	Change	Sensor	Alarm	
Threshold(s)	message	in	table	30.	
The	message	must	maintain	this	format:	
 5	octets	–	Activation	Switches		
 3x	octets	–	Sensor	reading	periods	
 5	octets	–	delimiter		
	
	 168	 	
	
 6x	octets	–	Sensor	alarm	thresholds	
 5	octets	–	delimiter		
The	final	delimiter	ends	the	configuration	in	the	user	data	segment.	
Determining	whether	we	have	reported	every	sensor’s	configuration	
The	configuration	confirmation	message	must	report	on	each	sensor	that	is	active	
in	the	remote	system.		This	includes	sensors	that	are	turned	off.		In	essence,	if	the	
system	is	configured	with	a	sensor	and	the	monitor	knows	that	the	hardware	is	
present,	its	configuration	is	reported	irrespective	of	the	sensor’s	current	active	
status.	
This	does	not	mean	that	40	sets	of	sensor	data	will	be	reported	in	the	message.		
The	 requirement	 is	 to	 report	 only	 configured	 and	 physically	 present	 sensors.		
This	 if	 a	monitor	 is	 configured	 to	use	 three	 sensors,	 only	 three	 sets	 of	 sensor	
configuration	are	reported,	whether	 they	are	currently	on	or	off.	 	Each	sensor	
should	only	be	reported	once.		Should	the	base	station	receive	a	message	where	
the	same	sensor	ID	appears	2	or	more	times,	the	message	should	be	discarded	
and	ignored.	
One	shortcoming	of	this	approach	is	that	the	base	station	has	no	way	to	tell	if	the	
remote	 monitor	 has	 actually	 reported	 each	 sensor.	 	 This	 leads	 us	 to	 an	
assumption	 that	 the	 base	 station	 must	 maintain	 the	 fundamental	 sensor	
configuration	 for	 each	 remote	 monitor	 in	 order	 to	 verify	 such	 messages	 and	
highlight	 where	 the	 remote	 monitor	 is	 deviating	 from	 the	 expected	 sensor	
configuration.		Such	configuration	is	application	specific	and	outside	the	scope	of	
our	communications	protocol.	
6.11	Shortcomings	of	the	control	message	approach	that	must	be	
considered	by	the	implementing	application	
There	are	a	number	of	potential	shortcomings	of	this	approach	to	remote	control	
of	 the	monitor	 that	 should	 be	 considered	 before	 it	 is	 implemented	within	 an	
application.			
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Size	of	full	configuration	messages	
A	full	configuration	message	for	40	sensors	would	require	615	octets	of	user	data	
capacity	plus	2	octets	for	the	control	message	format	for	a	total	of	617	octets	of	
user	data.		While	in	size‐unlimited	carriers,	617	octets	is	not	significant,	for	size	
limited	carriers	such	as	SMS,	this	is	a	payload	that	is	much	larger	than	a	single	
message.	 	Our	solution	will	support	up	to	7	SMS	concatenated	to	form	a	single	
virtual	message,	using	the	message	structure	field	in	the	header.		This	provides	a	
total	data	capacity	(note	not	user	data	capacity)	of	140	x	7	octets,	or	980	octets	in	
total.		If	we	take	40	octets	per	message	for	the	header,	we	end	up	with	700	octets	
of	user	data	capacity.		This	provides	us	with	enough	capacity	to	store	our	largest	
proposed	configuration	message	within	our	smallest	size	limited	carrier	option.	
However,	it	should	be	noted	that	the	use	of	multiple	SMS	to	form	a	concatenated	
payload	may	increase	the	potential	for	configuration	message	failure	(or	failure	
of	the	associated	response)	as	the	control	message	and	response	must	both	be	
delivered	using	multiple	individual	SMS	before	the	message	can	be	reassembled	
by	the	receiver.		This	should	be	considered	and	tested	for	suitability	as	part	of	the	
implementation	of	the	protocol.	
Maintaining	knowledge	of	the	configuration	of	remote	monitors	
The	sending	and	receiving	of	control	messages	and	configuration	confirmation	
messages	implies	that	there	is	a	need	for	the	base	station	controlling	a	monitoring	
application	 to	manage	 a	 database	 of	 the	 “known	 configuration”	 of	 the	 remote	
monitors.	 	 When	 a	 configuration	 change	 is	 requested,	 that	 change	 must	 be	
tracked	 to	 ensure	 that	 what	 is	 confirmed	 by	 remote	 monitor	 is	 what	 was	
requested	by	the	base	station	in	the	first	place.	
This	 will	 require	 the	 application	 to	 implement	 some	 form	 of	 configuration	
database	to	manage	the	configurations	of	the	remote	monitors.		This	is	not	seen	
to	 be	 a	 significant	 impediment	 to	 the	 use	 of	 the	 protocol,	 as	 in	 theory,	 any	
monitoring	application	will	need	to	implement	a	database	of	remote	monitors	to	
be	communicated	with,	their	device	ID’s,	carriers	in	use,	carrier	specific	ID’s	(such	
as	 IP	addresses	or	GSM	telephone	numbers)	and	other	parameters	 in	order	to	
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achieve	communications	with	the	devices.		In	addition,	knowledge	of	the	sensors	
will	likely	be	required	to	understand	a	bio‐monitoring	message	from	the	remote	
monitor	–	i.e.	which	sensor	is	sending	a	specific	value	will	determine	what	that	
value	actually	means.			
Requesting	suitable	configuration	based	on	the	capability	of	the	
remote	monitor	
While	we	provide	the	capability	to	transmit	configuration	and	control	messages,	
we	do	not	validate	that	the	configuration	of	control	requested	is	actually	valid	for	
the	 remote	 monitor	 in	 question.	 	 For	 example,	 if	 a	 remote	 monitor	 is	 only	
equipped	with	six	sensors,	but	our	configuration	tries	to	control	10	sensors,	there	
is	nothing	in	the	protocol	to	stop	this	happening.	
This	implies	a	reason	for	the	application	to	use	a	database	of	configurations	at	the	
base	station,	so	that	for	a	particular	remote	monitor,	the	base	station	understands	
attributes	such	as:	
 The	monitor	ID	
 The	monitor’s	carriers	
 The	monitor’s	 carrier	 specific	 ID’s	 for	 communications	 routing	 (i.e.	 IP,	
GSM	phone	number,	radio	station	ID	etc.)	
 The	monitor’s	fundamental	configuration	(i.e.	the	sensors	on	the	monitor)	
 The	monitor’s	current	configuration	
 The	requested	in	progress	configuration	(if	applicable)	
It	will	be	an	application	specific	requirement	to	maintain	such	a	database,	and	to	
ensure	that	control	messages	are	developed	in	such	a	way	as	to	be	suitable	for	
the	remote	monitor	in	question.	
Tracking	of	control	requests	to	ensure	the	base	station	knows	when	
a	request	has	not	been	actioned	in	a	timely	manner	
The	use	of	the	2VP	+	G	formula	to	calculate	a	valid	interval	within	which	to	expect	
the	 actioning	 of	 configuration	 control	messages	 implies	 the	 base	 station	must	
track	the	sending	of	control	messages	and	the	response	from	the	monitor	to	those	
messages	to	ensure	that	the	response	to	a	control	message	is	received	in	a	timely	
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manner.		An	application	implementing	the	protocol	will	be	required	to	consider	
this	requirement	and	implement	appropriate	tracking	of	such	messages.	
6.12	Validation	of	the	control	message	architecture		
In	order	to	validate	the	proposed	control	message	architecture,	a	control	message	
generator	was	created	to	encode	messages	based	on	the	mechanisms	described	
in	 this	 chapter.	 	 A	 sample	 of	 the	 generator	 form,	 allowing	 for	 the	 various	
combinations	 of	 message	 across	 the	 proposed	 40	 sensor	 capacity	 of	 the	
application,	is	shown	in	figure	59:	
	
FIGURE	59:	CONTROL	MESSAGE	GENERATION	TOOL	
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This	tool	was	used	to	encode	a	number	of	test	messages,	on	the	basis	of	a	three‐
sensor	configured	remote	monitor	(shown	in	the	sensor	activation	panel	of	figure	
60).		The	configuration	messages	used	were	based	on	the	options	shown	in	table	
30,	namely:	
 Reset	message	
 Set	remote	originated	message	interval	
 Change	active	sensors	
 Change	sensor	reading	period	
 Change	sensor	alarm	threshold	
 Change	sensor	parameters		
 Change	base	station	
We	tested	the	messages	using	SMS	as	the	carrier.	 	This	allowed	us	to	simulate	
transmission	scenarios	between	endpoints	including	successful	transmission	and	
reception	 and	 successful	 transmission	 with	 reception	 outside	 of	 the	 2VP	 +	 G	
timeframe.	
In	each	case,	the	message	sent	was	decoded	and	validated	for	content	based	on	
the	 checksums.	 	 Once	 validated,	 the	 message	 was	 disassembled	 into	 the	
component	header	and	user	data	segment	fields.		The	message	was	submitted	to	
an	algorithm	to	determine	validity	and	timeliness	based	on	the	proposed	process	
in	figure	56,	and	validated	as	to	the	outcome.		For	each	test,	25%	of	the	messages	
were	submitted	to	a	scenario	where	they	would	exceed	the	2VP+G	timeframe.	
The	 results	 of	 the	 testing	 for	 140	 test	 messages	 showed	 that	 transmission	
characteristics	and	message	handling	were	as	expected	and	defined	above.	 	As	
there	were	 no	 outlier	 cases,	 the	 results	 have	 not	 been	 further	 detailed.	 	 Both	
transmission	and	reception	was	as	expected,	with	no	unforeseen	issues.	
Samples	of	the	code	used	for	the	generation	of	the	messages	and	validation	of	the	
checksums	and	validity	period	can	be	found	in	appendix	F.	
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6.13	Performance	indicators	addressed	by	the	control	message	
framework	
The	 control	 message	 framework,	 along	 with	 the	 configuration	 confirmation	
message,	addresses	the	requirement	that	the	system	can	be	configured	remotely	
in	order	that	it	can	adapt	to	changing	monitoring	circumstances,	per	table	1.		This	
addresses	the	performance	indicators	of	supporting	the	ability	to	send	extensible	
configuration	messages,	as	shown	in	the	control	request	message,	and	the	ability	
for	 the	 base	 station	 to	 query	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	 remote	 system,	 via	 the	
control	response	message	and	the	configuration	confirmation	message.	
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7. 	FACILITATING	SECURITY, 	
ROBUSTNESS , 	ASSURANCE	AND	
IDENTIFICATION	
In	chapter	2,	we	illustrated	how	the	research	in	the	field	often	assumes	security,	
encryption,	 identification	 and	 robustness	 of	 data	 as	 they	 are	 not	 specifically	
discussed	in	the	nature	of	the	proposed	bio‐monitoring	systems.		For	messages	
transmitted	 in	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 these	 should	 not	 be	 incidental	
considerations.		It	is	imperative	that,	in	a	medical	system,	the	data	received	is	the	
data	that	was	transmitted	and	that	messages	are	trusted	and	data	secure	[79].	
For	a	carrier‐agnostic	system,	in	chapter	3	we	demonstrated	that	many	carriers	
provide	capabilities	for	some	of	these	attributes.		However,	in	a	carrier	agnostic	
solution,	as	we	have	stated	previously,	no	reliance	can	be	made	on	carrier‐level	
capabilities	where	those	capabilities	do	not	exist	across	all	of	our	carriers.		
While	 we	 can	 take	 additional	 benefit	 from	 capabilities	 supplied	 by	 specific	
carriers	(i.e.	encryption	of	transmission,	inherent	identification	capabilities)	we	
cannot	rely	on	such	capabilities	across	our	proposed	set	of	carriers	as	they	are	
not	 consistent	 features	 of	 each	 of	 our	 proposed	 carriers.	 As	 part	 of	 our	
communications	platform	we	must	consider	how	we	ensure	that,	fundamentally,	
what	the	sender	sends	is	what	the	receiver	receives.	
In	this	chapter,	we	propose	considerations	and	methods	to	address	a	variety	of	
robustness	 and	 security	 considerations	 for	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 solution.	 We	
evaluate	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 carrier	 agnostic	 model	 to	 facilitate	 such	
attributes	 that	 does	 not	 rely	 on	 specific	 capabilities	 of	 any	 one	 carrier	 (for	
example,	we	cannot	assume	GSM	mobile	data	encryption	is	present).		However,	
to	 be	 carrier	 agnostic,	 our	model	 is	 not	 impacted	 should	 such	 capabilities	 be	
present	in	a	specific	carrier.			
We	examine	the	impacts	of	this	model	on	different	carriers	(for	example	in	terms	
of	data	capacity	 impacts	of	application	of	encryption)	and	identify	solutions	to	
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maintain	carrier	independence	while	providing	the	operational	facilities	and	data	
transmission	capabilities	that	we	require.	
We	 evaluate	 the	 actions	 of	 the	 system	where	 data	 becomes	 lost	 or	 corrupted	
during	 transmission,	 either	 through	 inaccurate	or	 incomplete	 transmission,	or	
through	 a	 fault	 in	 the	 transmission	 signal‐path.	 	 We	 propose	 mechanisms	
whereby	 data	 that	 is	 lost	 (i.e.	 fails	 to	 be	 received	 at	 the	 destination)	 can	 be	
detected	at	the	destination	as	a	result	of	its	absence.			
7.1	Why	do	we	need	these	attributes?	
In	the	modern	world,	data	is	a	commodity	that	is	traded	back	and	forth	between	
nations,	corporations	and	individuals	tirelessly	across	the	electronic	pathways	of	
the	Internet.		
As	the	volumes	of	data	that	are	shipped	around	the	Internet	increase	every	day	
[80],	 the	 bits	 and	 bytes	 that	 we	 generate	 as	 a	 by‐product	 of	 our	 data	
transmissions	 have	 become	 intrinsically	 valuable.	 	 Indeed,	 respected	 IT	 Tech	
Journalists	ZDNET	recently	published	an	article	that	stated	that	“stolen	Twitter	
accounts	now	fetch	more	than	credit	cards	on	the	cybercrime	black	market”	[81].			
	
FIGURE	60:	CISCO	FORECASTS	132	EXABYTES	PER	MONTH	OF	IP	TRAFFIC	BY	2018[80]	
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If	the	username	and	password	for	a	commonly	used	social	media	platform	has	
value,	what	is	the	value	of	personal	bio‐metric	data?		Could	such	data	be	used	by	
corporations	such	as	insurance	companies,	banks	and	the	like	to	determine	your	
eligibility	for	their	services,	or	by	employers	to	determine	whether	you	are	a	good	
prospect	for	a	job?		Samani	[82]	says	that	the	answer	to	this	questions	is	probably	
yes!	
If	value	exists	in	the	misuse	of	personal	information,	there	is	a	need	to	ensure	that	
personal	information	is	only	used	for	the	manner	in	which	it	was	collected.		That	
is	the	aim	of	privacy	legislation	around	the	world	[67].		Data	should	be	prevented	
from	unauthorised	access	and	unauthorised	use.			
In	the	context	of	medical	monitoring,	the	accuracy	and	trustworthiness	of	data	is	
highly	significant.		The	symptomatic	difference	between	a	blood	glucose	level	of	
3	mmol/l	and	4	mmol/l	is	hypoglycaemia	[83],	yet	in	the	measurement	data	there	
but	a	single	integer	step.		If	inaccuracy	creeps	into	our	measurement	data	during	
transmission,	it	might	have	grave	consequences	for	our	patient.	
We	must	also	be	able	to	trust	that	messages	sent	are	received	at	the	other	end	of	
the	transmission,	or	figure	out	where	messages	have	been	lost.		In	the	case	of	an	
adverse	event,	what	happens	if	we	lose	messages,	and	thus	time,	to	treat	a	patient,	
for	example	having	a	cardiac	arrest.	 	Response	time	is	critical	 in	some	medical	
situations	[84].		We	should	therefore	be	able	to	identify	where	messages	are	not	
delivered,	go	missing	or	have	issues	in	transmission	and	can	therefore	no	longer	
be	trusted	in	order	to	ensure	we	are	keeping	a	watchful	eye	on	all	of	our	patients.	
The	result	of	these	requirements	is	that	our	solution	needs	to	be	robust	across	
many	 attributes.	 	We	must	 ensure	 that	 the	 data	we	 receive	 originates	 from	 a	
trusted	source,	so	that	we	can	establish	a	level	of	trust	in	the	data.		We	must	also	
ensure	that	the	data	we	receive	is	the	same	as	the	data	that	was	sent,	and	this	
means	being	able	to	verify	the	received	data	in	the	absence	of	the	patient	or	the	
remote	monitor	that	took	the	reading	in	the	first	place.		We	must	also	secure	the	
data	where	required,	to	prevent	misuse.	
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7.2	Encryption	of	the	data	
Encryption	of	data	has	an	overhead	in	terms	of	computation	and	data	costs	[85]	
[86]	 [87].	 Given	 our	 carrier	 agnostic	 approach,	 we	must	 consider	 the	 cost	 of	
encryption	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 processing	 and	 data	 capacity	 overheads.	 	 We	
discussed	 security	 considerations	 for	 bio‐monitoring	 systems	 in	 our	 earlier	
paper	 [88].	 However,	 before	 we	 look	 at	 pervasive	 encryption	 functionality	
throughout	our	protocol,	we	 should	evaluate	 the	 inherent	 security	of	 the	data	
within	our	message	protocol.		
Should	the	message	header	be	encrypted?	
The	protocol	message	structure	shown	in	table	9	does	not	contain	any	personally	
identifiable	data.		If	we	review	the	data	stored	in	the	header	fields	it	can	be	seen	
that	 the	 message	 packet	 does	 not	 contain	 any	 information	 that	 specifically	
identifies	a	user	within	 the	message	header.	The	header	 fields	relate	 to	either	
system	 constructs	 (message	 type,	message	 format,	 application	 ID,	message	 ID	
etc.),	 device	 identifiers	 (sender	 ID,	 recipient	 ID)	 or	 message‐specific	
characteristics	(validity	period,	receipt	requirement	and	the	checksums).			
The	 identification	 fields	 (sender	 ID,	 recipient	 ID)	 are	 24‐bit	 system	 specific	
identifiers	which	have	no	context	outside	of	the	application	using	the	protocol.		
To	relate	the	 information	 in	a	protocol	message	back	to	a	specific	subject,	one	
would	need	access	to	the	system	configuration	for	translation	of	values	such	as	
sender	ID	into	patient	details,	or	details	of	which	sensor	relates	to	which	ID	in	the	
user	data	segment.	
The	message	header	does	not	contain	personally	identifiable	data	in	the	absence	
of	the	“directory”	of	patients	stored	at	the	base	station.		Given	the	lack	of	personal	
data,	we	believe	that	the	message	packet	header	is	sufficiently	obfuscated	that	
the	data	remains	incoherent	to	an	interceptor	who	does	not	have	access	to	the	
details	 of	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	 overarching	 application	 making	 use	 of	 the	
communications	 protocol.	 	 As	 such,	 we	 would	 not	 propose	 encryption	 of	 the	
message	header	is	required	to	further	protect	the	data.	
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Encryption	of	the	User	Data	Segment	
Despite	 the	 obfuscated	 nature	 of	 the	 header,	 the	 user	 data	 segment	may	 still	
provide	a	risk	of	exposing	personal	information.		The	user	data	segment	is	“a	free	
form	 binary	 data	 store	which	 can	 be	 put	 to	 a	 number	 of	 uses”.	 	We	 propose	
specific	uses	of	the	data	segment	in	this	work.			In	some	message	types,	the	user	
data	 segment	 may	 therefore	 contain	 personal	 bio‐monitoring	 information	
relating	to	the	subject	being	monitored.			
In	 the	 context	 of	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 system,	 a	 general	 “vital‐signs”	 monitoring	
message	is	likely	to	make	up	the	majority	of	traffic	within	a	system.		If	the	user	
data	segment	contains	personal	biometric	information,	we	must	consider	that	the	
user	data	segment	might	be	the	target	of	an	attack	to	 intercept	and	access	the	
information	transmitted	by	the	protocol.	
As	our	user	data	segment	is	free	form,	we	have	avoided	specifying	the	format	in	
which	bio‐monitoring	data	will	be	encoded	in	the	user	data	segment	to	remain	
agnostic	 as	 to	 how	 the	 application	 using	 the	messaging	 format	 uses	 the	 data	
segment.	 	However,	to	evaluate	whether	this	data	is	at	risk,	 let	us	assume	that	
such	data	 is	 encoded	by	 the	monitoring	 system	 in	 a	 type/value	pair	 encoding	
system,	as	shown	in	table	34	(note	that	data	lengths	were	covered	in	chapter	3	–	
refer	table	2):	
Value	Type	ID	 Description Octets	required	for	data
1	 Temperature 1
2	 Heart	Rate 1
3	 Blood	Pressure 2
4	 Respiration rate 1
5	 Blood	oxygen	concentration 1
6	 Blood	glucose	concentration 3
Table 33. Octets	required	for	monitor	readings	
In	such	a	scheme,	we	could	have	a	hypothetical	encoding	scheme	that	used	the	
first	octet	to	define	the	reading	type,	and	the	next	X	octets	to	record	the	value,	as	
shown	in	the	sub‐message	frame	in	figure	61:	
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ID
1
Value
Temperature 
reading
ID
2
Value
Heart Rate BPM
ID
3
Value
Blood Pressure 
Systolic
Value
Blood Pressure 
Diastolic
ID
4
Value
Respiration Rate 
BPM
ID
5
Value
Blood Oxygen 
Concentration
ID
6
Value
Blood glucose 10's
Value
Blood glucose 1's
Value
Blood glucose .1's
	
FIGURE	61:	SUB‐MESSAGE	FRAMES	FOR	MEDICAL	DATA	ENCODING	
If	vital‐signs	data	were	encoded	into	the	user	data	segment	without	any	form	of	
encryption,	it	would	be	readable.		However,	using	ID’s	to	identify	types	of	value,	
rather	 than	 encoding	 “BLOOD	 PRESSURE”	 in	 some	 human	 readable	 form,	 the	
value	and	identity	is	obfuscated	where	the	attacker	does	not	have	knowledge	of	
how	data	was	originally	encoded	(i.e.	which	ID	relates	to	which	measurement).		
An	attack	on	an	application‐defined	encoding	mechanism	therefore	places	some	
reliance	 on	 the	 attacker	 “understanding”	 or	 deducing	 how	 the	 data	 had	 been	
encoded	 in	order	 to	compromise	 the	data.	 	The	ranges	of	 the	values	and	 their	
change	over	time	may	provide	some	insight	into	the	nature	of	the	data.		However,	
for	a	one‐time	intercept,	the	values	may	not	be	readily	interpretable,	even	if	they	
can	be	read.				
However,	 because	 the	 user	 data	 segment	 is	 free	 form	 binary,	 we	 might	 also	
envisage	a	situation	where	it	is	used	to	send	patient	details	or	information	about	
the	subject	of	the	monitor	in	human	readable	form.		An	application	may	elect	to	
send	human	readable	data	rather	than	obfuscated	values,	and	our	protocol	does	
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not	prevent	this.		While	it	is	certainly	not	efficient	from	a	data	perspective	to	send	
“Respiration	 Rate	 32BPM”	 as	 binary	 coded	 ASCII	 (i.e.	 22	 octets	 vs	 3	 for	 our	
proposed	 type/value	 pair),	 it	 is	 certainly	 permissible	 to	 use	 the	 user	 data	
segment	in	this	way	if	the	application	so	requires	it	(for	example,	to	facilitate	fall	
back	texting	of	readings	to	a	doctor’s	mobile	phone).	
Alternatively,	consider	where	data	encoded	in	a	standards‐compliant	packet	of	
medical	telemetry	–	for	example	using	IEEE	11073‐20601	format	medical	data	
[89].			
As	Deok	Seok	Seo	et	al	state,	this	IEEE	standard	relates	to	“mutual	compatibility	
between	all	sorts	of	[personal	health	devices]	and	the	gateways	for	collecting	bio	
information	from	the	devices	and	activating	related	services.		This	international	
standard	is	the	first	official	document	that	has	dealt	with	communication	related	
to	the	healthcare	device”[90].	
Where	our	protocol	carries	medical	data	using	a	standard‐based	format	such	as	
IEEE	11073,	it	is	possible	that	the	attacker	could,	through	analysis,	determine	the	
standard	being	used	and	thus	have	a	“map”	of	the	encoding	for	data	within	the	
communication	packet.	
Given	we	cannot	control	the	use	of	the	user	data	segment	if	we	remain	application	
agnostic,	we	should	consider	the	ability	to	apply	some	form	of	security	to	the	data	
as	part	of	the	protocol	capabilities.	
Encrypting	the	user	data	segment	
In	the	protocol	header	fields	discussed	in	table	9,	we	include	a	field	that	defines	
the	User	Data	 Segment	 Encryption	 ID.	 	 This	 facilitates	 the	 identification	 of	 an	
encryption	type	for	the	user	data	segment,	while	allowing	an	application	using	
the	 protocol	 to	 use	 appropriate	 encryption	 mechanisms	 to	 suit	 its	 specific	
requirements.	
The	definition	of	the	meaning	of	this	octet	is	predominantly	application	specific	
(with	the	exception	of	the	use	of	the	lower	and	upper	bound	values	which	have	
been	defined	by	 the	protocol).	 	Any	non‐zero	and	non‐maximum	value	 in	 thus	
header	field	identified	that	encryption	has	been	applied	to	the	user	data	segment.		
	
	 181	 	
	
The	 value	 identifies	 an	 application‐specific	 encryption	 type	 to	 use	 to	 encode	
and/or	decode	the	message.	
In	chapter	2,	we	demonstrate	the	breadth	of	research	in	the	field.		To	that	end,	we	
have	made	a	deliberate	decision	to	not	define	the	specific	encryption	to	be	used	
within	 our	 protocol.	 	 This	 provides	 flexibility	 to	 applications	 to	 decide	 what	
encryption	strength,	processing	and	data	overhead	are	acceptable	considering	
the	carriers	and	hardware	in	use	within	the	monitoring	solution.		The	nature	of	
the	encryption	ID	header	also	provides	flexibility	to	allow	the	application	to	use	
encryption,	or	not,	on	a	message‐case	by	case	basis.	
This	supports	a	number	of	use	scenarios.		If	the	protocol	is	used	within	a	secure	
system	where	data	security	was	facilitated	in	another	way	(i.e.	through	using	only	
secure	carriers),	or	where	all	user	data	segment	messages	were	encoded	in	such	
a	fashion	that	encryption	is	not	deemed	to	be	required,	then	we	do	not	impose	
the	requirement	for	encryption	on	the	application.		Alternatively,	the	application	
may	elect	to	only	encrypt	vital‐signs	messages	because	of	the	personal	data,	and	
thus	only	specify	an	encryption	ID	on	messages	with	personal	data.		Finally,	the	
application	may	use	one	type	of	encryption	for	personal	data,	and	another	with	
different	 attributes,	 for	 the	 control	 and	 system	 level	 messages.	 	 All	 of	 these	
scenarios	are	possible	where	we	do	not	require	or	specify	an	absolute	encryption	
requirement	but	rather	facilitate	the	option	to	apply	encryption	as	required.	
Choosing	appropriate	encryption	
Encryption	algorithms	should	be	selected	based	on	the	specific	requirements	of	
the	application	and	the	sorts	of	data	that	are	being	transmitted,	as	well	as	 the	
carrier	set	and	application	hardware	that	is	being	used.		There	is	much	work	in	
the	field	of	selecting	developing	and	selecting	optimal	encryption	mechanisms	for	
specific	cases	(for	example	[91],[92]).		An	appropriate	type	of	encryption	should	
be	selected	by	the	application	after	considering	the	need	for	user	data	encryption	
against	 the	 overhead	 of	 applying	 the	 encryption	 on	 both	 processing	 and	 data	
capacity.	 	 In	 selecting	 an	 appropriate	 encryption	 algorithm	 for	 use	 with	 the	
protocol,	we	believe	a	number	of	factors	should	be	considered.	
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1. The	encryption	method	selected	must	be	reversible.		We	need	to	encode	
data	when	it	is	sent	and	then	decode	data	when	it	is	received.	
2. The	 encryption	 algorithm	 should	 require	 a	 low	 overhead.	 	 When	
encrypting	the	user	data	segment,	the	number	of	additional	octets	of	data	
that	 are	 required	 to	 encode	 encrypted	 vs	 unencrypted	 data	 should	 be	
considered	and	kept	as	low	as	possible.	 	In	capacity‐limited	carriers,	we	
do	not	want	the	encryption	overhead	to	outweigh	the	volume	of	data	in	
the	message.	
3. The	selected	encryption	algorithm	should	provide	a	level	of	data	security	
that	is	commensurate	with	the	requirements	imposed	by	the	application.		
This	 should	 consider	 factors	 such	 as	 data	 obfuscation	 and	 the	
interpretability	of	the	data	if	a	message	was	to	be	intercepted.		In	a	bio‐
monitoring	application,	the	data	in	a	message	may	not	be	easily	linked	to	
a	 specific	 monitoring	 subject	 without	 access	 to	 the	 underlying	
configuration	of	the	application.			
4. Given	 the	 remote	 monitoring	 system	 may	 utilise	 a	 low	 power	 set	 of	
devices	 worn	 on	 the	 body,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 sensor	 hub	 used	 to	
communicate	with	the	monitor	will	also	be	relatively	low	power	(at	least	
in	modern	computing	terms).		As	Ganesan	(and	many	others)	state	[87],	
there	is	an	overhead	to	implementing	encryption	and	this	is	measurable	
in	low	power	devices.		Any	encryption	algorithm	used	should	ideally	have	
a	low	processing	overhead	to	encrypt	or	decrypt	the	data.		In	the	case	of	
an	urgent	monitoring	message,	we	would	assert	that	it	may	not	acceptable	
for	 the	 encryption/decryption	 of	 user	 data	 to	 require	 significant	
additional	processing	time	before	the	unencrypted	data	can	be	accessed	
and	the	message	actioned.	
By	 virtue	 of	 the	 agnostic	 nature	 of	 the	 protocol,	 it	 is	 an	 application	 specific	
responsibility	to	define	the	encryption	and	enable	methods	to	encode	and	decode	
the	messages	appropriately	as	part	of	the	system	implementation.	
The	impact	of	different	encryption	methods	
In	order	to	illustrate	the	impact	of	the	encryption	of	data,	we	created	a	simple	
C#.NET	application	to	test	four	common	encryption	algorithms.		Specifically,	we	
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tested	the	AES,	Rijndael,	RSA	and	Blowfish	encryption	methods	in	.NET	as	they	
are	amongst	the	common	algorithms	used	in	reversible	encryption	of	data	[93]	
[94].		Figure	62	shows	the	user	interface	for	the	application.	
	
FIGURE	62:	THE	CRYPTOGRAPHY	OVERHEAD	TEST	APPLICATION	(TIMES	IN	MILLISECONDS)	
A	test	was	established	to	encode	a	160‐character	test	message,	specifically:	
This	 is	a	160	character	ASCII	message	that	would	fit	 in	a	standard	SMS	message	
packet.		Our	smallest	carrier	unit	according	to	the	premises	established	earlier.	
Note:	160	characters	was	used	here	as,	in	standard	ASCII	using	7	–	8	bit	ASCII	packing	supported	natively	in	
SMS	messages,	140	octets	translate	to	160	packed	ASCII	characters	of	capacity.	 	Refer	to	Appendix	C	 for	an	
overview	of	7‐bit	packing	for	ASCII	messages.	
During	 initial	 testing,	 it	was	noted	 that	 there	was	 a	 “warm	up”	period	 for	 the	
application	to	create	the	various	encryption	runtimes	(an	artefact	of	how	.NET	
applications	 work).	 	 As	 such,	 the	 test	 application	 was	 run	 several	 times	 to	
establish	a	benchmark,	and	then	measurements	were	taken	once	the	encryption	
time	readings	became	consistent.		The	test	application	used	the	system	clock	at	
millisecond	 resolution	 to	 measure	 the	 start	 and	 end	 time	 of	 the	 encryption	
process	inline	in	the	application	code.		It	published	the	timings	back	to	the	user	
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interface.	 	At	 the	conclusion	of	 the	encryption	process,	 the	encrypted	message	
data	 was	 then	 decrypted	 to	 ensure	 the	 encoding	 was	 reversible	 back	 to	 the	
original	source	message	(as	reversible	encryption	is	essential	for	bio‐monitoring	
transmission	–	we	must	be	able	to	decode	the	transmitted	message	at	the	base	
station).	
The	encryption	overhead	was	calculated	by	taking	the	octet	length	of	the	original	
text,	 and	 comparing	 it	 with	 the	 octet	 length	 of	 the	 resultant	 cipher	 text	 after	
encryption.			
Averaged	results	over	100	encryption	attempts	(post	application	warmup)	 for	
the	purposes	of	timing	were	as	per	table	35:	
Source	message	
length	
	 RSA	 Rijndael	 Blowfish	 AES	
160	octets	
Encrypted	
Data	size	
320	 236	 336	 236	
Encryption	
time	
11522ms	 11ms	 3ms	 26ms	
Table 34. Overhead	values	from	encryption	test	
There	is	an	overhead	of	anywhere	from	47%	through	to	110%	in	terms	of	data	
capacity	 impact	 of	 encrypting	 the	 message.	 	 The	 encryption	 also	 adds	 a	
measurable	 delay	 of	 anywhere	 from	 3ms	 through	 to	 over	 11	 seconds	 for	 the	
encryption	processing	of	 the	message	depending	on	the	type	of	encryption.	 	 It	
should	 also	 be	 remembered	 that	 these	 tests	 were	 conducted	 on	 a	 desktop	
workstation	with	24GB	RAM,	running	a	64‐bit	operating	system	with	a	6	core	
3.2ghz	processor	–	not	a	small	low	power	device	that	might	be	used	in	a	typical	
BAN.	
The	impacts	of	some	forms	of	encryption	are	significant	both	in	terms	of	the	time	
to	create	and	send	a	message	and	the	overhead	to	encrypt	and	transmit	the	data.		
These	 overheads	 must	 be	 considered	 by	 the	 application	 making	 use	 of	 the	
encryption	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 ability	 to	 rapidly	 raise	 and	 send	 medical	
monitoring	messages,	 and	 to	 action	 these	 at	 the	 other	 end.	 	 This	 is	 especially	
relevant	for	larger	source	data	packets	in	size	limited	carriers,	or	for	low	power	
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remote	 monitors	 with	 limited	 CPU	 power.	 	 However,	 none	 of	 these	 impacts	
preclude	 the	 use	 of	 encryption	 –	 they	 simply	 imply	 that	 care	 be	 taken	 in	 the	
selection	of	the	encryption	algorithm	to	be	used.	
Using	the	User	Data	Segment	Encryption	Type	Octet	in	the	message	
header	
A	number	of	encryption	algorithms	may	be	used	to	encrypt	data.			We	illustrated	
four	 in	 the	 test	 above.	 The	 application	may	 therefore	 define	 the	 use	 of	 UDSE	
header	field	as	necessary.	 	Based	on	the	encryption	algorithms	tested	above,	a	
definition	of	the	UDSE	field	values	could	be	as	per	table	36:	
Value	 Description
00000000 No	encryption	used
00000001 AES
00000010 RSA
00000011 Rijndael
00000100 Blowfish
11111111 Reserved	for	system	use
Table 35. Example	UDSE	values	
7.2	 Message	 trust	 ‐	 identifying	 the	 sender	 and	 receiver	 of	 a	
message	
In	a	carrier‐agnostic	situation,	there	may	be	no	carrier	specific	way	to	explicitly	
identify	the	sender	of	a	message.		For	example,	on	radio,	the	message	is	broadcast	
on	the	radio	network	and	does	not	necessary	have	a	station	ID	associated	with	
the	transmission	(unlike,	for	example,	Internet	with	a	packet	level	Mac	address	
[95],	or	SMS	with	a	GSM	phone	number	[41,	42]).	
In	medical	monitoring,	we	must	have	trust	that	the	sender	of	a	message	can	be	
identified	in	order	to	relate	vital‐signs	readings	to	a	patient.		We	must	therefore	
have	 a	 carrier‐agnostic	way	of	 identifying	 a	 sender	within	our	 application.	To	
support	this	requirement,	we	defined	a	number	of	fields	relating	to	the	identity	
of	the	message	within	the	system	in	our	header	block	in	table	9.		An	excerpt	of	
these	fields	is	shown	in	table	37	below.	
Field	Nbr.	 Field	Name Abbrev.	
5	 Application	ID APID	
6	 Sender	Device	ID SDID	
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Field	Nbr.	 Field	Name Abbrev.	
7	 Recipient	Device	ID RDID	
8	 Message	ID MSID	
Table 36. Fields	to	identify	the	sender	and	receiver	of	a	message	
The	application	ID	is	a	single	octet	used	to	identify	1	–	255	applications	using	the	
fundamental	communications	infrastructure	that	provides	our	carriers.		This	is	
specifically	included	to	cater	for	situations	where	on	or	more	of	our	carriers	is	
part	of	a	broadcast	infrastructure,	for	example	over	radio.		On	a	radio	network,	
all	devices	listening	to	the	same	channel	or	frequency	can	“hear”	a	transmitted	
message,	even	if	it	is	not	addressed	to	them.		The	application	ID	allows	the	same	
communications	 infrastructure	 to	 be	 segmented	 by	 identifying	 different	 user	
applications	within	that	infrastructure.		For	example,	application	ID	2	might	be	
for	the	sports	medicine	department	of	a	hospital,	3	for	diagnostic	medicine	and	4	
for	cardiac	care.		Applications	using	our	protocol	must	check	the	application	ID	is	
appropriate	to	them	prior	to	actioning	a	message	any	further.	
A	message	also	includes	two	header	fields	for	sender	and	recipient	ID.		However,	
it	is	worth	notice	explicitly	that	receiver	and	sender	ID	are	essentially	taken	from	
the	same	pool	of	ID’s.		Each	device	in	an	application	will	have	a	device	ID,	and	it	
is	used	as	either	the	sender	or	receiver	ID	depending	on	the	direction	of	the	travel	
of	the	messages	to	and	from	that	device,	as	per	figure	63.	
	
FIGURE	63:	USE	OF	THE	DEVICE	ID	AS	THE	SENDER	OR	RECIPIENT	ID	FIELD	IN	THE	HEADER	
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The	 Device	 ID	 is	 a	 24‐bit	 number	 allocated	 to	 a	 specific	 device.	 	 In	 terms	 of	
establishing	trust,	while	the	ID	can	in	theory	identify	more	than	16	million	unique	
devices	 per	 application,	 there	 is	 no	 requirement	 imposed	 by	 our	 protocol	 to	
sequentially	or	uniformly	allocate	ID’s	to	devices	on	an	incremental	basis.		The	ID	
could	be	allocated	according	to	an	algorithm	that	incorporates	some	form	of	ID	
validation.		For	example,	in	the	simplest	case,	the	Device	ID	might	be	only	used	
where	 it	 is	exactly	divisible	by	some	nominated	integer.	 	Alternatively,	remote	
ID’s	might	be	 taken	 from	a	pool	 of	 ID	values	between	50,000	and	55,000	and	
allocated	for	every	third	ID	value	in	the	set.		The	definition	of	ID	allocation	rules	
can	therefore	be	used	to	assist	an	application	 in	verifying	that	a	stated	ID	 in	a	
message	adheres	to	the	rules	of	allocation	defined	within	the	application	itself.			
The	sender	 ID	 is	used	 to	 identify	 the	sending	device	 for	a	message.	 	For	some	
message	types	(for	example	control	messages	discussed	in	chapter	6)	the	sender	
ID	is	used	to	validate	that	the	message	sender	is	authorised	to	request	and	action	
(i.e.	a	base	station	has	requested	a	configuration	change).		The	sender	ID	is	also	
used	by	the	base	to	relate	remote	monitor	readings	back	to	a	particular	patient.		
The	 sender	 ID	 could	 be	 validated	 by	 the	 application	 according	 to	 the	 rules	 of	
allocation	used	by	the	application,	to	ensure	the	ID	fits	within	the	subset	of	IDs	
allowed	for	by	those	rules.	
The	receiver	ID	field	is	used	to	denote	the	specific	receiver	for	whom	the	message	
is	intended.		In	the	case	of	a	remote	monitor	sending	a	message,	the	receiver	ID	
will	typically	be	its	base	station.		A	base	station	may,	however,	send	messages	to	
any	associated	remote	monitors	and	thus	must	be	aware	of	the	ID	of	each	monitor	
that	it	is	responsible	for.		The	receiver	ID	is	used	to	denote	which	device	should	
action	 a	message.	 	When	 receiving	 a	message,	we	noted	 in	 chapter	 4	 that	 the	
receiver	should	check	the	receiver	ID	in	the	message	header	equates	to	its	own	
ID	value	prior	to	actioning	the	message.		The	receiver	ID,	like	the	sender	ID,	could	
also	 be	 validated	 by	 the	 rules	 of	 allocation	 –	 i.e.	 pool	 based	 or	 algorithmic	
allocation	is	possible	to	reduce	the	set	of	acceptable	ID’s	and	therefore	ensure	the	
ID	meets	the	application	allocation	rules.			
Finally,	each	message	has	its	own	internal	identification	number,	encoded	in	the	
message	ID	field.	 	The	message	ID	is	a	24‐bit	number,	and	thus	16	million	plus	
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unique	messages	per	sender	can	be	identified	using	the	message	ID	alone.		The	
message	ID	is	allocated	by	the	sender	of	the	message,	using	the	next	available	ID	
from	its	 internal	counter	of	message	ID’s.	 	Message	ID’s	are	not	reused	for	the	
lifetime	of	the	24‐bit	address	pool	(that	is,	we	allocate	message	ID’s	sequentially	
and	do	not	consider	reusing	an	ID	until	the	sequence	passes	the	upper	limit	value	
of	16,777,215	messages).		16	million	ID’s	should	be	sufficient	for	a	bio‐monitoring	
application,	as	even	sending	1	message	per	second,	24	hours	per	day,	this	would	
give	us	a	monitoring	period	of	194	days	before	the	pool	was	exhausted	and	had	
to	cycle	back	to	1.		If	we	reduce	messages	to	5	second	intervals,	we	have	over	900	
days	before	the	pool	is	exhausted.	
Combining	all	 of	 the	 identification	 fields	 together,	 the	application	 ID,	 receiver,	
sender	and	message	ID’s	provide	a	total	of	10	octets	or	80	bits	of	identification	to	
give	context	to	a	message	within	an	application	between	a	specific	sender	and	
receiver.		This	identification	data	can	be	utilised	either	by	treating	each	field	in	
isolation,	or	by	treating	them	as	a	combined	address	value.		Alternatively,	the	ID	
fields	could	be	used	to	store	a	key	or	token	to	identify	the	sender	and/or	receiver	
of	the	message	based	on	an	application	specific	authentication	method	[96]	with	
support	 from	additional	message	 types	 if	 required	(for	example,	 to	generate	a	
new	token	by	re‐authenticating	a	remote	monitor).		However,	for	our	purposes,	
we	 propose	 that	 the	 fields	 are	 use	 in	 concert	 to	 allow	 the	 identification	 of	
messages	 lost	 or	 inserted	 into	 the	 network,	 for	 an	 additional	 level	 of	 trust	 in	
message	transmissions.	
Identifying	if	messages	are	lost	or	added	to	the	network	
To	 prevent	 insertion	 of	 messages	 from	 an	 attacker,	 and	 to	 identify	 where	
messages	are	lost	during	transmission,	we	propose	that	the	message	ID	field	is	
used	to	identify	the	sequence	of	messages	between	a	sender	and	receiver	pair.		
Thus,	for	a	combination	of	sender	ID	1	and	receiver	ID	2,	the	message	ID	relates	
to	the	sequence	of	messages	sent	between	these	two	parties	and	is	incremented	
for	each	message	between	the	two	parties.		When	sending	between	sender	ID	1	
and	receiver	ID	3,	the	message	ID	relates	to	the	sequence	between	sender	1	and	
receiver	 3	 and	 so	 tracks	 that	 series	 of	 communications.	 	 The	 sequence	 is	
maintained	independently	for	each	sender	receiver	pair.		For	bio‐monitors,	which	
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will	typically	communicate	only	with	their	base	station,	this	means	the	monitor	
will	typically	track	one	sequence	–	between	itself	and	its	base	station.		The	base	
station,	conversely,	will	need	to	track	the	conversations	between	itself	and	each	
of	its	monitors	independently	(figure	64).	
It	would	be	an	application	specific	responsibility	to	keep	a	track	of	the	message	
ID’s	in	use	for	each	pair	of	sender	and	receiver.			
	
	
FIGURE	64:	TRACKING	EACH	CONVERSATION	AT	THE	BASE	STATION	
In	 this	 scenario,	 the	 message	 ID	 field	 provides	 16.7	 million	 messages	 per	
transmission	pair.		We	demonstrate	the	allocation	of	message	ID’s	in	this	scenario	
for	base	station	ID	1	in	conversation	with	two	discrete	remote	monitors,	2	and	3,	
in	table	37	below:	
Transmission	
number	
Sender	ID Receiver	ID Message	ID
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1 1 2 1	
2 1 2 2	
3 1 3 1	
4 1 2 3	
5 1 3 2	
6 1 3 3	
7 1 3 4	
8 1 2 4	
Table 37. The	use	of	message	ID	between	specific	sender	and	receiver	
pairs	
	
The	sequential	nature	of	the	ID	means	that	it	should	also	be	possible	for	a	station	
to	 identify	where	a	message	has	 gone	missing	during	a	 conversation	between	
itself	and	a	specific	discrete	recipient.		If	an	ID	is	missed,	then	a	message	has	been	
lost.	 as	 the	 message	 ID	 between	 a	 specific	 sender	 and	 receiver	 pair	 would	
increment	 non‐sequentially	 where	 a	 message	 is	 lost	 during	 transmission.		
Conversely,	this	also	means	that	we	can	detect	when	messages	are	inserted	into	
the	network	if	a	message	ID	is	reused	
7.3	Assuring	that	data	received	is	what	was	originally	sent		
One	of	the	fundamental	requirements	identified	in	table	1	is	the	ability	to	ensure	
that	 what	 was	 sent	 is	 the	 same	 as	 what	 was	 received	 –	 that	 is	 to	 ensure	
transmission	 accuracy.	 	 Corruption,	 errors	 in	 transcription,	 deliberate	
intervention	 or	 interference	 all	 contribute	 to	 potential	 errors	 that	 may	 be	
introduced	into	a	transmission	[97].		In	medical	monitoring,	we	should	not	simply	
assume	that	what	is	sent	is	the	same	as	what	is	received	at	the	other	end	of	the	
transmission.			
Our	protocol	 incorporates	 three	checksums	 that	are	applied	 to	various	sets	of	
data	during	the	message	encoding	process	to	provide	assurance	that	the	data	in	
the	received	message	is	the	same	as	the	data	in	the	message	that	was	sent.		Our	
earlier	work	in	SMS	communications[45]	investigated	the	use	of	checksums,	and	
showed	 how	 the	 use	 of	 either	 CRC32	 or	 Adler32	 checksums	 as	 the	 primary	
message	checksum	method	could	be	effective	in	identifying	data	issues.			
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Alternative	checksum	algorithms	
In	the	spirit	of	agnosticism,	the	CRC32	and	Adler32	are	only	two	checksums	that	
could	be	used.		We	do	not	require	that	these	specific	algorithms	be	applied	to	a	
message.		Any	other	32‐bit	checksum	algorithm	may	be	used	to	verify	the	data.		
Alternatively,	the	protocol	may	be	extended	to	provide	additional	checksum	field	
sizes	(i.e.	a	64‐bit	field	instead	of	32	bits).		In	such	cases,	alternatives	such	as	MD5	
or	SHA1	[98]	which	require	64	or	more	bits	may	then	be	considered.		However,	
our	research	in	[45]	showed	that	Adler	or	CRC	provide	a	suitable	level	of	error	
detection	capability	along	with	consuming	a	small	amount	of	octets,	addressing	
some	of	our	concerns	when	faced	with	size‐limited	carriers.		
CRC32	and	Adler32	Checksums	
CRC32	and	Adler32	are	well	proven	in	production	scenarios	(for	example,	[99‐
102]	,	and	research	has	shown	that	such	checksums	provide	“an	extremely	low	
probability	of	undetected	errors”	[63].		CRC32	is	best	known	from	its	use	within	
computing	circles	as	part	of	 file	checking	algorithms,	where	cyclic	redundancy	
checks	 are	part	of	 the	 file	 system’s	 ability	 to	 self‐validate	 the	 integrity	of	 files	
when	conducting	operations	on	those	data.			
The	Adler32	algorithm	is	a	similar	checksum	algorithm,	but	one	that,	according	
to	author	Mark	Adler	is	“much	faster	than	the	CRC32	algorithm”	[63].	
The	Adler32	 algorithm	generates	a	32‐bit	 checksum	by	 calculating	 two	16‐bit	
checksums	and	concatenating	those	checksum	values	into	a	32‐bit	integer	using	
a	specific	concatenation	format.	 	 	The	checksum	is	calculated	by	evaluating	the	
data	octet	stream	from	the	first	octet	in	the	data	segment	to	the	last	octet	when	
read	from	left	to	right.			
The	two	16	bit	values	compute	different	types	of	checksum.		The	first	16‐bit	value	
provides	the	sum	total	of	all	octets	in	the	data	stream	when	read	from	left	to	right,	
with	a	value	of	1	added	at	the	end	of	the	calculation.		The	second	16‐bit	checksum	
is	the	sum	of	each	individual	value	of	A	as	 it	 is	calculated	cyclically	during	the	
reading	of	the	octet	data	stream.			
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The	16	bit	values	are	calculated	using	a	modulo	65521,	which	is	the	largest	prime	
number	smaller	than	216	[103].		This	allows	for	long	chains	of	octets	(where	the	
calculated	sum	would	exceed	a	16‐bit	value)	 to	be	checked	using	Adler32	and	
provides	 a	pre‐defined	and	algorithmically	 supported	 rollover	point	when	 the	
total	checksum	value	exceeds	65521.				
The	resultant	checksum	16	bit	values	are	assembled	using	four	contiguous	octets.		
This	provides	for	a	final	checksum	that	is	32	bits	long.		Additional	detail	on	the	
calculation	 of	 Adler	 32	 is	 included	 in	 the	 appendices	 of	 this	 document	 (refer	
Appendix	A).	
The	message	checksum	fields	
The	 protocol	 header	 includes	 three	 checksum	 fields.	 	 The	 header	 checksum	
provides	 integrity	checking	over	the	header	of	 the	message.	 	This	checksum	is	
generated	by	 reading	 the	header	 from	 the	 SYNC	 field	 up	 to	 and	 including	 the	
UDSE	field.	
The	user	data	segment	checksum	provide	integrity	checking	over	the	user	data	
segment.		This	checksum	is	generated	from	the	entire	user	data	segment	of	the	
message.	
The	 message	 checksum	 is	 calculated	 over	 the	 entire	 message	 including	 the	
previous	 two	 checksums.	 	 The	 checksum	 is	 generated	 by	 first	 setting	 the	
Combined	 Message	 Checksum	 field	 to	 a	 default	 value	 and	 generating	 the	
checksum	over	the	whole	message.		Once	the	checksum	in	generated,	the	actual	
calculated	value	of	the	checksum	is	inserted	into	the	message.			Upon	receiving	
the	message,	the	receiver	extracts	the	value	of	the	message	checksum,	resets	the	
checksum	field	in	the	message	to	the	default,	and	validates	the	checksum	across	
the	message.			
The	 application	 of	 the	 three	 message	 checksums	 was	 shown	 in	 figure	 28	 in	
chapter	4.		The	process	to	apply	the	checksums	is	as	per	figure	65:	
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Start Calculate checksum for message header
Encode checksum in 
HCHK field
Calculate checksum 
for user data 
segment
Encode checksum in 
UCHK field
Encode 0 in MCHK 
field
Calculate checksum 
for overall combine 
message
Encode checksum in 
MCHK field 
(replacing 0)
End
	
FIGURE	65:	PROCESS	FOR	ENCODING	THE	THREE	CHECKSUMS	
Upon	receipt	of	a	message,	the	checksums	are	decoded	by	reverse	of	the	process	
and	any	message	where	all	three	checksums	are	not	valid	should	be	discarded.		In	
this	way,	we	identify	where	the	data	may	be	corrupted	during	transmission.	
7.4	Ensuring	messages	arrive	by	requesting	a	receipt		
In	 carrier	 agnostic	 medical	 telemetry,	 it	 is	 not	 appropriate	 for	 us	 to	 simply	
assume	 that	 a	 message	 sent	 will	 subsequently	 arrive	 at	 the	 destination	 [13].		
Depending	on	the	carrier,	once	a	message	leaves	the	sender,	we	may	have	no	way	
of	knowing	whether	that	message	has	arrived	at	the	destination	successfully.	
Consider	that	if	a	remote	monitor	enters	an	area	where	there	is	no	service	for	one	
or	more	carriers,	a	message	sent	from	base	by	the	best‐known	signal	path	(at	the	
base	 station)	 may	 not	 be	 able	 to	 be	 delivered	 to	 the	 remote	monitor.	 	 If	 the	
message	is	sent	by	a	store	and	forward	or	broadcast	carrier	such	as	SMS	or	radio,	
we	may	not	get	a	carrier	provided	delivery	receipt	and	we	would	not	know	if	the	
message	had	arrived	or	not.	
To	ensure	delivery	has	occurred,	we	 should	be	 able	 to	 request	 a	 receipt	 for	 a	
message	independently	of	the	carrier	we	are	using.		We	defined	message	types	in	
table	 12	 to	 incorporate	 both	 a	 standard	 form	 of	 each	message,	 and	 a	 variant	
where	 “with	 receipt	 requested”	 attributes	 are	 set	 for	 the	 message.	 	 For	 the	
purpose	of	receipting,	we	also	define	one	additional	message	type,	 ID	253,	 the	
receipt	message.			
Receipting	a	message	
There	 is	only	one	 type	of	 receipt	message	definition	used	 to	receipt	any	other	
message	type.		Where	a	message	is	received	with	the	receipt	requested	attribute	
set,	a	receipt	message	will	be	sent	by	the	receiver	to	confirm	that:	
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a) the	message	was	received	at	the	destination;	and		
b) the	status	of	the	received	message	was	valid.	
It	should	be	noted	that	the	receipt	message	is	not	intended	to	show	successful	
application	of	a	message	(i.e.	 for	a	control	message)	but	rather	determines	the	
transmission	success	of	the	message	being	received	–	that	is	that	the	message	was	
received	and	then	decoded	with	valid	checksums.		The	process	for	receipting	is	
as	per	figure	66:	
	
	
FIGURE	66:	RECEIPTING	PROCESS	
When	 the	 carrier	 receives	 a	 message	 that	 requires	 a	 receipt,	 it	 must	 first	 be	
decoded	according	to	normal	processes	 including	validation	of	checksums	and	
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decrypting	of	any	encrypted	UDSG.		Once	checksums	are	validated	the	message	is	
declared	valid,	or	not.		Where	the	message	is	not	valid,	the	message	is	discarded	
(as	for	any	other	message	where	decoding	does	not	occur	properly).		In	this	case,	
a	receipt	would	not	be	issued.	
If	 the	 message	 is	 valid,	 the	 message	 type	 field	 is	 evaluated.	 	 If	 the	 message	
requires	a	receipt	(per	table	12),	the	receipt	is	encoded	for	a	standard	message	of	
type	253.			
Encoding	a	receipt	message	header	
The	 receipt	message	 is	 a	 discrete	message	 and	 has	 its	 own	MTYP	 field	 value	
(11111101)	and	its	own	message	ID.	 	Note	that	the	receipt	does	not	reuse	the	
original	message’s	message	ID	in	the	message	header.	
The	sender	and	receiver	ID	in	the	receipt	will	be	the	receipting	party’s	ID	and	the	
ID	of	the	station	that	requested	the	receipt,	respectively.		The	receipt	message	is	
only	ever	returned	to	the	sender	of	the	message	that	caused	the	original	request	
for	the	receipt	–	this	cannot	be	overridden	with	another	address.			
The	receipt	message	makes	use	of	the	user	data	segment	to	encode	the	details	of	
the	message	being	receipted	into	the	message	being	returned	to	the	requester.		
The	receipted	message	details	are	encoded	in	a	set	of	10	octets	as	per	figure	67:	
	
FIGURE	67:	SUB‐MESSAGE	FRAME	FOR	USER	DATA	SEGMENT	RECEIPT	MESSAGE	
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	
The	first	octet	of	the	UDSG	is	the	application	ID	of	the	message	being	receipted.		
The	second	field	is	a	set	of	three	octets	containing	the	sender	ID	of	the	original	
message	 (the	message	 being	 receipted).	 	 The	 third	 field	 of	 three	 octets	 is	 the	
receiver	ID	of	the	original	message	and	should	be	the	same	as	the	sender	ID	of	the	
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receipt	 message.	 	 The	 fourth	 field	 is	 the	 message	 ID	 of	 the	 message	 being	
receipted,	once	again	three	octets	in	length.	
A	receipt	is	only	ever	sent	for	a	message	that	was	received	in	good	health	(that	is	
the	message	was	able	to	be	decoded,	the	length	of	the	UDSG	was	valid	and	the	
checksums	valid).		No	additional	content	is	encoded	in	the	UDSG	for	the	receipt.		
Thus,	where	a	receipt	is	requested	but	the	requesting	message	was	not	valid	in	
some	way,	a	receipt	will	not	be	delivered	within	the	time	2VP	+	G	and	thus	should	
cause	 an	 alarm	 at	 the	 base	 station	 (refer	 6.3	 for	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 2VP	 +	 G	
timeframe).			
As	with	control	messages,	it	should	be	noted	that	this	implies	that	the	application	
using	this	solution	will	track	messages	for	which	a	receipt	has	been	requested	to	
determine	when	and	if	a	receipt	fails	to	be	delivered	in	a	timely	manner.	
7.5	Considerations	where	no	carrier	is	available	for	an	extended	
period?	
In	order	to	deal	with	an	extended	period	where	no	carrier	is	available,	a	medical	
monitoring	 application	 should	 support	 an	 ability	 to	 detect	 a	 lost	monitor.	 For	
example,	 consider	 cases	 of	 hardware	 failure,	 battery	 drain,	 entering	 a	
transmission	blackspot,	area	of	interference,	and	so	on.		How	do	we	determine	a	
monitor	is	not	currently	actively	part	of	the	network?	
To	ensure	our	monitors	 are	all	 active,	 a	 regular	 “hello”	or	keep‐alive	message	
should	be	sent	 from	each	remote	monitor.	 	This	would	be	a	remote	originated	
message	sent	by	the	monitor	on	a	scheduled	basis.		The	maximum	period	between	
expected	 transmissions	 would	 be	 defined	 for	 each	 remote	 monitor	 by	 the	
application.		For	example,	each	monitor	is	set	up	to	send	information	back	to	base	
once	every	5	minutes	as	a	minimum.			
Message	transmission	of	these	minimum	messages	would	be	sent	according	to	a	
timed	 and	 known	 interval	 that	 could	 be	 then	 “expected”	 and	 checked	 by	 the	
receiving	base	station,	per	figure	68:	
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FIGURE	68:	EXPECTED	RECEPTION	TIMES	AT	THE	BASE	STATION	
An	 application	 specific	 threshold	 should	 then	 be	 enacted,	 to	 allow	 a	 remote	
monitor	to	miss	one	or	two	of	these	scheduled	transmissions,	per	figure	69:	
	
FIGURE	69:	MESSAGES	MISSING	DURING	SCHEDULED	TRANSMISSION	PROCESSES	
As	 long	as	 the	remote	monitor	comes	back	on	 line	within	a	certain	number	of	
missed	messages,	then	all	is	well.		However,	if	the	remote	monitor	misses	more	
than	the	application	allowed	threshold	value,	the	base	should	recognise	this	and	
initiate	an	alert	for	the	monitoring	doctor	to	action.		The	nature	of	the	alert	would	
be	dependent	on	the	requirements	of	the	application	using	the	communications.		
Figure	70	illustrates	this.	
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FIGURE	70:	MULTIPLE	MISSING	MESSAGES	TRIGGER	ALERT	STATUS	AT	BASE	STATION	
7.6	Evaluation	of	the	proposed	capabilities	
In	order	to	validate	that	our	proposed	capabilities	are	suitable	for	use	within	the	
communications	protocol,	we	used	our	communications	protocol	generator	tool	
to	generate	test	messages	for	the	following	scenarios:	
 UDSG	encryption	and	use	of	the	encryption	type	field	
 Incremental	 message	 ID	 values	 for	 conversations	 between	 sender	 and	
receiver	pairs	
 Checksum	 application	 for	 the	 two	 subsections	 of	 the	message	 and	 the	
message	overall	
 Receipt	required	using	the	receipt	message	types	
 Scheduled	keep‐alive	messages	
UDSG	encryption	and	use	of	the	encryption	type	field	
A	message	was	encoded	using	message	type	01	(remote	originated,	application	
01,	 sender	 01,	 recipient	 15,	 message	 ID	 01,	 with	 appropriate	 generation	
timestamps	and	a	validity	period	of	256	seconds.		The	user	data	segment	was	our	
160‐character	 test	 message	 (as	 outlined	 previously),	 encrypted	 using	 an	
arbitrary	selection	of	Rijndael	encryption	(UDSE	type	00000011).		The	message	
parameters	were	as	per	the	screenshot	in	figure	71:	
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FIGURE	71:	THE	PROTOCOL	MESSAGE	TESTER	SOFTWARE	
The	message	was	encoded	and	resulted	in	a	276‐octet	message	(40	octet	header	
+	236	octet	encrypted	user	data	segment).		
	 200	 	
	
0011100101000100001100100100011000101111001101010111010101001001011110000110
1101011011000110011101100111010100000101100101010001010001110110111101001110
0111000001010010010011110100101001010101011101100110101001010000001100000100
0001010000010101010101010111011011100011001001001101010011100110011101110101
0110011100110110011000010100111001001111011000010111100000110111011110100111
0010010100010100001101101100011100010110111101000011011010000010101101010100
0101010100110000001101000100111001101110010101010111011000110010011101110011
1101 
The	 message	 was	 then	 decoded	 from	 the	 protocol	 packet,	 and	 the	 user	 data	
segment	(in	its	encrypted	form)	compared	to	the	original	encrypted	values:	
Decoded	UDSG	value:	
kCvZ+7vobDfesqtE4rnSRY+657MDN05JdEU0922lUO+qXsKbu838GEORMdZ5g52J
wYAXveinpmTnIjB4C8i4wQIjQENB/OuS/DAiuKiIRqFUmtwr7odIAzhGmWEAW4b
WJVwzNQx7oy8wmtrl3hI+NhPi+wZ6TH3KGES9aoygd9D2F/5uIxmlggPYQGoNpR
OJUvjP0AAUWn2MNgug6aNOax7zrQClqoCh+TU04NnUv2w=	
Original	encrypted	value:	
kCvZ+7vobDfesqtE4rnSRY+657MDN05JdEU0922lUO+qXsKbu838GEORMdZ5g52J
wYAXveinpmTnIjB4C8i4wQIjQENB/OuS/DAiuKiIRqFUmtwr7odIAzhGmWEAW4b
WJVwzNQx7oy8wmtrl3hI+NhPi+wZ6TH3KGES9aoygd9D2F/5uIxmlggPYQGoNpR
OJUvjP0AAUWn2MNgug6aNOax7zrQClqoCh+TU04NnUv2w=	
The	strings	were	compared	via	code	comparison	and	determined	to	be	an	exact	
match.	
Finally,	the	decoded	string	was	passed	to	the	decryption	algorithm.		In	this	case,	
using	 Rijndael	 with	 the	 same	 configuration	 values	 resulted	 in	 the	 decrypted	
string	as	expected	(figure	72):	
	
FIGURE	72:	THE	DECODED	ENCRYPTED	MESSAGE	FROM	THE	UDSG	
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The	 test	 was	 repeated	 for	 the	 other	 proposed	 encryption	 types,	 with	 similar	
results.	
Incremental	message	ID	values	
In	 order	 to	 test	 a	 number	 of	 incremental	 message	 ID	 values,	 a	 number	 of	
messages	were	encoded	(similar	to	the	sample	message	shown	above)	with	the	
message	ID	incremented	for	each	message	in	the	sender/receiver	pair.		Two	pairs	
of	sender/receiver	were	used.	
By	 using	 a	 log	 table	 to	 store	 the	 sender,	 receiver	 and	 message	 ID’s	 of	 each	
message	generated,	the	system	was	able	to	increment	the	message	ID	on	the	basis	
of	the	sender/receiver	ID	pair,	for	example	as	shown	below:	
Sender ID  Recipient ID  MessageID 
1  3  1 
1  3  2 
1  3  3 
1  3  4 
2  3  1 
1  3  5 
1  3  6 
2  3  2 
2  3  3 
Table 38. Log	table	showing	message	transmissions	between	sender	
and	receiver	pairs	
Each	message,	 upon	 receipt,	was	 logged	 by	 the	 receiver	 in	 order	 to	 track	 the	
message	ID’s,	using	a	database	table	similar	to	the	above.	
In	the	case	of	the	above	test,	no	duplicates	were	found	and	so	all	messages	were	
deemed	usable	from	a	sequencing	perspective.	
However,	to	show	the	ability	to	detect	a	duplicate	message,	one	of	the	messages	
in	 the	 set	 was	 manually	 modified	 and	 re‐encoded	 with	 valid	 checksums	 as	
follows:	
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Sender ID  Recipient ID  Messaged 
1  3  1 
1  3  2 
1  3  3 
1  3  4 
2  3  1 
1  3  4 
1  3  6 
2  3  2 
2  3  3 
Table 39. A	duplicate	message	
By	querying	our	database	with	a	query	such	as:	
Select	*	from	messagelog	where	senderID	=	<messagesenderID>	and	recipientID	
=	<messagerecipientID>	and	messageID	=	<messagemessageID>	
The	system	was	quickly	able	to	determine	the	presence	of	a	potential	duplicate	
message	(i.e.	a	message,	in	this	case,	between	sender	1	and	receiver	3	with	the	
message	ID	4).		This	caused	an	exception	to	occur	which	could	be	used	to	trigger	
an	alarm	state.	
By	removing	a	message	(i.e.	by	manually	double	 incrementing	 the	message	 ID	
field,	as	per	the	table	below):	
Sender ID  Recipient ID  Messaged 
1  3  1 
1  3  2 
1  3  3 
1  3  4 
2  3  1 
1  3  6 
1  3  7 
2  3  2 
2  3  3 
Table 40. A	missing	message	
The	above	query	noted	no	duplicate.		However,	by	implementing	a	query	based	
on	using	the	current	message	ID	to	determine	the	expected	previous	message	ID,	
as	follows:	
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Select	*	from	messagelog	where	senderID	=	<messagesenderID>	and	recipientID	
=	<messagerecipientID>	and	messageID	=	<messagemessageID>	‐1	
The	system	can	 identify	whether	the	 incrementally	previous	message	exists	 in	
the	database.	
Alternatively,	the	system	could	query	the	maximum	ID	of	the	messages	between	
this	sender/receiver	pair,	and	determine	 if	 that	 ID	 is	suitable	 for	 the	expected	
sequence	of	messages:	
Select	 max(messageID)	 from	 messagelog	 where	 sender	 senderID	 =	
<messagesenderID>	and	recipientID	=	<messagerecipientID>	
Checksums	
In	order	to	validate	the	checksums,	a	number	of	messages	were	encoded	via	the	
protocol	test	tool.		The	encoded	and	assembled	message	was	then	decoded	and	
the	checksums	validated	correctly.	
The	messages	were	 then	randomly	edited	by	manually	 substituting	bit	values,	
and	the	checksums	validated.		The	results	were	as	follows	for	the	following	test	
scenarios:	
Scenario	 Message	
Checksum	
Header	
Checksum	
User	 Data	
Checksum	
Decode	of	intact	message	  	 
Decode	 of	 message	 with	 1‐bit	
variance	in	user	data	 ×	 	 ×	
Decode	 of	 message	 with	 1‐bit	
variance	in	header	 ×	 ×	 	
Decode	 of	message	with	 4	mirrored	
bits	in	user	data	 ×	 	 ×	
Decode	 of	message	with	 4	mirrored	
bits	in	header	 ×	 ×	 	
Decode	 of	 message	 with	 random	
changes	to	header	 ×	 ×	 	
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Scenario	 Message	
Checksum	
Header	
Checksum	
User	 Data	
Checksum	
Decode	 of	 message	 with	 random	
changes	to	user	data	 ×	 	 ×	
Decode	 of	 message	 with	
modifications	to	header	checksum	 ×	 ×	 	
Decode	 of	 message	 with	
modifications	to	user	data	checksum	 ×	 	 ×	
Decode	 of	 message	 with	
modifications	to	message	checksum	 ×	 	 	
Table 41. Checksum	test	scenarios	
The	testing	above	demonstrates	that	the	checksum	picked	up	a	variety	of	issues.		
Such	testing	was	repeated	for	a	sample	of	100	messages,	using	incremental	ID’s,	
different	generation	 timestamps	and	changing	user	data,	 to	ensure	 the	 results	
were	consistent.		Results	of	error	detection	in	the	three	checksums	was	consistent	
over	the	duration	of	the	tests.	
Receipting	of	messages	using	the	receipt	message	types	
In	order	to	test	whether	the	system	could	differentiate	receipt	message	types,	a	
message	 was	 encoded	 using	 the	 standard	 and	 receipt	 variants	 of	 the	 remote	
originated	message	 (message	 types	1	and	193	 respectively).	 	On	decoding	 the	
message	 packet,	 the	 software	 was	 able,	 on	 each	 test,	 to	 correctly	 determine	
whether	a	receipt	was	requested	or	not	based	on	 the	use	of	 the	message	 type	
octet.	
Validation	of	the	keep‐alive	message	
In	a	final	test,	two	endpoints	representing	base	and	monitor	were	established	and	
a	1	minute	keep	alive	with	a	3‐message	alarm	was	defined.		Each	message	sent	
from	the	monitor	to	the	base	station	would	reset	the	keep	alive	timer.		
A	database	table	was	established	to	log	the	receipt	of	messages	at	the	base	station	
as	per	figure	73.	
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FIGURE	73:	TABLE	STRUCTURE	FOR	LOGGING	MESSAGE	RECEIPT	AT	BASE	STATION	
A	sample	data	set	such	as	figure	74	was	then	applied	to	the	proposed	keep	alive	
algorithm.	
	
FIGURE	74:	SAMPLE	DATA	FROM	TESTING	KEEP	ALIVE	
In	the	scenario	in	figure	74,	messages	4,	5,	and	6	all	triggered	the	commencement	
of	an	alarm	state,	but	because	the	next	message	was	received,	although	late,	 it	
reset	the	keep	alive	each	time.		The	threshold	of	three	missed	keep	alive	messages	
was	never	reached.	
However,	after	message	6,	we	then	stopped	station	2	from	sending	any	further	
messages.		Up	until	the	three‐minute	threshold	has	expired	a	query	such	as	the	
following	can	identify	that	messages	were	received	during	the	threshold	period:	
select * from message_receipt where received > dateadd(minute,‐3, '2015‐07‐19 
12:14:09.000') 
 
At	12:15:09,	the	system	detected	the	alarm	through	the	use	of	a	query	such	as	the	
following:	
select * from message_receipt where received > dateadd(minute,‐3, '2015‐07‐19 
12:15:09.000') 
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In	the	case	of	the	data	in	figure	74,	this	query	identified	no	transmissions	in	the	
threshold	period	from	sender	2,	and	thus	could	be	used	to	trigger	the	alarm.	
7.7	Performance	indicators	addressed	by	these	attributes	of	the	
protocol	
The	provision	of	these	attributes	as	part	of	our	carrier‐agnostic	communications	
solution	 addresses	 two	 of	 the	 requirements	 and	 associated	 performance	
indicators	identified	in	table	1.	
Through	 the	 discussed	 obfuscation	 of	 the	 header,	 and	 the	 facilitation	 of	
encryption	 we	 facilitate	 provision	 of	 a	 secure	 solution	 that	 can	 protect	 the	
transmitted	 data.	 By	 supporting	 encryption	 and	 obfuscation	 natively	 in	 our	
communication	packet,	we	remove	any	reliance	on	carrier	capabilities.		However,	
none	of	our	capabilities	impact	on	those	of	the	carrier,	so	if,	for	example,	carrier	
transmissions	are	encoded,	we	can	coexist	with	these	without	impact.	
Through	 the	 provision	 of	 message	 identification	 attributes	 and	 the	
“conversation”	style	use	of	ID	values,	as	well	as	through	the	support	of	the	three	
data	checksums,	we	 facilitate	robust	communications	with	data	assurance	and	
the	 ability	 to	 identify	 missing	 messages	 in	 the	 system.	 	 The	 addition	 of	 the	
proposed	keep‐alive	process	further	support	robust	communication	by	allowing	
us	 to	determine	when	messages	might	be	missing	 for	 an	extended	period,	 for	
whatever	reason.	
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8 .  REPORTING	 ISSUES 	WITH	
THE	ALARM	MESSAGE	 	
We	consider	the	potential	for	issues	with	the	remote	monitoring	system	and	look	
at	methods	by	which	the	solution	can	report	to	the	base	station	that	there	is	an	
issue.	
We	evaluate	the	sorts	of	alarm	message	that	are	required	to	facilitate	such	issue	
reporting,	and	propose	some	encoding	schemes	to	allow	appropriate	messages	
to	be	sent	back	to	base	using	carrier	agnostic	communications.	
8.1	The	alarm	message	
In	 a	 bio‐monitoring	 solution,	 alarm	 situations	 may	 occur	 [104].	 	 It	 may	 be	
necessary	that	messages	relating	to	an	alarm	condition	–	i.e.	a	threshold	adverse	
event	measurement	from	a	patient	–	should	be	prioritised	for	processing	higher	
than	any	other	system	message	to	facilitate	more	rapid	triage	[105].		To	support	
this,	we	incorporate	into	our	protocol	an	alarm	message	type.		The	alarm	message	
is	 to	be	used	 in	 situations	where	 the	 remote	monitor	has	a	priority	 issue	 that	
needs	to	be	processed,	overriding	any	other	activities	within	the	system.			
The	alarm	message	might	be	used	for	a	variety	of	purposes.			We	earlier	discussed	
the	 ability	 of	 the	 configuration	 and	 control	 messages	 to	 define	 high	 and	 low	
threshold	levels,	to	flag	when	data	from	remote	sensors	passes	an	upper	or	lower	
bound	(for	example,	high	or	low	heart	rate).		Such	thresholds	can	be	used	by	the	
application	to	cause	an	alarm	to	be	raised.			In	addition	to	vital‐signs	alarms,	the	
alarm	message	might	also	be	used	for	system	level	alarms	such	as	a	low	battery	
state,	a	sensor	failure,	carrier	failure	or	other	hardware	issue.	
The	alarm	message	has	 its	own	discrete	message	 type,	and	uses	 the	user	data	
segment	to	transmit	alarm	data	in	order	to	minimise	the	use	of	header	octets	(for	
a	 discussion	 of	 the	 reasoning	 for	 this,	 refer	 to	 chapter	 6	 around	 the	 control	
message).	 	 An	 alarm	 message	 is	 defined	 using	 the	 message	 header	 fields	 as	
normal.		The	message	type	is	set	to	254	(11111110).		The	sender	ID,	application	
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ID,	recipient	ID,	validity	period,	timestamp	and	other	fields	are	all	set	as	per	any	
standard	message.	
The	user	data	segment	carries	the	important	payload	for	an	alarm	message.		The	
user	 data	 segment	 is	 encoded	 as	 per	 the	 following	 sub‐field	 message	 frame	
(figure	75).	
	
FIGURE	75:	ALARM	MESSAGE	USER	DATA	SEGMENT	STRUCTURE	
Octets	1	and	2	of	the	user	data	segment	combine	as	a	16‐bit	alarm	message	type	
definition.		This	field	is	defined	on	an	application	specific	level.		All	subsequent	
octets	from	octet	3	of	the	user	data	segment	onwards	are	allocated	to	the	specific	
alarm	data.		For	this	purpose,	the	data	will	describe	the	alarm	condition	or	the	
information	that	is	required	to	be	actioned.	
An	alarm	message	will	contain	only	one	type	of	alarm,	to	ensure	that	each	alarm	
condition	can	be	actioned	and	tracked	independently.	
Some	proposed	alarm	message	types	
The	 message	 sub‐frame	 for	 the	 user	 data	 segment	 proposes	 a	 16‐bit	 alarm	
message	type	to	uniquely	identify	up	to	65535	alarm	states.		While	the	types	of	
alarm	message	and	 their	granularity	will	be	defined	on	an	application	specific	
level,	we	would	propose	that	at	least	the	following	alarm	types	are	included	for	
implementation	based	on	some	common	use	case	scenarios	[106].	
Alarm	 Type	
Number	
Alarm	Type	Octets	Value Description
1	 0000000000000001 Low	 Power	 Alarm	 –	 the	 monitor	 is	
experiencing	 a	 low	 power	 state	 and	 the	
alarm	highlights	 that	 either	 sensors	or	 the	
aggregation	 hub	 device	 is	 in	 danger	 of	
shutdown	due	to	low	power.	
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2	 0000000000000010 Hardware	 Alarm	 –	 the	 monitor	 has	
identified	 a	 hardware	 issue	 and	 the	 UDSG	
identified	the	nature	of	the	issue.	
3	 0000000000000011 Carrier	Alarm – the	monitor	has	 identified	
an	 ongoing	 carrier	 issue	 –	 i.e.	 that	 the	
monitor	 is	 continuously	 unable	 to	 connect	
to	 one	 of	 the	 carrier	 devices.	 	 The	 UDSG	
would	identify	the	carrier	and	nature	of	the	
issue.	
65535	 1111111111111111 Threshold	 alarm	 –	 the	 bio	 monitor	 has	
sensed	a	particular	sensor	value	that	crosses	
one	of	the	defined	sensor	thresholds	for	this	
monitor	 (refer	 chapter	 5	 for	 details	 of	
setting	 sensor	 thresholds).	 	 The	 user	 data	
segment	 provides	 detail	 of	 the	 sensor	 and	
threshold	reading	causing	the	alarm.	
Table 42. The	set	of	proposed	default	alarm	type	values	
The	low	power	alarm	
The	proposed	low	power	alarm	message	is	intended	to	notify	the	base	station	of	
a	 remote	 monitor	 that	 may	 be	 in	 danger	 of	 going	 off	 line	 due	 to	 low	 power	
conditions.	 	 As	 remote	 monitors	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 wearable	 bio‐monitoring	
systems,	there	is	a	likelihood	that	at	some	point	in	their	usage	cycle,	either	the	
central	aggregator	device	(such	as	a	smart	phone	or	PDA)	or	one	of	the	sensors	
may	lose	power	and	the	system	will	therefore	be	either	inoperative	or	operating	
in	a	suboptimal	manner.	
In	a	medical	monitoring	solution,	such	information	should	be	conveyed	back	to	
base	 in	 order	 that	 the	monitoring	 team	can	 act	 on	 to	 remediate	 any	potential	
issues	arising	from	this	scenario.	
The	low	power	alarm	message	will	be	sent	with	the	first	two	octets	of	the	user	
data	 segment	defined	as	 the	16‐bit	 value	1	–	0000000000000001.	 	Additional	
octets	can	then	be	used	to	determine	which	element	of	the	system	is	entering	a	
low	power	state.		For	example,	on	the	basis	of	our	proposed	configuration	scheme	
for	 sensors,	 we	 would	 propose	 the	 following	 schema	 definition	 to	 provide	 a	
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simple	low	power	message	format	using	a	minimum	of	data	–	namely	octets	1	and	
2	for	the	alarm	message	type,	and	octet	3	for	the	nature	of	the	alarm:	
User	 Data	
Segment	Octet	3	
Equivalent	
Decimal	
Value	
Purpose
00000001	 to	
00101000	
1	to	40 The	proposed	sensor	model	supports	from	1	to	40	sensors	
on	the	remote	monitor.		Setting	octet	3	to	a	value	between	
1	 and	 40	 represents	 the	 sensor	 that	 is	 going	 into	 low	
power	warning	state.	
00101001	 to	
01010000	
41	to	80 Setting	octet	3	to	a	value	between	41	and	80	represents	
that	sensor	X‐40	(where	X	is	the	value	in	the	octet)	has	lost	
power	and	is	non‐responsive.	
10000001 129	 The	 central	 aggregator	 device	 (for	 example	 a smart	
phone)	is	entering	a	low	power	alarm	state	(note	that	if	
the	sensor	device	is	off	because	of	power	failure,	it	will	not	
be	able	to	send	an	“I	am	now	off”	message	as	it	is	assumed	
the	central	hub	of	the	system	is	responsible	 for	sending	
the	messages).	
11000001 193	 Radio	Carrier	device	is	in	a	low	power	warning	state.
11000010 194	 SMS	Carrier	device	is	in	a	low	power	warning	state.
11000011 195	 MMS	Carrier	device	is	in	a	low	power	warning	state.
11000100 196	 Wireless	 Internet	 Carrier	 device	 is	 in	 a	 low	 power	
warning	state.	
11000101 197	 Serial	Data	Carrier	device	is	in	a	low	power	warning	state.
11000110 198	 Radio	Carrier	device	is	powered	off.	
11000111 199	 SMS	Carrier	is	powered	off.
11001000 200	 MMS	Carrier	is	powered	off.
11001001 201	 Wireless	Internet	Carrier	is	powered	off.	
11001010 202	 Serial	Data	Carrier	is	powered	off.	
Other	values	 ‐‐	 Application	specific	utilisation.
Table 43. Proposed	low	power	alarm	message	codes	for	octet	3	of	the	
user	data	segment	
	
The	alarm	message	may	choose	to	encode	multiple	octets	in	the	UDSG	with	alarm	
values,	for	example	where	more	than	one	sensor	is	at	issue.		Other	than	the	alarm	
message	type	in	the	first	two	octets	of	the	UDSG,	the	alarm	message	may	use	any	
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number	of	single	octets	 in	 the	data	segment	 to	raise	 low	power	 issues.	 	 It	 is	a	
function	of	the	implementing	application	to	extend	this	model	as	required.	
The	hardware	alarm	
The	hardware	alarm	is	an	implementation	specific	alarm	that	is	intended	to	notify	
the	base	station	of	an	issue	with	a	hardware	element	of	the	remote	monitor.		For	
example,	the	hardware	alarm	may	notify	that	a	carrier	modem	is	non‐responsive,	
or	a	sensor	cannot	be	polled.			
By	its	very	nature,	the	hardware	alarm	requires	knowledge	of	the	hardware	that	
is	in	use	in	the	system,	specifically	in	the	remote	monitor.		We	would	propose	that	
a	 similar	 system	 to	 the	 low	 power	 alarm	 message	 could	 be	 used	 for	 the	
transmission	of	hardware	alarms.			
For	example,	octet	3	could	be	used	to	define	255	hardware	level	alarm	messages.		
If	more	than	255	alarm	messages	are	required,	octets	4,	5,	6	and	so	on	can	be	
added	to	provide	sufficient	bit	depth	to	signify	each	different	alarm	state.	
For	example:	
User	 Data	
Segment	Octet	3	
Equivalent	
Decimal	
Value	
Purpose
00000001	 to	
00101000	
1	to	40 Sensors	1	through	40	– sensor	is	unresponsive.	
00101001 41	 Radio	Carrier	device	is	unresponsive.	
00101010 42	 SMS	Carrier	device	is	unresponsive.	
00101011 43	 MMS	Carrier	device	is	unresponsive.	
00101100 44	 Wireless	Internet	Carrier	device	is	unresponsive.
00101101 45	 Serial	Data	Carrier	device	is	unresponsive.	
Table 44. Proposed	hardware	alarm	message	codes	for	octet	3	of	the	
user	data	segment	
These	 are	 only	 some	 of	 the	 potential	 uses	 of	 the	 hardware	 alarm,	 and	 can	be	
significantly	expanded	for	other	purposes	based	on	the	nature	of	the	system.		For	
example,	Bluetooth	or	ZigBee	diagnostic	messages	from	the	MBAN	between	the	
sensors	on	the	remote	monitor	may	be	encoded	here,	with	the	first	two	octets	
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setting	 the	 hardware	 alarm	 type,	 the	 third	 octet	 stating	 this	 is	 a	 Bluetooth	
diagnostic	 alarm,	 and	 the	next	 X	 octets	 showing	 the	 alarm	diagnostic	 data.	 	A	
message	sub‐field	frame	for	this	approach	is	shown	in	figure	76.	
	
FIGURE	76:	AN	OPTION	FOR	ENCODING	DIAGNOSTIC	DATA	IN	LINE	IN	THE	ALARM	MESSAGE	
DATA	SEGMENT	
The	alarm	message	may	use	any	number	of	octets	in	the	data	segment.		It	is	at	the	
application	designer’s	discretion	to	extend	this	model	as	required.	
The	carrier	alarm	
For	a	system	that	proposes	the	use	of	multiple	carriers	within	the	same	system,	
the	ability	to	notify	the	base	of	carrier	issues	may	be	required	when	a	monitor	is	
in	the	field.		For	example,	this	might	be	used	to	inform	the	base	when	a	remote	
monitor	has	entered	an	area	where	no	service	is	available	for	a	GSM	modem	(and	
so	 SMS	 and	 MMS	 or	 Mobile	 Internet	 may	 not	 be	 the	 best	 signal	 path	 for	 a	
particular	 remote	monitor).	 	 Such	 a	message	might	 allow	 the	 base	 station	 to	
adjust	 is	 carrier	 selection	 algorithm	 to	 better	 suit	 the	 needs	 of	 individual	
monitors	based	on	carrier	availability	in	the	remote	monitor’s	current	operating	
environment.	
The	carrier	alarm	can	be	used	to	send	a	variety	of	messages	–	for	example:	
 Carrier	has	no	service	
 Carrier	has	marginal	service	
 Carrier	handshake	process	failed	
 Carrier	cannot	establish	a	connection	to	remote	recipient	
 Carrier	not	responding	
 Carrier	transmission	corrupt	
 Carrier	message	bounced	back	
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The	specific	suite	of	messages	would	depend	on	the	nature	of	the	transmission	
hardware	and	the	carriers	in	use.	 	For	example,	a	radio	or	serial	modem	might	
have	issues	with	signal	availability,	handshaking,	and	connection	to	the	remote	
recipient.		An	Internet	carrier	may	have	issues	with	messages	bouncing	back	to	
the	sender	where	a	sender	address	cannot	be	correctly	routed,	and	so	on.	
To	carry	the	above	types	of	message,	we	would	propose	a	coding	scheme	as	per	
the	following	message	sub‐field	frame	shown	in	figure	77:	
	
FIGURE	77:	PROPOSED	CODING	SCHEME	FOR	THE	CARRIER	ALARM	MESSAGE	
The	first	two	octets	of	the	user	data	segment	define	the	message	type	–	in	this	
case	0000000000000011.	
The	 third	 octet	 defines	 the	 carrier	 that	 the	 alarm	 message	 applies	 to.	 	 For	
example,	this	could	be	based	on	the	following	table	of	proposed	values:	
Carrier	Number	 Octet	Value Description
1	 00000001 SMS
2	 00000010 MMS
3	 00000011 Radio
4	 00000100 Mobile	Data
5	 00000101 Internet
…	 …	 Other	carriers	– system	defined	
Table 45. Values	for	the	carrier	type	octet	
The	fourth	octet	defines	the	carrier	alarm	message	details,	based	on	the	following	
table	of	proposed	values:	
Carrier	 Alarm	
Message	number	
Octet	Value Description
1	 00000001 No	service
2	 00000010 Marginal	service
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Carrier	 Alarm	
Message	number	
Octet	Value Description
3	 00000011 Handshake	failed
4	 00000100 Cannot	establish	a	connection	
5	 00000101 Carrier	not	responding	
6	 00000110 Carrier	transmission	was	corrupt	
7	 00000111 Carrier	message	bounced	
…	 …	 Other	system	defined message	
Table 46. Values	for	the	carrier	alarm	message	octet	
Any	octets	post	the	fourth	octet	could	then	be	used	to	send	further	information	
and	diagnostic	data	about	the	error.		For	example,	if	the	carrier	cannot	establish	
a	connection,	the	next	three	octets	could	be	used	to	send	the	recipient	ID	to	whom	
the	connection	was	attempted.		However,	once	again	the	specific	implementation	
will	depend	on	application	requirements	and	the	carriers	in	use.	
The	threshold	alarm	
In	 the	 context	 of	 our	 bio‐monitoring	 system,	 the	 threshold	 alarm	 is	 the	most	
medically	 related	 of	 our	 proposed	 alarm	 messages.	 	 The	 threshold	 alarm	 is	
generated	when	a	monitoring	sensor	crosses	a	 threshold	value	defined	by	 the	
system	configuration	(see	chapter	6	for	details	on	setting	the	threshold	values	for	
sensors	remotely).	
The	 threshold	 configuration	 defines	 the	 range	 of	 values	 for	 a	 sensor	 outside	
which	the	readings	are	not	acceptable.		For	example,	a	blood	oxygen	content	less	
than	90%	may	indicate	a	subject	who	is	in	significant	respiratory	distress	[107].		
A	heart	rate	outside	the	range	of	60	–	100	beats	per	minute	in	adults	may	indicate	
tachycardia	(too	fast	heartbeat)	or	bradycardia	(too	slow	heartbeat)	[108].			
The	ability	to	set	ranges	that	are	considered	too	low	or	too	high	for	a	specific	type	
of	sensor	reading	 in	 the	case	of	a	specific	patient	would	appear	 to	be	a	highly	
useful	 capability	 for	 a	 medical	 monitoring	 system	 [109].	 	 Our	 control	 and	
configuration	messages	proposed	a	method	to	set	these	ranges,	with	the	specific	
application	of	ranges	to	sensors	left	to	the	application	making	use	of	the	protocol.		
However,	 given	 this	 configuration	 is	 present	 and	 assuming	 the	 underlying	
application	recognises	a	sensor	reading	outside	the	thresholds,	what	should	the	
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system	do	when	a	sensor	reading	falls	outside	the	defined	“nominal”	or	expected	
range?	
The	threshold	alarm	is	our	proposed	response	to	a	sensor	value	sample	that	falls	
outside	of	the	normal	good	range.		In	chapter	6,	we	proposed	both	a	low	and	a	
high	range	value	for	each	sensor.		However,	if	only	one	of	these	values	is	set,	an	
alarm	would	only	be	raised	when	the	sensor	reading	is	outside	that	range	value,	
in	the	appropriate	direction	(i.e.	below	the	range	value	for	a	low	range	definition,	
and	above	the	value	for	a	high	range	definition).	
We	propose	the	following	user	data	segment	message	sub‐field	frame	structure	
to	deal	with	the	threshold	alarm	messages	(figure	78):	
	
FIGURE	78:	THE	THRESHOLD	ALARM	STRUCTURE	
As	for	other	alarm	messages,	the	first	two	octets	of	the	user	data	segment	contain	
the	 alarm	 message	 type	 –	 in	 this	 case	 the	 16‐bit	 value	 65535	 –	
1111111111111111.		This	is	used	to	denote	the	threshold	alarm.	
The	third	octet	defines	the	sensor	sending	the	alarm	from	1	to	40.		This	is	based	
on	our	definition	of	up	to	40	sensors	per	remote	monitor	(see	chapter	6	for	more	
detail	on	the	cluster	of	40	sensors	that	we	propose	to	support	in	this	version	of	
the	protocol).	
The	fourth	octet	defines	the	threshold	that	was	broken.		This	is	an	encoding	of	
either	ASCII	H	or	L	characters	to	represent	high	or	low.	
Finally,	the	necessary	octets	to	represent	the	actual	value	that	triggered	the	alarm	
are	encoded.		This	represents	the	sensor	reading,	and	may	require	several	octets	
for	 an	 appropriate	 representation	 of	 the	 sample	 value	 as	 per	 the	 encoding	
requirements	discussed	in	table	2.			
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The	 threshold	alarm	has	 the	potential	 to	be	medically	significant	and	so,	 for	a	
medical	monitoring	context,	we	would	recommend	that	the	application	continues	
to	transmit	the	threshold	alarm	during	every	sample	period	where	the	threshold	
value	is	exceeded.	
8.2	The	alarm	acknowledgement	and	reset	message	
Given	our	proposed	use	of	the	threshold	alarm	message	to	continue	transmitting	
the	alarm	while	 the	 threshold	value	persists,	 the	alarm	acknowledgement	and	
reset	message	 is	 used	 to	 acknowledge	 an	 alarm	message	 and	 ask	 the	 remote	
system	to	reset	that	alarm	state.			
The	alarm	may	still	be	retriggered	by	a	recurrence	of	the	alarm	condition,	but	this	
instance	of	the	alarm	is	acknowledged	and	reset	by	this	message	type.		The	alarm	
acknowledgement	and	reset	message	is	defined	in	the	message	types	as	type	8	
(or	type	200	where	a	receipt	is	required).	
The	message	header	is	encoded	as	per	normal,	with	a	message	ID,	application	ID,	
validity	period	and	timestamp	as	for	all	other	messages.		The	sender	ID	is	the	ID	
of	 the	base	acknowledging	the	alarm.	 	The	recipient	 ID	 is	 the	 ID	of	 the	station	
generating	 the	alarm.	 	All	of	 the	standard	header	 fields	are	 filled	 in	as	 for	any	
other	discrete	message.		The	information	for	the	acknowledgement	and	reset	is	
encoded	 in	 the	user	data	segment	as	shown	 in	 the	message	sub‐field	 frame	 in	
figure	79.	
	
FIGURE	79:	ALARM	MESSAGE	ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	AND	RESET	
The	 first	 three	 octets	 of	 the	 user	 data	 segment	 encode	 the	message	 ID	 being	
acknowledged.		This	is	the	24‐bit	value	set	in	the	original	alarm	message	ID.	
Octets	4	 and	5	 encode	 the	 alarm	message	 type	based	on	our	defined	possible	
alarm	message	types	in	table	42.	
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Octets	6	onward	within	the	user	data	segment	define	the	specific	message	data	
that	is	being	acknowledged	and	that	was	originally	sent	in	the	alarm	message.	
For	example,	if	the	message	being	acknowledged	is	a	low	power	alarm,	then	octet	
6	contains	the	value	of	the	low	power	item	code	that	was	sent	(per	table	43).		If	
the	 message	 being	 acknowledged	 is	 a	 hardware	 alarm,	 then	 octet(s)	 6	 …	 x	
contains	the	hardware	alarm	message	code	that	was	sent	(per	table	44).		If	the	
message	 being	 acknowledged	 is	 a	 carrier	 alarm,	 octet	 6	 contains	 the	 carrier	
generating	the	alarm,	and	octet	7	the	carrier	alarm	message	details	per	table	45	
and	46.	
If	 the	 message	 being	 acknowledged	 is	 a	 threshold	 alarm,	 octet	 6	 defines	 the	
sensor	sending	the	alarm	from	1	to	40.	 	Octet	7	defines	the	threshold	that	was	
broken.		This	is	an	encoding	of	either	ASCII	H	or	L	characters	to	represent	high	or	
low.		Subsequent	octets	copy	the	value	that	broke	the	threshold,	as	transmitted	
in	the	original	alarm	message.	
When	the	remote	monitor	receives	such	an	acknowledgement,	it	is	proposed	that	
it	 would	 turn	 off	 the	 alarm	 for	 that	 particular	 condition.	 	 Should	 the	 alarm	
retrigger	in	the	next	sample	period	(i.e.	the	threshold	is	once	again	crossed	during	
a	sensor	sample	or	 through	a	subsequent	hardware	 issue,	 for	example)	a	new	
alarm	would	be	transmitted.	
Finally,	as	the	acknowledgement	message	provides	the	user	with	the	ability	to	
stop	 the	 transmission	of	 an	 alarm	 (or	 a	 repeated	alarm	 such	 as	 the	 threshold	
alarm)	it	is	recommended	that	the	acknowledgment	and	reset	message	only	be	
accepted	from	the	authorised	base	station(s)	as	per	the	recommendations	for	the	
control	message.		The	remote	monitor	should	therefore	discard	alarm	resets	from	
any	other	source.	
Additional	alarm	messages	
The	alarm	message	type	octets	provide	the	option	for	an	application	to	define	a	
large	number	(65k)	of	alarm	messages.	 	We	have	proposed	a	small	number	of	
message	 types	 relating	 to	 communications,	 signal	 paths	 and	 system	 viability.			
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Further	extension	of	the	alarm	capabilities	is	left	to	the	application	in	line	with	its	
specific	requirements.	
8.3	Verification	of	the	proposed	alarm	message	structure	
To	verify	the	alarm	message	structure,	a	sample	message	was	encoded	using	the	
alarm	message	type	using	the	protocol	test	software.		This	message	was	sent	over	
our	test	rig	amongst	a	set	of	9	other	normal	messages	for	a	total	population	of	10	
messages	per	sample.	
10	 sample	 sets	 of	 messages	 were	 used,	 with	 the	 alarm	 message	 sent	 and	
sequenced	at	a	different	point	in	the	message	set,	to	ensure	the	remote	monitor	
could	identify	the	alarm	message	in	a	variety	of	delivery	patterns	(figure	81).	
	
FIGURE	80:	SAMPLE	ALARM	MESSAGE	
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In	each	case,	the	station	simulating	the	remote	monitor	was	able	to	distinguish	
the	difference	between	 the	alarm	message	and	 the	 “regular”	messages	 in	each	
test.	
8.4	 Shortcomings	 of	 the	 alarm	message	 in	 a	 carrier	 agnostic	
situation	
While	the	alarm	message	identifies	a	high	priority	message	in	the	perspective	of	
our	bio‐monitoring	solution,	there	is	an	issue	with	alarm	message	processing	in	
a	carrier	agnostic	situation	that	must	be	considered.			
Depending	 on	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 carriers	 in	 use,	 there	 is	 no	 “native”	 method	
available	 to	 us	 to	 ensure	 that	 we	 can	 prioritise	 the	 transmission,	 routing,	
reception	and	decoding	of	an	alarm	message	on	a	particular	carrier	to	ensure	that,	
at	the	physical	communications	layer,	that	message	is	routed	as	a	priority	to	the	
end	point	over	and	above	any	other	traffic.	
This	means	that,	while	an	alarm	message	clearly	identifies	itself	at	the	message	
management	layer	level	of	our	application,	carrier	interfaces	see	the	message	just	
as	another	binary	package	of	data	to	be	sent.		In	cases	of	transmission	contention,	
or	where	there	are	a	number	of	messages	queued	for	transmission	or	decoding	
after	reception,	this	could	be	an	issue	as	there	is	no	physical	priority	provided	to	
the	alarm	message.	
In	the	context	of	carrier	agnosticism,	there	is	nothing	we	can	do	to	prioritise	the	
physical	 message	 at	 the	 infrastructure	 level	 as	 we	 do	 not	 rely	 on	 any	 of	 the	
capabilities	of	our	carriers	(unless	all	carriers	support	the	feature).		
At	an	application	 level,	alarm	messages	could	be	prioritised	to	the	front	of	 the	
transmission	queue	when	they	are	encoded	by	the	message	management	layer,	
and	during	processing	at	the	base	station,	the	incoming	message	queue	could	first	
be	queried	for	any	alarm	messages	before	looking	at	any	other	messages.		Given	
the	discrete	ID	of	the	alarm	message	type,	this	could	be	as	simple	as	querying	the	
incoming	message	queue	for	any	unprocessed	messages	where	the	message	type	
is	254.	
	
	 220	 	
	
At	the	infrastructure	layer,	however,	it	would	be	an	application	specific	feature	to	
evaluate	and	implement	the	capability	to	prioritise	and	route	alarm	messages	as	
a	priority,	based	on	the	carriers	and	capabilities	available.	
8.5	Performance	indicators	addressed	by	the	alarm	message	
The	 alarm	 message	 supplements	 and	 enhances	 the	 features	 of	 our	
communications	protocol	in	a	number	of	ways.		It	contributes	to	our	requirement	
for	 robust	 communications	 by	 providing	 applications	 with	 a	 defined	 and	
structured	method	through	which	to	notify	the	base	station	of	alarm	conditions	
at	the	remote	monitor.			
The	 alarm	 message	 facilitates	 support	 for	 medical	 monitoring	 applications	
through	the	provision	of	specific	alarm	message	types	to	allow	the	identification	
of	medical	 emergency	alarms.	 	 It	 also	allows	 the	medical	monitor	 to	advise	of	
issues	 of	 concern	 with	 the	 underlying	 hardware,	 communications	 and	 other	
capabilities	to	ensure	the	base	station	can	best	communicate	with,	and	manage,	
the	remote	monitors.			
The	 ability	 of	 the	 alarm	 message	 to	 enhance	 the	 robustness	 of	 the	
communications	infrastructure	and	facilitate	medical	alarm	condition	reporting	
is	critical	 to	 the	protocol’s	use	 for	medical	monitoring,	and	 for	 this	 reason	the	
alarm	 message	 is	 a	 fundamental	 to	 the	 success	 of	 a	 real‐world	 monitoring	
application.	
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9. 	EVALUATION	OF	FEASIBILITY , 	 	
We	 evaluate	 whether	 carrier	 agnosticism	 is	 feasible	 for	 communications	 in	
medical	monitoring.	 	We	 look	at	 the	potential	 to	 implement	a	 carrier	agnostic	
solution,	and	examine	some	practical	considerations	for	the	implementation	of	
such	 a	 system.	 	 We	 consider	 whether	 such	 a	 solution	 can	 provide	 seamless	
communications,	and	evaluate	the	possible	use	case	for	the	protocol	by	reviewing	
available	hardware,	software	and	supporting	technologies.		We	also	propose	a	list	
of	issues	to	be	considered	during	an	implementation	of	the	protocol.			
9.1	 Is	 carrier	 agnosticism	 possible	 in	 medical	 monitoring	
systems?	
As	 we	 have	 demonstrated,	 carrier	 agnosticism	 is	 possible	 within	 a	
communications	system.	 	The	communications	protocol	proposed	 in	this	work	
demonstrates	that	features	such	as	remote	control,	user	data	transmission	and	
message	delivery	receipting	can	all	be	implemented	in	such	a	way	that	the	carrier	
itself	becomes	irrelevant	to	the	provision	of	those	features.		In	short,	the	carrier	
becomes	simply	the	means	by	which	our	protocol	message	data	is	transmitted	
from	end	to	end	of	the	transmission.			
We	 demonstrated	 how	 the	 communications	 protocol	 can	 provide	 all	 of	 the	
features	 that	we	 believe	 are	 required	 for	 carrier	 agnostic	 communications	 by	
implementing	a	defined	message	format	and	a	set	of	attributes	that	addresses	the	
requirements	identified	in	table	1.			
As	a	result	of	the	work	conducted	in	this	thesis,	on	a	purely	conceptual	level,	it	is	
possible	to	construct	a	communications	message	protocol	that:	
a) Does	not	rely	on	the	native	capabilities	of	any	specific	carrier;	and	
b) Allows	an	equivalent	message	to	be	encoded	(with	some	specific	capacity	
limitations	based	on	the	carrier)	across	any	of	the	carriers	in	use	on	the	
system.	
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It	is	possible	to	construct	a	messaging	solution	that	can	use	multiple	carriers	and	
does	 not	 rely	 on	 a	 ubiquitous	 Internet	 connection.	 	 Furthermore,	 we	 have	
proposed	a	model	whereby	the	implementation	of	the	messaging	system	could	
facilitate	selection	of	the	optimal	available	signal	path	via	an	application	specific	
carrier	selection	algorithm	and	demonstrated	how	this	could	facilitate	fail	over	
and	 selection	 of	 an	 optimal	 signal	 path	 via	 application‐based	 carrier	
prioritisation.		We	have	also	covered	how	the	prioritisation	of	carriers	might	be	
amended	based	on	alarm	messages	from	the	remote	monitor,	using	the	carrier	
alarm	to	inform	the	base	station	when	a	particular	carrier	is	not	available.			
We	have	also	tested	the	transmission	and	reception	of	sample	protocol	messages	
across	a	variety	of	carriers,	proving	that	fundamentally,	the	carrier	can	transmit	
the	same	data	independently.		On	the	basis	of	all	of	the	above	considerations,	we	
assert	that	carrier	agnosticism	is	theoretically	possible.	
However,	 we	 also	 raised	 some	 concerns	 in	 the	 case	 of	 carrier	 agnosticism.		
Carriers	have	different	capacities,	and	the	transmission	of	data	(and	selection	of	
the	optimal	carrier)	must	take	into	account	the	nature	of	the	data	capacity	that	is	
required	to	be	transmitted.		While	we	have	proposed	that	there	are	mitigations	
for	this	issue,	in	terms	of	allowing	messages	to	be	concatenated	and	using	more	
than	one	SMS	in	a	concatenated	form	as	a	data	carrier	to	extend	the	data	payload,	
these	issues	must	be	considered	in	any	implementation.	
9.2	Practical	considerations	for	real‐world	carrier	agnosticism	
At	 a	 theoretical	 level,	 our	 agnostic	 platform	 is	 feasible.	 	 However,	 there	 are	 a	
number	of	considerations	that	must	be	made	on	an	application	specific	basis	to	
enable	carrier	agnosticism,	and	these	must	be	considered	in	the	context	of	the	
costs	and	benefits	of	the	model	for	specific	real‐world	applications.			
The	hardware	
The	use	of	multiple	carriers	potentially	requires	multiple	hardware	devices	to	
access	the	different	carriers.		For	example,	a	system	using	SMS,	radio	and	mobile	
Internet	would	require	at	least	two	carrier	access	devices,	a	4G	mobile	
telephone	device	for	SMS	and	wireless	Internet,	and	a	radio	modem	for	access	
to	the	radio	network.			
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The	use	of	multiple	hardware	devices	imposes	requirements	around	power	
supplies,	size	of	the	hardware,	antenna	requirements,	weight	of	the	equipment	
and	portability	of	the	monitor	for	the	end	user.		Such	hardware	and	
implementation	requirements	need	to	be	considered,	as	a	wearable	medical	
monitor	is	not	really	wearable	if	it	requires	a	wheelbarrow	to	move	components	
around.		
However,	one	thing	that	is	ever	certain	in	the	world	of	technology	is	that	
information	technology	devices	such	as	modem,	mobile	phone	and	the	like	
continue	to	be	reduced	in	size	even	as	more	and	more	functionalities	are	
crammed	onto	single	integrated	circuit	chips	and	micro‐profile	circuit	boards.		
The	extent	of	such	ongoing	miniaturisation	in	information	technology	can	be	
seen	when	one	examines	the	Raspberry	Pi	computer	(figure	81),	an	entire	
personal	computer	architecture	in	a	package	that	measures	86mm	x	56mm	x	
21mm.	It	weighs	45g,	and	would	have	been	inconceivable	a	mere	5	years	ago.		
[110].	
	
FIGURE	81:	THE	RASPBERRY	PI		
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As	 another	 example	 of	 this	 ongoing	miniaturisation	 of	 technology	 to	 support	
communications	can	be	seen	in	the	evolution	of	GPS	and	GSM	mobile	telephone	
modules.		In	1999,	a	GPS	processor	in	integrated	circuit	form	was	about	50mm	x	
30mm	x	10mm	in	size	with	a	requirement	for	significant	supplementary	power	
supply,	 shielding	 and	 regulation	 circuitry.	 	 A	 GSM	mobile	 engine	was	 around	
double	that	size	in	an	off‐the‐shelf	form	factor.		Now,	multi‐purpose	single	chip	
packages	are	available,	sized	at	around	20mm	x	20mm	x	5mm,	that	incorporate	
both	mobile	telephone	and	GPS,	plus	functionality	such	as	4G,	wireless	internet	
and	data	processing	CPU	capabilities.			Radio	modules	to	support	AX.25	have	also	
continued	to	shrink,	even	though	the	technology	is	very	old	now.		For	example,	
and	RFD900+	radio	modem	module	measures	30mm	x	57	mm	x	12.8	mm	and	
weighs	less	than	15g	[51].					
As	hardware	elements	 continue	 to	 evolve	 and	more	efficient	designs	 facilitate	
smaller	functional	packages,	we	believe	it	is	feasible	that	low	power,	small‐profile	
packages	to	provide	multiple	communications	functions	across	disparate	carriers	
in	 a	 small	 enough	 package	 that	 multi‐carrier	 support	 could	 be	 physically	
delivered	in	man‐portable	form.		This	is	certainly	the	case	with	mobile	telephone	
devices,	 where	 it	 is	 not	 unusual	 for	 a	 single	 Smartphone	 to	 provide	 802.11x	
wireless,	 mobile	 data,	 SMS,	 MMS,	 Bluetooth,	 Near	 Field	 Communication	 and	
mobile	Internet	from	the	same	device	[111].			
Even	if	we	fixate	on	a	multi‐carrier	device	such	as	a	Smartphones,	our	agnostic	
communication	processes	can	still	be	relevant.	 	The	use	of	the	carrier	agnostic	
approach	allows	us	to	use	multiple	transmission	capabilities	of	the	Smartphone’s	
communications	 (such	 as	 Internet,	 MMS	 and	 SMS)	 depending	 on	 the	
environment,	 the	 available	 connectivity	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	messages	 to	 be	
transmitted.	
Power	and	longevity	to	support	monitoring	activity	in	the	field	
A	 remote	 medical	 monitoring	 device	 might	 be	 deployed	 into	 the	 field	 for	 an	
extended	 period	 of	 time	 [2].	 	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	may	 be	 required	 that	we	 can	
power	the	device	for	an	extended	period.		At	the	least,	we	would	assert	that,	for	a	
	
	 225	 	
	
medical	 monitor	 worn	 all	 day	 long,	 the	 device	 should	 be	 able	 to	 run	 all	 day	
without	the	subject	being	required	to	“recharge”.		
In	the	context	of	power	drain	and	longevity	of	operations,	the	more	devices	that	
we	use	on	a	monitor,	 the	greater	 the	overall	power	drain	 from	the	device.	 	As	
Mitcheson	 states,	 “there	 are	 clear	 trade‐offs	 between	 functionality,	 battery	
lifetime	and	battery	volume	for	wearable	and	implantable	wireless‐biosensors” 
[112]. The	wearable	monitoring	 system	must	 have	 sufficient	 power	 supply	 to	
meet	the	power	drain	of	all	of	its	components	and	address	the	demands	of	the	
proposed	activity	cycle	for	the	monitor	(i.e.	running	all	day	without	recharge).	
Given	 the	 possibility	 for	 extended	 monitoring,	 we	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 it	 is	
necessarily	feasible	to	have	a	remote	monitor	deployed	in	the	field	without	the	
need	 to	 recharge	 its	 power	 source	 over	 time.	 	 We	 would	 suggest	 that	 the	
requirements	of	such	a	system	in	the	field	would	be	similar	to	those	for	a	modern	
Smartphone:	
a) The	battery	must	be	 able	 to	power	 the	device	without	 intervention	 for	
whatever	common	mobile	duty	cycle	is	defined	for	the	application.	 	For	
example,	a	Smartphone	might	require	that	the	phone	remain	powered	on	
for	a	typical	use	case	of	phone	calls,	messaging	and	Internet	access	for	the	
period	of	an	entire	day.		For	a	monitor,	this	period	may	be	a	day,	a	week,	
or	some	other	arbitrary	period	defined	by	the	specifics	of	the	application	
in	question.			
b) The	 weight	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 battery	 must	 not	 interfere	 with	 the	
portability	of	the	monitor	or	its	usability.	
c) The	 type	 of	 battery	 used	 must	 not	 adversely	 impact	 the	 subject’s	
wellbeing.		For	example,	a	wet	lead	acid	battery	is	likely	not	appropriate	
for	this	purpose,	as	it	is	both	heavy	and	contains	dangerous	and	accessible	
chemicals.	
These	 requirements	 imply	 that	 there	must	 be	 a	 compromise	 between	 battery	
size/type	and	battery	life/duty	cycle	for	the	monitor,	assuming	that	the	size	and	
weight	of	the	battery	is	proportional	to	the	overall	capacity	of	the	battery.		If	we	
make	the	battery	large	and	long	lasting,	it	is	likely	to	be	bigger	and	heavier,	and	
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therefore	 less	wearable,	 so	 the	 implementer	 of	 the	 system	must	 consider	 the	
compromise	point	between	battery	capacity,	duty	cycle	and	the	weight	or	bulk	of	
the	power	source,	in	the	context	of	the	power	drain	from	each	of	the	disparate	
components	of	the	system.	
Overall	size	and	weight	of	the	wearable	monitoring	system	
In	 bio‐monitoring,	 the	 system	 must	 be	 man‐portable	 in	 a	 way	 that	 does	 not	
adversely	 impact	 the	 quality	 of	 life	 activities	 of	 the	 subject.	 	 For	 example,	 if	
monitoring	 a	 worker,	 we	 cannot	 stop	 the	worker	 performing	 their	 duties.	 	 If	
monitoring	an	athlete,	weight	and	size	are	issues	that	may	impact	performance.		
If	monitoring	a	patient,	then	the	nature	of	the	monitor,	its	size	and	weight	must	
not	negatively	impact	the	patient’s	condition	or	exacerbate	the	issue	for	which	
they	are	being	monitored	in	the	first	place.	
One	of	the	characteristics	of	a	bio‐monitoring	system	is	that	some	component	of	
the	system	(the	sensors)	must	likely	be	worn	on	the	body	to	function	correctly	
[18].	 	The	first	cardiac	Holter	monitor	was	the	size	of	a	backpack	and	weighed	
around	30kg	[69].		However,	modern	wearable	solutions	must	be	comfortable	so	
as	to	not	impact	the	patient	or	the	data	being	collected.		We	do	not	believe	that	it	
is	feasible	for	the	monitor	to	be	rucksack	sized	in	most	cases,	nor	is	it	likely	to	be	
appropriate	for	a	subject	to	lug	a	suitcase	of	equipment	around	with	them	during	
the	monitoring	period.			
If	 the	 bio‐monitoring	 system	 must	 be	 man‐portable	 and,	 as	 far	 as	 possible,	
unobtrusive	this	implies	that	that	the	form	factor	of	a	Smartphone,	or	other	small	
computing	 device,	 is	 likely	 ideal	 as	 the	 transceiver	 for	 the	 communications	
carriers.		Smartphones	contain	mechanisms	to	utilise	multiple	carriers	within	the	
one	 device,	 along	 with	 a	 power	 supply,	 processing	 capacity	 and	 data	 storage	
capabilities	through	either	flash	memory	or	on‐board	Flash	or	RAM.	
However,	 the	 use	 of	 a	 Smartphone	 potentially	 precludes	 the	 incorporation	 of	
radio	as	a	carrier,	as	phones,	while	making	use	of	some	part	of	the	radio	spectrum,	
do	 not	 typically	 facilitate	 traditional	 radio	 style	 transceiver	 operations.	 	 If	we	
want	to	offer	radio	as	a	carrier	amongst	other	options	such	as	SMS	and	mobile	
Internet,	there	is	a	compromise	to	be	considered	between	overall	size	and	weight	
	
	 227	 	
	
of	the	system,	and	the	hardware	required	to	deliver	optimal	capabilities	to	that	
system.		However,	as	shown	earlier	in	this	section,	radio	modems	of	less	than	15g	
are	available	to	add	the	basic	capability	of	radio	transmission	to	the	system.	
However,	 radio	will	 require	additional	equipment	such	as	a	radio	antenna.	 	 In	
some	cases,	the	additional	size	and	weight	requirements	of	a	small	radio	modem	
setup	attached	to	the	monitor	may	outweigh	the	costs	of	that	device	in	terms	of	
additional	weight	 and	 bulk.	 	However,	 the	 value	 of	 the	 support	 for	 additional	
carriers	would	have	 to	be	determined	on	a	per	application	basis	based	on	 the	
environment	 and	 carriers	 that	 are	 predominantly	 available	 in	 the	monitoring	
subject’s	activity	area.			
Supporting	infrastructure	for	data	communications	
To	justify	the	incorporation	of	additional	carriers,	support	infrastructure	for	the	
various	 carriers	we	use	 to	 transmit	 information	must	be	 available	 in	 order	 to	
facilitate	 the	 communications	 backbone	 for	 each	 of	 the	 carriers.	 	 Most	 of	 the	
research	 in	 the	 field	 of	 bio‐monitoring	 systems	 assumes	 that	 communications	
infrastructure	 exists	 already	 to	 allow	 the	 selected	 carrier(s)	 to	 function.	 	We	
assume	that,	where	a	remote	wearable	monitor	is	used,	the	application	evaluates	
the	 carriers	 selected	 to	 ensure	 that	 sufficient	 supporting	 communications	
infrastructure	exists	in	the	monitoring	environment	to	support	data	transmission	
between	the	monitor	and	the	base	station.	 	Applications	should	consider	what	
communications	infrastructure	is	available	and	not	just	assume	(the	reasons	for	
which	we	illustrate	in	Appendix	G).	
The	 supporting	 infrastructure	 for	 a	 monitoring	 system	 needs	 to	 be	 clearly	
identified,	 and	 the	 communications	 methods	 in	 use	 validated	 based	 on	 the	
capabilities	 that	 are	prevalent	within	 the	 environment	where	 the	 system	may	
operate.	 	 Specifically,	 when	 we	 consider	 the	 communications	 backbone,	 the	
knowledge	of	where	we	may	conduct	monitoring	will	assist	the	implementer	to	
determine	which	communications	services	are	appropriate	or	required.			
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Incorporation	of	older	technologies	such	as	radio	
Having	discussed	the	capabilities	of	modern	Smartphones,	one	might	argue	that	
a	 Smartphone	provides	 all	 of	 the	 communications	 capabilities	we	might	need,	
with	Bluetooth,	Wireless,	Internet,	mobile	data,	SMS	and	MMS	all	supported	from	
a	single	device.		Why,	then,	do	we	even	consider	the	alternative	of	packet	radio	
and	its	specific	equipment	requirements?	
In	 Appendix	 G,	 we	 show	 that	 GSM	 service	 coverage	 (the	 basis	 for	 many	
Smartphones	 and	 modems	 to	 provide	 mobile	 Internet)	 is	 not	 geographically	
pervasive.	 	 Our	 contention	 is	 that	 where	 there	 are	 no	 pervasive	 and	 reliable	
communications	 standards	 available,	 there	 is	 always	 the	 potential	 for	 our	
monitoring	system	to	move	into	an	area	where	there	is	no	reception	for	carriers	
such	4G	or	3G	mobile	telephone	services,	whether	because	of	a	black	spot	or	an	
area	with	no	coverage.		For	a	reliable	and	robust	solution	for	medical	monitoring	
communications,	we	must	consider	and	be	prepared	to	remediate	 the	 issue	of	
inconsistently	available	communications,	or	our	system	will	fail	at	some	point.		In	
fact,	this	was	one	of	the	key	issues	raised	at	the	commencement	of	this	work,	by	
virtue	of	the	assumption	of	constant,	pervasive	Internet	connectivity	which	we	
have	shown	may	not	be	valid	assumption	for	many	locations	around	the	globe	
including	“1st	world”	countries	such	as	Australia.			
Where	pervasive	communications	infrastructure	does	not	already	exist,	or	is	not	
consistently	reliable,	 it	 is	possible	 for	an	organisation	 to	 implement	 their	own	
alternate	communications.	 	While	 it	may	not	be	 feasible	 for	an	organisation	to	
implement	 their	 own	 GSM	 services	 in	 a	 mobile	 phone	 “black	 spot”,	 radio	
communications	can	be	 implemented	on	a	 limited,	self‐originated	basis.	 	Many	
organisations	already	do	this	–	taxi	companies,	bus	companies	and	couriers	all	
make	use	of	radio	technology	over	citizens’	band	radio	frequencies	to	transmit	
data	and	communications,	providing	capabilities	to	send	and	receive	information	
on	 quasi‐private	 networks.	 	 These	 technologies	 can	 fill	 a	 gap	 where	 the	
infrastructure	 does	 not	 exist	 to	 provide	 consistently	 reliable	mobile	 Internet,	
GSM	data	or	SMS.	 	As	such,	we	assert	that	 it	 is	worth	considering	technologies	
such	as	radio	as	carriers	for	data.	
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9.3	Can	a	carrier	agnostic	solution	be	seamless?	
We	demonstrated	in	chapter	5	that,	given	the	appropriate	selection	algorithms,	a	
carrier	agnostic	solution	can	seamlessly	transmit	the	same	message	to	the	end	
user	independently	of	the	underlying	carrier.		With	the	use	of	the	alarm	message	
in	 chapter	 8,	we	 further	 identified	 that	 the	 carrier	 selection	 process	 could	 be	
dynamically	 altered	 over	 time	 to	 cater	 for	 changing	 conditions	 within	 the	
communication	environment.		The	communication	in	our	solution	can	therefore	
make	use	of	an	optimal	signal	path	selection	algorithm	to	determine	the	route	by	
which	to	transmit	data,	and	the	communications	protocol	can	support	delivery	
receipting	and	message	tracking	to	ensure	that	appropriate	action	can	be	taken	if	
a	message	does	not	appear	to	have	been	delivered.			
The	failure	of	a	message	to	be	transmitted	because	of	carrier	unavailability,	or	the	
lack	 of	 a	 receipt	 for	 a	message	within	 a	 reasonable	 time	 (say	within	 the	 time	
denoted	 by	 our	 proposed	 2VP	 +	 G	 timeframe	 formula)	 allow	 the	 underlying	
application	to	either	retry	the	transmission	or	fail	over	to	another	carrier	based	
on	 application	 specific	 configuration.	 	 The	 alarm	 message	 from	 the	 remote	
monitor,	identifying	carrier	issue	(such	as	failure,	unavailability	etc.)	allows	the	
base	station	to	modify	the	selection	process	for	communication	with	a	specific	
remote	monitor.	
Protocol	 based	 receipting	 allows	 us	 to	 track	 the	 delivery	 of	 a	 message	
independently	of	the	carrier	in	use.		Receipting	supports	cases	where	a	carrier	is	
available	at	one	end	of	the	transmission	pair,	but	is	not	available	at	the	other	end	
(for	example	where	a	monitor	goes	into	a	reception	blackspot	for	one	or	more	of	
the	carriers	in	use).		In	the	absence	of	receipt,	or	failure	of	transmission,	we	can	
move	to	another	carrier	for	the	same	message,	sending	exactly	the	same	message	
payload	(subject	to	capacity	requirements)	via	a	different	carrier.	
Because	of	all	of	these	attributes	of	the	solution,	communications	over	a	carrier	
agnostic	framework	could	appear	seamless	to	the	end	user,	as	the	system	would	
simply	transmit	and	receive	messages	on	the	best	currently	available	link	and	fail	
over	 in	 case	 of	 issue.	 	 With	 the	 appropriate	 application	 implementation,	 the	
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patient	 or	 doctor	 would	 not	 need	 to	 worry	 about	 how	 or	 why	 a	 specific	
transmission	mechanism	was	selected	or	used.		If	transmission	or	receipt	failed,	
the	message	 would	 be	 retried	 on	 alternate	 carriers	 until	 such	 time	 as	 it	 was	
received	and	receipted	appropriately.	
9.4	A	real	world	use‐case	–	 is	such	a	system	possible	with	 the	
hardware	we	have	today?	
The	hardware	
The	 author’s	 current	 smartphone	 device	 offers	 the	 following	 communications	
mechanisms	in	a	package	that	is	12xm	x	6cm	x	1cm	in	size:	
 GSM	mobile	telephone	
 3G	mobile	data	
 4G	mobile	data	
 Mobile	Internet	
 802.11x	wireless	networking	
 Bluetooth	
 Near	Field	Communication	(NFC)	
 32GB	of	on	board	flash	RAM	data	storage	
 SMS	
 MMS	
In	addition,	during	this	thesis,	we	tested	using	digital	radio	modems,	digital	GSM	
modems	 and	 other	 devices	 which	 provide	 communications	 capabilities	 to	
consumers	in	small,	man‐portable	and	low‐powered	packages.	 	These	portable	
devices	are	commercially	available,	and	mean	we	can	establish	a	communication	
backbone	in	a	package	weighing	less	than	1kg.	
For	example:	
Raspberry	Pi	as	a	controller	module	 45g	
RX900	radio	modem		 	 	 15g	
Bluefin	antenna	for	Radio	 	 	 272g	
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iPhone	7	smartphone	 	 	 138g	
Lithium	Ion	6600mAh	battery	 	 155g	
Total	raw	component	weight	 	 625g	
The	 weights	 of	 each	 component	 were	 sourced	 directly	 from	 manufacturer	
technical	specifications	of	product	specification	webpages.	
Given	 the	 raw	 components	 come	 in	 well	 under	 a	 kilogram,	 with	 modern	
manufacturing	 techniques,	 lightweight	materials	and	clever	design,	we	believe	
that	the	communications	aspects	of	our	proposed	solution	are	certainly	feasible	
in	a	production	scenario.	
We	 also	 note	 that,	 in	 our	 other	 life	 as	 part	 of	 a	 commercial	 research	 and	
development	team,	we	developed	a	vehicle	tracking	solution	for	Oztrak,	which	
was	carrier	agnostic	and	supported	data	transmission	over	three	carriers,	mobile	
data,	SMS	and	packet	radio.		Our	team	was	awarded	the	Bus	Industry	Award	for	
Innovation	and	the	Victorian	Premier’s	Award	for	Small	Business	[113]	for	work	
in	this	field.		While	this	Oztrak	R&D	project	was	specifically	for	vehicle	tracking	
and	 telemetry,	 the	 basic	 principles	 are	 further	 illustration	 that	 carrier	
agnosticism,	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 transmit	 the	 same	 data	 over	 a	 variety	 of	
communication	methods,	is	operationally	feasible.	
The	software	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 ability	 to	 implement	 the	 software	 for	 handling	 the	 remote	
communications,	 fail	 over,	 message	 encoding,	 decoding	 and	 other	 protocol	
features,	 we	 have	 demonstrated	 and	 implemented	 software	 using	 Microsoft’s	
.NET	 platform	 that	 can	 implement	 many	 features	 of	 the	 message	 protocol,	
including	 encryption,	 generation	 of	 checksums,	 binary	 encoding	 of	 data,	
management	of	data	in	a	structured	header,	 integration	with	carrier	hardware	
and	message	decoding.			
For	 mobile,	 man‐portable	 implementations	 of	 such	 software,	 our	 current	
Smartphone	computing	capabilities	equivalent	to	recent	last‐generation	personal	
computers,	 and	 storage	 capabilities	 equivalent	 to	 gigabytes	 of	memory.	 	 That	
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same	phone	is	capable	of	running	games	with	high	definition	graphics,	playing	
movies	in	high	definition	resolution,	or	producing	audio	at	CD	quality	or	better.		
In	short,	the	processing	power	of	this	device	is	more	than	adequate	to	facilitate	
the	operational	aspects	of	both	our	communications	and	monitoring	needs.	
The	Body	Area	Network	
The	 provision	 of	 commercial	 Bluetooth	 functionality	 in	 the	 smartphone	 could	
facilitate	a	body	area	network	using	Bluetooth,	as	was	outlined	in	several	of	the	
research	papers	we	reviewed	in	our	literature	review.		In	short,	without	needing	
to	go	near	any	form	of	specialist	hardware	that	is	custom	made	for	this	purpose,	
we	believe	that	modern	Smartphones	can	provide	the	necessary	infrastructure	
and	capabilities	to	implement	our	proposed	functionality,	and	simultaneously	act	
as	a	bio‐monitoring	aggregator	and	master	controller.			
In	 the	area	of	personal	healthcare	and	monitoring,	 specialist	devices	are	often	
used,	with	specific	operating	systems	and	failure‐hardened	hardware	used	due	
to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 task	 at	 hand.	 	 If	 we	 consider	 that	 a	 solution	 could	 be	
implemented	using	a	commercially	available	Smartphone	(and	this	is	backed	by	
other	research	in	the	field	–	see	[16]	for	example)	then	we	believe	that	there	is	no	
impediment	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 an	 application	 using	 specialist	 medical	
hardware	to	provide	this	functionality	either.	
We	 believe	 that	 a	 medical	 monitoring	 solution	 using	 our	 communications	
protocol	 over	 multiple	 carriers	 is	 therefore	 totally	 feasible	 in	 an	 operational	
sense.	
9.5	Considerations	and	limitations	during	implementation	
It	must	be	acknowledged	that	even	 in	a	system	where	we	 implement	multiple	
carriers	and	agnostic	data	transmissions,	there	may	still	arise	the	case	where	no	
transmission	carrier	is	available	right	now,	and	therefore	the	system,	or	at	least	
its	communications,	will	fail.			
However,	 if	 we	 consider	 that,	 when	 we	 utilise	 carrier	 agnosticism	 we	 have	
multiple	signal	paths	to	choose	from,	if	one	pathway	fails,	we	can	move	on	to	the	
next,	then	the	next,	until	the	possibilities	are	exhausted.		We	can	then	also	go	back	
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to	the	beginning,	and	start	the	process	again,	until	such	time	as	the	first	possible	
carrier	 becomes	 available.	 	We	 showed	 that	Mobile	 Internet	 requires	 a	 better	
quality	of	signal	than,	say,	SMS	transmission,	so	with	multiple	carriers	it	is	likely	
that	the	carrier‐agnostic	solution	can	return	to	a	transmittable	status	far	more	
quickly	than	one	depending	on	a	single	carrier.			
If	we	compare	this	to	a	system	that	relies	on	a	single	carrier	–	such	as	an	Internet	
connection	‐	and	thus	will	only	function	over	that	connection,	we	would	argue	
that	the	carrier	agnostic	solution	is	much	more	capable	of	avoiding	total	failure	
mode	scenarios	due	to	the	multiple	communications	options	that	are	available.	
The	 carrier	 agnostic	 solution	 provides	 a	 number	 of	 advantages	 during	
implementation.		Carriers	and	their	associated	control	software	can	be	added	and	
removed	in	the	solution	based	on	the	location	in	which	the	monitor	will	be	used.		
The	agnostic	solution	can	allow	for	additional	carriers	 to	be	 included	on	some	
remote	systems	based	on	their	application,	with	additional	application	specific	
configuration	in	those	monitors.		For	example,	bio‐monitors	in	low	GSM	coverage	
areas	might	include	radio,	while	monitors	in	the	middle	of	the	city	will	only	have	
GSM	based	communications	such	as	SMS,	mobile	data	and	mobile	Internet.		If	the	
application	 takes	 a	 modular	 approach	 to	 the	 carrier	 incorporation	 via	 our	
suggestion	of	carrier	hardware	control	modules	that	implement	a	consistent	set	
of	 functions,	 this	 will	 allow	 the	 monitors	 in	 the	 field	 to	 adapt	 to	 their	 usage	
scenario	with	the	addition	of	carriers	as	requires.	
It	should	also	be	considered	that	a	multiple	carrier	approach	means	that	in	some	
cases,	 data	 transmissions	 may	 take	 longer	 to	 get	 from	 end	 to	 end	 of	 the	
transmission	path.	 	Consider	 the	situation	where	a	 transmission	 fails	on	 three	
carriers	before	successfully	being	delivered	by	the	fourth.		The	message	may	well	
have	taken	over	a	minute	between	the	initial	(failed)	attempt	at	transmission	and	
final	delivery	to	the	base	station.		While	one	may	argue	that	this	is	a	long	period	
to	wait,	we	would	contend	that	the	ability	to	actually	deliver	the	message	in	this	
situation	is	better	than	having	no	capability	to	deliver	until	the	subject	moves	out	
of	 a	 single‐carrier	 blackspot.	 	 However,	 the	 potential	 timeframes	 for	
communications	should	be	considered	in	the	calculation	of	alarm	and	keep	alive	
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thresholds	(for	example	as	discussed	for	control	messages	and	alarm	messages	
in	chapters	6	and	8).	
Another	 issue	 to	be	considered	 is	 the	varying	capacity	of	different	carriers.	 	A	
single	 SMS	message	 only	 allows	 a	 packet	 of	 140	 octets	 of	 data	 including	 the	
header.	 	If	we	concatenate	SMS	under	the	GSM	native	concatenation	(using	the	
features	of	that	specific	carrier),	other	research	has	shown	that	we	can	combine	
approximately	8	SMS	before	there	is	a	risk	of	data	loss	due	to	SMS	message	loss.		
Our	proposed	solution	supports	7	message	packets	concatenated	into	a	virtual	
message.		With	7	SMS	concatenated,	we	get	over	700	octets	of	payload	available.		
However,	if	we	support	both	native	SMS	concatenation	for	up	to	8	messages,	and	
our	protocol’s	capacity	to	concatenate	up	to	7	carrier	message	packets,	we	end	
up	with	140	x	8	x	7	octets	=	7,840	octets	of	data.		While	this	is	far	less	than	we	can	
transmit	using	a	packet	radio,	Internet	or	serial	data	connection,	it	is	a	significant	
capacity	for	discrete	measurements	of	the	sorts	of	values	that	we	have	defined.		
As	we	have	started	in	previous	chapters,	our	protocol	features	do	not	collide	or	
impact	 with	 the	 native	 features	 of	 the	 underlying	 carriers.	 	 While	 our	
concatenation	process	is	internal	and	does	not	depend	on	the	native	capabilities	
of	 any	 carrier,	we	 can	 leverage	 the	 “safe”	native	 concatenation	of	 SMS	 to	 also	
extend	our	available	message	packet	size.		However,	the	consideration	needs	to	
be	 made	 that	 there	 are	 some	 carriers	 with	 capacity	 constraints	 and	 the	
application	using	such	carriers	should	consider	these	during	its	implementation.	
A	final	consideration	is	the	fact	that	some	of	our	carriers	will	provide	immediate	
feedback	 when	 a	 message	 cannot	 be	 delivered.	 	 For	 example,	 a	 serial	 data	
transmission	requires	a	handshake	before	data	can	be	sent,	and	the	sender	can	
determine	if	the	data	is	sent	correctly	through	the	appropriate	acknowledgement	
frames	over	 the	 carrier.	 	However,	 an	SMS	or	MMS	message	do	not	provide	a	
reliable	delivery	notification.		SMS	and	MMS	also	possess	a	lifespan	which	means	
that	they	can	“float	around”	in	the	carrier	network	for	many	hours	before	they	
are	delivered	or	discarded	(for	example,	if	the	receiving	station	does	not	make	
contact	with	the	network	during	that	period).		To	this	end,	we	provide	a	protocol	
based	receipting	process,	and	message	generation	and	validity	period	attributes	
independently	 of	 the	 carrier.	 	 It	 is	 strongly	 recommended	 that,	 for	 medical	
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monitoring	applications,	the	ability	to	receipt	messages	is	used	as	appropriate,	
along	 with	 the	 use	 of	 the	 message	 age	 and	 validity	 fields	 to	 ensure	 only	
appropriate	messages	are	actioned.	
	 	
	
	 236	 	
	
10. 	CONCLUSIONS	AND	FUTURE	
WORK	
10.1	Review	‐	is	it	possible	to	address	all	of	our	requirements	
The	protocol	presented	herein	is	a	fully	realised	communications	protocol	and	
usage	methodology	that	allows	the	transmission	of	the	same	data	across	a	carrier	
agnostic	 communications	 backbone.	 	 The	 protocol	 provides	 internal	 self‐
management	 features	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 attributes	 of	 the	 carrier	 become	
irrelevant	other	than	as	the	medium	through	which	the	message	is	transmitted.			
The	application	making	use	of	the	protocol	can	identify	sender,	receiver,	message	
ID,	application	and	message	type,	as	well	as	other	attributes	such	as	the	age	and	
validity	 of	 the	 message.	 	 The	 application	 does	 not	 need	 to	 have	 any	 specific	
awareness	of	 the	 carrier	over	which	 the	message	was	 transmitted	 in	order	 to	
address	each	of	these	attributes.		The	modular	approach	proposed	supports	the	
addition	and	removal	of	carriers	as	required	by	the	operating	circumstances	of	
the	monitoring	situation.	
In	table	1,	we	identified	5	discrete	requirements,	and	12	performance	indicators	
which	determine	whether	the	carrier‐agnostic	approach	can	be	successful.		Over	
the	course	of	chapters	3	to	8,	we	showed	how	the	performance	indicators,	and	
thus	the	requirements,	have	been	addressed	by	the	solution	we	propose.			
Specifically,	through	the	support	for	multiple	carriers,	we	address	requirement	1	
and	performance	indicators	to	remove	the	reliance	on	a	single	pervasive	Internet	
connection,	 facilitate	 communications	 over	 more	 than	 one	 communication’s	
channel,	and	consider	the	availability	of	different	 types	of	communication	 in	a	
specific	monitoring	environments.			
Requirement	2	is	addressed	by	the	creation	of	a	message	format	that	supports	a	
defined	 header	 structure	 with	 no	 personally	 identifiable	 data,	 facilitates	
appropriate	use	of	user	data	 segment	 encryption	and	 implements	obfuscation	
and	encryption	independently	of	the	capabilities	of	the	carrier.	
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Requirement	 3	 for	 robust	 communications	 independent	 of	 the	 carrier	 is	
implemented	 through	 the	protocol’s	 independent	use	of	 a	number	of	message	
checksums,	and	 the	provision	of	message	sequence	and	 identification	 features	
that	 can	 be	 used	 to	 identify	messages	 in	 a	 conversation	 between	 sender	 and	
receiver,	and	determine	if	messages	are	lost	in	the	conversation	or	conversely	if	
they	are	duplicated	in	the	system.			
Requirement	 4	 is	 supported	 by	 the	 solution’s	 proposal	 for	 a	 carrier	 selection	
algorithm	with	appropriate	 fail	over	processes.	 	The	structured	and	consistent	
message	format	facilitates	fail‐over	by	allowing	the	same	message	to	be	sent	via	
any	of	the	selected	carriers.		This	capability	is	further	enhanced	by	the	provision	
of	the	alarm	capability	and	the	alarm	message’s	ability	to	identify	carrier	issues	
and	notify	the	base	station	of	a	communication	problem	at	the	remote	monitor,	
thus	 allowing	 the	 base	 to	 progressively	 adapt	 the	 carrier	 selection	 to	 suit	 the	
current	monitoring	conditions.	
Requirement	 5	 is	 addressed	 by	 the	 definition	 of	 the	 control	message	 and	 the	
ability	to	send	remote	configuration	from	authorised	sources	and	the	monitor’s	
ability	to	acknowledge	the	specific	configuration	that	was	applied.		The	capability	
is	 enhanced	 by	 the	 base’s	 capacity	 to	 query	 the	 configuration	 of	 the	 remote	
monitor	without	changing	it.	
Finally,	 in	 chapter	 9,	 we	 discussed	 the	 feasibility	 of	 a	 potential	 real‐world	
implementation	 of	 the	 protocol	 using	 commonly	 available	 hardware	 to	
determine	 the	 feasibility	 of	 using	 multiple	 carriers.	 	 With	 all	 components	
weighing	less	than	1kg,	and	given	that	we	have	demonstrated	.NET	software	to	
implement	significant	components	of	the	protocol,	real	world	implementation	is	
definitely	feasible.	
In	 addressing	 each	 of	 the	 requirements,	 this	 thesis	 demonstrates	 that	 carrier	
agnostic	communications,	where	the	underlying	carrier	does	not	rely	on	a	single	
communication	media	or	backbone	such	as	Mobile	Internet,	are	both	possible	and	
feasible	 given	 the	 hardware	 and	 software	 capabilities	 available	 today.		
Furthermore,	we	believe	that	there	are	significant	advantages	to	implementing	
such	a	carrier‐agnostic	system	for	transmission	of	critical	application	data	such	
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as	 medical	 monitoring	 information.	 	 Carrier	 agnosticism	 removes	 the	
dependence	 on	 a	 particular	 carrier	 and	 helps	 to	 ensure	 communications	
capabilities	are	maintained	independently	of	geographic	location	(refer	appendix	
G	for	issues	with	geographic	coverage	in	Mobile	Internet).	
10.2	Future	work	
We	have	discussed	a	protocol	and	communication	methodology	that	facilitates	
and	 supports	 medical	 bio‐monitoring	 applications.	 	 However,	 our	 structured	
protocol	also	incorporates	significant	potential	for	future	enhancement.			
We	specify	a	number	of	default	proposed	values	for	each	of	the	communication	
protocol	message	header	 fields,	as	well	as	proposed	dimensions	and	usage	 for	
each	field.		Future	developments	could	see	refinement	of	the	protocol	for	specific	
applications,	 adding	 new,	 or	 repurposing	 existing,	 sets	 of	 application	 specific	
values	 for	 the	 header	 fields.	 	 For	 example,	 the	 number	 of	 sensors	 allowed	 in	
control	messages	could	be	reduced	to	reduce	the	number	of	octets	required	in	
command	and	control	messages.		Alternatively,	the	supported	carriers	could	be	
reduced	or	increased	to	suit	specific	deployment	environments.	 	New	message	
types	could	also	be	defined	for	specific	operational	requirements.		The	protocol	
is	structured	in	such	a	way	that	the	Message	Protocol	Format	field	can	allow	for	
variations	and	enhancements	in	the	protocol	by	defining	a	new	MFMT	value	for	
any	variations	to	the	protocol	definition.	
The	 protocol	may	 be	 refined	 further	 by	 reducing	 the	 supported	 carriers,	 and	
therefore	 assuming	 additional	 common	 features	 that	 can	 be	 supplied	 by	 the	
carrier.		This	could	reduce	the	number	of	required	consistent	header	fields.		For	
example,	if	all	carriers	in	the	system	provide	encryption	natively,	there	may	be	
no	 need	 for	 the	 protocol	 to	 support	 an	 encryption	 ID	 and	 user	 data	 segment	
encryption	as	it	can	be	assumed	this	is	inherited	from	the	carriers.		Alternatively,	
if	 error	 detection	 provided	 by	 the	 supported	 carrier’s	 native	 capabilities	 is	
deemed	 suitable	 for	 the	 application’s	 purpose,	 the	 three	 message	 checksums	
might	be	reduced	to	one,	or	even	discarded	completely.	
Further	 development	 may	 also	 repurpose	 the	 protocol	 for	 uses	 other	 than	
healthcare.		For	example,	in	our	work	history,	we	have	undertaken	commercial	
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research	 and	 development	 work	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 remote	 device	 control,	
telemetry	for	vehicles	and	production	systems,	and	applications	such	as	alarm	
monitoring	 and	 vehicle	 tracking.	 	 A	 refactoring	 of	 the	 fundamental	 use	 of	 the	
protocol	 may	 establish	 a	 need	 for	 certain	 fields	 to	 be	 added,	 or	 provide	 the	
opportunity	to	remove	fields	 from	the	consistent	message	header.	 	We	believe	
that	the	structured	field	based	format	of	the	protocol	lends	itself	to	this	sort	of	
expansion	 and	 customisation	 for	 application	 specific	 requirements,	 and	 our	
existing	field	default	value	definitions	certainly	leave	room	for	such	expansion	to	
occur.	
Finally,	a	protocol	implementation	of	this	messaging	protocol	for	use	in	medical	
monitoring	 could	 examine	 the	 potential	 for	 integrating	 our	 fundamental	
messaging	protocol,	supporting	the	carrier	agnostic	backbone,	with	standards‐
compliant	medical	data	protocols.		For	example,	our	protocol	would	support	the	
carrier	agnostic	data	communication	backbone,	and	the	user	data	segment	would	
be	encoded	using	IEEE	medical	telemetry	transmission	standards	such	as	IEEE	
11073‐20601	or	other	appropriate	standards.		This	could	provide	a	fully	realised	
and	medical	application	specific	telemetry	standards	compliant	protocol.			
10.3	Conclusion	
Through	the	features	of	the	protocol	that	we	discussed	in	chapters	3	to	9	of	this	
work,	 we	 identified,	 proposed	 and	 designed	 attributes,	 capabilities	 and	
characteristics	that	can	deliver	a	communications	protocol	that	meets	the	needs	
established	in	table	1	at	the	commencement	of	this	work.			
This	work	has	proven	that	carrier	agnostic	communication	is	possible	for	medical	
monitoring,	 and	 could	 be	 implemented	 in	 a	 real‐world	 application	 subject	 to	
certain	considerations	that	we	have	also.	
We	contend	that	there	is	significant	advantage	to	be	gained	by	considering	the	
use	 of	 multiple	 carriers	 with	 transmission	 fail‐over	 as	 part	 of	 a	 medical	
monitoring	system.			However,	we	also	identify	a	number	of	considerations	and	
potential	limitations	of	a	carrier	agnostic	system	(such	as	bandwidth	constraints,	
hardware	requirements	and	hardware	specific	 implementation	requirements),	
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and	strongly	recommend	that	such	considerations	be	examined	and	allowed	for	
in	any	medical	monitoring	system.	
While	we	developed	our	solution	specifically	to	support	perceived	limitations	in	
the	research	field	of	medical	bio‐monitoring	systems,	we	further	assert	that	the	
capabilities	 provided	 in	 our	 protocol	 may	 lend	 themselves	 to	 applications	 in	
other	fields.		The	structured	and	highly	efficient	field‐based	header	documented	
in	our	approach	makes	it	possible	to	extend,	enhance	and	repurpose	the	protocol	
discussed	herein	for	a	variety	of	other	possible	uses	and	we	therefore	leave	this	
protocol	to	the	uses	that	the	reader	may	find	appropriate.	
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GLOSSARY	OF 	ABBREVIATIONS	
APID	 Application	ID	
BAN	 Body	Area	Network	
CDMA	 Code	Division	Multiple	Access,	an	alternative	carrier	format	
to	GSM	
CSMS	 Concatenated	SMS,	also	known	as	Long	SMS	(which	may	or	
may	not	be	a	contradiction	in	terms!)	
ETSI	 European	Telecommunications	Standards	Institute	
GENT	 Generation	Timestamp	
GSM	 Global	 System	 for	 Mobile	 communications,	 a	 common	
system	 for	 mobile	 telecommunications	 and	 the	 parent	
carrier	for	the	SMS	protocol	
HCHK	 Header	Checksum	
LSB	 Least	 significant	 bit	 –	 the	 lowest	 value	 bit	 in	 a	 binary	
number	–	typically	the	rightmost	bit	
MCHK	 Combined	Message	Checksum	
MFMT	 Message	Protocol	Format	
MMS	 Multimedia	Message	
MSB	 Most	 significant	 bit	 –	 the	 highest	 value	 bit	 in	 a	 binary	
number	–	typically	the	leftmost	bit	
MSID	 Message	ID	
MSTR	 Message	Structure	
MTYP	 Message	Type	
Nibble	 4	bits	–	half	an	octet	
Octet	 In	 the	 binary	 system,	 an	 octet	 is	 a	 collection	 of	 8	 bits	 of	
information,	commonly	referred	to	as	a	byte	
PDU	 Protocol	Data	Unit	 –	 the	 official	 name	 of	 the	 binary	 SMS	
packet	
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RDID	 Recipient	Device	ID	
SDID	 Sender	Device	ID	
SMS	 Short	Message	Service	
SMSC	 Short	Message	Service	Centre	–	the	delivery	coordinator	for	
SMS	messages	on	the	GSM	(and	related)	networks	
SOMF	 Start	of	Message	Frame	
UCHK	 User	Data	Segment	Checksum	
UDSE	 User	Data	Segment	Encryption	ID	
UDSG	 User	Data	Segment	
UDSL	 User	Data	Segment	Length	
VAPD	 Validity	Period	
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APPENDIX 	A: 	CREATION	OF	CRC32	
OR	ADLER32	CHECKSUMS	
In	a	system,	such	as	a	medical	monitoring	system,	when	transmitting	data,	we	
must	 validate	 that	 what	 we	 received	 is	 what	 was	 originally	 sent.	 	 Data	
transmissions	can	be	corrupted	in	transit.		In	a	carrier‐agnostic	system,	we	must	
be	responsible	for	ensuring	wherever	possible	that	we	protect	against	such	data	
corruption.		Without	the	knowledge	that	our	data	is	good,	we	cannot	have	trust	
in	our	data.	
While	our	messaging	format	includes	a	number	of	safeguards	to	ensure	critical	
communications	are	sent	correctly,	we	need	some	form	of	reliable	mechanism	to	
assure	our	data	and	help	to	detect	errors.		Given	the	nature	of	the	message	format	
we	 propose,	 the	 actual	 checksum	 calculation	 routines	 used	 by	 the	 message	
generation	and	decoding	may	actually	be	application	dependent.		However,	in	the	
case	of	our	communications,	we	need	to	ensure	a	balance	between	reliability	and	
capacity	use	 (by	 the	 checksum).	 	To	 this	 end,	we	have	 selected	 the	use	of	 the	
CRC32	or	Adler32	Checksums	as	they	offer	a	relatively	small	footprint	and	a	fairly	
high	level	of	error	detection	capability.			
Both	 Adler32	 and	 CRC32	 checksums	 offer	 “an	 extremely	 low	 probability	 of	
undetected	errors”	 [63].	 	CRC32	checksums	are	well	known	from	the	world	of	
computer	 disks	 and	 files	 integrity	 checks	 (as	 in	 the	 Cyclic	 Redundancy	 Check	
error	from	a	PC	reading	a	corrupted	CD‐ROM	or	disk	file).		However,	the	Adler32	
algorithm	 offers	 similar	 capabilities	 while	 remaining,	 according	 to	 its	 author,	
Mark	Adler,	“much	faster	than	the	CRC32	algorithm”	[63].	
While	 there	 are	many	 works	 covering	 the	 CRC32	 algorithm	 and	 it	 is	 not	 the	
intention	of	this	thesis	to	replicate	them	here,	Adler32	is	less	well	known	and	is	
discussed	in	brief	below.	
The	Adler32	algorithm	generates	a	32‐bit	checksum	by	calculating	two	related	
16‐bit	checksums	and	concatenating	the	values	into	a	single	32‐bit	integer.				
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The	first	16‐bit	checksum	(A)	is	the	sum	of	all	of	the	octets	in	the	data,	plus	1.		The	
second	 16‐bit	 checksum	 (B)	 is	 the	 sum	 of	 each	 individual	 value	 of	 A	 as	 it	 is	
calculated	cyclically	along	the	octet	stream	from	the	first	octet	(leftmost)	to	the	
last	(rightmost)	octet.			
The	following	table	shows	how	the	checksum	is	calculated:	
	 Values	
Octet	#	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	
Octet	
Value	
111	 99	 88	 77	 66	 55	 44	
A	
calculation	
111	+	1	 111	+	99	+	
1	
111	+	99	+	
88	+	1	
111	+	99	+	
88	+	77	+	
1	
111		+	99	+	
88	+	77	+	
66	+	1	
111		+	99	+	
88	+	77	+	
66	+	55	+	1	
111		+	99	+	
88	+	77	+	
66	+	55	+	
44	+	1	
A	value	 112	 211	 299	 376	 442	 497	 541	
B	
calculation	
112	 112	+	211	 112	+	211	
+	299	
112	+	211	
+	299	+	
376	
112	+	211	
+	299	+	
376	+	442	
112	+	211	
+	299	+	
376	+	442	
+	497	
112	+	211	
+	299	+	
376	+	442	
+	497	+	
541	
B	value	 112	 323	 622	 998	 1440	 1637	 2178	
Table 47. Illustrating	the	use	of	the	Adler	32	Checksum	Algorithm	
The	addition	of	 the	octets	 is	done	to	modulo	65521.	 	This	 is	 the	 largest	16	bit	
prime	number	[103].	 	Using	this	modulo	as	a	rollover	point	for	the	calculation	
allows	very	long	chains	of	octets	to	be	calculated	into	the	algorithm	–	the	sum	
simply	rolls	back	to	0	when	the	total	exceeds	65521	(note	that	this	also	means	
that	our	checksum	will	never	have	 the	value	of	11111111	 in	any	of	 its	octets,	
which	allows	us	to	continue	to	reserve	this	value	 for	system	purposes	such	as	
field	delimiting).	
Using	 this	method,	 A	 is	 calculated	 as	 the	 16‐bit	 number	 0000001000011101,	
while	B	is	calculated	as	0000100010000010.	
The	resultant	values	are	then	stored	in	BA	format	across	four	continuous	octets.		
The	final	checksum	is	32	bits	long:	
00001000100000100000001000011101	
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Both	CRC32	and	Adler32	checksums	are	in	use	in	a	wide	variety	of	applications.		
They	have	the	advantage	of	being	quick	to	apply,	easy	to	implement,	and	give	a	
good	probability	of	error	detection.			 	
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APPENDIX 	B: 	7‐BIT 	SMS	
ALPHABET	
The	 following	 table	 shows	 the	7	bit	SMS	Alphabet,	 as	defined	 in	 the	GSM	SMS	
standard	[42].		This	alphabet	should	be	used	for	the	7‐bit	packing	of	SMS	ASCII	
into	8‐bit	binary	data	segments.	
Hex	 Dec	 Character	name	 Character	
0×00	 0	 COMMERCIAL	AT	 @	
0×01	 1	 POUND	SIGN	 £	
0×02	 2	 DOLLAR	SIGN	 $	
0×03	 3	 YEN	SIGN	 ¥	
0×04	 4	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	E	WITH	GRAVE	 è	
0×05	 5	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	E	WITH	ACUTE	 é	
0×06	 6	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	U	WITH	GRAVE	 ù	
0×07	 7	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	I	WITH	GRAVE	 ì	
0×08	 8	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	O	WITH	GRAVE	 ò	
0×09	 9	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	C	WITH	CEDILLA	 Ç	
0×0A	 10	 LINE	FEED	
0×0B	 11	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	O	WITH	STROKE	 Ø	
0×0C	 12	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	O	WITH	STROKE	 ø	
0×0D	 13	 CARRIAGE	RETURN	
0×0E	 14	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	A	WITH	RING	
ABOVE	
Å	
0×0F	 15	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	A	WITH	RING	ABOVE	 å	
0×10	 16	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	DELTA	 Δ	
0×11	 17	 LOW	LINE	 _	
0×12	 18	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	PHI	 Φ	
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Hex	 Dec	 Character	name	 Character	
0×13	 19	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	GAMMA	 Γ	
0×14	 20	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	LAMBDA	 Λ	
0×15	 21	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	OMEGA	 Ω	
0×16	 22	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	PI	 Π	
0×17	 23	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	PSI	 Ψ	
0×18	 24	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	SIGMA	 Σ	
0×19	 25	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	THETA	 Θ	
0×1A	 26	 GREEK	CAPITAL	LETTER	XI	 Ξ	
0×1B	 27	 ESCAPE	TO	EXTENSION	TABLE		
0×1B0A	 27	10	 FORM	FEED	
0×1B14	 27	20	 CIRCUMFLEX	ACCENT	 ^	
0×1B28	 27	40	 LEFT	CURLY	BRACKET	 {	
0×1B29	 27	41	 RIGHT	CURLY	BRACKET	 }	
0×1B2F	 27	47	 REVERSE	SOLIDUS	(BACKSLASH)	 \	
0×1B3C	 27	60	 LEFT	SQUARE	BRACKET	 [	
0x1B3D	 27	61	 TILDE	 ~	
0x1B3E	 27	62	 RIGHT	SQUARE	BRACKET	 ]	
0×1B40	 27	64	 VERTICAL	BAR	 |	
0×1B65	 27	
101	
EURO	SIGN	 €	
0×1C	 28	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	AE	 Æ	
0×1D	 29	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	AE	 æ	
0×1E	 30	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	SHARP	S	(German)	 ß	
0×1F	 31	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	E	WITH	ACUTE	 É	
0×20	 32	 SPACE	
0×21	 33	 EXCLAMATION	MARK	 !	
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Hex	 Dec	 Character	name	 Character	
0×22	 34	 QUOTATION	MARK	 “	
0×23	 35	 NUMBER	SIGN	 #	
0×24	 36	 CURRENCY	SIGN	 ¤	
0×25	 37	 PERCENT	SIGN	 %	
0×26	 38	 AMPERSAND	 &	
0×27	 39	 APOSTROPHE	 ‘	
0×28	 40	 LEFT	PARENTHESIS	 (	
0×29	 41	 RIGHT	PARENTHESIS	 )	
0×2A	 42	 ASTERISK	 *	
0×2B	 43	 PLUS	SIGN	 +	
0×2C	 44	 COMMA	 ,	
0×2D	 45	 HYPHEN‐MINUS	 ‐	
0×2E	 46	 FULL	STOP	 .	
0×2F	 47	 SOLIDUS	(SLASH)	 /	
0×30	 48	 DIGIT	ZERO	 0	
0×31	 49	 DIGIT	ONE	 1	
0×32	 50	 DIGIT	TWO	 2	
0×33	 51	 DIGIT	THREE	 3	
0×34	 52	 DIGIT	FOUR	 4	
0×35	 53	 DIGIT	FIVE	 5	
0×36	 54	 DIGIT	SIX	 6	
0×37	 55	 DIGIT	SEVEN	 7	
0×38	 56	 DIGIT	EIGHT	 8	
0×39	 57	 DIGIT	NINE	 9	
0×3A	 58	 COLON	 :	
0×3B	 59	 SEMICOLON	 ;	
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Hex	 Dec	 Character	name	 Character	
0×3C	 60	 LESS‐THAN	SIGN	 <	
0×3D	 61	 EQUALS	SIGN	 =	
0×3E	 62	 GREATER‐THAN	SIGN	 >	
0×3F	 63	 QUESTION	MARK	 ?	
0×40	 64	 INVERTED	EXCLAMATION	MARK	 ¡	
0×41	 65	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	A	 A	
0×42	 66	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	B	 B	
0×43	 67	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	C	 C	
0×44	 68	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	D	 D	
0×45	 69	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	E	 E	
0×46	 70	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	F	 F	
0×47	 71	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	G	 G	
0×48	 72	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	H	 H	
0×49	 73	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	I	 I	
0×4A	 74	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	J	 J	
0×4B	 75	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	K	 K	
0×4C	 76	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	L	 L	
0×4D	 77	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	M	 M	
0×4E	 78	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	N	 N	
0×4F	 79	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	O	 O	
0×50	 80	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	P	 P	
0×51	 81	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	Q	 Q	
0×52	 82	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	R	 R	
0×53	 83	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	S	 S	
0×54	 84	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	T	 T	
0×55	 85	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	U	 U	
	
	 250	 	
	
Hex	 Dec	 Character	name	 Character	
0×56	 86	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	V	 V	
0×57	 87	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	W	 W	
0×58	 88	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	X	 X	
0×59	 89	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	Y	 Y	
0×5A	 90	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	Z	 Z	
0×5B	 91	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	A	WITH	DIAERESIS	 Ä	
0×5C	 92	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	O	WITH	DIAERESIS	 Ö	
0×5D	 93	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	N	WITH	TILDE	 Ñ	
0×5E	 94	 LATIN	CAPITAL	LETTER	U	WITH	DIAERESIS	 Ü	
0×5F	 95	 SECTION	SIGN	 §	
0×60	 96	 INVERTED	QUESTION	MARK	 ¿	
0×61	 97	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	A	 a	
0×62	 98	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	B	 b	
0×63	 99	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	C	 c	
0×64	 100	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	D	 d	
0×65	 101	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	E	 e	
0×66	 102	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	F	 f	
0×67	 103	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	G	 g	
0×68	 104	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	H	 h	
0×69	 105	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	I	 i	
0×6A	 106	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	J	 j	
0×6B	 107	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	K	 k	
0×6C	 108	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	L	 l	
0×6D	 109	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	M	 m	
0×6E	 110	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	N	 n	
0×6F	 111	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	O	 o	
	
	 251	 	
	
Hex	 Dec	 Character	name	 Character	
0×70	 112	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	P	 p	
0×71	 113	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	Q	 q	
0×72	 114	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	R	 r	
0×73	 115	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	S	 s	
0×74	 116	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	T	 t	
0×75	 117	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	U	 u	
0×76	 118	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	V	 v	
0×77	 119	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	W	 w	
0×78	 120	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	X	 x	
0×79	 121	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	Y	 y	
0×7A	 122	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	Z	 z	
0×7B	 123	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	A	WITH	DIAERESIS	 ä	
0×7C	 124	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	O	WITH	DIAERESIS	 ö	
0×7D	 125	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	N	WITH	TILDE	 ñ	
0×7E	 126	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	U	WITH	DIAERESIS	 ü	
0×7F	 127	 LATIN	SMALL	LETTER	A	WITH	GRAVE	 à	
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APPENDIX 	C : 	7‐BIT 	PACKED	ASCII 	
FORMAT	
7	 bit	 ASCII‐encoded	 text	 (or	 7	 bit	 packed	 ASCII)	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 GSM	 SMS	
Standard	[41].		The	reason	for	the	development	of	the	7‐bit	packing	method	was	
to	maximise	the	number	of	characters	that	could	be	sent	 in	an	SMS	containing	
140	 octets	 of	 data.	 	 Standard	 ASCII	 is	 a	 7‐bit	 code,	 and	 by	 packing	 the	 7	 bit	
characters	 into	 8	 bit	 octets	 (rather	 than	 discarding	 the	 remaining	 bit	 in	 each	
octet),	160	characters	can	be	packed	into	the	140‐octet	message	capacity	of	the	
SMS.		The	following	equation	shows	how	we	arrive	at	160	7	bit	characters.	
140	݋ܿݐ݁ݐݏ	ݔ	8	ܾ݅ݐݏ ൌ 1120	ܾ݅ݐݏ	
1120	ܾ݅ݐݏ	 ൊ 7	ܾ݅ݐݏ ൌ 160	7	ܾ݅ݐ	݄ܿܽݎܽܿݐ݁ݎݏ	
7‐bit	encoding	of	an	SMS	is	used	to	send	plain	text	messages	and	is	used	in	English	
and	 most	 European	 language	 text	 messages.	 	 The	 packing	 of	 the	 7	 bit	 ASCII	
message	into	8	bit	octets	is	performed	by	the	originator	of	the	message	during	
the	encoding	process.		It	occurs	as	follows:	
Take	the	string	Hello	World	as	an	example.		In	the	7‐bit	alphabet	used	by	SMS,	
this	string	has	the	following	7	bit	values:	
	
Character	 Binary	Value
H	 1001000	
e	 1100101	
l	 1101100	
l	 1101100	
o	 1101111	
<SPACE> 0100000	
W	 1010111	
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Character	 Binary	Value
o	 1101111	
r	 1110010	
l	 1101100	
d	 1100100	
Table 48. 7	bit	ASCII	values	for	Hello	World	
	
While	 we	 might	 simply	 assign	 each	 character	 to	 an	 octet,	 leaving	 the	 most	
significant	bit	of	the	octet	as	0,	it	is	possible	to	use	the	8th	bit	for	additional	data,	
packing	the	7	bit	characters	across	octet	boundaries.			
The	packing	process	starts	with	the	first	character	of	the	message	and	encodes	it	
into	the	octet,	leaving	the	most	significant	bit	free.	
Bit	
8	 7	 6	 5	 4	 3	 2	 1	
	 1	 0	 0	 1	 0	 0	 0	
Table 49. Encoding	the	7	bit	ASCII	character	H	in	an	8‐bit	octet	
We	then	take	the	least	significant	bit	from	the	following	character	to	create	a	full	
octet.		For	the	second	character	in	our	string,	e,	we	therefore	encode	1	bit	into	the	
first	octet,	and	the	remaining	6	bits	into	the	second	octet	(starting	from	the	LSB).	
Thus,	in	the	second	octet,	2	bits	from	the	least	significant	positions	of	the	third	
character	are	encoded	into	the	MSB	end	of	this	octet.	 	The	process	is	repeated	
until	user	data	is	fully	encoded	into	the	message	payload.	
For	 the	Hello	World	 message,	 the	 first	 character	 is	 H,	 1001000	 in	 the	 7‐bit	
alphabet.		After	encoding	the	7	bits	of	H	into	the	octet,	we	have	a	single	bit	free	at	
the	MSB	end	of	the	octet.		To	create	a	full	octet	of	8	bits,	the	packing	algorithm	
takes	the	least	significant	bit	of	the	next	character,	e	(1100101)	which	is	bit	value	
1,	then	adds	it	to	the	most	significant	bit	position	of	the	first	octet	to	make	a	single	
octet	with	a	value	of	11001000.	
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The	 e	 character	 now	 requires	 an	 additional	 6	 bits	 to	 encode	 (110010)	 after	
donating	 the	 least	 significant	 bit	 to	 the	 packing	 of	 H.	 	 The	 packing	 algorithm	
encodes	this	into	the	next	octet,	and	then	takes	two	bits	from	the	next	character,	
l	(1101100),	00,	and	adds	these	at	the	most	significant	 locations	in	the	second	
octet	 for	a	result	of	00110010.	 	The	remaining	bits	of	 the	7‐bit	 l	character	are	
therefore	5	bits	(11011)	long,	and	as	the	process	is	repeated	we	encode	these	5	
bits	 into	 the	 third	octet	 and	 take	 the	 least	 significant	 three	bits	 from	 the	next	
character,	another	l,	for	a	value	of	10011011.		This	process	is	repeated	until	the	
entire	message	is	packed.	
At	the	end	of	the	message,	if	the	packing	of	the	last	character	does	not	result	in	a	
full	(8	bits	used)	octet,	the	‘missing’	bits	starting	from	the	most	significant	bit	are	
set	to	0.			
The	 following	 diagram	 illustrates	 the	 start	 of	 the	 packing	 process	 for	 the	 five	
characters	of	the	word	Hello.	
	
	
FIGURE	82:	ILLUSTRATION	OF	THE	PACKING	PROCESS	‐	7	BIT	ASCII	INTO	8	BIT	OCTET	
In	the	case	of	the	above	diagram,	the	final	3	bits	of	character	5	(o)	would	then	be	
encoded	into	the	next	octet.	
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APPENDIX 	D: 	A 	SOFTWARE	CLASS 	
STRUCTURE	TO	 IMPLEMENT	THE	
PROTOCOL	USING	C#	
The	protocol	as	discussed	within	this	thesis	can	be	implemented	via	a	class	using	
C#	or	another	object‐oriented	language.		Other	methods	of	implementation	such	
as	structures,	types,	variables	and	subroutines	etc.	are	also	possible,	but	are	not	
explored	herein.		The	implementation	of	the	protocol	structure	is	intended	as	an	
example	only	for	illustrative	purposes.	
A	class	diagram	for	a	proposed	protocol	class	is	as	follows:	
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Code	to	define	the	field	positions	of	the	various	fields,	and	define	properties	of	
the	class	to	hold	each	field	in	the	header	(plus	the	user	data	segment)	are	shown	
below:	
//base 0 message format positions and lengths in the byte array 
        public static int startHeader = 0; 
        public static int lengthHeader = 40; 
 
        //base 0 user data segment start 
        public static int startUSDG = 40; 
 
        //base 0 field positions 
        public const int start_FLD_01_SOMF = 0; 
        public const int start_FLD_02_MFMT = 2; 
        public const int start_FLD_03_MTYP = 3; 
        public const int start_FLD_04_APID = 4; 
        public const int start_FLD_05_SDID = 5; 
        public const int start_FLD_06_RDID = 8; 
        public const int start_FLD_07_MSID = 11; 
        public const int start_FLD_08_MSTR = 14; 
        public const int start_FLD_09_GENT = 15; 
        public const int start_FLD_10_VAPD = 22; 
        public const int start_FLD_11_USDL = 25; 
        public const int start_FLD_12_UDSE = 27; 
        public const int start_FLD_13_HCHK = 28; 
        public const int start_FLD_14_UCHK = 32; 
        public const int start_FLD_15_MCHK = 36; 
 
        //lengths of fields 
        public const int length_FLD_01_SOMF = 2; 
        public const int length_FLD_02_MFMT = 1; 
        public const int length_FLD_03_MTYP = 1; 
        public const int length_FLD_04_APID = 1; 
        public const int length_FLD_05_SDID = 3; 
        public const int length_FLD_06_RDID = 3; 
        public const int length_FLD_07_MSID = 3; 
        public const int length_FLD_08_MSTR = 1; 
        public const int length_FLD_09_GENT = 7; 
        public const int length_FLD_10_VAPD = 3; 
        public const int length_FLD_11_USDL = 2; 
        public const int length_FLD_12_UDSE = 1; 
        public const int length_FLD_13_HCHK = 4; 
        public const int length_FLD_14_UCHK = 4; 
        public const int length_FLD_15_MCHK = 4; 
 
        //default values 
        public const string default_FLD_01_SOMF = "**"; 
        public const string default_FLD_02_MFMT = "00000010"; 
        public const string default_FLD_03_MTYP = "00000001"; 
        public const string default_FLD_04_APID = "00000001"; 
        public const string default_FLD_05_SDID = "000000000000000000000001"; 
        public const string default_FLD_06_RDID = "000000000000000000000001"; 
        public const string default_FLD_07_MSID = "000000000000000000000001"; 
        public const string default_FLD_08_MSTR = "00000000"; 
        public const string default_FLD_09_GENT = 
"00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000"; 
        public const string default_FLD_10_VAPD = "000000000000000011111111"; 
        public const string default_FLD_11_USDL = "0000000000000000"; 
        public const string default_FLD_12_UDSE = "00000000"; 
        public const string default_FLD_13_HCHK = "00000000000000000000000000000000"; 
        public const string default_FLD_14_UCHK = "00000000000000000000000000000000"; 
        public const string default_FLD_15_MCHK = "10101010101010101010101010101010"; 
 
 
        //message fields 
        public byte[] FLD_01_SOMF { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_02_MFMT { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_03_MYTP { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_04_APID { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_05_SDID { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_06_RDID { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_07_MSID { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_08_MSTR { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_09_GENT { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_10_VAPD { get; set; } 
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        public byte[] FLD_11_UDSL { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_12_UDSE { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_13_HCHK { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_14_UCHK { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_15_MCHK { get; set; } 
        public byte[] FLD_16_UDSG { get; set; } 
 
 
        //compiled versions of the message 
        public byte[] MESG_B { get; set; }          //byte array message	
Code	to	initialise	the	structure	of	the	header:	
public void initialise() 
        { 
            FLD_01_SOMF = convertCharacterStringToBinaryCodedASCII(default_FLD_01_SOMF); 
            FLD_02_MFMT = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_02_MFMT); 
            FLD_03_MYTP = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_03_MTYP); 
            FLD_04_APID = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_04_APID); 
            FLD_05_SDID = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_05_SDID); 
            FLD_06_RDID = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_06_RDID); 
            FLD_07_MSID = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_07_MSID); 
            FLD_08_MSTR = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_08_MSTR); 
            FLD_09_GENT = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(encodeBinaryGenerationTimeStamp()); 
            FLD_10_VAPD = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_10_VAPD); 
            FLD_11_UDSL = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_11_USDL); 
            FLD_12_UDSE = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_12_UDSE); 
            FLD_13_HCHK = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_13_HCHK); 
            FLD_14_UCHK = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_14_UCHK); 
            FLD_15_MCHK = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_15_MCHK); 
        } 
 
Code	 to	 encode	 and	 decode	 the	 fields	 in	 a	 message	 into	 or	 out	 of	 the	 class	
attributes:	
public bool encodeMessage() 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                int UDSGLength = 0; 
                try 
                { 
                    UDSGLength = FLD_16_UDSG.Length; 
                    FLD_11_UDSL = 
convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(convertNumberToBinary(UDSGLength,2));              
                } 
                catch (Exception) 
                { 
                    UDSGLength = 0; 
                } 
 
                MESG_B = new byte[lengthHeader+UDSGLength]; 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_01_SOMF, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_01_SOMF, length_FLD_01_SOMF); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_02_MFMT, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_02_MFMT, length_FLD_02_MFMT); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_03_MYTP, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_03_MTYP, length_FLD_03_MTYP); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_04_APID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_04_APID, length_FLD_04_APID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_05_SDID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_05_SDID, length_FLD_05_SDID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_06_RDID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_06_RDID, length_FLD_06_RDID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_07_MSID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_07_MSID, length_FLD_07_MSID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_08_MSTR, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_08_MSTR, length_FLD_08_MSTR); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_09_GENT, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_09_GENT, length_FLD_09_GENT); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_10_VAPD, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_10_VAPD, length_FLD_10_VAPD); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_11_UDSL, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_11_USDL, length_FLD_11_USDL); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_12_UDSE, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_12_UDSE, length_FLD_12_UDSE); 
 
                //add in the user data 
                if (FLD_16_UDSG != null) 
                    Array.Copy(FLD_16_UDSG, 0, MESG_B, startUSDG, FLD_16_UDSG.Length); 
 
                //generate the header and udsg checksums 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.header, MESG_B); 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.userdata, MESG_B); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_13_HCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_13_HCHK, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_14_UCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_14_UCHK, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
 
                //for the message checksum we need to set the default value and then drop in the real one after 
encoding 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
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                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.message, MESG_B); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
                 
                return true; 
            } 
            catch (Exception ex) 
            { 
                return false; 
            } 
        } 
 
 
        public bool decodeMessage(byte[] message) 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_01_SOMF, FLD_01_SOMF, 0, length_FLD_01_SOMF); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_02_MFMT, FLD_02_MFMT, 0, length_FLD_02_MFMT ); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_03_MTYP, FLD_03_MYTP, 0, length_FLD_03_MTYP); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_04_APID, FLD_04_APID, 0, length_FLD_04_APID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_05_SDID, FLD_05_SDID, 0, length_FLD_05_SDID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_06_RDID, FLD_06_RDID, 0, length_FLD_06_RDID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_07_MSID, FLD_07_MSID, 0, length_FLD_07_MSID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_08_MSTR, FLD_08_MSTR, 0, length_FLD_08_MSTR); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_09_GENT, FLD_09_GENT, 0, length_FLD_09_GENT); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_10_VAPD, FLD_10_VAPD, 0, length_FLD_10_VAPD); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_11_USDL, FLD_11_UDSL, 0, length_FLD_11_USDL); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_12_UDSE, FLD_12_UDSE, 0, length_FLD_12_UDSE); 
 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_13_HCHK, FLD_13_HCHK, 0, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_14_UCHK, FLD_14_UCHK, 0, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_15_MCHK, FLD_15_MCHK, 0, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
 
                Array.Copy(MESG_B, startUSDG, FLD_16_UDSG, 0, MESG_B.Length ‐ 40); 
 
 
                //now backup the checksums 
                byte[] HCHK = new byte[length_FLD_13_HCHK]; 
                byte[] UCHK = new byte[length_FLD_14_UCHK]; 
                byte[] MCHK = new byte[length_FLD_15_MCHK]; 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_13_HCHK, HCHK, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_14_UCHK, UCHK, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
 
 
                //generate the header and udsg checksums 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.header, message); 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.userdata, message); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_13_HCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_13_HCHK, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_14_UCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_14_UCHK, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
 
                //for the message checksum we need to set the default value and then drop in the real one after 
encoding 
                FLD_15_MCHK = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_15_MCHK); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.message, message); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
 
                //checksum validation 
                if (!FLD_13_HCHK.SequenceEqual(HCHK)) 
                    strMessages += "HCHK not validated"; 
 
                if (!FLD_14_UCHK.SequenceEqual(UCHK)) 
                    strMessages += "UCHK not validated"; 
 
                if (!FLD_15_MCHK.SequenceEqual(MCHK)) 
                    strMessages += "MCHK not validated"; 
 
 
                return true; 
            } 
            catch (Exception) 
            { 
                return false; 
            } 
        }	
Code	for	checksum	calculation	is	shown	below	–	licensed	by	Jon	Skeet	and	Marc	
Gravell	under	Apache	License	and	fully	acknowledged	inline	in	the	code:	
  //Adler32 taken from the library here 
    //Credits/Copyright: Copyright © 2004‐2008 Jon Skeet and Marc Gravell. 
    //Source: http://www.yoda.arachsys.com/csharp/miscutil/ 
    //licensed under APACHE license 
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    //duly acknowledged with thanks 
 
    public class Adler32 
    { 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Base for modulo arithmetic 
        /// </summary> 
    const int Base = 65521; 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Number of iterations we can safely do before applying the modulo. 
        /// </summary> 
    const int NMax = 5552; 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Computes the Adler32 checksum for the given data. 
        /// </summary> 
        /// <param name="initial"> 
        /// Initial value or previous result. Use 1 for the 
        /// first transformation. 
        /// </param> 
        /// <param name="data">The data to compute the checksum of</param> 
        /// <param name="start">Index of first byte to compute checksum for</param> 
        /// <param name="length">Number of bytes to compute checksum for</param> 
        /// <returns>The checksum of the given data</returns> 
        public static int ComputeChecksum(int initial, byte[] data, int start, int length) 
        { 
            if (data == null) 
            { 
                throw (new System.ArgumentNullException("data")); 
            } 
            uint s1 = (uint)(initial & 0xffff); 
            uint s2 = (uint)((initial >> 16) & 0xffff); 
 
            int index = start; 
            int len = length; 
 
            int k; 
            while (len > 0) 
            { 
                k = (len < NMax) ? len : NMax; 
                len ‐= k; 
 
                for (int i = 0; i < k; i++) 
                { 
                    s1 += data[index++]; 
                    s2 += s1; 
                } 
                s1 %= Base; 
                s2 %= Base; 
            } 
 
            return (int)((s2 << 16) | s1); 
        } 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Computes the Adler32 checksum for the given data. 
        /// </summary> 
        /// <param name="initial"> 
        /// Initial value or previous result. Use 1 for the 
        /// first transformation. 
        /// </param> 
        /// <param name="data">The data to compute the checksum of</param> 
        /// <returns>The checksum of the given data</returns> 
        public static int ComputeChecksum(int initial, byte[] data) 
        { 
            if (data == null) 
            { 
                throw (new System.ArgumentNullException("data")); 
            } 
            return ComputeChecksum(initial, data, 0, data.Length); 
        }                 
    }	 	
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APPENDIX 	E : 	ENCRYPTION	TEST	
APPLICATION	
The	encryption	test	application	was	created	to	test	the	overhead	for	a	number	of	
common	reversible	encryption	techniques.		The	tests	allowed	for	AES,	Rijndael,	
RSA	and	Blowfish	encryption	to	be	tested	via	Microsoft’s	.NET	security	libraries.	
	
FIGURE	83:	ENCRYPTION	TEST	APPLICATION	SCREEN	
	
using System; 
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using System.Collections.Generic; 
using System.ComponentModel; 
using System.Data; 
using System.Drawing; 
using System.Linq; 
using System.Text; 
using System.Threading.Tasks; 
using System.Windows.Forms; 
using System.IO; 
using System.Security.Cryptography; 
using System.Collections; 
 
/*********************************************** 
 
    This sample uses encryption code taken from the following web sites: 
 
    http://www.aspsnippets.com/Articles/AES‐Encryption‐Decryption‐Cryptography‐Tutorial‐with‐
example‐in‐ASPNet‐using‐C‐and‐VBNet.aspx 
    http://www.obviex.com/samples/encryption.aspx 
    https://msdn.microsoft.com/en‐
us/library/system.security.cryptography.rsacryptoserviceprovider.aspx 
    https://defuse.ca/blowfish.htm 
 
 
***********************************************/ 
 
 
namespace Encryption 
{ 
    public partial class Form1 : Form 
    { 
 
 
        public Form1() 
        { 
            InitializeComponent(); 
        } 
 
        private void btnGo_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            Encrypt(sender, e); 
        } 
 
 
        protected void Encrypt(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            txtSource.Text = "This is a 160 character ASCII message that would fit in a standard 
SMS message packet.  Our smallest carrier unit according to the premises established earlier."; 
            txtSourceLength.Text = txtSource.Text.Length.ToString(); 
            txtAES.Text = this.EncryptAES(txtSource.Text.Trim()); 
            txtAESLength.Text = txtAES.Text.Length.ToString(); 
 
 
            string passPhrase = "tHiS1SaS1Mpl3K3y";         // can be any string 
            string saltValue = "s@1tValue";                 // can be any string 
            string hashAlgorithm = "SHA1";                  // can be "MD5" 
            int passwordIterations = 2;                     // can be any number 
            string initVector = "@1Bdslkj34jhlks3";         // must be 16 bytes 
            int keySize = 256;                              // can be 192 or 128 
 
 
            string cipherText = EncryptRijndael(txtSource.Text, passPhrase, saltValue, 
hashAlgorithm, passwordIterations, initVector, keySize); 
 
            txtRjindael.Text = cipherText; 
            txtRjindaelLength.Text = txtRjindael.Text.Length.ToString(); 
 
 
            UnicodeEncoding ByteConverter = new UnicodeEncoding(); 
 
 
            byte[] dataToEncrypt = ByteConverter.GetBytes(txtSource.Text); 
            byte[] encryptedData; 
            byte[] decryptedData; 
            using (RSACryptoServiceProvider RSA = new RSACryptoServiceProvider(5120)) 
            { 
                encryptedData = RSAEncrypt(dataToEncrypt, RSA.ExportParameters(false), false); 
                decryptedData = RSADecrypt(encryptedData, RSA.ExportParameters(true), false); 
 
	
	 263	 	
	
                txtRSA.Text = ByteConverter.GetString(encryptedData); 
                txtRSAlength.Text = txtRSA.Text.Length.ToString(); 
            }; 
 
 
            BlowFish b = new BlowFish("04B915BA43FEB5B6"); 
 
            txtBlowfish.Text = b.Encrypt_CBC(txtSource.Text); 
            txtBlowfishLen.Text = txtBlowfish.Text.Length.ToString(); 
 
        } 
 
 
 
 
 
        public byte[] RSAEncrypt(byte[] DataToEncrypt, RSAParameters RSAKeyInfo, bool 
DoOAEPPadding) 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                byte[] encryptedData; 
                //Create a new instance of RSACryptoServiceProvider. 
                using (RSACryptoServiceProvider RSA = new RSACryptoServiceProvider(5120)) 
                { 
 
                    //Import the RSA Key information. This only needs 
                    //toinclude the public key information. 
                    RSA.ImportParameters(RSAKeyInfo); 
 
                    //Encrypt the passed byte array and specify OAEP padding.   
                    //OAEP padding is only available on Microsoft Windows XP or 
                    //later.   
                    encryptedData = RSA.Encrypt(DataToEncrypt, DoOAEPPadding); 
                } 
                return encryptedData; 
            } 
            //Catch and display a CryptographicException   
            //to the console. 
            catch (CryptographicException e) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine(e.Message); 
 
                return null; 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        public byte[] RSADecrypt(byte[] DataToDecrypt, RSAParameters RSAKeyInfo, bool 
DoOAEPPadding) 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                byte[] decryptedData; 
                //Create a new instance of RSACryptoServiceProvider. 
                using (RSACryptoServiceProvider RSA = new RSACryptoServiceProvider(5120)) 
                { 
                    //Import the RSA Key information. This needs 
                    //to include the private key information. 
                    RSA.ImportParameters(RSAKeyInfo); 
 
                    //Decrypt the passed byte array and specify OAEP padding.   
                    //OAEP padding is only available on Microsoft Windows XP or 
                    //later.   
                    decryptedData = RSA.Decrypt(DataToDecrypt, DoOAEPPadding); 
                } 
                return decryptedData; 
            } 
            //Catch and display a CryptographicException   
            //to the console. 
            catch (CryptographicException e) 
            { 
                Console.WriteLine(e.ToString()); 
 
                return null; 
            } 
 
        } 
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        private string EncryptAES(string clearText) 
        { 
            string EncryptionKey = "tHiS1SaK3y"; 
            byte[] clearBytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(clearText); 
            using (Aes encryptor = Aes.Create()) 
            { 
                Rfc2898DeriveBytes pdb = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(EncryptionKey, new byte[] { 0x49, 
0x76, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x64, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x65, 0x76 }); 
                encryptor.Key = pdb.GetBytes(32); 
                encryptor.IV = pdb.GetBytes(16); 
                using (MemoryStream ms = new MemoryStream()) 
                { 
                    using (CryptoStream cs = new CryptoStream(ms, encryptor.CreateEncryptor(), 
CryptoStreamMode.Write)) 
                    { 
                        cs.Write(clearBytes, 0, clearBytes.Length); 
                        cs.Close(); 
                    } 
                    clearText = Convert.ToBase64String(ms.ToArray()); 
                } 
            } 
            return clearText; 
        } 
 
 
        private string DecryptAES(string cipherText) 
        { 
            string EncryptionKey = "tHiS1SaK3y"; 
            byte[] cipherBytes = Convert.FromBase64String(cipherText); 
            using (Aes encryptor = Aes.Create()) 
            { 
                Rfc2898DeriveBytes pdb = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes(EncryptionKey, new byte[] { 0x49, 
0x76, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x65, 0x64, 0x76, 0x65, 0x64, 0x65, 0x76 }); 
                encryptor.Key = pdb.GetBytes(32); 
                encryptor.IV = pdb.GetBytes(16); 
                using (MemoryStream ms = new MemoryStream()) 
                { 
                    using (CryptoStream cs = new CryptoStream(ms, encryptor.CreateDecryptor(), 
CryptoStreamMode.Write)) 
                    { 
                        cs.Write(cipherBytes, 0, cipherBytes.Length); 
                        cs.Close(); 
                    } 
                    cipherText = Encoding.ASCII.GetString(ms.ToArray()); 
                } 
            } 
            return cipherText; 
        } 
 
 
 
        public static string EncryptRijndael(string plainText, string passPhrase, string saltValue, 
string hashAlgorithm, int passwordIterations, string initVector, int keySize) 
        { 
            // Convert strings into byte arrays. 
            // Let us assume that strings only contain ASCII codes. 
            // If strings include Unicode characters, use Unicode, UTF7, or UTF8  
            // encoding. 
            byte[] initVectorBytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(initVector); 
            byte[] saltValueBytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(saltValue); 
 
            // Convert our plaintext into a byte array. 
            // Let us assume that plaintext contains UTF8‐encoded characters. 
            byte[] plainTextBytes = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(plainText); 
 
            // First, we must create a password, from which the key will be derived. 
            // This password will be generated from the specified passphrase and  
            // salt value. The password will be created using the specified hash  
            // algorithm. Password creation can be done in several iterations. 
            PasswordDeriveBytes password = new PasswordDeriveBytes 
            ( 
                passPhrase, 
                saltValueBytes, 
                hashAlgorithm, 
                passwordIterations 
            ); 
 
            // Use the password to generate pseudo‐random bytes for the encryption 
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            // key. Specify the size of the key in bytes (instead of bits). 
            byte[] keyBytes = password.GetBytes(keySize / 8); 
 
            // Create uninitialized Rijndael encryption object. 
            RijndaelManaged symmetricKey = new RijndaelManaged(); 
 
            // It is reasonable to set encryption mode to Cipher Block Chaining 
            // (CBC). Use default options for other symmetric key parameters. 
            symmetricKey.Mode = CipherMode.CBC; 
 
            // Generate encryptor from the existing key bytes and initialization  
            // vector. Key size will be defined based on the number of the key  
            // bytes. 
            ICryptoTransform encryptor = symmetricKey.CreateEncryptor 
            ( 
                keyBytes, 
                initVectorBytes 
            ); 
 
            // Define memory stream which will be used to hold encrypted data. 
            MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream(); 
 
            // Define cryptographic stream (always use Write mode for encryption). 
            CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream 
            ( 
                memoryStream, 
                encryptor, 
                CryptoStreamMode.Write 
            ); 
 
            // Start encrypting. 
            cryptoStream.Write(plainTextBytes, 0, plainTextBytes.Length); 
 
            // Finish encrypting. 
            cryptoStream.FlushFinalBlock(); 
 
            // Convert our encrypted data from a memory stream into a byte array. 
            byte[] cipherTextBytes = memoryStream.ToArray(); 
 
            // Close both streams. 
            memoryStream.Close(); 
            cryptoStream.Close(); 
 
            // Convert encrypted data into a base64‐encoded string. 
            string cipherText = Convert.ToBase64String(cipherTextBytes); 
 
            // Return encrypted string. 
            return cipherText; 
        } 
 
 
        public static string DecryptRijndael(string cipherText, string passPhrase, string 
saltValue, string hashAlgorithm, int passwordIterations, string initVector, int keySize) 
        { 
            // Convert strings defining encryption key characteristics into byte 
            // arrays. Let us assume that strings only contain ASCII codes. 
            // If strings include Unicode characters, use Unicode, UTF7, or UTF8 
            // encoding. 
            byte[] initVectorBytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(initVector); 
            byte[] saltValueBytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(saltValue); 
 
            // Convert our ciphertext into a byte array. 
            byte[] cipherTextBytes = Convert.FromBase64String(cipherText); 
 
            // First, we must create a password, from which the key will be  
            // derived. This password will be generated from the specified  
            // passphrase and salt value. The password will be created using 
            // the specified hash algorithm. Password creation can be done in 
            // several iterations. 
            PasswordDeriveBytes password = new PasswordDeriveBytes 
            ( 
                passPhrase, 
                saltValueBytes, 
                hashAlgorithm, 
                passwordIterations 
            ); 
 
            // Use the password to generate pseudo‐random bytes for the encryption 
            // key. Specify the size of the key in bytes (instead of bits). 
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            byte[] keyBytes = password.GetBytes(keySize / 8); 
 
            // Create uninitialized Rijndael encryption object. 
            RijndaelManaged symmetricKey = new RijndaelManaged(); 
 
            // It is reasonable to set encryption mode to Cipher Block Chaining 
            // (CBC). Use default options for other symmetric key parameters. 
            symmetricKey.Mode = CipherMode.CBC; 
 
            // Generate decryptor from the existing key bytes and initialization  
            // vector. Key size will be defined based on the number of the key  
            // bytes. 
            ICryptoTransform decryptor = symmetricKey.CreateDecryptor 
            ( 
                keyBytes, 
                initVectorBytes 
            ); 
 
            // Define memory stream which will be used to hold encrypted data. 
            MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream(cipherTextBytes); 
 
            // Define cryptographic stream (always use Read mode for encryption). 
            CryptoStream cryptoStream = new CryptoStream 
            ( 
                memoryStream, 
                decryptor, 
                CryptoStreamMode.Read 
            ); 
 
            // Since at this point we don't know what the size of decrypted data 
            // will be, allocate the buffer long enough to hold ciphertext; 
            // plaintext is never longer than ciphertext. 
            byte[] plainTextBytes = new byte[cipherTextBytes.Length]; 
 
            // Start decrypting. 
            int decryptedByteCount = cryptoStream.Read 
            ( 
                plainTextBytes, 
                0, 
                plainTextBytes.Length 
            ); 
 
            // Close both streams. 
            memoryStream.Close(); 
            cryptoStream.Close(); 
 
            // Convert decrypted data into a string.  
            // Let us assume that the original plaintext string was UTF8‐encoded. 
            string plainText = Encoding.UTF8.GetString 
            ( 
                plainTextBytes, 
                0, 
                decryptedByteCount 
            ); 
 
            // Return decrypted string.    
            return plainText; 
        } 
 
 
 
 
    } 
} 
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APPENDIX 	F : 	CODE	SAMPLES	FOR	
MESSAGE	VALIDATION	
Message	 validation	 required	 the	 ability	 to	 encode	 and	 decode	 messages	
according	 to	 the	message	 protocol	 structure	 proposed	 above.	 	 Values	 for	 the	
fields	were	manually	entered,	usually	as	string	representations	of	the	underlying	
binary	data	–	i.e.	message	format	was	specified	as	00000010	and	then	converted	
to	appropriate	octet	values	for	the	byte	array.	
The	following	encode	and	decode	routines	were	used	to	facilitate	the	creation	and	
decode	of	messages:	
private void btnEncode_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            msg.strMessages = ""; 
 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox1.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_01_SOMF = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox1.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox2.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_02_MFMT = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox2.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox3.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_03_MYTP = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox3.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox4.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_04_APID = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox4.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox5.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_05_SDID = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox5.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox6.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_06_RDID = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox6.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox7.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_07_MSID = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox7.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox8.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_08_MSTR = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox8.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox9.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_09_GENT = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox9.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox10.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_10_VAPD = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox10.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox11.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_11_UDSL = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox11.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox12.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_12_UDSE = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox12.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox13.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_13_HCHK = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox13.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox14.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_14_UCHK = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox14.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox15.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_15_MCHK = msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(textBox15.Text); 
            if (!(string.IsNullOrEmpty(textBox16.Text))) 
                msg.FLD_16_UDSG = msg.convertCharacterStringToBinaryCodedASCII(textBox16.Text); 
 
            msg.encodeMessage(); 
            textBox11.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_11_UDSL); 
            txtEncodedMessage.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.MESG_B); 
            lblCharLen1.Text = txtEncodedMessage.TextLength.ToString(); 
            lblOctetLen1.Text = (txtEncodedMessage.TextLength / 8).ToString(); 
            copyMessageToScreen(); 
        } 
 
        private void btnDecode_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            //txtDecodedMessage.Text = 
msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.MESG_B); 
            msg.strMessages = ""; 
            
msg.decodeMessage(msg.convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(txtDecodedMessage.Text)); 
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            copyMessageToScreen(); 
            lblCharLen2.Text = txtDecodedMessage.TextLength.ToString(); 
            lblOctetLen2.Text = (txtDecodedMessage.TextLength / 8).ToString(); 
        } 
 
        private void btnReset_Click(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            msg.initialise(); 
 
            try 
            { 
                textBox1.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_01_SOMF); 
                textBox2.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_02_MFMT); 
                textBox3.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_03_MYTP); 
                textBox4.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_04_APID); 
                textBox5.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_05_SDID); 
                textBox6.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_06_RDID); 
                textBox7.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_07_MSID); 
                textBox8.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_08_MSTR); 
                textBox9.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_09_GENT); 
                textBox10.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_10_VAPD); 
                textBox11.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_11_UDSL); 
                textBox12.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_12_UDSE); 
                textBox13.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_13_HCHK); 
                textBox14.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_14_UCHK); 
                textBox15.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_15_MCHK); 
                textBox16.Text = msg.convertByteArrayToBinaryStringRepresentation(msg.FLD_16_UDSG); 
            } 
            catch (Exception) 
            { 
            } 
 
            copyMessageToScreen(); 
        }	
	
These	routines	called	the	encode	and	decode	message	routines	shown	below:	
public bool encodeMessage() 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                int UDSGLength = 0; 
                try 
                { 
                    UDSGLength = FLD_16_UDSG.Length; 
                    FLD_11_UDSL = 
convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(convertNumberToBinary(UDSGLength,2));              
                } 
                catch (Exception) 
                { 
                    UDSGLength = 0; 
                } 
 
                MESG_B = new byte[lengthHeader+UDSGLength]; 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_01_SOMF, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_01_SOMF, length_FLD_01_SOMF); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_02_MFMT, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_02_MFMT, length_FLD_02_MFMT); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_03_MYTP, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_03_MTYP, length_FLD_03_MTYP); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_04_APID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_04_APID, length_FLD_04_APID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_05_SDID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_05_SDID, length_FLD_05_SDID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_06_RDID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_06_RDID, length_FLD_06_RDID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_07_MSID, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_07_MSID, length_FLD_07_MSID); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_08_MSTR, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_08_MSTR, length_FLD_08_MSTR); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_09_GENT, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_09_GENT, length_FLD_09_GENT); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_10_VAPD, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_10_VAPD, length_FLD_10_VAPD); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_11_UDSL, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_11_USDL, length_FLD_11_USDL); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_12_UDSE, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_12_UDSE, length_FLD_12_UDSE); 
 
                //add in the user data 
                if (FLD_16_UDSG != null) 
                    Array.Copy(FLD_16_UDSG, 0, MESG_B, startUSDG, FLD_16_UDSG.Length); 
 
                //generate the header and udsg checksums 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.header, MESG_B); 
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                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.userdata, MESG_B); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_13_HCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_13_HCHK, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_14_UCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_14_UCHK, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
 
                //for the message checksum we need to set the default value and then drop in the 
real one after encoding 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.message, MESG_B); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, MESG_B, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
                 
                return true; 
            } 
            catch (Exception ex) 
            { 
                return false; 
            } 
        } 
 
 
        public bool decodeMessage(byte[] message) 
        { 
            try 
            { 
                 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_01_SOMF, FLD_01_SOMF, 0, length_FLD_01_SOMF); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_02_MFMT, FLD_02_MFMT, 0, length_FLD_02_MFMT ); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_03_MTYP, FLD_03_MYTP, 0, length_FLD_03_MTYP); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_04_APID, FLD_04_APID, 0, length_FLD_04_APID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_05_SDID, FLD_05_SDID, 0, length_FLD_05_SDID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_06_RDID, FLD_06_RDID, 0, length_FLD_06_RDID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_07_MSID, FLD_07_MSID, 0, length_FLD_07_MSID); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_08_MSTR, FLD_08_MSTR, 0, length_FLD_08_MSTR); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_09_GENT, FLD_09_GENT, 0, length_FLD_09_GENT); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_10_VAPD, FLD_10_VAPD, 0, length_FLD_10_VAPD); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_11_USDL, FLD_11_UDSL, 0, length_FLD_11_USDL); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_12_UDSE, FLD_12_UDSE, 0, length_FLD_12_UDSE); 
 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_13_HCHK, FLD_13_HCHK, 0, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_14_UCHK, FLD_14_UCHK, 0, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
                Array.Copy(message, start_FLD_15_MCHK, FLD_15_MCHK, 0, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
 
                Array.Copy(MESG_B, startUSDG, FLD_16_UDSG, 0, MESG_B.Length ‐ 40); 
 
 
                //now backup the checksums 
                byte[] HCHK = new byte[length_FLD_13_HCHK]; 
                byte[] UCHK = new byte[length_FLD_14_UCHK]; 
                byte[] MCHK = new byte[length_FLD_15_MCHK]; 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_13_HCHK, HCHK, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_14_UCHK, UCHK, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
 
 
                //generate the header and udsg checksums 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.header, message); 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.userdata, message); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_13_HCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_13_HCHK, length_FLD_13_HCHK); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_14_UCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_14_UCHK, length_FLD_14_UCHK); 
 
                //for the message checksum we need to set the default value and then drop in the 
real one after encoding 
                FLD_15_MCHK = convertBinaryStringRepresentationToByteArray(default_FLD_15_MCHK); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
                generateChecksum((int)checksumType.message, message); 
                Array.Copy(FLD_15_MCHK, 0, message, start_FLD_15_MCHK, length_FLD_15_MCHK); 
 
                //checksum validation 
                if (!FLD_13_HCHK.SequenceEqual(HCHK)) 
                    strMessages += "HCHK not validated"; 
 
                if (!FLD_14_UCHK.SequenceEqual(UCHK)) 
                    strMessages += "UCHK not validated"; 
 
                if (!FLD_15_MCHK.SequenceEqual(MCHK)) 
                    strMessages += "MCHK not validated"; 
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                return true; 
            } 
            catch (Exception) 
            { 
                return false; 
            } 
        } 
 
Checksums	used	the	Adler	32	algorithm,	based	on	the	following	code:	
//Adler32 taken from the library here 
    //Credits/Copyright: Copyright © 2004‐2008 Jon Skeet and Marc Gravell. 
    //Source: http://www.yoda.arachsys.com/csharp/miscutil/ 
    //licensed under APACHE license 
    //duly acknowledged with thanks 
 
    public class Adler32 
    { 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Base for modulo arithmetic 
        /// </summary> 
    const int Base = 65521; 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Number of iterations we can safely do before applying the modulo. 
        /// </summary> 
    const int NMax = 5552; 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Computes the Adler32 checksum for the given data. 
        /// </summary> 
        /// <param name="initial"> 
        /// Initial value or previous result. Use 1 for the 
        /// first transformation. 
        /// </param> 
        /// <param name="data">The data to compute the checksum of</param> 
        /// <param name="start">Index of first byte to compute checksum for</param> 
        /// <param name="length">Number of bytes to compute checksum for</param> 
        /// <returns>The checksum of the given data</returns> 
        public static int ComputeChecksum(int initial, byte[] data, int start, int length) 
        { 
            if (data == null) 
            { 
                throw (new System.ArgumentNullException("data")); 
            } 
            uint s1 = (uint)(initial & 0xffff); 
            uint s2 = (uint)((initial >> 16) & 0xffff); 
 
            int index = start; 
            int len = length; 
 
            int k; 
            while (len > 0) 
            { 
                k = (len < NMax) ? len : NMax; 
                len ‐= k; 
 
                for (int i = 0; i < k; i++) 
                { 
                    s1 += data[index++]; 
                    s2 += s1; 
                } 
                s1 %= Base; 
                s2 %= Base; 
            } 
            return (int)((s2 << 16) | s1); 
        } 
 
        /// <summary> 
        /// Computes the Adler32 checksum for the given data. 
        /// </summary> 
        /// <param name="initial"> 
        /// Initial value or previous result. Use 1 for the 
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        /// first transformation. 
        /// </param> 
        /// <param name="data">The data to compute the checksum of</param> 
        /// <returns>The checksum of the given data</returns> 
        public static int ComputeChecksum(int initial, byte[] data) 
        { 
            if (data == null) 
            { 
                throw (new System.ArgumentNullException("data")); 
            } 
            return ComputeChecksum(initial, data, 0, data.Length); 
        }                 
    } 
	
Note	that	encryption	was	achieved	by	manually	encrypting	the	user	data	segment	
via	the	encryption	test	application.	
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APPENDIX 	G: 	CAN	WE	ASSUME	AN	
OMNIPRESENT	 INTERNET	
CONNECTION	TO	FACILITATE	BIO‐
MONITORING	DATA	
TRANSMISSION	
	
In	our	Honours	work	we	reviewed	the	coverage	available	for	mobile	Internet	at	
the	 time	 of	 writing	 [45].	 	 However,	 in	 the	 interim	 period,	 technology	 has	
continued	to	march	on	and	coverage	and	availability	of	mobile	Internet	may	have	
improved.		In	this	chapter,	we	review	the	current	state	of	mobile	Internet	in	light	
of	the	assumption	of	a	pervasive	always‐on	Internet	connection	for	our	mobile	
bio‐monitoring	solution.	
We	consider	 the	 truth	of	 such	assumptions	as	 the	ubiquitous	and	 “always	on”	
Internet	connection	and	the	assumption	of	an	inherently	available	and	unlimited	
mobile	communications	backbone	in	the	context	of	developments	and	availability	
at	the	present	time,	in	light	of	real‐world	coverage	maps	provided	by	carriers	in	
different	 parts	 of	 the	 world.	 	We	 evaluate	 the	 availability	 of	 the	 connectivity	
required	to	provide	such	a	connection,	and	discuss	whether	the	assumption	of	
the	 availability	 of	 ubiquitous	 Internet	 is	 feasible	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	wearable,	
remote	bio‐monitoring	solution.	
	
G.1	“Always	On”	carriers	
As	 demonstrated	 in	 the	 literature	 review,	 many	 of	 the	 systems	 proposed	 or	
developed	in	the	context	of	the	current	research	in	the	field	assume	that	there	is	
an	“always	on”	Internet	connection	that	is	fundamentally	present	as	part	of	the	
operating	 environment.	 	 In	many	 cases,	 this	 is	 proposed	 as	 a	mobile	 Internet	
connection	 that	 makes	 use	 of	 mobile	 telephony	 data	 services	 to	 provide	 the	
communications	backbone.	
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We	would	 readily	 concede	 that	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 ubiquitous	mobile	 Internet	
connection	has	many	advantages	 in	 such	a	 system.	 	Depending	on	 the	 type	of	
communications	used	over	the	Internet	(for	example	FTP,	HTTP,	web	services)	
the	 transmission	 length	 is	 possibly	 almost	 limitless.	 	 There	 are	 many	 pre‐
established	protocols	that	can	be	used	to	facilitate	the	data	transmission.		Finally,	
there	is	widespread	knowledge	and	a	common	assumption	of	general	access	to	
the	 Internet,	with	billions	of	users	worldwide	who	have	ready	 Internet	access	
from	at	least	one	location	they	regularly	visit.	
However,	the	research	in	the	field	makes	the	assumption	that	the	mobile	Internet	
connection	is	actually	available	to	the	device	at	all	times	as	an	inherent	part	of	the	
overall	“system”.		As	an	assumption,	the	Internet	connection	therefore	makes	up	
part	of	the	underlying	environment	in	which	the	system	operates	and	so	does	not	
need	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 integral	 component	 of	 the	 solution	 that	must	 be	
delivered.		We	would	argue	that	the	assumption	of	the	always	on,	omnipresent	
and	ubiquitous	mobile	 Internet	connection	 is	not	valid	 for	all	environments	 in	
which	a	bio‐monitoring	system	may	operate.		In	addition,	given	mobile	Internet	
depends	on	mobile	telephone,	and	mobile	telephone	signals	can	be	attenuated	for	
a	 number	 of	 reasons	 which	 are	 outside	 of	 the	 control	 of	 the	 bio‐monitoring	
system,	we	would	further	assert	that	it	is	not	appropriate	to	assume	the	quality	
of	 this	 “always	 on”	 Internet	 connection,	 not	 the	 ability	 to	 make	 a	 successful	
transmission	over	this	connection	at	all	times.	
G.2	Coverage	of	services	to	facilitate	pervasive	wireless	Internet	
By	way	of	reviewing	the	availability	of	mobile	Internet	services,	we	examined	the	
coverage	maps	for	several	countries	globally.		Mobile	coverage	maps	are	available	
from	 a	 variety	 of	 sources.	 	 A	 good	 starting	 point	 is	 the	 website	
http://maps.mobileworldlive.com/network_info.php?nid=746&org_id=20&cid=
169	 which	 maintains	 a	 comprehensive	 list	 of	 coverage	 zones	 for	 carriers	
worldwide	and	regularly	updates	the	maps	that	it	provides.	
To	 illustrate	 our	 concerns	 about	 the	 assumption	 of	 having	 ubiquitous	mobile	
Internet	as	an	“infrastructure”	level	carrier	that	can	be	assumed	to	exist	for	the	
reliable	 transmission	 of	 this	 sort	 of	 data,	 if	 we	 accept	 that	 mobile	 Internet	
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requires	 a	 mobile	 telephony	 service	 over	 which	 to	 broadcast	 data,	 we	 can	
consider	the	following	mobile	telephony	and/or	data	coverage	maps	for	different	
parts	of	the	world	and	quickly	realise	that	coverage	for	mobile	Telephone,	and	
therefore	mobile	Internet,	is	not	geographically	absolute	nor	does	it	cover	all	of	
the	population.	
Australian	coverage	can	be	seen	to	be	quite	limited	geographically,	if	we	refer	to	
the	following	coverage	map	provided	by	Telstra,	ostensibly	the	carrier	who	offers	
the	widest	coverage	of	any	Australian	telecommunications	company.	
	
FIGURE	84:	Telstra	Australia	Coverage	Map	[114]	
	
If	we	examine	in	additional	detail,	we	can	find	a	more	detailed	map	of	the	regional	
coverage	around	Greater	Melbourne	in	the	Vodafone‐provided	network	coverage	
map	shown	below.		This	map	has	the	advantage	of	showing	where	different	types	
of	coverage	exist	in	the	region	around	Melbourne,	Victoria.		From	the	map	below,	
it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 coverage	 quickly	 slips	 from	 4G	 into	 standard	 3G	within	 a	
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comparatively	short	distance	around	Melbourne,	and	tracts	of	no	coverage	exist	
in	the	remoter	regions	of	the	state	of	Victoria.			
	
FIGURE	85:	Vodafone	Melbourne	Region	Coverage	Map	[115]	
The	same	is	visible	in	the	Optus	network:	
FIGURE	86:	OPTUS	REGIONAL	MELBOURNE	COVERAGE	MAP	[116]	
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The	Optus	map	shows	where	3G	connectivity	is	only	available	with	an	external	
supplemental	antenna,	as	well	as	the	no	coverage	areas.	 	While	admittedly	the	
areas	of	no	coverage	are	remote,	 there	are	significant	areas	where	an	external	
antenna	is	required	to	obtain	even	3G	coverage.	
Surely,	we	would	 argue,	 a	monitoring	 system	 depending	 on	 reliable	 coverage	
could	not	 reconcile	moderate	 coverage	near	 to	major	metropolitan	 centres	 as	
being	 acceptable	 as	 the	 only	 possible	 communications	mechanism	without	 at	
least	considering	the	potential	to	implement	a	backup	communications	backbone	
to	supplement	the	mobile	data	in	cases	where	the	connection	was	attenuated	or	
lost?	
Furthermore,	mobile	 telecommunications	 coverage	 in	 Australia	 has,	 in	 recent	
times,	become	saturated	with	users	utilising	smartphones,	mobile	internet	and	
simple	 voice	 communications.	 	 Ainsworth	 [117],	 [118],	 and	 websites	 such	 as	
vodafail.com	outline	how,	despite	people	being	informed	that	there	is	coverage	
available	 from	 a	 network	 infrastructure	 perspective,	modern	mobile	 network	
take	up	has	led	to	a	shortfall	in	available	connections	within	the	current	mobile	
telephone	cell	infrastructure	to	which	a	customer	is	directly	connected.			
The	outcome	of	this	is	that	there	is	not	always	connectivity	into	the	network,	even	
if	the	network	infrastructure	is	technical	“available”	for	the	customer	to	consume,	
because	 network	 capacity	 is	 being	 consumed	 by	 increasing	 numbers	 of	 users	
while	 infrastructure	 is	 not	 keeping	 up	 with	 the	 ever‐growing	 demand.	 	 In	
addition,	 more	 and	 more	 people	 are	 switching	 to	 mobile	 only	 services,	
abandoning	 fixed	 line	 infrastructure,	 further	 saturating	 the	 mobile	
communications	infrastructure.	
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FIGURE	87:	INCREASING	USE	OF	MOBILE	SERVICES	OVER	TIME	IN	MILLIONS	OF	SUBSCRIBERS	
(AUSTRALIA)[119] 
	
Where	 there	 are	 more	 users	 than	 available	 communications	 channels	 in	 the	
mobile	telephone	cell,	the	result	is	a	failure	to	connect	to	the	service	when	the	
user	wishes	to	transmit.		As	such,	we	have	two	problems	to	face	in	a	country	such	
as	 Australia.	 	 Network	 congestion	 (more	 users	 consuming	 than	 service	 entry	
points	 available)	 is	 one	 problem	 acknowledged	 by	 all	 the	 carriers,	 while	
geographic	 network	 service	 availability	 and	 coverage	 is	 apparent	 as	 an	 issue	
illustrated	by	the	coverage	maps.	
In	addition	to	 the	 issue	of	geographic	coverage,	 in	Australia,	mobile	 telephony	
may	cover	up	to	99%	of	the	population	“where	people	live”	but	not	necessarily	
all	 of	 the	 population,	 or	 all	 of	 the	 work‐places	 or	 travel	 destinations	 in	 the	
country.	 	 The	 following	 is	 an	 excerpt	 from	 the	 Department	 of	 Broadband,	
Communications	 and	 the	 Digital	 Economy	 (Australian	 Federal	 Government,	
2013):	
“Mobile	phone	services	are	available	in	urban	areas,	many	regional	areas	and	along	
a	number	of	national	and	regional	highways.	Mobile	phone	services	currently	reach	
99	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 Australian	 population	 where	 people	 live	 [according	 to	 the	
Telco’s].	However,	coverage	is	only	available	to	around	25	per	cent	of	the	Australian	
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landmass.	 Satellite	mobile	 phone	 services	 cover	 100	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 Australian	
landmass	and	population.	
The	Vodafone	Hutchinson	Australia	networks	currently	cover	more	than	94	per	cent	
of	the	Australian	population.	Optus	claims	its	3G	network	provides	services	to	96	
per	 cent	 of	 the	Australian	 population,	 and	 97	 per	 cent	when	 using	 an	 external	
antenna.	Telstra	claims	its	Next	G	network	now	provides	mobile	coverage	to	99	per	
cent	of	Australians.	“	[120]	
In	addition,	the	Department	of	Communications	(Australian	Federal	Government,	
2015)	stated	the	following	in	its	Mobile	Coverage	Programme	discussion	paper:	
“Inadequate	mobile	 phone	 coverage	 remains	 a	 significant	 issue	 for	 Australians	
living,	 working	 and	 travelling	 in	 regional	 areas	 of	 the	 country.	 	 The	 2011‐12	
Regional	Telecommunications	Review	 identified	a	 lack	of	adequate	mobile	voice	
and	broadband	coverage	as	the	issue	of	greatest	concern	to	regional	communities.	
Australia’s	three	national	mobile	network	operators	(MNOs)	 ‐	Optus,	Telstra	and	
Vodafone	Hutchison	Australia	 ‐	 collectively	 claim	 to	provide	mobile	 coverage	 to	
99	per	cent	 of	 the	 population	 (i.e.	 premises).	 	However,	 reflecting	 our	 country’s	
highly	 urbanised	 population,	 this	 level	 of	 coverage	 equates	 to	 only	 around	
25	per	cent	of	the	landmass.		In	addition:	
 in	some	locations	within	the	mobile	coverage	footprint,	reception	is	only	
possible	using	additional	equipment	such	as	a	car	kit	or	external	antenna	–	
handheld	reception	is	not	available;	and	
 for	significant	portions	of	regional	Australia	where	coverage	is	available,	it	
is	provided	by	only	a	single	MNO.”	
	
Source:	[121]	
While	 99%	 of	 home	 population	 centres	 may	 be	 covered	 depending	 on	 the	
network	 you	 are	 consuming,	 only	 about	 25%	 of	 the	 geographic	 landmass	 is	
covered.	 	While	satellite	offers	an	alternative	with	100%	geographic	coverage,	
this	is	a	totally	different	infrastructure	requiring	different	hardware	and	far	more	
expensive	 data/communications	 call	 rates.	 	 There	 is	 no	 seamless	 transition	
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between	satellite	and	mobile	data	communications	when	moving	out	of	range	of	
mobile	telephony.	
Effectively,	 this	means	 that	 if	 you	 are	 travelling	within	 75%	of	 the	Australian	
landmass,	you	will	have	no	mobile	phone	service	available	to	you.		In	addition,	it	
must	be	considered	that	for	some	areas,	the	presence	of	a	mobile	phone	service	
does	not	equate	to	the	availability	of	a	reliable	mobile	Internet	service.		A	certain	
level	 of	 service	 quality	 is	 required	 by	 the	 phone	 to	 maintain	 a	 reliable	 data	
connection.		This	may	not	be	available	in	fringe	reception	areas.	
However,	given	the	evidence	presented	above,	one	might	argue	that	Australia	is	
an	isolated	case	and	that	for	some	other	developed	nations,	this	situation	may	be	
the	norm.	 	 If	we	 look	at	 the	coverage	 that	AT&T	mobile	offers	 in	 the	USA,	 the	
coverage	 is	 almost	 total,	 but	 there	 are	 still	 some	 significant	 areas	 of	 zero	
coverage,	especially	in	the	Western	states	and	Alaska,	as	shown	by	the	coverage	
map	below.	
	
FIGURE	88:	AT&T	USA	Coverage	[122]	
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While	other	carriers	in	the	US	go	some	ways	to	make	up	the	shortfall	in	coverage	
(refer	 http://maps.mobileworldlive.com/network.php?cid=169&cname=United	
States	 where	 over	 50	 different	 carriers	 are	 listed	 as	 supplying	 some	 level	 of	
mobile	services)	a	side	issue	is	that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	the	presence	of	a	
carrier	means	that	you	can	implement	continuous	service	between	two	carriers.		
Some	carriers	do	not	yet	have	“roaming”	agreements	with	their	counterparts	and	
while	efforts	are	afoot	to	ensure	continuous	coverage,	it	is	still	possible	that	when	
leaving	one	carrier’s	coverage	zone	in	the	USA	and	entering	another’s	,	you	may	
not	shift	to	a	roaming	connection	and	retain	your	service	[123].	
Examining	another	developed	nation,	one	which	is	geographically	much	smaller	
than	either	the	USA	or	Australia,	the	coverage	of	the	United	Kingdom	illustrates	a	
startling	 lack	of	 coverage	 for	Vodafone,	 one	of	 the	 top	 three	mobile	providers	
[124]	in	that	country.	
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FIGURE	89:	Vodafone	UK	Coverage	Map	[125]	
	
As	 can	 be	 seen,	 large	 tracts	 of	 the	 South‐West,	Wales,	 and	 the	 North	 are	 left	
without	coverage.	 	Can	we	 therefore	say	 that	 the	access	 to	Vodafone	provides	
seamless	 access	 to	 mobile	 data	 services	 across	 the	 UK?	 	We	 believe	 that	 the	
answer	is	probably	not.	
As	 a	 final	 illustration	 of	 the	 coverage	 by	 carrier	 in	 those	 countries	 widely	
regarded	 as	 the	 “developed	 nations”,	 we	 are	 looking	 at	 Canada	 and	 the	 Bell	
Telecom	coverage.	 	As	can	be	seen	 from	the	below	excerpt,	geographically	 the	
coverage	 is	 extremely	 limited,	 with	 Quebec,	 Newfoundland,	 Ontario	 and	
Manitoba	almost	without	coverage.	
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FIGURE	90:	Canada	Bell	Telecom	Coverage	[126]	
	
One	might	argue	that	the	developed	nations	should	in	fact	show	the	highest	levels	
of	 coverage	 and	 mobile	 network	 penetration	 into	 the	 marketplace.	 	 The	
counterpoint	to	this	argument	is	therefore	that	lesser	developed	countries	should	
exhibit	worse	coverage.		Is	this	the	case?		A	look	at	some	of	the	African	nations,	
and	some	parts	of	 India	as	examples,	 illustrates	 that	 their	 coverage	 is	 in	most	
cases	analogous	with	that	in	the	more	developed	nations.	
For	Kenya	Airtel	Networks,	the	coverage	map	illustrates	GSM	900/1800	coverage	
at	the	following	levels	(however	there	is	no	indication	for	mobile	Internet):	
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FIGURE	91:	Airtel	Kenya	Coverage	[127]	
	
This	is	a	good	illustration	of	where	the	service	provided	may	facilitate	a	mobile	
telephone	call	but	may	not	provide	mobile	Internet.		If	the	network	provides	only	
standard	GSM	services,	mobile	Internet	may	not	be	possible	as	this	may	require	
a	3G	or	better	connection	to	achieve	reasonable	transmission	speeds.	
If	 we	 move	 onto	 India,	 the	 coverage	 information	 available	 online	 shows	 an	
abundance	 of	 carriers,	many	 of	whom	 appear	 to	 provide	 coverage	 on	 strictly	
regional	basis.		In	the	main,	most	of	these	networks	are	not	currently	providing	
coverage	 maps	 (refer	 to	
http://maps.mobileworldlive.com/network.php?cid=172&cname=India),	 but	
some	 coverage	 information	 is	 available	 and	 again	 illustrates	 the	 lack	 of	
contiguous	 coverage	 from	 any	 one	 provider.	 	 However,	 coverage	 in	 India,	
according	 to	 the	 website,	 appears	 to	 be	 some	 of	 the	 best,	 with	 Vodafone	
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themselves	stating	“Vodafone	has	network	coverage	across	almost	all	of	India.”	
[128].	
	
FIGURE	92:	INDIA	MOBILE	TELEPHONE	COVERAGE	[129]	
	
G.3	Conclusion	
While	 these	 coverage	maps	 do	 not	 show	 all	 of	 the	 smaller	 coverage	 areas	 of	
regional	and	local	mobile	service	providers	they	are	indicative	of	overall	coverage	
and	availability	of	mobile	telecommunications	service	in	the	areas	studied.		It	is	
apparent	that	there	is	a	lack	of	blanket	mobile	coverage	and	thus	a	lack	of	blanket	
Internet	 coverage	 in	 every	 country	we	 have	 examined.	 	 The	 potential	 lack	 of	
consistent	 interconnect	agreements	between	carriers	 to	 facilitate	continuity	of	
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coverage	between	networks,	 and	 the	 lack	of	 an	overarching	 carrier	 continuity	
agreement	for	different	service	providers	to	transfer	“calls”	on	to	other	carriers	
in	adjacent	coverage	regions	also	 impacts	 the	pervasive	ability	of	services.	 	As	
such,	we	 believe	 that	 these	 coverage	maps	 are	 illustrative	 of	 the	 problems	 in	
making	a	fundamental	assumption	that	GSM	mobile	reception	and	GSM‐mobile‐
based	 Internet	 service	 can	 be	 used	 as	 a	 pervasive,	 always	 on	 model	 for	
connectivity,	wherever	you	may	be.	
Taking	 all	 of	 this	 into	 account,	 we	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 a	 standard	 mobile	
telephony‐based	 mobile	 Internet	 connection	 can	 be	 assumed	 to	 be	 an	
omnipresent	 and	 ubiquitous	 infrastructure	 that	 provides	 an	 “always	 on”	 and	
readily	 available	 connection	 option	 in	 all	 parts	 of	 the	 world.	 	 As	 such,	 this	
provides	a	clearly	defined	use	case	to	support	our	assertion	that	the	fundamental	
assumption	of	always‐on	pervasive	internet	for	mobile	bio‐monitoring	is	not	a	
good	 assumption,	 especially	where	 the	monitored	 subject	may	 be	mobile	 and	
may	move	outside	of	defined	mobile	service	areas.	
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